Alexander Dugin

Foreword to Foundations of Geopolitics

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Foreword to Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (Arktogeya, Moscow: 2000) 



The history and fate of geopolitics as a science is paradoxical. On the one hand, the concept itself seems to have become customary and is actively used in modern politics. Geopolitical journals and institutes have multiplied, the texts of the founders of this discipline are being published, conferences and symposia are being organized, and geopolitical committees and commissions have been created.

Yet nevertheless, to this day geopolitics has still been unable to enter the category of conventionally recognized sciences. The first geopolitical works of the German Ratzel, the Swede Kjellen, and especially the Englishman Mackinder have been met with hostility by the scientific community. Classical science, fully inheriting the hyper-critical spirit of early positivism, has considered geopolitics to be an “over-generalization,” and consequently it is believed to be little more than a variety of “charlatanism.”

In a sense, the sad fate of geopolitics as a science has been associated with the political side of the problem. The opinion has been approved that the war crimes of the Third Reich’s expansion, the war, deportations, etc. were to a significant extent theoretically prepared by German geopoliticians who allegedly supplied Hitler’s regime with a pseudo-scientific basis (first and foremost, this refers to Karl Haushofer, the German geopolitician who at one time was quite close to the Fuhrer).

However, German geopolitics, on a theoretical level, is essentially no different from Anglo-Saxon geopolitics (Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman), French geopolitics (Vidal de La Blanche), or Russian “military geography” (Milyutin, Snesarev), etc. The difference lies not in the specific views of Haushofer, which were entirely logical and adequate for the discipline, but in the methods by which a number of his geopolitical positions were realized. Moreover, the specific foreign policies of Germany in the ’30’s and ’40’s in their most repulsive manifestations were diametrically opposed to the ideas of Haushofer himself. Instead of a “continental bloc” along the axis of Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo, there was the attack on the USSR; instead of an organic understanding of the doctrine of Lebensraum, or “living space” (in the spirit of Schmitt’s theory of “people’s rights”), there was vulgar nationalism and imperialism, etc. It should be noted that Haushofer’s school and his journal Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik were never official elements of the Nazi system. As with many intellectual groups of the so called “conservative revolutionaries” in the Third Reich, their ambiguous existence was simply tolerated, and this tolerance varied depending on political conditions at a given moment.

However, the main reason for the historical suppression of geopolitics is the fact that it too openly reveals the fundamental mechanisms of international politics which various regimes often prefer to hide behind vague rhetoric or abstract ideological schemes. In this sense, it is possible to cite the parallel with Marxism (at least in its, scientific, analytical aspect). Karl Marx more than cogently revealed the mechanics of relations of production and their connections with historical formations, just as geopolitics exposes the historical demagogy of foreign policy discourse and shows the real deep levers which influence international, inter-state, and inter-ethnic relations. But if Marxism is a global revision of classical economic history, then geopolitics is a revision of the history of international relations. The latter explains the ambivalent attitude of society towards geopolitical scholars. The scientific community stubbornly refuses to tolerate them in their midst and harshly criticizes them, often without even noticing that, on the contrary, authorities use geopolitical calculations to formulate international strategy. Such, for example, was the case with one of the first geopoliticians, the true founding father of the discipline, Sir Halford Mackinder. His ideas were not accepted in academic circles, but he himself directly participated in the formulation of English policies for the first half of the 20th century, laying the theoretical basis for the international strategy of England which was passed on to the US in the middle of the century and developed by Mackinder’s American (or, more broadly, Atlanticist) followers.

In our opinion, the parallel with Marxism is a successful one. A method may be adapted and utilized by different poles. The Marxist analysis is important for both the representatives of Capital and fighters for the emancipation of Labor. Geopolitics is important for both the representatives of large states (empires), as it instructs them how to best preserve territorial domination and carry out expansion, and their opponents for whom geopolitics presents the conceptual principles of the revolutionary theory of “national liberation.” For example, the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the hands of Mackinder’s geopolitical school which expressed the interests of the West and aimed at weakening the states of Central Europe and the suppression of Germany. The German student of Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, proceeding from the same assumptions, developed a directly opposing theory of “European liberation” which was a total negation of the logic of Versailles and which formed the basis of the nascent ideology of National-Socialism.

These considerations show that even though it has not been accepted into the commonwealth of classical sciences, geopolitics is extremely effective in practice and its value is superior in some aspects to many conventional disciplines.

Be that is at may, today geopolitics exists and little by little it is gaining official recognition and the corresponding status. However, not everything is going smoothly in this process. Very often we are faced with a confusion of the concept of “geopolitics,” whose increasing use is becoming common place among non-professionals. The focus is shifted from the complete and global picture, developed by the founding fathers, to limited regional points of geo-economic schemes. The original postulates of geopolitical dualism, competing strategies, civilizational differentiation, etc. are either ignored, hushed, or denied. It is difficult to imagine something similar in any other science. What would happen to classical physics if, operating with the concepts of “mass”, “energy”, “acceleration”, etc., scientists started to implicitly, gradually deny the law of gravity, forget about it, and simply recognize that Newton was “a mythological figure never having existed in reality” or a “dark religious fanatic?” But it is precisely this, mutatis mutandis, which is happening with geopolitics in our time.

The purpose of this book is to present the basics of geopolitics objectively and impartially beyond preconceived notions, ideological sympathies and antipathies. No matter how we treat this science, we can only have a definite opinion of it upon being acquainted with its principals, history, and methodology.


Russia and Multipolarity

Author: Leonid Savin

Translator: Jafe Arnold


Many ascribe the first steps in developing a strategy for multipolarity in international relations to Russia as well. Indeed, this claim has some merit. In Moscow on April 23rd, 1997, Russia and China signed the “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”, and on May 15th the declaration was registered in the UN.1 The document asserted that the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China will strive to promote the development of a multipolar world and new international order. The text also remarked that international relations had undergone profound changes at the end of the 20th century and affirmed a diversity of political, economic, and cultural paths of development for all countries and an increasing role for forces advocating peace and broad international cooperation. Furthermore, the document reads: “A growing number of countries are beginning to recognize the need for mutual respect, equality and mutual advantage – but not for hegemony and power politics – and for dialogue and cooperation – but not for confrontation and conflict. The establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and rational new international political and economic order is becoming a pressing need of the times and an imperative of historical development.

In addition, the declaration voiced the notion that every state has a right to, proceeding on the basis of its unique circumstances, independently and autonomously choose its own path of development without interference from other states. In the words of the statement: “Differences in their social systems, ideologies and value systems must not become an obstacle to the development of normal relations between States.” At the same time, it was emphasized that China and Russia are switching to a new form of mutual relations and that such is not directed against any other countries.

Hopes then arose that the UN would play an important role in establishing a new international order, and developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement were named as important forces contributing to the formation of a multipolar world. The Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21st Century, which was signed in Moscow on July 1st, 2005 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and PRC President Xu Jintao, logically continued this line.2 This declaration was a response to the US invasion of Iraq, a reaction to this challenge which was intended to strengthen efforts to organize a new international order. One part in the new declaration read:

The main trend of the world today is not towards a “clash of civilizations”; rather, it underscores the imperative of engaging in global cooperation. The diversity of civilizations in the world and the diversification of development models should be respected and safeguarded. Differences in the historical backgrounds, cultural traditions, social and political systems, value concepts, and development paths of countries should not become an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Different civilizations should conduct dialogue, exchange experiences, draw on each other’s experiences, learn from each other’s strong points to make up for their own shortcomings, and seek common progress on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance. Cultural exchanges should be increased in order to establish relations of friendship and trust among countries.

Russia and China drew attention to the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the intensification of cooperation between BRIC countries and later BRICS, which is seen as an attempt at establishing individual rules for the game at least in each country’s zone of strategic interests.

In the sphere of its own strategic interests, as proclaimed by President Medvedev following Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August 2008, Russia uses the Eurasian Economic Community as an economic integration instrument and military cooperation within the CSTO. Directly introduced into Russia’s foreign policy doctrine in 2000 was the provision that “Russia will seek the creation of a multipolar system of international relations which genuinely reflects the diversity of the modern world with its diversity of interests.”3

It should be noted, however, that Russian politicians, diplomats, and scholars’ understanding of the need to develop a theory of multipolarity has its roots in a crisis situation. First, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union which was accompanied by ethnic conflicts. A similar collapse occurred in Yugoslavia and led to several foreign interventions and the transformation of the regional political map. NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia and the Albanian proclamation of Kosovo were a painful blow not only to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which at the time consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, but to the European geopolitical system as a whole. In addition, the collapse of Marxist doctrine and the negative experience of IMF and World Bank reforms in Russia led to an understanding of the need to develop a distinct foreign and domestic policy. Although the inertia of the Soviet era made itself felt, certain attempts were made at rethinking Russia’s role and place in the global political system.

September 11th, 2001 also affected perceptions of the global system in a new vein. It is no coincidence that in an article from September 2003, a Russian advocate of multipolarity and political heavyweight who served as prime minister in 1999, Yevgeny Primakov, noted that “what followed the events of September 11 showed more clearly than ever the confrontation between two trends. On the one hand, there was the preservation of the world order, save for some modernization, founded on such a mechanism for multilateral actions as the United Nations. On the other, there was ‘unilateralism’, or the bet that decisions that are vitally important for humanity can be taken by one country, the United States, on the grounds of Washington’s subjective perception of international reality.”4 Primakov pointed out that the EU was becoming a center of power comparable in its capacity to the US, while China, Russia, India, and Japan were also in no hurry to trail behind the wake of events set by Washington. Also highlighted in this regard is the UN’s role in the formation of multipolarity. Previously, Primakov had observed that “the uneven development of states will manifest itself primarily in antagonistic forms…historically, no dominant power can establish a unipolar world order.”5

Here it is important to note that Yevgeny Primakov had at the time already condemned the US leadership, pointing instead to rapidly expanding opportunities for other countries and alliances. “The fall of the USSR as a counterbalance to America does not give reason to believe that the US is an undisputed winner and, accordingly, that the world should be unipolar with only one center in Washington. This contradicts the very course of global development. For instance, China and India’s respective GDP’s are larger than that of the US. US leadership in scientific and technological progress as one of the main conditions of the unipolar world is also being actively contested today.”6 This is confirmed by statistical data: “By 2011 four major centers of scientific progress had formed – the USA (31% of global spending on scientific research in terms of purchasing power parity), the European Union (24%), China (14%), and Japan (11%).”7

Primakov argued against liberals and globalists, affirming that:

The transition to a multipolar system is a process, not a single change with a finished character. Therefore, great importance is attached to various trends, sometimes contradictory ones, manifesting themselves over the course of this transition. Some of them have their source in the unequal development of states and the successes or failures of integration associations. The fluctuating ratio between, relatively speaking, the course towards restarting relations and the inertial line of states’ conduct inherited from the Cold War and ingrained during the period of outright confrontation, is directly impacted. This relation between two tendencies manifests itself in the political, military, and economic fields as well. Therefore, the correct conclusion that a multipolar world order does not in itself in the conditions of globalization lead to conflict situations, or military clashes, does not exclude the altogether complex environment in which the process of the transition to such a system takes place.8

Being a supporter of the creation of the Russia-India-China triangle that could balance out the aggressive behavior of the US and other challenges, Primakov is rightfully considered to be one of the first Russian practicians of multipolarity.

Thanks to his official position and numerous foreign contacts, Russia’s position vis-a-vis the future world order was successfully conveyed to the widest range of decision-makers possible and consolidated in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.9

Alexander Dugin’s doctrine of neo-Eurasianism was another ideological and intellectual platform which gave impetus to the development of multipolarity. The program of Eurasianist ideology asserts:

At the level of a planetary trend, Eurasianism is a global, revolutionary, civilizational concept which, in gradually refining itself, is to become a new ideological platform for mutual understanding and cooperation for a wide conglomerate of different forces, states, peoples, cultures, and confessions which reject Atlanticist globalization…Eurasianism is the sum of all the natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles along the path to unipolar globalization, at once elevated from the level of simple negation to being a positive project, a creative alternative.10

Although classical Eurasianism was concerned solely with the fate of Russia which it characterized as “Eurasia” by virtue of its uniqueness, vast territory, and central situation between “classical” Europe and Asia, Alexander Dugin’s concept has supplemented this ideology with new methodologies and scholarly concepts. Thus, Eurasianism has acquired a global dimension and moved beyond the borders of the Eurasian continent. In this new understanding, “Eurasianism is a philosophy of multipolar globalization designed to unite all the societies and peoples of the earth in the construction of a unique and authentic world, every component of which would be organically derived from historical traditions and local cultures.11

Rather close to this formula is the opinion of another Russian scholar, Boris Martynov, who noted that newly emergent multipolarity cannot be of any other dimension than civilizational. Martynov emphasizes:

Inter-civilizational communication is already a reality of the modern world in which different economic and financial institutions, non-state structures, and religious, business, and public associations and, finally, individuals as representatives of their civilizational archetypes are increasingly active apart from states and alongside their lasting multi-profile and multilevel international contacts of various kinds…In addition, the advantage of a system of multipolar world order in view of the unipolar and bipolar ones lies in that it must be based on law to function. The correctness of this observation is obvious in the case of the unipolar world which operates on the basis of the ‘understandings’ of the main player in the global system. This is true for bipolarity as well, where each of the two ‘equally-responsible’ subjects strive to ensure themselves a ‘free hand’ in their zones of influence regardless of international law. However, law is needed for interaction between several major players wielding approximately comparable might and influence in order to guarantee a reasonable modus vivendi between them. This is especially true for such a complex system as civilizational multipolarity.12

However, far from all Russian scholars and diplomats have assigned a positive nature to emerging multipolarity. For example, the director of the Russian Academy of Science’s Institute for US and Canadian Studies, S.N. Rogov, has claimed that “the new polycentric system lacks common ‘rules of the game’, norms, and institutions which could effectively regulate interaction between centers of power, including both cooperation and rivalry.” Thus, in this view, the trend towards multipolarity generates “instability and unpredictability as to the evolution of the modern system of international relations and threatens to send the situation spinning out of control.”13 This claim is clearly based on the mondialist paradigm which insists on a strictly limited ideological standard.

Nonetheless, Russian efforts seem to generally be strong attempts at re-building a world order which respects all nations, states, peoples, and cultural-religious traditions.


1 Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, adopted in Moscow on 23 April 1997. Letter dated 15 May 1997 from the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation to the United Nations  addressed to the Secretary-General, Distr. GENERAL A/52/153, S/1997/384, 20 May 1997

3 Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации. Москва. 28 июня 2000 г. // Системная история международных отношений в четырех томах 1918–2003 / Под редакцией А.Д. Богатурова. Т. 4. Документы. М., 2004. С. 538-539.

4 Евгений Примаков, Мир без сверхдержав, 2 сентября 2003

5 Примаков Е. М. Мир после 11 сентября. М., 2002. С. 155.

6 Александр Бондарь. Евгений Примаков: «Мир будет многополярным», Столетие, 28.03.2008

7 Никонов Я. И. Компаративный анализ подходов к организации финансирования стратегии инновационного развития национальных экономик за рубежом // Вестник Томского государственного университета. № 392, 2015. С. 145.

8 Примаков Е. М. Мысли вслух. — М.: Российская газета, 2011. С. 159–160.

9 Е.М. Примаков. Вызовы и альтернативы многополярного мира: роль России. М.: Издательство Московского университета, 2014.

10 Дугин А. Г. Евразийская миссия. Международное евразийское движение, М., 2005. С. 11.

11 Ibid, 33.

12 Мартынов, Борис. Многополярный или многоцивилизационный мир?// Международные процессы. Том 7. Номер 3 (21). Сентябрь–декабрь 2009.

13 Рогов С.М, Россия и США: Уроки истории и выводы на будущее // Россия и Америка в XXI веке, № 1, 2006

The Eurasianist Polemic in the Opposition

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold 

Written in 1992 for publication in the newspaper Den, but rejected for being too “intellectualist”; subsequently published in the book Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya (Moscow, 1994)


The Opposition and the System

In recent times, the delicate balance in the political and ideological opposition’s camp has begun to be disrupted by a burgeoning polemic between the “ethno-centrists” and “Eurasianists,” “reds” and “whites”, etc. On the one hand, this polemic has clarified the doctrinal principles of various tendencies, movements, and parties which before were too often vague and only unconsciously formulated. This is a positive aspect. On the other hand, this process is a sign of the opposition entering a scheme arranged by the System, i.e., its “conventionalization”, taming,  and “castration” in sterile, parliamentary, and party “games.” It should be noted that this process of eliminating opposition not through repression, but through domestication, gradual corruption, and “sterilization” has been brilliantly worked out in the mondialist West. In the words of Jean Thiriart: “There are two ways to destroy a revolutionary ideology (particularly communism): bureaucracy and parliamentarism.”

It is rather telling that in developed mondialist societies, there is in fact no opposition which really challenges the very principles of the System. Both right and left are but elements of a deliberate and cunning play. Our opposition, however, which took shape following August 1991, is a genuine opposition embodying the profound opposition of certain segments of society not only to specific actions of the ruling group, but to the very foundational principles of the worldview that has triumphed in the country following the defeat of the coup.

The onset of such extensive polemics within the opposition could lead to its fragmentation and subsequent integration into political niches specially prepared for it by the regime itself. Hence why it is very important to here and now clarify the emerging differences in outlook within the opposition and surmise the logic of their potential development.

The beginning of the polemic: Eurasianists and ethno-centrists

The main line of the emerging division in the opposition runs between the “Eurasianists,” “statists”, and “national-communists” on the one hand and the “nationalists”, “Panslavists”, and “monarchists” on the other. The main criterion and central motive of this debate is the question of our approach to the state and ethnos. It is precisely this understanding that is dividing the opposition today, and not the question of attitudes towards communism, religion, Marxism, etc.

On both flanks there is an extreme right (including anti-Marxists, Orthodox, and fascists, etc.) and an extreme left (including former members of the party apparatus, communists, socialists, etc.). The Eurasianists and “statists” affirm the superiority of the State over the Ethnos. Their nationalism is openly imperial, supra-ethnic, and geopolitical in nature and is often coupled with the traditionally Russian, Orthodox, state-religious messianism of the God-bearing people. For this wing, the dismemberment of the USSR is an Absolute Evil, and the perpetrators of this atrocity are to clearly designated as national criminals with whom no constructive dialogue, conciliation, or compromise can be made. This is the “irreconcilable, radical opposition” which boasts strong political determination to fight the System to the very end. In this struggle, the Eurasianists are ready to ally with any religious, national, and geopolitical forces in both East and West that can help in the fight against mondialism and contribute to the re-establishment of the Empire. Speaking in geopolitical terms, the “statists” consider mondialism and the thalassocratic USA to be the main enemy.

The “Slavophile nationalists”, for their part, assert the primacy of the ethnic factor. Such nationalism is limited to either the Great Russian ethnos or to advocating a pan-Slavic union. This camp harbors two poles: the pole of “ethnic minimalism” embodied in the projects of the St. Petersburg-based ROD organization which proposes to establish a mono-ethnic Great Russian state, and the “ethnic maximalist” pole which at times even proposes to restore the USSR, but only in the context and over the course of Russian national military and economic expansion into the breakaway republics (for example, under the pretext of defending the Russian population). The Slavophile nationalists do not rule out the possibility of dialogue and cooperation with the government under the condition that the influence of open and odious Russophobes and non-Russian peoples is restricted. In all cases, for them the main enemy is other peoples, Jews, etc. For them, geopolitical factors are of secondary and purely practical value.

Mutual claims

Both poles of the opposition have a number of fundamental claims against one another which are easily distinguishable. The ethno-centrists accuse the Eurasianists of:

  • betraying the interests of the “Russian ethnos” by agreeing to cooperate with other peoples (especially Turkic peoples and sometimes Europeans);
  • betraying the interests of Orthodoxy by cooperating with anti-globalist Islam and European Catholic, Protestant, or pagan national revolutionary movements;
  • betraying the Russian Monarchy by extending a hand of cooperation to national-communists (who are alleged to be responsible for the October coup and the destruction of the Tsarist regime);
  • betraying the unique folk character (Narodnost) of the Russian people by appealing to esoteric teachings and initiatory practices (which are unequivocally associated with “masonry”);
  • allowing for elements of socialism in the economic system of the future Empire (which is supposed evidence of a certain continuity with communist theories);
  • claiming their ideology to be superior within the entire opposition on the basis of its openness, universality, and globalism (which detracts from the position of pure “nationalists”);
  • finally, betraying Conservatism by adopting ideas of technological development, social construction, and state futurism (which contradict national archaic tendencies).

The Eurasianists, in turn, have also presented a number of claims against the ethno-centrists. They accuse the latter of:

  • aiding the collapse of the USSR by demanding sovereignty for Russia and the establishment of the foundations of statehood within the RSFSR (which only played into the hands of the democrats and mondialists);
  • provoking tensions surrounding the Russian population in the republics (since restricting the Russian nation to a narrow ethnic framework cannot but lead to alienating them from the other peoples of the empire);
  • depriving the patriotic movement of geopolitical awareness of the American strategy to conquer Eurasia (an aspect which the Americans take advantage of in extending their hands to those regions which the Russians leave unattended upon deciding to “focus on their own problems”);
  • diminishing the “universal”, “imperial”, and “messianic” nationalism of Russians to the level of purely ethnic borders (thus rendering Russian nationalism powerless, passive, and incapable of realizing its state mission);
  • conformist engagement in dialogue with the anti-national, mondialist, and pro-American Russian government whenever it makes hypocritical gestures towards Russian traditions (archaic and innocuous national-religious folklore);
  • idiotizing Russian traditions in advocating for the restoration of archaic and lurid aspects of pre-revolutionary Russia and renouncing the technological, strategic, and industrial achievements of the Soviet period;
  • too often advocating private property (national capitalism), which contradicts Russia’s social traditions;
  • finally, for being the main initiators of the split in the opposition by virtue of refusing the alliance consistently offered to them by the Eurasianists in line with the openness and pragmatism of their ideology which sets reconquering the State and restoring the Empire as its main goals.

Who are the Bolsheviks? Who are the Mensheviks?

Such are the fundamental motives of the growing disputes among the opposition which can hardly be stopped at the level of authoritative leaders calling for harmony and unity and offering admonition and personal sympathies. On this issue, however, these contradictions are fundamental in nature and can be circumstantially compared to the dispute between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Eurasianists are the Bolsheviks who refuse to compromise with the corrupt mondialist goverment, stoop down to parliamentary demagoguery, pursue conciliation with the system, and who do not intend to opt for limited and ambiguous compromises. The ethno-centrists are the Mensheviks who are content with limiting themselves to pursuing gradual reforms on the national level and abandoning the planetary National Revolution for the sake of small concessions from the mondialists who are willing to present Russians with a folklorish “national being” in Eurasian reserves.

In addition, it is an extremely important fact that the Eurasianist camp is engaged in a process of ideological creativity which is resulting in the formation of new concepts, such as “Slavophile futurism” and the great idea of the “Eurasian Empire” which in the future will be capable of not only recovering Russia’s lost geopolitical might, but also becoming a center of anti-mondialist doctrine suitable for giving impulse to the planet-wide process of ideological and geopolitical liberation from American bankocratic domination. This ideology is offensive, aggressive, and universally applicable – in both Europe and the Third World.

The “nationalists” are only focused on passive, defensive resistance. They look backwards with passionate nostalgia and sentimental longing for the past. They are loyal not so much to the spirit and essence of the Russian Tradition as to its external forms. Yet the mono-ethnic model of Russia is without a doubt an entirely “modernist” idea, as nothing of the sort has ever existed in Russian in all of her history.

However, it would be wrong to associate the “Bolsheviks” of the opposition (the Eurasianists) with “modernism” and the “Mensheviks” with “archaism.” In fact, both poles contain both modern and traditional elements, albeit only combined in different ways. The imperial orientation, openness towards non-Russian ethnoi, elitehood, and community-based economic traditions make up the deeply traditional aspects of the Eurasianists’ side. Yet the Eurasianists are modernists in terms of industrial, technological, and military-industrial projects and in supporting the establishment of global information systems and modern communications systems. The pure “nationalists” are modernists in their “mono-ethnicism”, their dislike for elites (which is evidence of individualism and egalitarianism),  and in their sympathies towards national capital. On the other hand, their rejection of industrialism and technological development is a purely archaic feature.

Are we already that different?

One particularity of this division should be emphasized, namely, that the Eurasianist wing of the opposition is potentially ready for dialogue and cooperation with the ethno-centrists. After all, the Eurasianists largely share the feelings of “ethnic nationalists” on the emotional level, but they refrain from taking such to the level of a doctrinal, ideological principle. The “national reaction” of the Eurasianists is mediated and deferred. For example, although they might experience the exact same dislike for the mafia-capital Caucasians as the ethno-centrists, the Eurasianists nonetheless refrain from escalating this aversion to a political category. While sympathizing and empathizing with those Russians who have found themselves outside of Russia’s borders, they do not blame the indigenous, non-Russian populations of these republics. Rather, in remembering the reason for this state of affairs, they blame the puppets of the Americans who have seized power in Russia itself for such treason. 

Similarly, while being overwhelmingly Orthodox, the Eurasianists do not insist on proselytism (which is in fact entirely alien to the Russian Church) and instead seek strategic alliance with all anti-mondialist forces in Eurasia regardless of their religious affiliation (while at the same time taking into consideration the metaphysical specificities of different religious by virtue of which, for example, fatalistic and anti-individualist Islam is typologically closer to Russian Orthodoxy than the Anglo-Saxon, individualist, and subversive Protestant pseudo-Christianity of showmen preachers).

Thus, the “Eurasianist Bolsheviks” stand for unity of the opposition. On the inside, they understand their ethno-centrist opponents, but remain convinced that ethno-centric projects are hopeless and ineffective. Nor are the Eurasianists characterized by such “patriotic spy-mania” in which “agents of Judeo-Masonic influence” are seen everywhere. In fact, it is only those most radical ethno-centrists who refuse to enter into dialogue with the Eurasianist statists, who conform with the anti-people, anti-Russian government, that should be suspect of belonging to the Atlanticist lobby, since a radical rejection of the foundations of Eurasianist geopolitics solely benefits the US’ agents of influence whose main task is weakening and subjugating the Eurasian continental powers at any costs.

Splits benefit the enemy

In summating our remarks, the following point must be expressed: If the opposition were to finally split into “Bolsheviks” and “Mensheviks”, then its internal structure would be violated and its “implacability” and “radicality” would be lost. The ethno-centrist flank would most likely be integrated into the System in the role of a harmless, folklorish “party of reserves” and the slogan “Russia for Russians” would proceed to destroy the last remnants of statehood, alienating other peoples and provoking further separatism within the Russian Federation. Left alone, the Eurasianists would be considerably marginalized and it would be much easier for the System to  finally kill them off. The “Bolshevik” wing of the opposition could furthermore be finally weakened by a new showdown, such as one between “communists” and the “right” or “socialists” and “fascists”, etc. In any case, we must anticipate the future outcome of such ideological and political disputes.

It is unlikely that this polemic, which is already picking up, can be avoided. Nevertheless, already today must we realize what it is inevitably leading to and seek not simple party compromise, but genuine ideological synthesis. It is absolutely obvious that the Eurasianists’ openness and their organic solidarity with ethno-centrists yields grounds for this possibility. As long as a showdown is inevitable, we should try to transform such into a constructive, creative process as a result of which the opposition and all patriots will strengthen their ranks and try to distinguish those ideological elements that are interested in quarrels, squabbles, and weakening our whole camp, pushing it towards either conformism or suicide by extremism.

The ideology of victory

The possibility of a true ideological synthesis which could perfectly unite the “Bolsheviks” and “Mensheviks”, “nationalists” and “Eurasianists”, and “national-communists”, “national-democrats”, and “ethno-centricists” is already in view. On the level of geopolitics, the opposition’s ideal should be a powerful and supranational continental Empire that is sovereign on the political, strategic, and economic levels. At the level of domestic national policy, the opposition’s ideal should be the full restoration of national justice for the Russian people which has been oppressed and trampled over long decades of an anti-Russian ideology. This in particular means a radical struggle to the last breath against the Russophobic rabble which has now seized power in the country. On the level of social policy, the opposition should insist on the restoration of social justice and on the state and society caring for each of its members and providing economic guarantees to each and every one of the Great Power’s citizens. Moreover, in the future the country’s economic system might satisfy both national-communists (with public and state ownership of key industries) as well as the advocates of national-capitalism (with private ownership for small and medium enterprises, the promotion of private productive initiatives in industry and agriculture, etc.). The tyranny of international finance capital will be put to an end immediately after the opposition comes to power. However, all spheres of cooperation with foreign industrial enterprises that are beneficial for our state and nation will be developed. All of the opposition’s members should participate in this ideological synthesis, while the only ones excluded from this process should be those who themselves want to exclude others from this all-national process and claim to be in sole possession of the truth in the final instance.

The seriousness of the situation in which the opposition finds itself today and the historic importance of our time is so great that any such stubborn criticism, denial, exclusion, pseudo-prophetism, and sectarianism – in a word, Menshevism – should be seen as “subversive activities” against Russia, the State, and the Nation. Let us not fool ourselves, for what we are living through today is a REVOLUTION. And this means that “revolution-time” and wartime laws hereby enter into force. Our words, our statements, and our articles are no longer private, individual opinions or literary, publicist polemics. We will now have to be seriously accountable for every single written and published phrase.

The Metaphysical Roots of Political Ideologies


Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold 

Text written in 1988, first published in the journal Mily Angel in 1990, subsequently published in the book Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya in 1994 and the book Konspirologia in 2005. 


The confusion of definitions in political science

In modern political science, sociology, and the disciplines that have become inseparable from them, such as the history of religion, ethnology, and anthropology (all of which have in recent times yielded to statistics and economism), chaos reigns in regards to the most fundamental definitions of such political trends as fascism, communism, socialism, democracy, etc. Besides the fact that communists, fascists, and democrats themselves as a rule rather vaguely and contradictorily define their ideological positions (a fact explainable to a considerable extent by purely propagandistic goals), at the same time all proportions have been finally distorted amidst the particularly heightened popularity of the methodologies of the New Left, for whom the very word “fascism” has become a synonym for everything bad and communism (read: “freedom of will”) for everything good. On the other hand, among moderate democrats and moderate liberals another definition has become popular, namely, the one put forth by Sovietologists that “communism is fascism.” When it comes to such factors as religion, authoritarian rule, national specificity, and ecological cataclysms, then logical structures crumble altogether and any reasonableness in definitions is at times replaced by passion, emotion, and individual and national sympathies, etc.

All of this is to a certain extent even characteristic of our Russian political science as well, whose condition has deteriorated due not only to the considerable randomness of foreign political science towards which many Russian sociologists orient themselves, but also due to the many years when it was necessary to either intellectually “sleep” or simply hide one’s opinion in matters of politics which, in the end, led to the dominance of “indirect statements” expressed with an eye towards totalitarian dogma from whose form one could not depart even a single step. Thus, not only has our political science as a discipline which studies the spectra and ratio of ideologies, but also our politics itself, i.e., the sphere of actually direct (not analytical) ideological assertions, have turned out to be composed of irrational and contradictory theses, grotesque and absurd discussions, and a system of hints which have formed the Soviet “argo” that can be decrypted only with the knowledge of particularly sophisticated codes understood only by the “elites” themselves and “Western Sovietologists.” Be that as it may, the need for clear definitions for the principles and relations of different types of ideologies remains pressing and relevant insofar as the possibility of uncensored ideological statements might soon become the norm in Russia.

In this situation, we propose our own variation of a foundational political scheme which, in our opinion, will help cut the Gordian knot of political contradictions and isolate the main, irreducible ideological complexes or ideological “extremes” whose variations and numerous combinations form the multicolored spectrum of contemporary global politics. We by no means claim that our understanding is absolute, for it remains but a scheme and therefore should be taken with rather rough approximation. At the same time, however, we are convinced that no synthetic or holistic picture can be obtained by descending into details and nuances. On the contrary, applying the principle to the concrete is always an easy and purely technical task. Moreover, in our opinion, it is the the fear of schematization and commitment to the analytical method that has led political science to the miserable state in which it finds itself today, a state of “luxurious poverty.” In our study, we will employ diverse spheres of human thought, naturally beginning with religious and metaphysical concepts since it is at this level, whether directly or indirectly, affirmatively or negatively, that the specificities of different political platforms are predetermined.

Metaphysical dogma behind the scenes

We believe that the origins of politics and man’s political self-determination first and foremost stem from certain metaphysical dogmas, and only later do they draw slogans and cliches from the specific social reality through which these dogmas find their direct expression. Moreover, in most cases these dogmas themselves remain entirely behind the scenes, and not only an ideology’s ordinary representatives but also its exponents or “creators” at times do not even have the slightest idea of such. These metaphysical dogmas can take root in a person through either the semantic implication of traditional symbols and signs (the cultural and social factor), through innate psycho-mental attitudes (the psycho-genetic factor), or through man’s existential reaction to Being (the existentialist factor). In any case, the metaphysical dogmas which predetermine ideology are experienced by man as something internal, unconditional, and as some kind of existential imperative. Perhaps this is why attempts at identifying this dogma in its pure form are so often abhorrent and draw repulsive reactions. This can be seen on a more superficial level as well, when the bearer of a specific political doctrine rather often finds it difficult to determine the essence of his principal position (and not some specific position in relation to a given issue), instead identifying his position as something self-evident. For example, there are communists who are unaware of the fact that communist ideology belongs to the category of “left” ideologies, a categorization which is consistent with its objective position, instead believing communism to be neither right nor left but “central” or “naturally” true.

Regardless of whether the rank-and-file adherents of certain political views or sophisticated analytical political scientists might protest, it is none other than generalizing ideological principles and the metaphysical dogmas of ideologies that allows one to somehow navigate the intricacies of contemporary political processes. Such books as Norman Cohn’s Fanatics of the Apocalypse, Igor Shafarevich’s The Socialist Phenomenon, and the works of  Alain Besançon (written as attempts at making global-scale generalizations), despite all the skepticism displayed towards them, will sooner or later become guiding reference points for the majority of experts in the field and more detailed and nuanced models will be built on them. In this sense, as long as they generalize something, even the nearly irrational ideologues of the New Philosophers (such as Lévy and Glucksmann) are often taken as starting points for studying more “sober” and “rational” sociologists and political scientists. Moreover, it is precisely on the level of global generalizations that representatives of diametrically opposed worldviews often come to adopt one and the same objective picture of ideological space. Despite the fact that they might naturally place moral and valued emphases on opposite poles of this space, at the same time, without these generalizations, the very use of certain terms by one political group or another is so different that the impression is made that people adhering to different ideologies belong to altogether different universes with no common ground whatsoever. Yet it is precisely agreement on the objective picture of ideological space between political antagonists and agreement yielded by global generalizations and schematizations that has brought life to the hallmark of “right and left extremism merging.” This hallmark, which would be completely senseless if we understood it literally, is in fact but a distorted kind of ascertainment of “agreement on objective generalization” between the most profound ideologists of the most different orientations who, with the utmost clarity, understand the metaphysical dogmas underlying their own positions. This stands in contrast to the ordinary carrier of ideas who acts more out of ideological inertia and does not separate cause from effect or, in other words, the idea from its carrier, i.e., from himself. This is what Dostoevsky had in mind when he described the character Kirillov in his novel Demons as having been “eaten by his idea.”

Thus, we can speak of extremism only in the etymological sense of the word, i.e., as the “ultimate” (the “extreme”, the “limit”) penetration of the essence of one’s own and another’s positions. Instead of a “coincidence” or “fusion” of opposites, in reality we are dealing with the proponents of opposing ideologies’ “understanding” (or lack thereof, which would no longer be “extremism”) of the deep origins and metaphysical dogmas which surface through the pragmatically advanced propagandistic slogans, ideas, and doctrines of specific political forces. In real ideological life, like in reality in general, opposites do not coincide, for otherwise the spiritual struggle of metaphysical positions and reality itself would be illusory spectacles devoid of any ultimate meaning.

Paradigms in traditional societies

In searching for terms which would be adequate for characterizing those fundamental philosophical trends which we will employ in our scheme, it would be best of all to appeal to the history of traditional societies, i.e., those societies in which metaphysical dogmas were expressed directly in metaphysical language. In none other than traditional societies is it easiest to find “borderline cases” of those principles which have always – outside of time – remained the driving factors in the ideological history of mankind, those which do not expire or disappear, but merely change their forms over the course of history much in the likes of a human body which does not change depending on the style in fashion, but is nevertheless different in proportions as, for example, between various races.

Paradise-Pole ideology

The first type of ideology which we can distinguish is Paradise-Pole ideology which has historically manifested itself in the Gnostic tradition, esotericism, and the inner, secret doctrine of religious teachings, and on the political level as the sacred imperialism of the Ghibellines in Medieval Europe and ultimately as German National Socialism in the 20th century. The essence of this position amounts to affirming the Subject of Divine Nature lying at the heart (in the Pole or in the middle) of and completely dominating (hence “paradisal”) the sacralized cosmos, the mirror cosmos, in which nothing is reflected besides the Subject itself, the salt of the Earth and the Sky. The Divine Subject has nothing outside of itself, over it, around it, or underneath it, has no higher metaphysical principle to take into spiritual account, and is therefore absolutely free and inseparable from God. God is within it. This position corresponds to Christ’s affirmation of the Old Testament maxim in the Gospel: “I said, You are gods.” There is no God outside of it. Thus, in the cosmos, in nature, and on Earth there is only the Divine Subject’s reflection, nature therefore being synonymous with Paradise – not an obstacle to its Will, but the extension of its Will, the realization of its Will, its “great body.” Such are the essential principles of the polar-paradisal worldview.

Wherever this worldview arises, immediately to the fore emerge such themes of the Divine Subject as the Hero, the Divine Incarnation, the Holy Emperor, the Angelic Leader, and the Prophet on the one hand and, on the other, the Sacred Cosmos and the shadow and extension of the subject unopposed to it. “Another World”, “better world”, the “Kingdom of God on Earth”, “Sacred Empire”, “New Heaven and New Earth”, “New Paradise,” “Thousand-Year Reich”, etc. – all of these can be synonymous for such a sacred cosmos. Whatever the historical forms of this type of ideology might be, they all develop out of this intrinsic paradigm of Pole-Subject and Cosmos-Paradise. The emphasis always falls on the absence of an intermediate distance between this immanent pole and the Absolute, the Transcendental Principle which opens up from within the Pole-Subject as this Subject itself, as its inner dimension.

As a rule, the Paradise-Pole worldview is strictly monarchically oriented, i.e., in real history it strives to maximally elevate the figure of the Ruler, the necessarily One and Angelized of the “polar side.” Together with this, it tends to “horizontalize” the distribution of this Ruler’s power through imperial expansion and drawing into the sphere of things subject to the Ruler, and the sphere of his personality’s reflection, a maximum amount of cosmic space, which is thereby converted into Paradise (the Sacred Empire) or into the field of the restored sacral-heavenly dimension. Here, however, it must be stressed that such monarchism and “imperialism” does not always correspond with historical monarchies and empires insofar as the foundation of this polar-paradisal worldview is necessarily conjuncted with totality. A monarch’s lack of subjectivity or the cosmos’ lack of a heavenly dimension, even amidst their nominal presence, leads to Gnostic revolution which in turn strives to restore the Pole and Paradise in all of their metaphysical volume with no room for relativity, circumstances, or “collective agreement.”

As a fundamental trend, Pole-Paradise ideology has never been solely confined to the political sphere, but has projected itself into the realm of pure speculation, religious teachings, and the “sacred sciences.” In the Medieval West’s Hermetic tradition in particular, the central symbol was the “Alchemical King, the “Red Sulphur”. In the Hindu tradition, there exists an entire school of  initiatory practice and spiritual realization called Raja Yoga, or “Royal Yoga.” What’s more, the terms “King”, “Monarch” or “Tsar” themselves are most common in the majority of esoteric schools, such as among Christian mystics (the Heavenly King), Muslims (especially Shiites), Lamaists, Jewish Gnostics (Kabbalists), etc. Indeed, these two sides of polar-paradisal ideology, politics and religion, were never completely disjoined – neither in antiquity, when priests participated in the process of monarchical rule in the ancient states of the East, nor in modernity, as in Germany in the 1910’s-’20’s when esotericists from secret Hermetic societies characterized by racial particularities (the heirs of the bearers of polar-paradisal ideology in the Middle Ages – the Templars and Ghibellines) actively participated in the formation of National Socialism. The same can be said in regards to Shiite Gnosis centered on the persona of the Hidden Imam, an analogue to the Divine Subject which is inseparable from contemporary political events unfolding the Middle East and especially in Iran.

One can also present the example of the European Rosicrucians, whose foundational symbols, the Rose and the Cross, meant the four rivers of the Paradise on Earth (the Cross) and the spirit of the Initiate finding himself at the Pole, in the center of Paradise, at the convergence point of the four rivers (the Rose). The very head of the Rosicrucian organization bore the title “Imperator”, which makes the entire system of correspondences fully genuine. The Rosicrucians’ influence on political process in Europe was extremely considerable, as in the case of the authentic Rosicrucians until 1648 actively participating in the Reformation and other most important post-Medieval political phenomena, as well as in the case of pseudo-Rosicrucian organizations in the likes of Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia, Golden Dawn in the Outer, H.B. of L., A.M.O.R.C., etc., which by the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries were involved in all of the most important political and geopolitical events of Western politics.

Creator-Creation ideology

The second type of ideology is the “Creator-Creation” ideology which can be called purely conservative. This ideology corresponds to the exoteric, outer side of religious teachings, but can also manifest itself and predominate in non-religious societies by virtue of inertia. This ideology’s purest form can be seen in Church organizations of the Catholic type or in the Islamic Ummah (primarily the Sunni). As a rule, it would be more precise to apply the terms “theocracy” or “clericalism” to such. This type can also be defined as the “Paradise lost” worldview where, unlike the polar-paradisal principle, this type of worldview places the subject not at the center of the World (at the pole), but on its periphery. The world itself is equated here not with heaven or paradise, but with Creation which separates the subject from the Creator. As a matter of course, this peripheral subject, a post-Fall subject having been expelled from Paradise, is no longer recognized as the Divine Master to whom the cosmos is completely subordinate as an extension of his will. He becomes an Outcast separated from the Creator by Creation which therein becomes an ambiguous territory insofar as, on the one hand, this Creation hides the Creator (the negative aspect), while on the other it bears the stamp of the Creator, which means that it indirectly reveals him (the positive aspect). It is with this postulate that religious thought begins to develop and can develop in the most different ways from the pure apophatic (denying the possibility of knowing the Creator through Creation) to the pure cataphatic (affirming the possibility of knowing the Creator in Creation all the way up to the point at which pantheists equate the two).

Creator-Creation ideology or “creationism” (from the Latin creare – to create) is in all forms and variations always opposed to the Gnostic approach of polar-paradisal ideology for which the theme of Creation or the separation of Creator and Creature is altogether alien. In fact, the main front of ideological struggle in history runs between these two types of ideologies. Let us examine this in greater detail.

The divine subject stands at the center of the world, and the world is subject and subordinate to it. In this case, if this state of affairs is violated, then polar-paradisal ideology does not change its principles, but simply, upon recognizing a deviation of circumstances from the norm, strives to restore the norm. In polar-paradisal ideology, the divine subject cannot be driven out of Paradise insofar as dwelling in Paradise is an inalienable category of its identity. This means that the Master Subject can never be turned into an outcast subject. The former can merely hide – together with Paradise (the Shiites’ Hidden Imam, the Ghibellines’ Sleeping Imperator, etc.). Those beings which know neither the Divine Subject nor Paradise are, from the standpoint of the polar-paradisal worldview, simply bereft of fundamental reality, fiction-ridden, and therefore as such have no right to establish a new metaphysics such as the Creator-Creation type insofar as there is no such thing as an outcast subject or, in other words, an outcast cannot be the subject. Hence arises the extreme form of gnostic anti-clericalism and the notion of the Evil Creator, the Evil Demiurge. The notion of the Evil Demiurge is founded on the assumption that if the fact of the separation of the Creator and Creation cannot be accepted for whatever reason, then neither the Creator nor Creation are spiritually positive. Thus, following this logic, the Creator is none other than the Evil Usurper (the Gnostics’ Awtad or the Albigenses’ Samail) and Creation is, as follows, nothing more than an evil, temporary illusion, a veil over Paradise. It also bears noting that those who uphold the polar-paradisal worldview are opposed to the non-polar subject and non-paradisal cosmos (out of the entirety of which the notions of God-within-and-without, God-the-Object, and the Distant Creator arise), not the idea of the Spirit or God itself.

On the other hand, exoteric and clerical Creator-Creation ideology considers the bearers of the Paradise-Pole doctrine to be subversive against the very foundations of Religion and Faith insofar as they reject both fundamental figures of this ideology: the outcast subject and the Creator behind Creation. Moreover, they are seen as logically putting themselves (by virtue of being involved directly or indirectly with the Divine Subject) on the same level as the Creator himself, and at times above him. Such logical conclusions allow for clerical consciousness to identify the polar-paradisal worldviews’ adherents as Luciferians, Satanists, as enemies of God and Man. Indeed, these very notions themselves are meant to characterize typically “polar-paradisal pride.”

The Gnostics’ fundamental denial of an outcast subject, however, does not preclude the recognition of such a figure, albeit without postulating him as bearing subjectivity. This logically leads the Gnostics to an anthropological dualism and affirmation of irremediable inequality. All people are, for the Polar Subject, divided into two categories: Man-Gods, Divine Subjects, and Supermen (the elite, spiritual aristocracy, superior people, “Sonnenmenschen”, “Sons of Light”, etc.) and un-subjective animals (plebs, inferior people, subhumans, “Tiermenschen”, “Sons of Darkness”). Herein arises the caste, racial, or intellectual differentiations found in all purely esoteric teachings. The outcast subject of Creator-Creation ideology is naturally understood by Gnostics as belonging to the lower category of people. Such an approach confirms all the exotericists’ suspicions of Gnosticism.

However, it should be noted that the Christian tradition itself was originally polar-paradisal in relation to Jewish clericalism, in which Creator-Creation ideology is most obviously and pronouncedly expressed, on account of its affirmation of the Apostles’ “New Man” born out of recognizing the incarnation of the Word of Christ-Immanuel (i.e., “God is with us”). Within a few centuries, Christian gnosis, insisting on the polar-paradisal dominant, came into conflict with the already burgeoning non-Jewish, purely Christian orthodoxy, i.e., the clerical version of Christianity in which the Creator-Creation theme increasingly came to take the place of “Paradise regained.” The Gnostic complex was gradually displaced and retired to the realm of secret esoteric organizations and at times heterodox sects. The Albigensians and Cathars were the last mainstream representatives of “polar Christianity” in the Middle Ages. This polar-paradisal complex reappeared later in Anabaptism and the Reformation, albeit in considerably distorted form.

Several essential aspects of Creator-Creation ideology are its characteristic catholicity, faith, and conservative stability. Its catholicity (from the Greek katolikos meaning “all taken together”) is the result of the non-divinity of the outcast subject who, having lost the central position in the world, is no longer self-sufficient and therefore needs social integration, i.e., entry into dialogue with other outcast subjects. This catholicity is needed by Creator-Creation adherents since only through the involvement of an exceedingly large number of individual outcasts from Paradise in the process of searching for the path of return does clerical consciousness see an opportunity to change the non-divine subject’s status. Catholicity can and must assume hierarchy, but this hierarchy is built from the bottom, whereas the most “catholic” persona are to be on top. In contrast, polar-paradisal consciousness’ hierarchy is built from the top, starting with the Divine Subject which is not catholic or compound but absolutely integral, with the degree of non-integrality increasing with distance down the hierarchical ladder. These differences can be traced in the example of the Sunni and. Shiite assumptions on political power. The Sunnis (the exoteric branch of Islam) stand for electoral power in which the majority evaluates the religious qualities of a given candidate, whereas Shiites insist on the right of hereditary power designed to ensure the genetic continuity of the race from the first Holy Imam, Ali.

The necessity of faith stems from the Creator’s being hidden behind Creation, which for the believer supposes a purely religious consciousness as some kind of volitional act of affirming the unevident. Faith is an integral quality of the outcast subject. The position of the Paradise-Pole, on the contrary, is founded on knowing. Hence the characteristic title “gnosis” (“knowledge”) and “gnostic” (knowing). Knowledge presupposes direct and already established contact with God within and the evidence of the internal God which makes faith redundant. The exoteric consciousness believes the Gnostics’ claim to “knowledge” to be Satanism and unqualified self-exaltation.

Finally, Creator-Creation ideology’s conservative stability rests in its neutral attitude towards Being as a whole. This attitude does not presume any sudden, traumatic, or abrupt transformations, and this neutrality is grounded in a fundamentally ambivalent attitude towards Creation. The apophatic and cataphatic approaches assume an indefinite duration which is just as indefinite as the boundaries of Creation itself. In other words, one can arbitrarily and as long as desired consider the positive aspect of the cosmos and find in it the marks of the Creator, and just as indefinitely distinguish Creation’s contrasts with the Creator, for such cannot change the essential status of the outcast subject or the Creator-God. The principle of catholicity is by definition incapable of developing into the principle of indivisibility, and the principle of Faith cannot become the principle of Knowledge without going beyond the framework of Creator-Creation ideology. Such is in fact the case in history with those clericalists who treated the notion of Creator-Creation as something transitional, designed only to realize the true birth of the Subject and the true discovery of Paradise. If they wanted to intellectually and doctrinally form their spiritual aspirations and were not content with the mysterious, “eremite”  spiritual realization, then they instantly “fell into heresy,” i.e., fell outside of exoteric religious ideology and were excommunicated.

It must also be noted that the polar-paradisal worldview is far from conservative, being instead eschatological since the purported absence of paradisal polarity in Being is felt as absolute Evil. As follows, a profound, uncompromising struggle is to be waged against any non-paradisal conditions (whereas the condition of the Creator-Creation is non-paradisal in the eyes of conservatives themselves). The polar-paradisal worldview’s striving to put an end to non-paradisal Being, i.e., the End of the World (hence eschatology, the “science of the end”), represents a constant destabilizing tendency ultimately aimed against the conservative approach itself, against the maintenance of the religious status-quo. We find this eschatological pathos in all types of the polar-paradisal worldview from the Christian Gnostics and extreme Shiites (Islamists) to the Lutheran Reformation and National Socialist uprising which proclaimed the beginning of the thousand-year Reich, the Third Reich, or Third Kingdom, or the Christian mystic Joachim de Flora’s Kingdom of the Holy Spirit (the first kingdom is of the Father, the second of the Son, and the third of the Holy Spirit).

Both ideological positions, Creator-Creation and Paradise-Pole, often coexist within the same society, the same tradition, or within one political system. However, this in no way negates the enormous difference between them. These ideological types are irreconcilable, like fire and water and light and darkness, and it is between them that battles have raged (the Albigensian Crusade, the Fatimid Caliphate, the Guelphs and Ghibellines war, the French Revolution, etc.) so fierce that they would otherwise be unthinkable between merely different traditions, religions, or different political systems.

The political form of Creator-Creation ideology can find expression in exoteric “theocracy” as well as in the Jacobin state, the Nation-State. As the brilliant political scientist Carl Schmitt showed, the “theology of the state” is preserved regardless of whether strictly religious organizations maintain central positions in society or not. The Creator-Creation principle in form also determines the typological specificity of the Wahhabi theocracy of Saudi Arabia or the fascist “absolute state” of Giovanni Gentile who developed Hegelian theses to their final, logical conclusions. One of the most characteristic hallmarks of such an archetypal, particular ideological position is its mandatory and foundational anti-eschatologism which is equally peculiar to both secular regimes and ideologies with accentuated religious overtones. Indeed, the religious anti-eschatologism of Creator-Creation ideology has its place even when religion itself is explicitly and unambiguously eschatological, as is the case with Christianity, in which it is doctrinally affirmed that Christ comes into the world immediately before the End of the World, as well as in the case of Islam, which Muslims consider to be the last pre-eschatological Revelation. This also in particular explains the “anti-Nazism” of many Western countries, such as England and the US, on the one hand, and the contemporary anti-Iranism of many Middle Eastern and North African regimes on the other. In both cases, the fundamental issue taken is rejecting eschatological pathos, whether of the Aryan Superman in the first case or the World Islamic Revolution associated with the appearance of the Imam of Time in the other.

The ideology of “Magical Matter”

The third fundamental position is that of “mystical materialism”, the ideology of “Magical Matter”, or “absolute pantheism.” This type of ideology denies both the Paradise-Pole and the Creator-Creation pairs. It can also be equated with pure atheism. Here the subject is seen not as the Polar Lord whose inner self is God himself, nor is it an outcast from Paradise separated from an external God, the God-Object, or Creation. In this case, the subject is taken to be part of the cosmos in which the cosmos itself is reflected, and nothing more. In other words, the subject has no internal or external God, and is itself nothing more than a mirror of the external world and, at the same time, an element of this world. Thus, the pure atheist or “mystical materialist” in fact assigns the cosmos the quality of divinity insofar as the notions of Reason and God essentially converge. This gives us grounds to identify this ideology as “pantheism” or “all-godness”, the identification of the entire Cosmos and World with God. One of the most striking varieties of this position is cosmism which can in principle be considered a synonym for pantheism.

Inseparable from this third ideological type is the concept of evolution, i.e., the gradual and unidirectional improvement of the cosmos’ quality to the point of perfection. If adherents of the Paradise-Pole ideal strive to accomplish the once-and-for-all leap from non-paradise and non-subject to Paradise and the Subject, and if the adherents of the Creator-Creation idea are interested in preserving the ontological status quo (in which the apophatic approach would be balanced by the cataphatic), then “magical matter” is above all interested in continuously and gradually improving the cosmos whose inertial course is ultimately self-improvement in and of itself. On the level of ideology, the meaning of evolution and progress can be reduced not to some kind of particularly excessive creativity, but to simply following the natural flow of events, eliminating along the way those obstacles first and foremost embodied in the face of clerical conservatives and eschatological imperialists. Strictly speaking, the subject of mystical-materialist ideology is the “servant of evolution”, i.e., a mirror reflecting the evolutionary process with the utmost distinctness and clarity.

Despite its intransigence, the conflict between Gnosticism and conservatism always (or almost always) takes place within religious teachings. After all, there can be no doubt that even the worst heretics never rejected the very idea of God. On the level of the “theology of the state”, neither Gnostics nor “exotericists” deny the need for the existence of the state. The first uncompromisingly insist on the Empire whereas the latter are satisfied with the nation-state. For its part, mystical materialism is essentially non-religious or atheistic insofar as Reason (God) is not only not hidden (behind the cosmos or within the human ego), but is simply obvious and always visible for the bearers of the idea of Magical Matter, surrounding them as this reason is the cosmos for which there is no reason to look anywhere else. The same goes for the idea of the state, which is alien in its roots to the mystical materialist (such as Marx’s thesis of the withering away of the state under communism, etc.).

Whereas Paradise-Pole ideology speaks of the Divine, Central Subject and the world subordinate to it, and Creator-Creation ideology presents a subject outcast to the periphery where it lies alienated from, yet still indicative of the existence of God (while hiding him at the same time), “mystical materialists” know no subject. According to the revelation of the famous Marxist, György Lukács, the subject and object coincide within the proletariat, i.e., the central figure of the most radical materialist doctrines. The proletariat is the ideal human machine or human mirror. The same can essentially be said of the notion of the “noosphere” which “deduces” the mind out of the evolutionary development of matter. Without a doubt, this mind is a mirror of the external world.

Such an approach to the subject yields a particularly materialistic catholicity which ideally entails the abolition of hierarchy altogether but in practice creates a special hierarchy based on degrees of “cosmicness”, i.e., ranking based on the greatest affinity to the material nature of the external cosmos. Herein arises the need to put an object or machine at the top of the atheist collective as a concentration of spiritual poverty. Hence the rather characteristic doctrine of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Characteristic of “servants of Magical Matter” is pure agnosticism, i.e., a third way between Gnosis and Faith. The agnosticism of mystical materialism is conditioned by the inadmissibility of the subject questioning knowledge, since the subject, as part and parcel of the cosmos, is merely one of the facts of this cosmos and nothing more, thus the subject’s reflective capacity (its mind) cannot add or subtract anything from the flow of the cosmos. In this view, knowledge is identical with cosmic fact, but insofar as the cosmos is in motion, knowledge is identified with practice, i.e., it is simply discarded. In other words, agnosticism is the result of the absence of the pair of “knower” and “known” which is necessary for knowledge itself. For the proponents of Magical Matter, the absolute surface of the world coincides with its absolute depth. Here it would be interesting to recall Nietzsche’s aphorism regarding how “a woman needs to find depth in her superficiality.” Such an analogy is no accident, since the ideology of Magical Matter bears an openly gyneocratic, matriarchal character, in some sense being a projection of the female subconscious closed to itself.

Despite the fact that in its purest form, the ideology of Magical Matter appeared altogether recently (true and open doctrinal materialism is relatively young, around two to three centuries old), the “pantheistic” tendency existed earlier as some kind of hidden anti-religious reality within a religious worldview. From time to time, materialism was present within this worldview only indirectly, whether in the form of  the pantheistic or “cosmisist” exegesis of Religion as the absolute opposite of the polar-paradisal, Gnostic, and purely initiatic exegesis. The Christian tradition, for instance, could at once become the basis for historical Christian Gnosticism (up to the Cathars of the Middle Ages), canonical Judeo-Christianity (Creator-Creation) and, finally, the outright cosmism of the neo-spiritualist doctrines of Fedorov and de Chardin in which purely atheistic, evolutionary pantheism stands behind a nominal appeal to Christian symbols. However, what Fedorov and de Chardin expressed explicitly and clearly, can be veiled by other pseudo-religious thinkers. In any case, since the very beginning of Christianity’s spread (and with Buddhism before it, which became the favorite doctrine of Eastern pantheists), attempts have been made by individual theologians to reinterpret religion in a pantheistic spirit. In Christianity, this manifested itself in emphasis being put on the humanness of the Incarnate Word and, as follows, the “new sacralization” of the material world after the Incarnation despite the entire absurdity of such ideas of “new total sacralization” which were thoroughly refuted in the Gospels and the Epistles of the Apostles, where it is clearly stated that the “world lies in evil” and a new sacred cosmos is discussed as imminent not after the First, but the Second (!) Coming of Christ. On a similar note, if one can really speak of some kind of continuity between Russian communism and Russian Orthodoxy (as some authors do, in particular Berdyaev), then this can only be related to cosmisist, pantheistic, and magical-materialist Christianity which completely disregards essential dogma in both the esoteric (Paradise-Pole) and exoteric (Creator-Creation) dimensions and develops a special type of materialistic and ultimately atheistic worldview which does not have the slightest relation to genuine Christianity.

This same cosmism can be seen in Hinayana Buddhism which emphasizes the mirror-like and composite nature of the subject as a temporary “clot” of cosmic energies or “dharmas” which does not possess any spiritual autonomy (not even the status of an outcast subject). It is precisely this branch of Buddhism which can be called “mystical atheism.” Hinayana Buddhism, however, in contrast to the whole and complete ideology of Magical Matter, lacks the evolutionism which is necessary for orthodox cosmism, thus rendering it somewhat different from other typologically close worldview forms.

The cosmisist aspect is extremely developed in yet another mystical doctrine, namely, European Freemasonry. Masonic doctrines are the descendants of Western forms of Gnosticism, i.e., polar-paradisal ideology, which at a certain historical stage were reinterpreted in a cosmisist vein and subject to atheization and materialization. The Masonic worldview had an enormous impact on European consciousness overall but was more hidden and latent than the direct influence of Christianity. Gradually over the course of the 18th century and especially in the 19th century, Masonry drastically altered its spiritual and ideological orientations and, while maintaining some external attributes, completely, diametrically altered its inner content. From this time on, evolutionism, pantheism, materialism, and cosmism began to play an extremely important role in Western culture and science. The very fact that almost all prominent cultural and scientific figures have been members of Masonic lodges is either overlooked altogether or is considered to be a simple formality, a kind of fad. But in fact, Freemasonry boasts a fundamental doctrine which corresponds to a particular type of religious  consciousness that cannot but shape Freemasons’ specific positions. Many of the cultural and scientific developments in the West in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries had definite correlations in the modifications undertaken in Masonic doctrines and statuses either in certain branches of Freemasonry or in Freemasonry as a whole. The atheization of Masonic statuses instantly gave rise to the spread of European “scientific” cosmism and evolutionism in both the purely methodological, scientific sphere, as well as in the form of neo-occultist, essentially pantheistic movements (such as theosophy, occultism, neo-spiritualism, etc.).

Just as the polar-paradisal worldview can reinterpret any religious form in its spirit, so can the doctrine of Magical Matter, despite its essentially anti-religious character, usurp a religious form to assert its principles. Meanwhile, the Creator-Creation position as a rule avoids the radical exegesis of religious doctrines in order to keep them intact even at the cost of rendering them relics and lifeless shells.

The political implications of metaphysical dogmas

We can now summarize the 20th century socio-political positions of the three principle ideologies which we have distinguished. Paradise-Pole proponents stand for a new, heavenly, eschatological Empire formed around the superhuman Leader-Pole (the Third Reich and Führerprinzip of German National Socialism). The Creator-Creation position’s supporters stand on the side of moderate democracy and liberalism, seeking to preserve the social status quo of autonomous individuals “outcast from Paradise” without abandoning the search for the lost Principle, but nevertheless not insisting on such an endeavor (this is especially true for the Central European democratic regimes and North American states of the 18th-19th centuries). Finally, the doctrine of Magical Matter, openly and originally atheistic, has manifested itself in socialist and communist political systems whose types vary from absolute totalitarian cosmism, such as Korean Juche and the Cambodian Pol Pot experiment (in which the Pavlovian notion of the acquired reflexes of the man-object found its widest application), to the contemporary American and Swedish models of the “consumer society” in which the natural, coarse cosmos of the “primitive socialists” has been replaced by an industrial, technological, artificial, and socialized “cosmos” – a veritable dream come true for mystical materialists.

These three positions which we have distinguished allow us to explain certain contradictions in the history of ideologies which have to this day puzzled many scholars. First of all, it is clear in our classification that these positions are essentially incompatible with each other and, being engaged in one and the same traditional ideological form, they are certain to sooner or later drift towards an internal conflict in which each of these positions asserts its independence. The Paradise-Pole worldview might be unnoticeable for a long period of time in the overall Christian tradition, but sooner or later the Albigensian Crusade and the Gnostic Cathars are burned in their Christian churches, set alight by the hands of the bearers of the  Creator-Creation idea. As for another example, socialists can conveniently remain indistinguishable from liberals or moderate democrats, but sooner or later, if socialists manage to seize power, then democrats and liberals will be the first sent to the guillotine or the dungeons of the Cheka for being fundamentally incompatible with the ideas of “serving Evolution” and for wishing to preserve the status quo and obstructing progress. Granted, arson and Chekist torture chambers are extremes, but it is a fact that these three types of ideologies cannot but be in conflict with one another, and sooner or later this will always manifest itself in one way or another.

At this point we are left with addressing yet another aspect. Which of these three types of proto-ideologies, or as the Germans would say, Urideologien, are fundamentally incompatible with each other, and which can enter into an alliance? In principle, their interrelations are not quite symmetrical. It can be said, for instance, that Paradise-Pole ideology is the ideology of the Absolute Right, while Creator-Creation ideology is Absolute Centrist, and mystical materialism is the Absolute Left. Here the word “absolute” is employed to translate these definitions from the sphere of concrete politics into the realm of their metaphysical origins. We can also propose this ratio in the following order:

Absolute Right – Subject over Object

Absolute Centrist – Subject alongside Object

Absolute Left – Object over Subject


Absolute Right – History as the Fall; the necessity of instant Restoration; the primacy of eschatology.

Absolute Centrist – History as Continuity; the necessity of preserving balance between the Spiritual and Material.

Absolute Left – History as Progress; the necessity of contributing to the continuation and acceleration of progress by all means.

These metaphysical ranks determine the possibility of coalitions between these three positions. The Absolute Center and Absolute Left can unite against the Absolute Right (for example, Allied forces in the Second World War). But for the Absolute Left, the Absolute Center is also “fascism” (as in Stalinist propaganda or for the New Philosophers). Therefore, the Absolute Left is ultimately incompatible with the Absolute Center and seeks to destroy it. At times, the struggle against the Absolute Center can lead the Absolute Left to establish a pragmatic alliance with the Absolute Right but, as a rule, such very quickly dissipates (as with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or the National Bolshevik alliance between Lauffenberg and the Nazi Strasser in Germany in the 1930’s).

All of this allows us to understand the logic of those who inflate Nazism (the Absolute Right) and Communism (Absolute Left). Such an identification is possible only for a person of the Absolute Center, a supporter of the Creator-Creation concept. Curiously enough, such diametrically opposite political thinkers as the Russian patriot Shafarevich and the famous Russophobe, Jew, and Sovietologist, Besançon, despite completely diverging on practically all concrete issues, can exhibit astonishing unanimity in their mutual hatred of Soviet socialism (the Absolute Left) and German National Socialism (the Absolute Right). For Shafarevich, both the former and the latter are essentially manifestations of a suicidal, tanatophilic, and eschatological impulse in civilization, the sources of which he sees in the Babylonians, Plato, and later in the Cathars and Anabaptists. A similar mixing of the Paradise-Pole with Magical Matter is characteristic of Russian patriotic authors (such as Lev Gumilev and Yuri Boroday). We can even see the same thing in Besançon’s work when he calls both Soviet socialists and German Nazis representatives of “Marcionism”, i.e., emblematic of the anti-Judaic, anti-creationist, and Gnostic tendencies of early Christianity embodied in the figure of Marcion of Sinope. Medieval eschatological movements are also seen as the precursors of both Communist and Nazi regimes by the intriguing political scientist, historian, and Jew, Cohn. Thus, both Russophobic Jews and Russian patriots can find unity in metaphysical ideology beyond the extreme opposition of their particular political views. We hope that we have sufficiently explained the essential aspects of the metaphysical roots of ideology in order to write off the coincidences or randomness of this or that author. In addition, something similar can be said of a number of other intellectuals whose metaphysics (sometimes not even consciously perceived) establish principled ties even when political details presume an unbridgeable gap.

Speaking of a potential balance or harmonization between these three proto-ideologies is impossible on the basis of historical accounts, since in reality relative harmony arises only when the reigns of ideological governance are seized by the proponents of one of these positions by pressuring or casting to the periphery the others. All recipes for reconciliation are utopian and unrealistic. What’s more, such initiatives often come from cosmist circles who are so convinced of the reasonableness and, most importantly, positiveness of evolution that they can even make way for justifying the necessity of barriers to evolution in the interests of evolution (this is basically the case with some neo-Masonic projects, certain mondialist organization like the Club of Rome, Trilateral Commission, etc., as well as some of the ideas of de Chardin who proposes that democrats, fascists, and communists unite in a single political system).

On the other hand, there exists some kind of continuity in history between these three types of proto-ideologies. The deeper into antiquity one goes, the clearer and more “totalitarian” is the type of Absolute Right ideology, the polar-paradisal complex. In later antiquity, the Creator-Creation type began to acquire predominance and received its most pronounced doctrinal form in late Judaism and the other Abrahamic religions. Also in this period of “totality”, the structures of Creator-Creation ideology cyclically exuded the polar-paradisal tendencies, this time out of the desire for a “Revolution from the Right” colored with all the rising eschatologism. Finally, with modernity and in the contemporary period, Absolute Left trends have come to enjoy the greatest propagation, engulfing and denaturing the vestiges of previous traditional forms (Cosmisist Christianity, Cosmisist Hinduism and Buddhism, Social-Democracy, atheist neo-Freemasonry, “enlightened Judaism”, etc.). Even under the domination of Magical Matter, however, Absolute Center and Absolute Right tendencies have never been completely erased, and at each first opportunity they accumulate oppositional energy which yields a theocratic or polar-paradisal revolution. Thus, despite changing periods and reigns, our three trends or types of worldviews can cannot be fused or reduced in number. On the contrary, the opportunities offered by external forms which these proto-ideologies can take depending on circumstances are not limited. Even the most complex syncretic models designed to fuse together elements of the Absolute Right, Absolute Center, and Absolute Left, however, cannot relieve the proponent of such an endeavor from intrinsically and invariably belonging to one proto-ideology whose very ideological variations or alternative form would be precisely what comprises this syncretic model.

While not wanting to end on such a note of complete relativity and plurality, we would nevertheless like to express our belief that the secret of the history of global ideologies still has a rather straightforward solution. Sooner or later, one of these three metaphysical positions will reveal itself to be the only genuine and only true one. Which one exactly, however, time will tell. 

Towards a Social and Humanitarian Eurasian Union

Author: Leonid Savin

Translator: Jafe Arnold 

Any form of cooperation is governed by regulations, laws, and agreements between the involved parties. Therefore, in order to determine the criteria and official levels which regulate Eurasian cooperation in the social and humanitarian spheres, it is first and foremost necessary to analyze the foundational documents of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union entered into force on January 1st, 2015. This founding document proclaims the continuity of Eurasian economic integration (from the Declaration of November 18th, 2011), and practically all of the treaty’s articles are dedicated to trade, customs regulations, integration, tariffs, and other economic mechanisms. Adherence to the principles of the WTO and UN is also highlighted.

Article 61 on Consumer Protection Policy, which consists of two points and two proposals, can to some extent be related to the social sphere insofar as it concerns policy agreements between member-states in the sphere of protecting consumer rights. The administrative cooperation defined in Article 68 concerns only issues of an economic nature and management, including the exchange of information and cooperation between competent authorities. Only Articles 97 and 98 on employment are social and humanitarian in nature, insofar as they indicate mechanisms for social protection, health care, procedures for workers in member-countries, as well as the mutual recognition of documents pertaining to education and employment opportunities, etc. However, these issues are integral to any economic and business operation, since labor relations imply social responsibility on the part of employers, certain state guarantees, and appropriate qualification necessary for employing labor.

The treaty contains no other articles or points related to social and humanitarian activities.

Moreover, according to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, there is no authority proscribed for the latter organ in the social and humanitarian spheres. Point 18 merely provides for the commission’s operations in the sphere of labor migration, while Point 20 mentions “other spheres determined by the Treaty [on the Eurasian Economic Union] and international treaties within the union.” According to the EEU’s legal portal, social and humanitarian issues were not considered in the acts adopted by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in 2015-2016.[1]

A similar situation can be observed with the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council.[2] No memoranda or joint statements with international organizations engaged in humanitarian issues have been issued.

Before the Treaty on the EEU, on October 30th, 2014 a joint statement was issued on cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the United Nations on industrial development. Even earlier, in 2013, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Eurasian Economic Commission and Economic Union and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, and the Memorandum of Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), were all signed. Yet these UN commissions have nothing to do with social and humanitarian cooperation, although the United Nations does have corresponding bodies for these spheres.

Out of all the draft documents presented on the EEU legal portal that have either passed or are in the process of passing through public discussion (535 in total as of March 1st, 2017), in two years there has not been a single document which directly or indirectly relates to the social and humanitarian spheres.[3]

This situation is rather paradoxical since the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union was preceded by many years of significant intellectual work which implicitly related to the humanitarian sphere. Even if we consider exclusively economic factors or technical aspects, then they in one way or another have scientific foundations and are implemented in politics, and this is also pertains to the sphere of ideology and theories of the social and political sciences.

What’s more, it bears emphasis that the classical school of Eurasianists which arose among Russian emigres in the 1920’s, attached priority to questions of culture and society. The core of the Eurasian movement then was represented by the geographer Petr Savitsky, the philologist Nikolay Trubetzkoy, the lawyer Nikolay Alekseev, the historian and literary critic Petr Bitsilli, the philosopher and medievalist Lev Karsavin, the art historian Petr Suvchinsky, the historian George Vernadsky, the theologian George Florovsky, and the literary critic Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky. Tellingly enough, there were no economists in this group, although state systems did receive significant attention in Savitsky and Alekseev’s works.

The end of the era of classical Eurasianism is associated with the works of Lev Gumilev, after which it is commonly accepted to recognize the beginning of neo-Eurasianism, whose founder in Russia in the early 1990’s was Alexander Dugin. Dugin not only directly popularized the ideas of classical Eurasianism in intellectual and political science circles, but also complemented its main provisions with geopolitical and economic aspects in accordance with the challenges of the day. This was marked by the need to pay more attention to heterodox economic models that go beyond classical liberal or Marxist doctrines. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, also actively supported Eurasianist ideas. It was he who proposed at the highest political level to create a new type of Eurasian association after the collapse of the USSR. A significant difference at the time was that Dugin worked in the intellectual sphere under adverse conditions, since the period of Boris Yeltsin’s reign was overall associated with an orientation towards the West, not searching for a way out of the crisis of identity or a unique, independent path of development, whereas Nazarabyev used administrative resources in parallel to the development of a national ideology of Kazakhstan. These remarks should be considered in analyzing the work of the EEU, particularly in the humanitarian sphere.

Imbalances in the trade-economic sphere have also been acknowledged in the comments of senior officials who have considerable experience in the humanitarian field. The groundwork of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) might be useful in this regard, since the EEU has a number of direct agreements with the CIS. To some extent, both of these inter-state projects are interrelated, since all EEU members are also CIS members.

For example, on July 2nd, 2015, during the Forum for Young Leaders of Eurasian Economic Union Member-Countries held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the head of the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, Lyubov Glebova, remarked: “The development of cultural ties in the Eurasian space is important due to the fact that the entire history of our states exists within a common cultural space. Repression has never been at the heart of these relationships. Experience in mutual cultural enrichment helps us build relations today and allows us to avoid what we see in other parts of the world, such as the development of inter-ethnic conflicts sometimes artificially instigated from the outside.” [4]

In saying such, Glebova essentially confirmed Lev Gumilev’s famous theory of the complementarity of the various peoples inhabiting the Eurasian space and their influence on one another over the course of history. A similar opinion has been expressed by the former Executive Director of the International Foundation for Humanitarian Cooperation of the CIS and acting advisor to the President of Armenia on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation. In an interview in July 2016, he said regarding the EEU that the union has been established “in which economic relations play a key role. Without an economy, nothing can develop, and this is understandable. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that without education, science, and without the inclusion of cultural and national questions, it is extremely difficult to build relations between peoples and states. For people to understand each other, and for an atmosphere of complete mutual confidence to be achieved, we direly need those contacts that are established only through humanitarian cooperation – through culture, art, and education. It is impossible to imagine the formation of a Eurasian alliance without cooperation in these spheres. Sooner or later, we will necessarily arrive at this. Why not get ahead of ourselves and in the near future start building these bridges that will surely help economic relations?” [5]

The General Secretary of the Eurasian Economic Community, Tair Mansurov, also suggested: “The Eurasian Union should become a union of states with a common economic, customs, humanitarian, and cultural space.” [6] As things stand, the first two of these areas have been realized and enshrined in the association’s governing documents, while the last two are still in their infancy.

Today, humanitarian-cultural cooperation exists only out of the inertia of the traditions laid down in the Soviet Union and Russian Empire. As a process of historical continuity, there are more positive than negative sides in this, but it nevertheless bears recognition that the 21st century requires a comprehensive and consolidated approach.

First of all, there is competition between countries. The states of Central Asia and the Caucasus are the objects of the geopolitical interests of many other countries with their own projects. The People’s Republic of China, for instance, is actively pursuing the expansion of its One Belt One Road project in the region, which is regarded not only as political-economic penetration, but also an instrument of China’s “soft power.” Although the SCO-BRICS summit in Ufa in 2015 declared that the Eurasian Union and New Silk Road projects would merge, to this day no clear plan of action has been deliberated on this matter.

Secondly, there can be several interrelated factors present that function as instruments of external “soft power.” For example, Turkey takes advantage of two factors at once – the Turkic and Muslim factors – to spread its cultural-religious influence in the countries of Central Asia (two Eurasian Union participants, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have majority Muslim populations). Islamic ideas are also employed by Arab monarchies, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the basis for their economic and spiritual penetration of the region.

In addition to those countries that have throughout history been of direct relevance to the states of the Eurasian Economic Union in terms of trade, influence, or conflicts, foreign actors are also attempting to influence integration and decision-making. The USA and the UK in particular present their own variety of programs in the context of liberal-democratic, Western ideology, which is not only unsuitable for the peoples and states of this part of the world, but is in many ways purely destructive in nature. In particular, such asserts the superiority of the individual over the collective and rejects the importance of historical and religious traditions, which liberalism presents as relics that must be overcome for the sake of progress (without mentioning any concrete goals). Meanwhile, “many of the Eurasianists’ social projects speak of the sobornost’ and collectivism of the people, i.e., those principles which have allowed them to not only survive in unique climactic conditions, but also build a powerful state. Cooperative interaction appears as an integral feature of social life in Russian sociology.” [7]

Overall, drawing a dichotomy between political-economic and political-cultural approaches might have long-term consequences. Other countries’ experiences show that cultural factors cannot be ignored or downplayed while preference is given exclusively to economic ties. The crisis in the EU, besides economic, political, and social factors, also has a cultural-humanitarian dimension.

As the famous French philosopher and New Right ideologue, Alain de Benoist, pointed out: “Since the very beginning, European construction has been carried out contrary to common sense. It started with industry and trade, rather than giving priority to politics and culture. What was built instead of this base and turned into a superstructure was represented by the Brussels Commission which, while devoid of any democratic legitimacy, still continues to be considered omnipotent. Construction should have been based on countries and regions with strict observance of the principle of subsidiarity, and with sufficient competence…European construction was done without the consent of the population (surveys were conducted only a few times, and people mostly negatively responded, but this was not taken into account and the surveys were repeated until they replied ‘yes’). Finally, the ultimate goals of European integration were not clearly defined, because there was never any consensus on this. But the key question is: are they building a powerful Europe with clearly defined geopolitical borders, one capable of governing all forces in synergy in order to forge an autonomous structure which might play a regulatory role in contemporary globalization? Or are they working on a market-Europe, a free trade zone with blurred borders which is supposed to be integrated into the zone of dominance of the American superpower? Unfortunately, we are closer to the second one. I am against such a Europe; I stand for the idea of the first Europe.” [8]

Sharply dividing the economic, political, social, and other aspects should be avoided. Rather, they should organically complement each other. “There are four common approaches to studying human affairs in which emphasis is on the social, cultural, economic, or political aspects respectively…To some extent, all of these categories include the other three insofar as social, cultural, economic, and political life are naturally interdependent. When we choose one of these names, we choose only an emphasis.” [9]

The experience of the Russian Federation in the 1990’s shows that emphasis must not be exclusively placed on the economic side of state policy, since a quantitative approach and focus on numbers can produce a profound gap with socio-political reality. This was clearly demonstrated by the liberal reforms implemented in Russia and the economic defaults that hit wide swathes of the population. The examples of other countries that have at one time found themselves in difficult economic situations (such as the Republic of Cuba and Islamic Republic of Iran) show that the ideological component, with emphasis placed on cultural and historical aspects, helped these countries’ leaderships to mobilize society and overcome numerous problems. Conversely, neglect for cultural-historical traditions has led to numerous tensions within societies (such as the escalation of sectarian conflicts in Iraq, progressive liberalization in Serbia leading to large-scale emigration in recent years, and the critical situation in Ukraine) which in turn also undermined these states’ economic systems.

Recently, a large number of events dedicated to questions of the EEU’s establishment and development have been held. Some of them have been systemic in nature and took place before the EEU project came to life. Others have begun to attempt to directly reflect on the EEU’s work in order to identify gaps and smooth over possible contradictions. A number of “Eurasian events” have been organized by social organizations and movements with funding from the state (usually one-time grants), and some educational institutions have systematically engaged in holding courses and educational and scholarly events. For example, the Ural State University of Economics in Ekaterinburg held the 7th Eurasian Economic Youth Forum in 2016.[10] This forum was the continuation of a cycle of events focused on harmonizing international relations alongside the International Youth Business Game’s “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit – 2039” which was held at the Ural State University of Economics in 2009, as well as the first BRICS summit held in Ekaterinburg in the same year. The Eurasian Youth Herald is even published by the Ural State University of Economics. [11]

The Federation Council of the Russian Federation has also launched similar projects, such as the Eurasian Women’s Forum. Nine permanent discussion platforms have been established, each of which is a separate work group forming the basis for active cooperation between women’s leaders and women’s organizations. These forums’ activities are influencing the work on the program of the Second Eurasian Women’s Forum to be held in 2018. The Deputy Chairwoman of the Federation Council, Galina Karelova, has devoted particularly active work to such discussion forums as Women in Industry, Women in Agriculture, Women in the Shaping of Global Public Health Strategy, Women in Entrepreneurship, Women in Sport: Playing by One Set of Rules, and Charity without Borders, all of which have created a number of projects, including some featuring international participation.[12] These events have a pronounced gender character which is of no small importance in the modern international situation, in which serious attention is devoted to this factor. On the other hand, some of this forum’s initiatives have been criticized for having a pronounced liberal character. In particular, the National Strategy in Women’s Interests project published on the forum’s site has been severely criticized. It has been noted that many of the strategy’s provisions have been copied from Western feminist programs, such as “the outright destruction of traditional family values, basic models of behavior and social structure…many of the provisions approved by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, D.A. Medvedev, in the National Strategy in Women’s Interests for 2017-2012 go against the National Security Strategy approved by the President of Russia, V. V. Putin, and grossly violate the constitutional rights of tens of millions of citizens of Russia.”[13]

Thus, it is necessary to adjust such initiatives in accordance with the value systems of the EEU’s societies.

Another important event is Eurasian Week, an annual exhibition forum held by the countries of the Economic Union and the Eurasian Economic Commission. The decision to organize this event was taken by the prime ministers of EEU countries in 2015. The forum has been called on to become an effective platform for dialogue where business and expert circles, union countries’ authorities, and third countries can discuss current, practical issues of economic development in the context of global challenges and work together to develop strategic solutions. The Eurasian Week forum was held for the first time in 2016, and this year’s forum’s theme is “The EEU on the Global Innovation Agenda.” This platform could be used to promote ideas of humanitarian cooperation as part of the common agenda of economic development and innovation (such as tourism).

Overall, the EEU itself represents a platform for generating new ideas, trends, and solutions for developing not only economic cooperation, but also improving humanitarian cooperation between the countries of the Eurasian economic space.

However, even among the various NGO’s and groups which have enthusiastically greeted the EEU project, there misunderstanding prevails as to the importance of the humanitarian field of Eurasian integration. For example, on the website of the Eurasian Commonwealth organization established in 2013, the “Humanitarian cooperation” section consisting of seven sub-sections is blank [14]. If in three years this sphere remains in a vacuum, then this suggests a shortage of ideas and proposals from civic non-profit initiatives dealing with questions of Eurasian integration.

The International Eurasian Movement can be considered to be an exception. Functioning since 2003 and working in a number of areas of humanitarian cooperation (science and education, youth, culture and art, interfaith relations, information policy), this organization’s operations are not even limited to EEU members. In several cases, the organization is working on Eurasian-oriented projects with other states, such as Iran, Turkey, Serbia, and Thailand.

Among the many expert communities and various NGO’s directly or indirectly related to the Eurasian Economic Union, one often hears wishes that humanitarian cooperation vectors will be strengthened, especially the youth, touristic, educational, and cultural-information spheres since, after all, “at the heart of integration, as any mutually beneficial process, always lies humanitarian cooperation.” [15]

As has been noted, strengthening humanitarian cooperation in inter-state educational ties between EEU countries would serve to popularize national and common human cultural and spiritual values, promote a healthy lifestyle among youth, support the activities of social associations and organizations in the interests of preserving ethnic identity, support national-religious uniqueness, preserve the spiritual and cultural heritage of indigenous peoples, and consolidation them within the civil society of this significant space – Eurasia. [16]

The Eurasian Union must produce its own meta-identity, otherwise it will not develop to be a sustainable formation and will remain at the level of a customs union. “This would be an unstable construct. In the modern world, as it turns out, economic reorientation occurs quickly, but in order to form a meta-identity it is necessary to change discourse and move on from inspecting the debris of the Past to building a common Future.” [17]





[4] Подавление никогда не лежало в основе сотрудничества стран ЕАЭС — Глебова

[5] Армен Смбатян: Невозможно представить становление Евразийского союза без гуманитарного сотрудничества, Московский экспресс, 20 июля 2016

[6] Т. Мансуров. Евразийский проект Нурсултана Назарбаева, воплощенный в жизнь. К 20-летию евразийского проекта 1994 – 2014. М., 2014. С. 330

[7] Попкова Т.В. Кооперативные теории и евразийство: единство базовых оснований// Народы Евразии: культура и общество. Третий Международный Евразийский научный форум. Астана, 2004. 47.

[8] Ален де Бенуа, Леонид Савин. Либерализм, кризис и будущее Европы, Геополитика, 07.06.2013

[9] Карел ван Волферен. Загадка японской силы. М.: Серебряные нити, 2016. С. 26.



[12] В Совете Федерации обсудили подготовку ко Второму Евразийскому женскому форуму, 31 января 2017

[13] Людмила Рябиченко. А как же традиционные ценности? 15.03.2017


[15] Молодежь и неденежные отношения Кыргызстана и России, 28-01-2017


[17] Игорь Задорин: «Евразийского союза не будет без общей идентичности», Евразия. Эксперт, 15 Июня 2016 г.

Herman Wirth: Runes, Great Yule, and the Arctic Homeland

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

[The foreword to Signs of the Great North: The Hyperborean Theory (Moscow, Veche: 2008)]

There exists no greater mystery in human existence than the mystery of life and death, dying and becoming. For man, the Year is the supreme Revelation of divine action in the Universe. The Year is the expression of God’s providential cosmic law, in accordance with which occurs the becoming of the world in the infinite and everlasting return. The most magical and profound phenomenon before us in nature is the Year of God. A number of days makes up the Year, and in each of these days is opened the image of the Year: the birth of the Light from which comes all life, its climb to the highest peak, and its descent, death, and sinking, only to rise again. The morning, noon, evening, and night in a day correspond to spring, summer, autumn, and winter in the Year.

In spring, the “Light of the World” once again awakens all life, rectifies, and develops until it reaches its full deployment and limit of growth at the noon-summer time, then to once again begin the path to night and winter, preparing for death, after which inevitably follows new birth. The Nordic man beheld the image of his existence daily and yearly: early in the morning was his childhood, later his youth, then at noon and in the summer was his maturing, full maturity, and then the decay of life and old age leading to the winter of death, and through this to new life, to the rebirth and new becoming embodied in offspring. The cycle of the day reflects in its permanent and uninterrupted repetition the yearly cycle, as the Year is the circle of human life. The cycle, circular motion, and rotation itself is the supreme cosmic law of God, the ethical Foundation of the Universe of all beings. On this principle rests every consideration of God and every sense of justice. The law of eternal rotation, whose expressions are space and time, especially realized in the Year, were recognized by the Atlanto-Nordic race in the symbol of the Year and World Tree, the Tree of Life.

These words are from the book of the great Dutch scholar, Herman Wirth. His name can be mentioned to few modern men, even highly educated people, and his works cannot be found in modern university libraries, but the reason for this will be understood later. Nevertheless, Herman Wirth was one of those people who in our century, in this dark period of the Iron Age, the Kali Yuga, did an astonishing amount for the restoration of the Great Tradition from the time of the Golden Age and the mysterious region of Hyperborea – the magical, Apollonian land lying in the Far North. Rene Guenon and Julius Evola spoke of the Primordial Tradition and the polar paradise, and there names are known to all Traditionalists. But very few know of Herman Wirth even though this tall, thin professor, modest and passionate like any genuine scholar, discovered the secret of secrets of this Primordial Tradition, reconstructed its language, revealed the secrets of the ancient runes, and deciphered the message of the Golden Age.

This may seem incredible, but it is a fact. Herman Wirth did no more and no less than recreate the “Sacred Proto-Language of Humanity”, Heilige Urschrift der Menschheit, the very name of one of his thick, astounding, fundamental books.

Herman Wirth was born in 1885 in Utrecht, the Netherlands. His family descended from a line of ancient Frisians, the inhabitants of the northern regions of Holland differing to this day in their unusual height and classical Indo-European facial features. From his childhood, Wirth was interested in the history of his country and his people. He collected tales and legends, and attentively studied the signs and symbols which decorated the homes of ordinary Dutch peasants.

Wirth explored his entire country far and wide. In 1910, he defended his thesis entitled The Degradation of Dutch Folk Song and already in this first work surprised others with his incredible erudition, which subjected to analysis practically all available material relating to Dutch folklore. Moreover, he attempted to construct a general model, a kind of proto-mythology that stood behind all national art and which could help one better understand the holistic worldview of the ancient ancestors. Proceeding from the symbols and elements of Dutch antiquity, Wirth expanded the range of his ethnographic, cultural, symbolical searches first to all the Germanic lands, and then broader to Europe, Eurasia, and, finally, to the regions most distant from Europe itself: America, Oceania, Africa, and so on. In search of a formula that could generalize the worldview of the ancient Aryan ancestors, Wirth moved in a spiral, clarifying, correcting, extending, or re-considering all the information hitherto gathered by linguists, archaeologists, historians of religion and art, anthropologists, etc. His endeavor was one of incredible intensity.

Herman Wirth mastered a few hundred – just imagine, a few hundred! – ancient languages, seeking to find in them some kind of common patterns dating back to forgotten times. The models that Wirth developed anticipated the “Nostratic theory” of Illich-Svitych which appeared only much later, according to which the populations of Europe, Asia, and Africa spoke the same language at the dawn of humanity.

But Herman Wirth was unique by virtue of more than just his dazzling intellect. Unlike the positivist scientific community, he categorically disagreed with confining oneself to small spaces and spending one’s entire life clarifying and and double-checking minor details, as was accepted practice among scholarly circles in the “critical,” pessimistic century. Wirth, like the scholars of the Middle Ages, strove to cover an enormous field of knowledge at one time. His approach was not analytical, but synthetic. Therefore, for a fundamental historical hypothesis he appeals not to chaotic and isolated fragments of modern anthropologists’ studies which idolize fact, but to ancient myths, Tradition, and sacred sources. Like Rene Guenon, Wirth understood that the modern world is an anomaly, regression, and degeneration, and that truth is to be sought in myths, symbols, legends, religions, cults, rites, and folklore.

Yima – the First Man – acted on the advice of Ahura Mazda and built the city of Vara in the Far North surrounded by a wall and brought there the seeds of all the best from people, animals, and plants to preserve them from the fatal winter, the punishment of the spirit of evil, Angra Mainyu, descending upon the sacred land of happiness. Yima built the city of the golden arrow and made the gates luminescent and others into lights. And Spitama Zarathustra asked Ahura Mazda: ‘O creator of the material world, worthy decreer of the Aryans and builder of Asha! What are these lights in the city built by Yima?’ And Ahura Mazda replied: ‘These lights are both eternal and transient. Only once a year do they rise and descend in the city of Vara, the Stars, Moon, and the Sun. The city’s inhabitants believe the whole year to be one Day.

This fragment from the Bundahishn, the sacred book of the Zoroastrians, can be interpreted in different ways, as can many of Tradition’s other indications that in the Far North in forgotten times there existed an amazing country of paradise, Hyperborea (Thulle, Sarahi) where the joyful ancestors of the golden-haired, blue-eyed Aryans lived, the divine race of kings and heroes. Herman Wirth treated Tradition’s message literally, and this allowed him to create a unique theory of the origin of mankind, “Aufgangder Menschheit,” decipher ancient signs, explain the secret, unfathomable sides of archaic symbols, cults, and rituals, grasp the meaning of sacred rites, and restore the long-lost alphabet of the humanity of paradise. This may seem impossible. Why has such a fantastic discovery remained unnoticed by the general public? How can such stunning, breathtaking revelations be passed over? Why are both ordinary people and the scientific community not told of such a scholar’s name? Alas, once again, political incorrectness. Herman Wirth had the temerity to join at a young age the patriotic national movement of Holland, and later Germany. Wirth was the inspiration behind the Dutch youth movement, Dietske Trekvogels, an analogue of the German Wandervogel. This was a broad youth organization whose members visited rural areas, collected national folklore, and invested the typical revolutionary enthusiasm of youth into a paradoxical interest in the archaic. They hated the modern world, the commercial spirit of cities and stock exchanges, and the cynical attitude of the corrupt cosmopolitan hell into which Europe had inexorably slipped at the beginning of the 20th century. The anarchism of the Wandervogel was coupled with love for their people, the customs of their ancestors, and Tradition. By the 1930’s, this tendency could not but become a component part of another political movement whose name alone draws feelings of terror among today’s well-intentioned citizens. The ideas and works of Herman Wirth, the great restorer and discoverer of the most ancient proto-language of humanity, became unfortunately associated with a political regime that became extremely unpopular after the mid 1940’s. In the end, the North and its light, its people, its Tradition, and its symbols henceforth became politically incorrect.

Herman Wirth formulated the foundations of his theory in 1928 in his work Der Aufgang der Menschheit (“The Ascent of Mankind”). He believed that all the mentions of the ancient continent lying at the North Pole are not myths or fantasies, but historical fact. To confirm this hypothesis, he referred to the writings of modern geologists, in particular Wegener, according to whom continents are not in constant rest, but are constantly sliding along the shelf and can therefore move around the globe over fairly large intervals of time. Once upon a time, in the North Pole there existed a continent where different atmospheric conditions reigned. Memory of this continent was preserved in ancient legends, myths, and tales, etc. It is from this continent that the spiritual culture of humanity united in a common formula began to spread.

The basis of this culture, this Hyperborean cult, was not simply the Year, but the Year beheld in polar conditions in which a month lasts six months and six months a night. According to Herman Wirth, descriptions of the Polar Year lay at the heart of all sacred texts and cults, symbols, and signs from the cave paintings and first markings on mammoth bones to the most refined and sophisticated theological and mystical constructs. This fact, which other modern historians of religion and anthropologists had not considered, can be explained very simply. If we merely apply calendric cult circles to the primordial conditions of the lands on which we encounter the remains of ancient cultures, such as Sumeria, India, Eurasia, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, etc., then it is impossible to trace genuine correspondences since only part of the hieroglyphs remain unchanged since Hyperborean, polar times, while a portion were constructed under new, non-polar and non-arctic circumstances. The real key to interpreting ancient symbols is given only by accepting the hypothesis of a polar, nordic origin of civilization. But this hypothesis had never been seriously considered by anyone.

“A Day of the Gods equals one human year” – this assertion can be found in the Rig Veda, the Avesta, Ancient Greek myths, the Germanic sagas, Sumerian epics, and in archaic fragments of the Bible. The German Professor Herman Wirth took this literally and thus proceeded to made an incredible, unheard of discovery.

The first people were not Neanderthaloid idiots huddling in caves and poking each other with sticks as Darwinists, Marxists, and other profane thinkers assert. They were fully-fledged human beings with a refined, simple, yet ultimately spiritual worldview. They were the bearers of the Supreme Religion of Light, Purity, and the Spirit. They did not know of a detached Creator God acting on humanity and nature as if on something external. The whole world was permeated  with divine energies, and people themselves were seen as children of the Sun, descendants of Gods, as angelic, supreme beings professing a particular world view, a God-worldview, or Gottesweltanschauung. They did not need morality or laws insofar as moral and religious law was in them. These were tall, blond-haired and blue-eyed beings for whom ill thoughts, the spirit of greed, lust for power, and other subhuman defects were alien. Interestingly enough, Wirth was for some time close to the Dutch Communists, in whose plans he saw a return to the primordial, supreme, Nordic system. Of course, the Nordic-Aryan communism of Professor Wirth somewhat differed from the Marxian utopia. Wirth put forth the theory of a polar “proto-monotheism,” a “proto-God.” All elements of this most ancient ritual were in strict accordance with the harmony of cosmic Nature. There were no strict barriers between the human, natural, social, religious, and temporal.

Dualism was unknown. Thought and matter, spirit and substance, the particular and the whole, the natural and the social, and the divine and non-divine all existed in total harmony and determined a single formula, knowledge of which can be deciphered by not only linguistic and symbolic figures – products of artificial human origin – but the language of nature, the voices of animals, plants, rocks, and mountains. Here Wirth ultimately transcends the materialism generally accepted at the time in scholarly circles. He believed that the great sacred formula lying at the heart of polar civilization was not simply a description of the external world, but magical thought itself given flesh. “God creates thinking”, Wirth quotes the famous phrase of an Icelandic runic song. Knowledge is Being, both coinciding and each having no right to eminency. Therefore, to understand and to create are one and the same. Tradition is not an aggregate simply describing historical facts, but an absolutely living thing that is outside time and space. He who is able to reveal its secrets, changes not simply in the sense of broadening his knowledge, but is transformed within. Such an approach might be understood by believers, but not highbrowed and snobby professors with crooked mouths and short brains accustomed to believing poisonous doubt and selfish skepticism to be the scientific norm.

Germany’s scientific community ganged up on Herman Wirth. His ideas were regarded as extravagant and too radical. Essentially no objections were brought forth to seriously converse with this great erudite scholar, as all that was necessary was possessing qualities that opponents simply do not have. The main criticisms leveled concerned the “idealistic” approach and excessive trust which Wirth supposedly put in sacred sources. But today, after the research of Dumezil, Eliade, Levi-Strauss, Kerenyi, Jung, etc., scholars’ doubts back then seem to be completely unfounded. But the positivist approach still dominated then. Nevertheless, Wirth paid little attention to the attacks by his colleagues and continued to explore the Nordic Tradition and ascertain the secret formula, knowledge of which, in his opinion is, like Archimedes’ lever, capable of changing the world.

In studying the proto-language of humanity, Herman Wirth reached the astonishing conclusion that runic writing and especially the runic calendric circles discovered in Northern Europe are the remnants of Hyperborean proto-writing. They are not distorted Latin or a degenerate variant of the Mediterranean Phoenician alphabet. On the contrary, they are traces of the great symbolic circle out of which other historical alphabets developed much later, including the Phoenician one, which boasts no supremacy over other types of writing. But runes and their meaning can be understood only by accepting the hypothesis of the existence of the Polar Continent, Hyperborea, as their meaning, name, and distribution on calendric circles reveal their sense only in relation to the natural phenomenon that take place in the Arctic. Scholars have therefore been incapable of putting the pieces of this historical puzzle together and weave together the different details of archaeological and anthropological glimpses. Of course, primordial runes greatly differed from those known today. But they can be restored. In the thousands of pages he authored, Herman Wirth examined thousands of illustrations, ancient symbols, rock carvings, patterns on ancient household items, pottery, various tools, etc. All of this brings us closer to the much sought secret, the original runic circle.

The center of this circle is the winter solstice. The Great Yule is the main celebration of the Hyperborean Year. In it is the secret of the runes and the Primordial Tradition. In Hyperborea, Yule was celebrated on December 22nd. On December 22nd every year, the true New Year arrived, the moment of the birth of the runes, the moment of the Eternal Return, the second in which Hyperborea stood outside of time and space, pulled away from the cycles of the dark age, the confusion in the South, false theories, and miserable neglect of Supreme Magical Purity…Vara, Varahi, Ultima Thule…

Herman Wirth argued that the secrets of the runes were originally kept not by male priests, but priestesses. White Ladies. Weise Frau – Weisse Frau. The words “wisdom”, “woman,” and “white” are indeed closely related in many languages. Pallas is the Goddess of Wisdom, and the Sophia of the Gnostics is also an embodiment of knowledge and the feminine element in the Divine. The Russian word mudrost’ (wisdom) is similar to the German Made, Madchen or Maiden, Girl. Hence the ancient cult of the vestal virgins, the keepers of the sacred fire in Rome. Here we should also include the practice of the female priesthood in the early Christian church, and the Old Believers’ theory of “salvation through one’s wife.” Following Bachofen, Herman Wirth claimed that the Primordial Tradition was none other than matriarchal. It was the realm of the White Lady, the Pure Virgin. The primordial Nordic Pantheon was headed by a Goddess – not female in our patriarchal understanding of a capricious, stupid, cruel, and demanding being – but as the special, Most Pure Creation, a kind of Androgyne standing beyond dualism, its spiritual intuition penetrating the essence of things. The Polar Paradise, the Aryan race, the Primordial Tradition, the domination of the White Lady, the guardians of the runic cults and priestess of the dolmens and menhirs – for Wirth these are synonyms. Wirth thus insists on the primordial matriarchy of the polar Tradition.

In practice, this manifested itself in him professing a particular form of “Germanic Aryan Feminism.” The following picture of sacred archetypes in history is developed in Wirth’s work: Primordial matriarchy is deemed intrinsic to the northern peoples, the first bearers of culture. The other tribes of the earth received from them the foundations of cults, language, ritual, and myth. But as a result of mixing with the peoples of the South, the messengers of the North gradually lost Tradition’s proportions, forgot the meaning of the runes, and tweaked their religious-calendric rituals under new natural conditions. With this arose the new institute of priesthood in which the main role is henceforth played by men. The Germanic peoples, and especially the ancestors of the Dutch and the Frisians, were the last upholders of Aryan matriarchy, although other Indo-European peoples who adopted the practice of determining their identity through the mother’s line did belong to this category. These are the legendary Tuatha Dé Danann, the “tribes  of the goddess Danu” from the Irish sagas, the Frisians as the “children of Freya”, etc. Gradually mixed cultural forms thus yielded patriarchy, which came to be perfected among Middle Eastern ethnoi, especially the Semitic peoples.

Indo-European civilizations themselves came to be subjected to the influence of these new cults. The Ancient Hyperborean priestess institutions were abolished, demonized, or reduced to vestigial forms.

These ideas cost Herman Wirth very much. In the 1920’s, when he began presenting and widely promoting his Aryan-feminist views, he found himself an implacable enemy in the face of an immigrant from Russia’s Baltic lands, a certain Alfred Rosenberg who, on the contrary, believed patriarchy to be an indigenous Aryan institution. Unlike Wirth, Rosenberg was a pedant, a mediocrity, and aggressive plagiarist. But it was not even about his ideas…Herman Wirth was the archetype of a passionate scholar, a visionary, and seer. Rosenberg was a pathetic doctrinaire who regurgitated undigested fragments of knowledge and pretentiously arranged these scraps in his rash and meaningless book The Myth of the Twentieth Century. Unfortunately, it was this Baltic official embroiled in ressentiment who happened to determine the cultural police of the National Socialists who won in 1933. It is no wonder that afterwards the best intellectual and spiritual forces of the German Conservative Revolution – such people as Junger, Heidegger, Hielscher, and Wirth himself – were finally pushed into the opposition camp.

In 1932, German Wirth founded a society for the study of ancient cultures under the name Ancestors’ Heritage, or Ahnenerbe. In 1933, this organized came under the control of Heinrich Himmler, who was Rosenberg’s main opponent and rival among the Nazi leadership. For all this time, Herman Wirth continued his intense research into elucidating the secrets of the origin of mankind, language, ancient cultures, and primordial cults. The Ahnenerbe organized unique expeditions to the North Sea where, Wirth presumed, the traces of the ancient civilizations of the Hyperboreans were supposed to remain – such as in Dogger Bank or Dogger Shallows, the lands flooded relatively recently, altogether some 12,000 years ago. According to Wirth’s reconstruction, these are the lands of Ponseti or Forseti, Forsetiland, a remnant of the even more ancient continent of Mo-Uru. The expeditions acquired unique findings. In parallel, Wirth directed Schaeffer’s expedition to Tibet to check his hypothesis on the preservation of remains of Hyperborean culture in the Gobi desert and Western Tibet, in the mountainous land of Shan, the homeland of the Bon religion.

The Ahnenerbe juxtaposed enormous amounts of archaeological, paleo-epigraphical, as well as ethnological and linguistic materials at the organization’s disposal. Unique research unprecedented in scale and depth was carried out. Moreover, the majority of the Ahnenerbe’s leaders did not at all share the official regime’s totalitarianism and chauvinism. In the opinion of Wirth and his pupils, the descendants of the Hyperboreans, or pure Aryans, are currently among all of the earth’s peoples regardless of skin color, and Europeans, including Germans, were not vested with any kind of superiority in this regard. All of this inevitably led Wirth into the opposition. Wirth’s pupil and disciple, Wolfram Sievers and Friedrich Hielscher became the heads of an anti-Hitler conspiracy. They helped numerous persecuted people, including Jews, escape and relocate to safe places. Unsurprisingly, while head of the Ahnenerbe in 1938, Herman Wirth, not being a member of the National Socialist German Workers Party, was removed from his office and put under scrupulous surveillance by the Gestapo. His home was searched and many valuable artifacts were taken from his personal collection. His whole endeavor was thus ruined by conformists and idiots. Alas, this repeats itself constantly in history. One only has to demonstrate some kind of unique, lively, creative, fantastic, avant-garde initiative for thick, sullenly stupid, envious, and incompetent scum to grossly ruin the whole thing. Just as in science, thus it is in politics and art. The only true racism would be that directed against aggressive mediocrities and vain but swift empty heads, members of the ubiquitous “conspiracy of mediocrities”, the secret order of those with average capabilities united to constantly and invariably destroy the glorious plans of heroes and geniuses.

And so, Herman Wirth fell into disgrace and came under supervision by the secret police. If not for the intervention of his friend and colleague, a sophisticated mystic and lover of antiquity, Walter Darré, Wirth would not have avoided a concentration camp. But what do you do? Alas, this is the dark age, the triumph of lies and dishonesty. Injustice is the law of the epoch when the wheel of Dharma flies off of its axis…

Herman Wirth explained everything, such as why there exists the custom of putting up a Christmas tree. It turns out that this is a very ancient ritual, in which the tree symbolizes the World Tree, whose origins date back to the point of the winter solstice, the shortest day, and the crown at the top is the summer solstice, June 22nd. The months in a year are the branches and the ornaments are days. The spruce is the eternally green tree, in this respect similar to the Year or the biblical Burning Bush. The year moves, but remains the same just as pine needles do not change their color over the course of the year. The burning bush on Mount Sinai burns, but does not burn out. Wirth traces the Russian name for spruce, yel, back the ancient root ii or ei, referring to Light and the Divine as well as sacred artifacts symbolizing Light. The gifts placed under the Christmas tree are the New Year, the new world, fresh and full of new energy. There also exists the custom of stuffing boots or stockings with gifts. These are meant to not be matching. This symbolizes the fact that Time crosses the magical line of Yule with one foot, the winter solstice, while the other leg is left in the old year. The lights on the tree represent the sun at different stages of its yearly movement. For this very same reason, Ded Moroz’s (or Santa Claus’) red coat depicts a large, solar circle. Ded Moroz himself once represented a Light Deity, the Ancient-in-Days. Later his functions were taken over by Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker whose holiday is celebrated by the Church shortly before the winter solstice. Even the downward-slanted branches of the tree, according to Wirth, have symbolic meaning. This repeats the runic sign Tiu, the man with down-stretched hands. This symbolizes the half of the year over the course of which the polar sun descends downwards spirally to the dark regions of night. According to Wirth, Tiu, Tyr, and Tuisto are not simply the names of ancient deities in German paganism. After all, paganism was a perversion of the ancient proto-monotheism which came along with patriarchal usurpation. The Aryan ancestors never recognized the existence of separate, individualized deities. They worshipped the One World imbued with the presence of the One God whose signs of manifestation changed, unfolding in time and space, but while remaining essentially the same, the Self. Paganism arose out of the crisis of the primordial Nordic matriarchy. The White Lady, the Snow Queen, and our Snegurochka paradoxically turn out to be figures more ancient and more authentic than Ded Moroz. The True Mistress of the Great Yule, the winter solstice, is die Weisse Frau, die Weise Frau. She immaculately gives birth in this fantastic moment to the New Divine Eon, the New Year, the new God. It all fits together. It is no coincidence that Herman Wirth called the primordial Hyperborean tradition the somewhat strange combination of “polar Christianity”.

The New Year. The Great Yule. The rune tiu, i.e., the man with down-stretched hands, descends to the roots of the World Tree. This is the point of death. This is the center of hell. And in the Christian tradition, Satan himself is distinguished by all the features of the symbolic complex describing the signs of the winter solstice. Satan and devils have tails and tridents. Have you ever wondered why? Because the trident pointed downwards is the rune ig, the clear sign of the roots of the World Tree. And this rune is found at the point of the winter solstice. Such is also the meaning of the Greek Neptune’s trident.

The underworld in mythology is associated with being underwater, as in Lithuanian, in which jura means sea. The devils’ tails complement their bipedalism up to the fullness of the sacred sign. In fact, Satan limps for the same reason that a stocking with gifts is put by the Christmas tree for children. And the devils’ tridents, with which they actively stir their sinners in their cauldrons (which in themselves are also symbols of Yule) finally complete the picture. They are black and live underground. The fire of hell is an infernal version of the Christmas Lights, etc. Thanks to Herman Wirth’s formula, one can interpret all ancient and modern folklore and theology, the meaning of rites, and even the message of Nature. And this is embodied in the primordial Hyperborean language whose beginning was God. Gott ist Angang jeglicher Sprache. Martin Heidegger argued something similar when he said that Poetry lies at the basis of language. According to Wirth, language is not an instrument for formulating messages and expressions, but is in itself the higher Message and most important Expression. But modern people are deaf to this reality. They crudely and in a utilitarian manner use what furnishes first decoding, consciousness, understanding and only then – in fact, then you don’t want to tolerate and listen to all of this nonsense to which you’ve become so accustomed and which seems to us to be something familiar and obvious. But this is a propos; let us return again to the devils.

After all, it is known that on New Years night, the forces of hell rise up out of the ground to harass and frighten the two-legged. Everything that Gogol wrote is pure truth, and he even left out a lot that we would regret. And so, devils have horns. But why? Herman Wirth says that this is another rune, the rune ka, the man with raised hands and two upward-angled lines. These luminous horns are depicted on Moses’ brow. Two raised hands are also an Egyptian hieroglyph denoting a resurrecting soul. And in Egyptian it sounds – don’t be surprised – the same as the typical Icelandic rune ka. Thus, Death is tiu, and Resurrection is ka. The sacrificial descent into hell precedes the Great Yule, after which follows the victorious ascent. Before this magical point, God – the Light of the World – the Christmas Tree – Man – Priest – Priestess – the White Lady lower their hands. Tiu. Afterwards, their hands are lifted up. Ka or Kai. The birth of the new.

This is the meaning of initiation – transitioning from the old to the new, from the profane to the enlightened, from the mortal to the immortal, from the material to the spiritual. The Great Yule is the moment of initiation, dedication. Inside the heart, inside the small ventricle of the heart, in the cave, in a manger, in the place of the Brahma is born a new being, homo novus, Sonnenmensch.

Herman Wirth’s work is the metaphysics of the New Year, the reconstruction of the New Language – the unified Language which was spoken before the dispersion of Babel. This is the Nordic glossolalia, systematized and explained. All Kabbalistic designs, not to mention the pathetic attempts of modern occultism, fade before such a picture. Wirth operates with realities much more ancient than the emergence of the Ancient Hebrew or Phoenician writing systems which are in official Mediterranean scholarship considered to be the most culturally ancient. Herman Wirth easily interprets the Bible, every one of its tales, all of its linguistic difficulties, every symbol, and every passage. All the theology of Leviticus collapses before our very eyes. The Old Testament is a detailed narrative of the primordial Tradition and the Hyperborean formula, but not the only and unique one. Rather, it is one equal among other mythological constructs such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Greek, Iranian, Slavic, and Germanic mythologies, and the myths of the Indians, Malays, Africans, and peoples of Oceania. The ritual tattoos of the Maori peoples, the special initiatic language of their wisemen, and the West African alphabet of the Bamun script all suggest a divine reality that is just as clear (and perhaps even clearer) as the amazing and poetic passages of the Torah. In fact, Herman Wirth dedicated his enormous book of more than 1000 pages, Palestinabuch, to this subject. But, alas, no one, no matter how much they desire, can read it. In 1969, it was stolen from the old professor’s home by unknown assailants. Someone really did not want this veritable interpretation of the Old Testament to exist, even in manuscript form.

In 1945, Herman Wirth, after seven years of Gestapo surveillance, was interned in a concentration camp. What was left of his collection by the Gestapo beasts was destroyed by the “civilized” Americans. For two years, Herman Wirth – a sworn enemy of narrow German chauvinism and a member of the anti-Hitler underground – went through tortuous and humiliating de-Nazification. But the victors were not interested in nuances. They were even less concerned about the spiritual proto-language of humanity, the Northern ancestral home, the pre-Babel language, and the secrets of the runes. One side of the winners was not interested in anything more than money and comfort, while the other half was completely absorbed in its own totalitarianism and Engels’ illusory and rather simpleminded constructs. The very fact that Herman Wirth was a “Nordicist” and held to the theory of “cultural circles” (Kulturkreise), which was considered an indicator of “misanthropy”, proved to be sufficient grounds to expunge his name from official scholarship along with Klages, Baeumler, Kossina, Teudt, Horbiger, and others. Wirth was still lucky, however, as his disciple and successor Wolfram Sievers – who was also a leading member of the underground involved in an assassination attempt on Hitler and preparing an assassination attempt on Himmler – was altogether executed as a result of the Nuremberg Trials. But in the era of the Winter Solstice, in the midst of the Polar Night, such an outcome is natural.

Heidegger said: “Modern people are so far removed from the light of Being that they are unaware that they live in darkness. In complete absence of Light, the darkness itself ceases to be darkness for sake of nothing for comparison.” Wirth argued the same point, only he identified Light and Being with understanding the Divine Year, the source of language, thought, symbols, and spiritual teachings. Herman Wirth wrote:

The sacred meaning of the Year is completely unknown to modern, city-dwelling man. For him the year is only an abstract, temporal understanding in no way different from all other intervals of time along which modern “socio-economic” life operates. The year is known to him only on the calendar, in business records, and wardrobe changes. Modern urban man is no longer in step with the rhythm of creation. His encounter with the God Year in nature occurs only sporadically, during vacation or natural disasters. In order to return to the experience of the Year, modern man must “recover” from his civilized existence that is separated from the experience of being. As the pace of work and life is becoming faster, even the gap with the more human Year, with the cycle of man’s Destiny-Life, is increasing. In need of “recovering” are none other than those “social” people who, freed from all the natural laws of the God Year, turn night into day, and day into night, and make “optimal use of time” while they are in fact killing time. The God Year in nature refreshed men, but they can no longer find an inner path to it. If they understood its very meaning, they would have never set off in mad pursuit of Mammon, making money into a goal of life; they would have not started believing that senseless industrialization and the enlargement of cities is inevitable; and they would not be mired in such deep materialism that seals the poverty, weakness, and nothingness of their soul, the soul of ‘modern humanity.” The main reason for all ills is modern men’s fall from the eternal rhythm of the God Year. They themselves do not live, but are lived by something extraneous, something alien. They rot in their bodies and souls and grow old even in youth.

Herman Wirth lived to a very old age and died in 1981. His whole life was struggle, selfless activism, and preparing Spiritual Revolution. Not long before his death, he said in an interview to a small regional German journal, Humus: “Mein Leben ist immer geistige Revolutions-Arbeit gewesen” (“My life has always been working towards Spiritual Revolution”). Like all heroes in dark times, on the external level he was met with defeat, but on the spiritual level with Triumph and Victory. The blacker the night, the closer are the rays of the Golden Dawn, Aurora Consurgens. Among us lived a man who revealed great secrets, the secret cyphers of the Past, a man who reconstructed in its entirety the language of the great Primordial Tradition, but who remains virtually unknown, unnoticed, misunderstood, and unread. Despite the fact that Julius Evola called Herman Wirth one of his three teachers (along with Guenon and Guido da Giorgio), and despite the fact that Guenon himself dedicated his most important review of the cycles and symbolism of human races to Wirth, Traditionalists to this day altogether ignore this great author. This is so strange that it even arouses suspicion. Are even the chosen ones in the shadows and shroud of cosmic midnight? Does their carelessness and desire to at any price hold on to imaginary orthodoxy not expose their own parody and fraud? 

But Herman Wirth’s work has not been lost. The Light of the North beats in our hearts. The Snow Queen has taken our souls and enchanted them with the spells of polar dreams. There, in the Arctic night, in Arctogaia, we, under the initiatic name of Kai – the resurrected, risen, and belonging to the spring half of the Divine Year – piece together out of icicles the magic word, EWIGKEIT, the favorite word of the German professor, Herman Wirth.

Counter-Hegemony in the Theory of the Multipolar World

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

From Leviathan No. 5 [Moscow, Eurasian Movement: 2013] 

The most important aspect of the Theory of the Multipolar World (TMW) is the concept of counter-hegemony as first formulated in the context of the Critical Theory of International Relations (IR). In transitioning from Critical Theory to the Theory of the Multipolar World[i], this concept also undergoes a special sense of transformation which should be examined in more detail. In order to render such an analysis possible, we should first recall the main positions of the theory of hegemony with the framework of Critical Theory.   

The Concept of Hegemony in Realism

Although the concept of hegemony in Critical Theory is based on Antonio Gramsci’s theory, it is necessary to distinguish this concept’s position on Gramscianism and neo-Gramscianism from how it is understood in the realist and neo-realist schools of IR.

The classical realists use the term “hegemony” in a relative sense and understand it as the “actual and substantial superiority of the potential power of any state over the potential of another one, often neighboring countries.” Hegemony might be understood as a regional phenomenon, as the determination of whether one or another political entity is considered a “hegemon” depends on scale. Thucydides introduced the term itself when he spoke of Athens and Sparta as the hegemons of the Peloponnesian War, and classical realism employs this term in the same way to this day. Such an understanding of hegemony can be described as “strategic” or “relative.”

In neo-realism, “hegemony” is understood in a global (structural) context. The main difference from classical realism lies in that “hegemony” cannot be regarded as a regional phenomenon. It is always a global one. The neorealism of K. Waltz, for example, insists that the balance of two hegemons (in a bipolar world) is the optimal structure of power balance on a world scale[ii]. R. Gilpin believes that hegemony can be combined only with unipolarity, i.e., it is possible for only a single hegemon to exist, this function today being played by the USA.

In both cases, the realists comprehend hegemony as a means of potential correlation between the potentials of different state powers. 

Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony is completely different and finds itself in a completely opposite theoretical field. To avoid the misuse of this term in IR, and especially in the TMW, it is necessary to pay attention to Gramsci’s political theory, the context of which is regarded as a major priority in Critical Theory and TMW. Moreover, such an analysis will allows us to more clearly see the conceptual gap between Critical Theory and TMW.

Antonio Gramsci’s Hegemony Concept

Antonio Gramsci based his theory, later known as Gramscianism, on his understanding of Marxism and its practical embodiment in history. As a Marxist, Gramsci was convinced that socio-political history is completely predetermined by the economic factor and, like all Marxists, he explains the superstructure (Aufbau) through the base (infrastructure). Bourgeois society is in essence a class society in which the processes of exploitation reach their most concentrated expression in the form of the ownership of the means of production and the appropriation of the surplus value arising in the production process by the bourgeoisie. Inequality in the economic sphere (the base) and the domination of Capital over Labor composes the essence of capitalism and accordingly determines all social, political, and cultural semantics (the superstructure).

This thesis is shared by all Marxists, and there is nothing new or original here. But then Antonio Gramsci asked: how was a proletarian socialist revolution possible in Russia where, from Marx’s point of view (analyzing the situation in the Russian Empire in the 19th century from a prognostic perspective) and from the point of view of classical European Marxism from the beginning of the 20th century, the objective base (the underdevelopment of capitalist relations, a small proletariat, the predominance of the agricultural sector in the country’s total GDP, the absence of bourgeois political system, etc) excluded the possibility of a Communist party coming to power? After all, Lenin made this possible and began to build socialism.

Gramsci understands this phenomenon as fundamentally important, calling it “Leninism”. In Gramsci’s understanding, Leninism was the vanguard, advanced action of a consolidated and strong political superstructure (in the form of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks) in seizing political power. Once such a vanguard becomes a relevant factor, and revolution is successful, then it should rapidly develop the base through the accelerated creation of the superstructures whose according economic realities have not yet been implemented under capitalism, i.e., industrialization, modernization, “electrification”, “public education,” etc. Thus, Gramsci drew the conclusion that under certain circumstances politics (the superstructure) can stay ahead of the economy (the base). The Communist Party can “get in front” of the “natural” development of historical processes. Consequently, Leninism proves the existence of the significant autonomy of the superstructure in regards to the base.

But Leninism, as Gramsci understood it, was limited to the political segment of the superstructure, in which the functioning of law and government and the issue of domination are already solved. Gramsci insisted that the superstructure has yet another important segment which is not political in the fullest sense, i.e., not merely associated with political parties or bound to the issue of political power. Gramsci called this sphere “civil society.” Such a notion, however, should always be accompanied with the qualification of “civil society as understood by Gramsci”, for its meaning does not always coincide with the one that it is assigned in liberal theories. Gramsci’s civil society is the “zone of expansion” for the intellectual parts of society including science, culture, philosophy, art, analytics, journalism, etc. The Marxist, for Gramsci, relies on the regularity of the base in this domain, as for the whole superstructure. But…Leninism demonstrated that the regularity of the base, in some cases, is overcome by the relative autonomy of the superstructure, which advances ahead of the base’s processes. The experience of the Russian Revolution, as an historical example, demonstrated how politics is realized at the level of the superstructure. But here Gramsci emphasizes that, if this is so in the case of the political sphere of the superstructure, then why could something similar not happen at the level of “civil society?” It is at this point that Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” appears.[iii] He successively outlines something analogous to the economic division of Capital vs. Labor in the base, or the contradiction between the bourgeois party and government vs. the proletarian party and government (as in the Soviet Union), can take place in the intellectual sphere (Gramsci’s “civil society”). This third realm of contradiction is termed “hegemony” by Gramsci, where bourgeois consciousness and proletarian consciousness vie for domination relatively autonomous from both politics and the economy.

Studying bourgeois sociology[iv], the German sociologist Werner Sombart showed that leisure is valuable for this third category, or third “class,” which partially possesses such comfort while other social groups either do not know or do not have such. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit[v] similarly says that the Slave operates not by his own consciousness, but the Master’s consciousness. As is known, this and other elements of Hegel formed the foundation for Marx’s communist ideology. Continuing this chain of thought, Gramsci concluded that the adoption or rejection of hegemony (bourgeois consciousness structures) does not and cannot directly depend on the fact of belonging to the bourgeois class (in the sense of the base) or from political involvement in a bourgeois party or administrative system. Being on the side of hegemony, or against it, according to Gramsci, is a free choice. As an intellectual chooses it consciously, he is transformed from a “traditional” intellectual into an “organic” intellectual, i.e., one who consciously takes his/her stance on hegemony.

This leads to an important conclusion. The intellectual may oppose bourgeois hegemony even while living comfortably in a society in which capitalist relations are the basis and bourgeois political domination prevails. The intellectual can reject or accept hegemony freely, i.e., he has a gap of freedom similar to the autonomy of the political in regards to the economic base (as seen in the Bolshevik experience in Russia). In other words, one can be the carrier of proletarian consciousness and stand on the side of the laboring class for a just society even while being at the heart of bourgeois society. Everything depends on the intellectuals’ choice. Hegemony is thus a matter of conscience.

Gramsci himself came to such conclusions based on his analysis of political processes in Italy in the 1920’s-30’s[vi]. During this period, according to his analysis, the conditions prevailing in Italy were quite ripe for socialist revolution in terms of both the base (developed industrial capitalism and the sharpening of class contradictions and struggle) and the superstructure (the political successes of consolidated leftist parties). But, despite these seemingly favorable conditions, according to Gramsci’s further analysis, leftist forces failed in the intellectual field. It was here that Italy was most oppressed by bourgeois hegemony, who constantly introduced bourgeois stereotypes and clichés into popular consciousness even though these contradicted economic and political realities and the popularity of active, anti-bourgeois circles. In Gramsci’s view, Mussolini applied hegemony in his favor (fascism was disgusting for communists, who saw it as a form of domination by the bourgeois classes) and prevented an “artificial” socialist revolution from appearing in accordance with the natural historical course of events. In other words, despite waging (relatively) successful political battles, the Italian Communists overlooked “civil society”, the intellectual sphere, and the “metapolitical” fight. Gramsci saw this as the cause of their defeat.

Gramscianism has since been adopted by the European Left (especially the New Left) and left-wing movements in Europe have applied Gramscianism in practice since the 1960’s. The Leftist (Marxist) intellectuals (Sartre, Camus, Aragon, Foucault, etc.) were able to implant anti-bourgeois concepts and theories in the center of social and cultural life, thus taking advantage of publications, newspapers, clubs, and university departments which were integral parts of the capitalist economy, and they acted in the political context of the domination of the bourgeois system. They went on to prepare the events of 1968 which swept across Europe and the left turn of European politics in the 1970’s. Just as Leninism proved in practice that the political segment of the superstructure has a certain degree of autonomy, in the sphere of which activism can accelerate the processes unfolding at the base, so did the Gramscianism of the New Left demonstrate the efficacy and practical value of an active intellectual strategy in practice.

Gramscianism in Critical Theory: the Left Pivot

The Gramscianism which we have described has been integrated into IR Critical Theory by its modern representatives such as Robert Cox[vii], Stephen Gill[viii], etc. In Postmodernism, the autonomy of “civil society” was furthered and, consequently, the phenomenon of the intellectuals’ choice of hegemony and the placement of epistemological straggles above political processes and economic structures in general preserved the continuity of Marxist, leftist discourse. In this view, capitalism is regarded as generally better (more “progressive”) than pre-capitalist socio-economic systems even if it is obviously worse in comparison to any post-capitalist (socialist and communist) model by which it is to be replaced. This explains the structure of the project of counter-hegemony[ix]. IR Critical Theory remains leftist in its understanding of the historical process. One can describe this perspective in the following way: according to the representatives of Critical Theory, hegemony (bourgeois society culminating in the hologram of bourgeois consciousness) replaces that which “hegemonized” it (types of pre-bourgeois formations with inherent forms of pre-modern collective consciousness) only then to be subverted by counter-hegemony which, upon victory, is to establish post-hegemony. In the Communist Manifesto[x], Marx and Engels themselves insisted on the different ways in which communists’ opposition to the bourgeoisie has nothing to do with the claims against the bourgeoisie advanced by anti-bourgeois feudalists, nationalists, Christian socialists, etc. Capitalism is pure evil which concentrates in itself (albeit not so clearly and explicitly) previous forms of social exploitation. In order to defeat this evil, it must first be allowed to fully manifest itself, and only then can it be eradicated, instead of retouching its most odious features which only delays the horizon of revolution and communism. This must be taken into account when considering the structure of the neo-Gramscian analysis of international relations.

This analysis divides all countries into those in which hegemony is obviously strengthened (developed capitalist countries featuring industrial economies, the domination of bourgeois parties in parliamentary democracies organized in accordance with the example of the nation-state, a developed market economy, and a liberal legal system) and those in which, by virtue of various historical circumstances, such factors have not appeared. The first group of countries are called the “developed democratic powers” and the second are “borderline cases,” “problematic areas,” or even categorized as “rogue states.” The leftist (Marxist, neo-Maxist, and Gramscian) analysis is totally applicable in the countries in which hegemony is strengthened. However, in the case of countries displaying “incomplete hegemony”, things should be regarded in a different way.

Gramsci himself places these countries under the “Caesarist” category (seeing the experience of fascist Italy as a clear reference). “Caesarism” can be regarded in a broad sense as any political system in which bourgeois relations exist in fragmented form while their full political arrangement (in the form of classic bourgeois-democratic states) has been delayed. In “Caesarism,” the main point is not authoritarian rule, but the delay of the full realization of a fully-fledged, Western-style capitalist system (both base and superstructure). The reasons for this “delay” can vary from dictatorial styles of government, clan elites, and the presence of religious or ethnic groups in power to the cultural characteristic of a given society or the historical circumstances of a particular economic or geographical location, etc. What is first and foremost important is that in such a society hegemony acts both as an external force (from bourgeois states and societies) and as an internal opposition, which in one way or another is connected with external factors.

In IR, the neo- Gramscians insist that “Caesarism” is “incomplete hegemony.” Thus, its strategy is to ensure a balance between external and internal hegemonic pressures by granting certain concessions, all the while doing so only selectively in order to maintain power and prevent seizure by bourgeois political forces of the political superstructure presiding over the economic base of society. Caesarism is thus doomed to “transformism” (from the Italian transformismo), i.e., the permanent adjustment of hegemony, that very force which Caesarism constantly desires to delay or deflect down a false trajectory, the end of which is steadily approaching.

In this regard, IR Critical Theory considers “Caesarism” to be something that will sooner or later be eliminated by hegemony, as this phenomenon is nothing more than a “historical delay” rather than an alternative, i. e., a counter-hegemony in itself.

According to the representatives of modern IR Critical Theory, such“Caesarism” is obviously represented by most of the countries of the Third World and the major powers included in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Taking into account such characteristics, the limitations in such a conceptualization of counter-hegemony presented by the IR Critical Theory become clear as does the pure utopianism of alternative projects, such as Cox’s “counter-society”, which represents something expressionless and undefined. They proceed from the vague project of socio-political world order, which is supposed to appear “after liberalism”[xi]  (Immanuel Wallerstein) and conform to the usual left-wing communist utopia. A similar version of counter-hegemony is also limited by the fact that it hastily pushes numerous other political phenomena, which are obviously unrelated to hegemony and lean towards alternative versions of world order, into the category of “Caesarism”, and thus “incomplete hegemony.” This deprives these alternatives of any consideration as to their development towards an effective counter-hegemonic strategy. Nonetheless, it is this general analysis of the structure of international relations in the light of neo-Gramscian methodology which constitutes an extremely important trajectory for developing the TMW.

However, in order to overcome the limitations inherent to Critical Theory and fully exploit the potential in neo-Gramscianism, we should qualitatively expand this approach, going beyond left (and even “leftist”) discourse, which places the entire structure in the zone of ideological sectarianism and marginal exoticism (where such is currently found). In this regard, invaluable assistance can be found in the ideas of the French philosopher Alain de Benoist.

“Right Wing Gramscianism” – Alain de Benoist’s Revision

Back in the 1980s, the French representative of the “New Right” (“Nouvelle Droite”), Alain de Benoist, directed attention towards Gramsci’s ideas from the point of view of their methodological capacity[xii]. Just like Gramsci, de Benoist revealed the centrality of meta-politics as a special area of intellectual activity that prepares (in the form of a “passive revolution”) further political and economic changes. The success of the “New Left” in France, and in Europe in general, only confirms the effectiveness of this approach.

Unlike the majority of French intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century, Alain de Benoist was not a supporter of Marxism, a fact which isolated his position. However, de Benoist nonetheless built his political philosophy upon a radical rejection of liberal and bourgeois values, a negation capitalism, individualism, modernism, as well as a rejection of geopolitical Atlanticism and Western Eurocentrism. Moreover, he contrasted “Europe” to the “West” as  two antagonistic concepts. For de Benoist, Europe is the field of deployment of a special cultural Logos handed down from the Greeks which intensely combined the richness of the Celtic, Germanic, Latin, Slavic, and other European traditions. The “West”, on the other hand, is equivalent to the mechanistic, materialist, rationalist civilization based on the predominance of technology over other spheres. Alain de Benoist, like Oswald Spengler, understood the “West” as the “decline of Europe” and, along with F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger, he is convinced of the need to overcome modernity as nihilism and “the abandonment of Being in the world” (Seinsverlassenheit). In this regard, the “West” is identical to the very liberalism, capitalism, and bourgeois society against which the New Right strove to fight. At the same time, although not being materialists, the New Right agreed with the key significance assigned by Gramsci and his followers to “civil society.” For example, Alain de Benoist came to the conclusion that the phenomenon which Gramsci called “hegemony” is a set of strategies, attitudes, and values which he considered to be “pure evil.” This led to the proclamation of the principle of “Gramscianism from the Right.”

This Gramscianism “of the right” means recognizing the autonomy of “civil society” as understood by Gramsci as well as identifying the phenomenon of hegemony in this sphere and the personal choice of one’s ideological position on the opposite side from hegemony. Alain de Benoist has published a programmatic work entitled Europe and the Third World – One and the Same Battle[xiii] which entirely bases itself on the parallels between the struggle of the peoples of the Third World against bourgeois neocolonialism and the will of European nations to free themselves from the dictatorship of the bourgeois market society and the morality and praxis of traders, and replace such a system with heroic ethics[xiv] (Werner Sombart).

The crucial importance of this “right-wing Gramscianism” for TMW is that such an understanding of “hegemony” that allows one to transcend leftist and Marxist discourse and reject the bourgeois order at the base (economy) and the superstructure (politics and civil society) not after hegemony has become a total planetary and global factor, but in spite of it. Hence the extremely importance nuance imbued with meaning in the title of de Benoist’s second programmatic work, Against Liberalism[xv], which contrasts to the neo-Marxist Immanuel Wallerstein’s After Liberalism[xvi]. For de Benoist, the “after” cannot be counted on. In any case, one must not let liberalism be allowed to become an accomplish fact. Liberalism must be opposed here and now and must be fought from any position at any point in the world. Hegemony attacks on a planetary scale and finds its bearers in the developed bourgeois societies as well as in those societies in which capitalisms has not yet been definitively established. Therefore, counter-hegemony should be perceived as something beyond sectarian ideological restrictions; if we want to create a counter-hegemonic bloc, then it must include all anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist forces whether of the left, right, or those without any kind of definitive classification (Alain de Benoist himself has constantly emphasized that the division between “left” and “right” is not only outdated, but also does not correspond to the real choice of position – today what is significantly more important is whether one acts for or against hegemony).

Alain de Benoist’s right Gramscianism takes us back to the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels despite their rather exclusive and dogmatic appeal for the formation of a Global Revolutionary Alliance without “fellow travelers”. In contrast, we are dealing with one which unites all opponents of capitalism and hegemony and everyone who is essentially against this force. It is thus unimportant what is taken to be the positive alternative, since in this situation the presence of a common enemy is more pressing. Otherwise, according to the New Right (who in fact refused to call themselves “right”, the label which was given to their movement by their opponents), hegemony will be able to divide its opponents on artificial grounds and pose them against each other for the purpose of successfully dealing with everyone separately.

Denouncing Eurocentrism in Historical Sociology

The modern scholar of International Relations and one of the main representatives of historical sociology in International Relations, John Hobson, presents a completely different approach to this problem. In his key work, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics[xvii], Hobson analyzes nearly all of the approaches and paradigms of IR in terms of their hierarchies which are founded in principle on the comparisons of states, their roles, structures and interests to Western society as the universal referential standard. John Hobson concludes that all IR schools, without any exception, are based on an implicit Eurocentrism which recognizes the universality of Western societies and believes European history to be a phase compulsory for all other cultures. Hobson rightly considers this approach to be a form of European racism which gradually and imperceptibly passes from biological theories of the “superiority of the white race” to notions of the universality of Western cultural values, strategies, technologies, and interests. The “White Man’s Burden” becomes “the imperative of modernization and development.” At the same time, an indigenous society and culture are subjected to “modernization” by default – no-one asked whether they agree that Western values, technologies, and practices are universal of if they are an object of rejection. Only being faced with violent forms of desperate resistances in the forms of terrorism or fundamentalism does the West sometimes bring itself to ask the question: “Why do they hate us so much?” But the answer is a preconceived one: “The savagery and ingratitude of non-European peoples for all the blessings which Western “civilization” brings with it.”

Hobson importantly and convincingly shows that racism and Eurocentrism exist not only in the bourgeois theories of IR, but also in Marxism, including IR Critical Theory (neo- Gramscianism). The Marxists, despite their criticism of bourgeois civilization, remain convinced that its triumph is inevitable and thus share a common Eurocentrism in regards to Western culture. Hobson shows how Marx himself partly justified colonial practices insofar as they led to the modernization of the colonies and, thus, hastened the onset of proletarian revolutions. Thus, from historical perspective, Marxism is an accomplice of capitalist globalization and an ally of racist civilizational practices. Decolonization is regarded only as a prelude to the construction of the bourgeois state, which has yet to embark on full industrialization and move towards the future proletarian revolution. Very little separates this from the theories of the neo-liberals and trans-nationalists.

John Hobson thus proposes to begin to construct a radical alternative, a development of IR theory that is not based on Eurocentrism or racist approaches. He stands for the project of a “counter-hegemonic bloc” which, while being indeed nominated by neo-Gramscianism, would liberate itself from all forms of Eurocentrism and thus be qualitatively expanded.

The project of a non-Eurocentric theory of IR leads us directly to the Theory of the Multipolar World.

The Transition to Multipolarity

We can now bring together all of the above said on counter-hegemony and situate such in the context of the Theory of the Multipolar World (TMW) which is a theory of IR that is essentially, consistently no-nEurocentric, and which rejects hegemony on its own grounds and calls for the creation of a broad counter-hegemonic alliance or counter-hegemonic pact.

In TMW, counter-hegemony is understood in a similar way as neo-Gramscian theories and the Critical School of International Relations. Hegemony is the domination of capital and the bourgeois political system of society expressed in the intellectual sphere. In other words, hegemony is first and foremost a discourse. At the same time, the three segments of society designated by Gramsci, the base and the two components of the superstructure (politics and “civil society”) are considered by TMW to be predominant on the level of discourse, i.e., the intellectual sphere, in accordance with post-modern and post-positivist epistemology. Thus, questions of hegemony and counter-hegemony are central and fundamental to the construction of the TMW and its effective realization in practice. The sphere of metapolitics is just as important as politics and economics and does not eliminate them, but rather logically and conceptually precedes them. Man ultimately deals with his mind and and its projections. Therefore, the arrangement or reorganization of consciousness automatically entails a change in the (internal and external) world.

The TMW is a fixation of the concept of counter-hegemony in the concrete theoretical field. Until a certain point, TMW strictly follows Gramscianism. But when it arrives at the expression of the content of a counter-hegemonic pact, there arise certain divergences. The most important of such involves the rejection of left dogmatism; the TMW refuses to consider the bourgeois transformation of modern societies to be a universal law, which thus brings the Gramscianism and metapolitics of the TMW closer to the “New Right” (Alain de Benoist’s) version than that of the “New Left” (of R. Cox), but without excluding Marxism to the extent that it is an ally in the common struggle against capital and hegemony. Strictly, speaking, the term “right Gramscianism” is not entirely correct – it would be more correct to speak of an inclusive Gramscianism, i.e., in which counter-hegemony is widely understood as including all types of hegemonic confrontation and etymologically generalizing the otherwise rigid “counter”). This stands in contrast to exclusive Gramscianism (in which counter-hegemony is narrowly understood as “post-hegemony”). The TMW advocates inclusive Gramscianism. This position overcomes right and left and transcends the conceptual borders of the political ideologies of modernity, thus unfolding in the form of the Fourth Political Theory which is inextricably linked to the TMW.

J. Hobson’s contribution to the development of inclusive counter-hegemony is extremely important in this regard. His call to build a non-Eurocentric IR theory precisely coincides with the purpose of the TMW. International relations should be interpreted from a plurality of positions just as the construction of any universal theory must take into account different cultures, civilizations, religions, ethnic groups, societies, and communities. Every society has its own values, anthropology, ethics, regulations, identity, and understanding of space and time, and the general and the particular. Every society has its own “universalism” or at the very least its own understanding of “the universal.” What the West thinks about “universality” is well known, even too much so. It is time to give the rest of humanity the right to their own voices.

In its fundamental dimension, multipolarity means the free polylogue of societies, peoples, and cultures. But before this polylogue can actually appear, it is necessary to define general rules. Hence the a theory of International Relations, one which will involve an openness of terms, concepts, theories, notions, a plurality of actors, and the complexity and polysemy of expressions. In this case, TMW is not an end, but a beginning, the basic spatial preparation for the future world order.

However, the call for multipolarity is not sounded in empty space. Discourse on international relations and global political, social, and economic practice is dominated by hegemony. We live in a strictly Eurocentric world in which only one superpower (the USA) together with its allies and vassals (the NATO countries) are the imperialist dominants and in which market relations dictate all the rules of business practices, where bourgeois political norms are considered to be compulsory, where the technique and level of material development are considered to be the highest criteria, and in which the values of individualism, personal comfort, material well-being, and “freedom from” are extolled above all other factors. In other words, we live in a world of triumphant hegemony which has spread its network on a planetary scale and has subordinated all of mankind. Therefore, we need a radical opposition, struggle, and confrontation in order for multipolarity to be made real. In other words, we need a counter-hegemonic bloc (in the inclusive sense). We should now consider what resources this potential bloc has. 

The Syntax of Hegemony and the Syntax of Counter-hegemony

In its conceptual hologram, hegemony is based on the belief that modernity excels over antiquity (the past), that modernity triumphs over pre-modernity, and that the West dominates the non-West (the East and the Third World).

Thus we have the structure of the syntax of hegemony in its most general form:

The West=Modernity=the goal=welfare= progress=universal values=the USA (+ NATO)=capitalism=human rights=market=liberal democracy=law


The Rest= backwardness (pre-modernity)=the need for modernization (colonization/aid/lessons/external control)= the need for Westernization= barbarism (savagery)=native values=pseudo-capitalism (non-capitalism)=violation (less respect) of human rights=unfair market (State role, clans, group preferences)=pseudo-democracy=corruption

These formulas of hegemony are axiomatic and self-referencing, a kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy”. One term is justified by another one of the equivalent chain and is opposed to any term (symmetric or not) of the second chain. This unpretentious rule creates the discourse of hegemony. While it may have the appearance of causality, illustration, descriptiveness, analysis forecasting, historical research, opinion polling, debate, opposition, etc., in its structure, hegemony is in fact built on this backbone supported by millions of variations and disclosed experiences. If we accept these two parallel, equivalent chains, we find ourselves within hegemony and fully codified in its syntax. Any objection will be extinguished by new suggestive passes galloping through one or another term in order to arrive at hegemonic tautology. Even the most critical formulas of discourse sooner of later slip into these constantly repetitive semantic synonyms and dissolve. It is necessary to recognize at least one of these identifications, and then everything else is preordained. Hence why the creation of counter-hegemony begins with the retraction of both of these chains. Let us create the symmetrical syntax of counter-hegemony:

The West≠Modernity≠the goal≠welfare≠ progress≠universal values≠the USA (+ NATO) ≠capitalism≠human rights≠market≠liberal democracy≠law


The Rest≠ backwardness (pre-modernity) ≠the need for modernization (colonization/aid/lessons/external control) ≠the need for Westernization≠ barbarism (savagery) ≠native values≠pseudo-capitalism (non-capitalism) ≠violation (less respect) of human rights≠unfair market (State role, clans, group preferences) ≠pseudo-democracy≠corruption

If the equal signs hypnotically enter the collective consciousness as something matter of fact, then the detailed justification of each equal sign requires a separate text or group of texts. To one degree or another, the TMW and its parallels in the forms of the Fourth Political Theory,[xviii], Eurasianism, the “New Right” (A. de Benoist), non-Eurocentric IR theory (J. Hobson), traditionalism, postmodernism, and so on fulfill this task in their own way, but what is important is presenting this schema as the most generalized form of counter-hegemonic syntax. The denying of a meaningful expression is in itself meaningful due to its negation of the fact, which means that each inequality is in fact imbued with meaning and connections. In questioning the chain of the identification of hegemony, we obtain a semantic field free of hegemony and its suggestive “axiomatism.” This completely unties our hands and allows us to deploy counter-hegemonic discourse.

In this case, we have retrieved such basic guidelines for a specific purpose: the preliminary and most generalized estimation of the resources that can be theoretically expected in the construction of a counter-hegemonic pact.

A Global Revolutionary Elite

The counter-hegemonic bloc is built by intellectuals. Therefore, at its core should be a global revolutionary elite which rejects the “status quo” at its deepest level. In trying to understand one’s position at any point of the modern world – in any country, culture, society, social class, professional function, etc. – man sooner or later arrives at an understanding of the basic theses of hegemonic discourse in searching for deep answers to the deep questions of the social arrangement in which he lives. Of course, this is not possible for everyone even though according to Gramsci every man is an intellectual in one way or another. However, the only real intellectual is he who represents man in a holistic sense, a kind of delegate to the parliament of thinking humanity (homo sapiens) on behalf of the more modest representatives (those who cannot or do not want to realize the fullness of man in the form of the possibility culminating in the opportunity to think, i.e., being an intellectual). We have such an intellectual in mind when we speak of identifying hegemony. At the point when he is faced with a choice, i.e., realizing his opportunity to become an intellectual, he can say “yes” to hegemony and accept its syntax, thus continuing to act within its structure, or he can say “no.” If he says “no”, he is sent on the quest for counter-hegemony; he searches for accession to the global revolutionary elite.

This search can stop at the intermediate stage. There are always local structures (traditionalists, fundamentalists, communists, anarchists, ethnocentrists, revolutionaries of different types, etc.) who, realizing the challenge of hegemony and rejecting it, operate at the local level. At this point we are already dealing with the level of organic intellectuals who do not yet realize the need for culminating the rejection of hegemony in the form of a universal, planetary strategy. However, joining the real (not imaginary) fight against hegemony means that a revolutionary will sooner or later discover hegemony’s transnational, extraterritorial nature. To realize its goals, hegemony always resorts to the combination of internal and external factors, attacking whatever it considers to be its enemy or an obstacle to its imperial domination (the elements of the second chain, “the rest”). Thus, the localized resistance to the global challenge at one point reaches its natural limits. Hegemony may retreat at one time only to come back. No one can ever merely dodge its attacks.

When such a realization is acquired, the most intellectually developed representatives of local counter-hegemony will feel the need to pass to the level of a fundamental alternative, i.e., mastering counter-hegemonic syntax. This is the direct path to the Global Revolutionary Alliance which will be objectively and quite naturally formed by the global counter-hegemonic elite, which is destined to become the core of counter-hegemony. Herein lies the necessity of the Theory of the Multipolar World.

[i] Dugin, A. The Theory of the Multipolar World, Moscow, 2012.

[ii] Before the end of the Cold War, Waltz took  the example of the fight between the USA and the USSR as a fight between two hegemons. Now, his adherents promote the idea that a there will be a new bipolarity in which American hegemony will face China as the new candidate for the second pole.

[iii] “What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural “levels”: the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”, said Gramcsi. “These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ”hegemony” which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “juridical” government.” Gramsci A. The Prison Notebooks vol. 1. Columbia University Press, 1992

[iv] Werner Sombart. Der Bourgeois. München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1913

[v] Hegel G. W. F., The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977

[vi] Gramsci A. The Prison Notebooks. Columbia University Press, 1992

[vii] Сох Л. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method// Millennium. 12.1983.

[viii] GUIS. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

[ix] The Neo- Gramscian, Nicola Pratt defines counter-hegemony as the “a creation of an alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil society in preparation for political change”. Pratt N. Bringing politics back in: examining the link between globalization and democratization// Review of International Political Economy. Vol. 11. No. 2. 2004.

[x] Marx K., Engels F. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1955.Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Манифест Коммунистической партии // Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Сочинения. 2-е изд. Т. 4. М.: Государственное издательство политической литературы, 1955. С. 419-459.

[xi] Wallerstein I. After Liberalism. New York: New Press. 1995

[xii] BenoistdeA. Vude droite. Anthologie critique des idees contemporaines. P., Copernic, 1977.

[xiii] Benoist deA. Europe, Tiers monde, тёте combat. P.: Robert Laffont, 1986.

[xiv] Sombart, Werner (1915): Händler und Helden. München: Duncker & Humblot. 1915.

[xv] de Benoist A. Against Liberalism. To the Fourth Political Theory. S.-Petersburg, 2009

[xvi] Wallerstein I. After Liberalism. New York: New Press. 1995

[xvii] Hobson J. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010. Cambridge: Cambridge Umoniversity Press, 2012.

[xviii] Dugin A. The Fourth Political Theory. S.-Petersburg. 2009

On the Question of Russian Runes

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Chapter 9 of Mysteries of Eurasia (Moscow, Arktogeya: 1999) 

Runology according to Herman Wirth

There exist several points of view as to what runes are. Some believe that runes are an altered version of the Latin alphabet that appeared in the 5th-6th centuries among the Scandinavians and Northern European Germanic peoples. Others suggest that runes were the ancient characters used for divination and recording texts which emerged only at a later stage and under the influence of Latin writing. These two points of view on the nature and origin of runes are considered to be the “scholarly” and “orthodox” ones.

But there is another theory of runes proposed by the German scholar, Professor Herman Wirth. We should mention from the outset that this theory is not recognized by broader scholarly circles. The reason for this neglect of Wirth is not so much his paleo-epigraphic and runological works as his assessment of the text famously known as the Oera Linda Chronicle, the story behind which resembles that of the Book of Veles. The Oera Linda Chronicle was discovered at the beginning of the 19th century and allegedly presented the most ancient history of the Germanic peoples (the Frisians) stretching back centuries to many millennia. The text was written in a special quasi-runic script and contained tales of pre-Christian mythology and the sacred history of the Germanic people. The Book of Veles (discovered only at the beginning of the 20th century) represented a precise analogue of the Oera Linda Chronicle, only applied to the Slavs.

Scholars immediately assessed the Oera Linda Chronicle to be an outright forgery dating back to the era of the Dutch Renaissance when some encyclopedist, shifting the mythological and geographical knowledge of the epoch to distant times, created a pseudo-mythological outline. Supporters of the authenticity of the Oera Linda Chronicle were recognized as marginals, charlatans, and subjected to mockery. The parallel with the history of the Book of Veles is obvious in this aspect. Herman Wirth, however, did not assert that we are dealing with an original. He merely suggested that the matter at hand is a very ancient version of a pre-Christian mythological tradition processed and stylized much later by a Dutch humanist. Wirth, being an expert in hundreds of ancient and modern languages, an archaeologist, a linguist, and a historian, accomplished a colossal feat in analyzing the content of this entire “antique” and separating it into temporally different layers – most ancient, later, and altogether recent. The result of his reconstruction was the publication of the Oera Linda Chronicle with detailed commentary, something that made Wirth into an outcast among official historians who believed that the forgery of the Oera Linda Chronicle itself automatically discredited the author. For this reason, his other writings and even the major works of Herman Wirth, such as The Origin of Mankind and The Sacred Protolanguage of Humanity [50] which contain his runological theory and don’t even mention the Oera Linda Chronicle, were left without attention from the wider scholarly community. Yet these works contained stunning paleo-epigraphical material which fully deserves to become a sensation in the history of human proto-culture. Many of Wirth’s intuitions anticipated the so-called “nostratic” linguistic theories that appeared much later than the first works of this German professor. But this is only one side of his fantastic discoveries. The most important have been hitherto left aside.

And so, Wirth suggested the following explanation of runic characters. From his point of view, Scandinavian and ancient Germanic runes and runic circles represent traces of the most ancient symbolic model which lies at the heart of all types of languages, mythologies, cultures, rituals, sacred doctrines, calendar systems, astrological observations, etc. At one time, runes were known to all the peoples of the earth who descended from a single ancestral home, the northern country of Hyperborea. Wirth, as a supporter of the archeological theory of “cultural circles,” called this primordial proto-culture Thulekulturkreise, i.e. “the cultural circle of Thule.” Originally, runic circles were ritually applied only to wooden surfaces, since in the “cultural circle of Thule” wood was believed to be a sacred element, the physical embodiment of the World Axis. For this reason, it is impossible to trace the chronological development of fully-fledged runic writing in ancient epochs. The mere fragmentary inscriptions on cave walls, ceramics, stones and later on bronze and iron are most likely anomalies rather than the norm of ancient culture that only allow one to judge the evolutionary steps (or, more precisely, involution) of runic writing. Historical runes as they authentically appeared in the 5th-6th centuries are but the inertial traces of a forgotten ancient system which, in order to avoid confusion, can be called proto-runic.

According to Wirth, such a proto-runic system lies at the origin of all systems, including the Phoenician, Indian, Sumerian, Chinese, Egyptian, etc. Moreover, proto-runes and their system represent a key to the deciphering of absolutely all mythological stories and sacred doctrines, both monotheistic and developed and pagan and primitive. The runic circle is unmistakably evident in the phonemes, characters, mythological tales, customs, rituals, superstitions, associations, and ceremonies of all peoples of the earth. One merely needs to know the code in order for the deciphering of any system of symbols to not present any difficulty.

In his works, Herman Wirth accomplished the colossal labor of isolating series of tales and characters that compose the primordial ensemble of symbols of the “culture of Thule,” which can be traced from cave drawings to the most developed and modern theological constructions. Each volume of Wirth’s works consists of around 1,000 pages, including atlases and albums cataloguing his discoveries in the fields of archaeology (he actively participated in excavations), paleo-epigraphy, comparative linguistics, and the history of religions. It is impossible, of course, to give even a brief presentation of these unique studies in a few pages and, what’s more, his works are so rare that they are sometimes even absent in the fullest of European libraries. This circumstance is explained by political considerations. The point is that Herman Wirth was the founder of the scientific research organization, Ancestors Heritage (Ahnenerbe), during the Third Reich, and although he was found completely innocent of the crimes of Hitler’s regime, a certain shadow fell upon him as upon other famous German scholars and thinkers of a patriotic orientation, such as Martin Heidegger, Ernst Junger, Arthur Mueller van den Bruck, Karl Haushofer, etc. However, Wirth suffered even more than them, since the subjects he examined did not arouse the interest of European scholars (unlike Junger and Heidegger who were defended by their French supporters as spotless from the point of view of “anti-fascism”). Together with this, perhaps, is the fact that Wirth’s discoveries are incomparably more important to our understanding of the origins of the human spirit than the works of many other authors…

Wirth lived until 1982, but for the entire remainder of his life, he and his works were met with a silence so thorough that the impression arises that this involves some kind of sinister secret, some kind of “conspiracy.” One episode in particular is indeed very strange. Herman Wirth’s last book, Palestinabuch, in which he collected all the results of his research on the “Hyperborean” origins of the Old Testament tradition on the basis of a systematization and research of the archaic layers of Middle Eastern culture, was mysteriously abducted from his house on the eve of its sending to the printer. If Wirth’s studies were simple charlatanism, then it is hardly believable that someone simply came up with the idea of stealing this manuscript of many thousands of pages.

But this mystery has yet to be unraveled.

Slavic runes

What interests us here is not simply the history of this German professor, but the way in which his concepts can aid us in studying Slavic antiquity and explain many of the mysteries of the ancient pre-Christian culture of our distant ancestors. Today, this topic is exciting a growing number of people, hence the interest in the Book of Veles and the reconstruction of pre-Cyrillic writing, etc.

If Wirth’s view is accepted, then we know that the northern peoples of Eurasia who lived in close proximity to the primordial Arctic homeland of Hyperborea preserved proto-runic systems much longer than others, albeit their full meaning, ritual use, and alphabetical and calendar understandings were distorted and forgotten. The runes found among these peoples are thus in fragmented form, as a legacy of ancient knowledge, the key to which has been irrevocably lost. Nevertheless, starting with the 5th century, such late runes appeared in Northern Eurasia. Wirth thus attentively studied the Germanic-Scandinavian regions and pointed out the exact correlation between runic signs and the Orkhon inscriptions of the ancient Turks. Such Turkic runes appeared at almost the same time as the Germanic ones, which means that it is difficult to assume that they directly borrowed from each other. From the standpoint of simple geographical symmetry, what is immediately striking is that the ancient Slavs, mixed with Urgic tribes, were distributed between the settled areas of the Germano-Scandinavian tribes and the Turks of Siberia. Chernorizets Hrabrar wrote that these Slavs “wrote with lines and cuts.” Later runic writing was characterized by the fact that it was indented into wood or stones whereas, according to Wirth, the characters of original proto-runes were rounded. Thus, it is most likely of all that these “lines and cuts” were the symbolic system of “Slavic runes” which existed as a sort of intermediate layer between the Germanic and Turkic systems. Hrabrar’s pointing out that the ancient Slavs “pondered” such cuts indicates that the Slavs used their own runes as did the Germanic tribes, i.e. they served both as an alphabet and a method for sacred rituals (in its lowest form, for divination).

It is indeed astonishing how similar the characters of the Hymn of Boyan and the Book of Veles are to Germanic runes. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that Sulakadzaev, by means of his Masonic contacts to which all the threads of the history of the Book of Veles converge, might have been aware of the Oera Linda Chronicle similarly styled in runic writing. In such a case (which cannot be entirely discounted), the value of these documents is lost. It similarly cannot be discounted that, as in the case of the Oera Linda Chronicle, we are dealing with a later re-working of some kind of genuine ancient document. What is important is at least approaching the issue objectively and impartially without falling into premature enthusiasm or deliberate prejudice.

If the fragments of Sulakadzaev’s collection are authentic, then the Slavs must have had runic-type systems, the fragments of which we can unmistakably encounter in traditional Slavic embroidery, mythological tales, ornaments,  rituals, and beliefs. Consequently, the question at hand is initiating a thorough and large-scale deciphering of the ancient Slavic heritage without expecting that history will grant us any reliable material of a textual character. This would be all too easy. However, it also cannot be completed excluded that sooner or later the same testimony will be found. At the present moment, we can now proceed to decipher Slavic antiquity on a global scale given that we have the opportunity to utilize the invaluable scholarly framework developed by the genius German professor.

If we can explain the system of the Slavic runic circle, the problem will be solved, and all that will remain is to compare this model to the Germanic runes and writing system and the calendar signs of the ancient Turks. We will gradually reach the next level in getting ever closer to deciphering the ancient mysteries of Eurasia and grasping its proto-culture and secret, forgotten language as not merely a means of transmitting information (as technocrats and pragmatists today mistakenly understand language to be) but as information itself of the most important, the most significant, and sacred form.

The Mystery of the Apple: the Mystery of the North

Before we take the first steps in our study of Slavic runes, let us denote in the most general terms Herman Wirth’s concept in regards to the meaning of runic or proto-runic writing.

Wirth asserts that the primordial cultural model on the basis of which writing, phonemes, calendars, rituals, legal institutions, arts, and occupations developed, i.e., all of human culture in its primordial, nascent state, was the annual observation of the natural yearly phenomenon of the Arctic North [51]. Many traditions say that it is from the North that humanity’s ancestors descended to the middle and southern latitudes at which the ancient civilizations arose as reflections of the ancient homeland, as its reflections, reconstructions, and simulations. This is affirmed by the Iranian tradition which speaks of Airyana Vaeja, the homeland of the ancient Iranians’ ancestors. The same legend is contained in the Vedas where it is said that the first people lived in a place where day and night lasted a whole year, i..e, the Arctic. The Greeks also knew of the Northern country of Hyperborea, the home of solar Apollo [52]. 

The Hindus possess a traditional theory of cosmic cycles which they associate with the dynamics of continents. Each cycle has a corresponding continent, or dvipa. Our cycle corresponds to the so-called Jambudvipa, or “land of apple trees.” Rene Guenon showed [53] that such a theory does not concern India itself, but rather all relevant, existing continents and especially their synthesis in the form of the Northern Land, Arctogaia, or Hyperborea. This symbolic point is important. In many myths, the apple tree or apple are associated with paradise or the Garden of Eden, the place where mankind dwelt in primordial times. The very root of the word yabloko is etymologically linked to the Hindi jambu and German Appfel, or English apple, etc., which Wirth considers to be a kindred name of Apollo, the Hyperborean god of the Sun and Light. If one considers this “Arctic,” polar point, then the meaning of the many tales involving apples is brought to light, such as the rejuvenating apples of the Scandinavian sagas, the apples of Hesperides, the forbidden apple from the tree of knowledge which caused the ancestors to abandon paradise, etc. In addition, there is yet another expressive detail: if one cuts an apple crosswise, we have a five-pointed star in the middle screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-30-13, and this symbol was also a primordial image of the pole, the North, paradise.

Wirth explains the polar symbolism of the star in the following way. The ancient calendar was represented by a six-pointed star screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-31-00marking the six key positions of the sun. The summer sun (the top line), the winter sun (the lower line), the point of sunrise and winter sunset (the winter solstice – two slanted slashed on the top) or the summer solstice (two slanted slashes on the bottom). Sometimes a horizontal line was marked which corresponded to the points of the equinoxes, thereby yielding an eight-pointed star screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-32-08. In the Arctic, the sixth, lower line is absent since in winter the sun does not rise at all and, consequently, the six-pointed star becomes a five-pointed one. Arctogaia is thus the land of apples and apple trees. Proceeding from this understanding, one can easily deduce the role of apples in Russian and Slavic folklore [54].

Basic runes

Let us return to the proto-runic circle. Observing annual events outside of the Arctic, Northern polar circle allows one to render visible the following characters which are essential to proto-runes. The circle screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-33-10 depicts the daily sun over the head of the observer as if expanding the roundness of the sun to a comic scale. Perhaps the most ancient phoneme of this sign was the consonant R (with the variant of L since “fluid” consonants are often interchangeable when moved from language to language). The circle is sometimes adorned with a vertical bar at the bottom Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.33.23.png, from which comes the Greek ro – Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.33.29.png.

This closed circle is broken in the Arctic autumn and spring periods when the sun makes short arcs over the southern point Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.34.59.png. These arcs are the most ancient proto-runic character in Scandinavian circles, UR Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.35.05.png. Its vocalization, the vowel “u”, is the only sound which can be made with a closed mouth. Symbolically, this corresponds to the sun’s descent into the darkness of night based on the symbolic identification of the mouth and and voice with the cosmos. Compare the Russian word nyebo, the upper point of the mouth, the palate, and nyebo, or sky.

In the beginning of the year, the same sign UR was probably pronounced like “a”, since the vowel “a” is sounded by a fully opened mouth, a symbol of a new beginning. The sun comes out from under the earth, from the darkness of a cave. The New Day, or New Year thus begins.

This sector is further associated with the sign KA screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-35-18 representing the symbol of lifting, upraised hands, horns, etc. This sound was used to identify everything relevant to upwards movement, hence it often means spirit or fire. Above KA rises R (or RE or RI, since the vocalization of consonants in transition from the post-New Year A moves to the intermedia E and further to the I, which is the main sign of the summer solstice, the highest point of the year).

After the summer solstice pronounced as I, and depicted by the vertical bar screen-shot-2017-01-22-at-15-37-11, the highest sign, the spirit, or regal dignity, the sun begins to slope downwards towards winter and the Arctic night, from the top point to the bottom. The connection between them is maintained in the hieroglyph S,Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.37.24.png, and the proto-rune SOL, Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.37.31.png,which represents a descending fire, sun, sunset, together with lighting. This is also the falling apple bringing autumn down to the Earth.

Further follows the hieroglyph TU or TO, Screen Shot 2017-01-22 at 15.37.41.png. This is the autumn descent, lowered hands, branches (willow, spruce, pine, yew, etc.). The vowel O represents the middle point between I (sounded with a half-closed mouth and stretched lips) and U (produced by closing the mouth).

In addition, there are the two nasal consonants N and M, (Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.37.46) which, according to Wirth, denote the horizontal, water, the Earth, the womb, stone, the bottom, night, darkness, etc. This is a consonant which has not acquired clear form. Therefore, the first cry of a child, MA, expresses the ancient Hyperborean cult formula “from the depths of the night is born new life, new light, a new cosmos.”

Historical runes have several intermediate markers: THURS Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.38.53, the sign of the axe (or thorn) cuts the umbilical cord of the New Year from the Old. The axe and thorn, as well as the verb “to prick” are linked through the word “hack,” i.e axe. It is thus possible that the Slavs called this rune “kolo” or something similar. AS Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.39.30 and FEON Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.39.33are the two parts of the World Tree, the Spruce, Birch, or Apple Tree, etc. From FEON comes Russian BOG, god. From AS comes Russian az’, the first person singular of “I.”

The consonant N, initially depicted by a horizontal line Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.40.12 was later combined with NYT Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.40.16, hence Russian ne, nyet, and noch’. The vocalization of the springtime KA Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.40.56 (KEN Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.41.00in later circles) yields GYFU Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.41.39, a rune similar to KA, the uplifted hand and horizontal bar. A variation of I was the rune IEH Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.41.55which indicates the change in the trajectory of the sun’s path during the summer solstice.

At the point of the autumnal equinox was fixed the composite rune BEORG Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.42.17 or Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.42.21, i.e., “two mountains” which converge from the winter solstice in more ancient versions. From this phoneme is formed the Russian word for “birch”, bereza, the sacred tree of the Slavs. All other runes belong to the pre-New Year period, the autumn-winter season.

Next comes LAGU, a hook Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.42.50which means water or lake. The Russian word for meadow, lug, carries both proto-meanings, i.e., something crooked, a bow, or bent (the appearance of this ideogram, the hook, or the handle of a stick) and a space filled with water in spring. This is close to the German root meaning lake. Hence the Russian word for puddle, luzhka.

The rune MADR Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.43.09fell from the spring to the autumn, where it portrayed M (and sounded the same), the surging of water in contrast to the stagnant water of autumn, N Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.40.12.

The rune EOH Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.44.32resembles the ideogram of a horse, hence all the mythological tales of “water horses” or “sea stallions.” The rune ING Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.44.49 is the rune of marriage, the union of the sky (the upwards triangle Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.45.07) and land (the downwards triangle Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.45.13.png), or the male and feminine elements. It is also two entwined serpents phonetically pronounced by the gliding vowel NG (sometimes with a nasal N). In the ancient Russian language, “n” was nasal, but gradually disappeared. Such modern Russian words as ugol (angle), ugr’ (eel), kryuk (hook), ruka (arm), lyagushka (frog), etc. once had nasal “n” in front of “g” or “k.” Perhaps the Slavic name of the rune ING was ugol or kryuk.

ODIL Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.46.12 represents a node, loop, or drop. It means spirit, seed, and sometimes fish due to hieroglyphic similarities and the fact that fish live in water while the pre-New Year sector of the sacred year corresponds to water. In ancient Russian, the real name for fish, zva, was taboo. It is possible that the Russian ODIL was called none other than zva or “spirit.”

Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.46.38.png

The important rune DAG Screen Shot 2017-03-31 at 15.47.05means day, light, a double axe, or bowl, vessel, or pot for ritual celebrations. This rune yielded the name of the Celtic god Dagda who in Irish mythology was associated with a magic cauldron in which food never expires. This is none other than the New Year rune. From this root evolved the Indo-European names for the celestial god, the Hindus’ Dyaus, Latin Deos, the Greek Qeoj. To this same basis dates back German Tag and Russian den’ (“day”).

Now all that remains is attempting to discover the Slavic roots, patterns, legends, and mythological tales, etc. which correlate with this set of sacred ideograms. Thereby, we will near the restoration of our ancestors’ sacred picture of the world and clarify the sacred models underlying our ancient culture, language, ceremonies, our psychology, etc.

Eurasia: A Special Worldview

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Dugin’s Guideline – 

Eurasia is not only a geographical concept; it is also a whole theory, system, and special worldview. Its essence lies in the following.

For centuries the West has striven to impose its norms and criteria upon all of mankind. This is its civilizational policy. And this has not changed over the centuries regardless of what stands at the forefront of the West’s ideology, be it Catholicism, Protestantism, Modernism, Liberalism, or Capitalism. With equal fervor the West builds its Empire at the expense of all other peoples. On the world map this is reflected in expansion from Europe to Asia and, most importantly, Eurasia, i.e., the territory of the Russian Empire situated in the key zone of the absolute center. To the west of us is Europe. To the east – Asia. We ourselves are something third.

The West believes that only its path of development, only its logic, and only its values are universal and common to all of mankind, and that all other peoples have simply not yet understood this. This means that the West, albeit temporarily (until they understand this), can and is even obliged to rule others. With such a blatant agenda, the West has in practice managed to colonize the East. This is no easy feat, but it managed to. But the West faltered in the face of Russia, Eurasia. We, Russians, opposed the West with something that stopped it in its tracks. It repeatedly tried to take us by force and ruse, but we held on. The East fell, but we didn’t. And we are holding out to this day. This is Eurasia as an idea.

Eurasia means not succumbing to the West’s claims to universality, rejecting its hegemony, and insisting that no one has a monopoly on truth, especially not the West. Eurasia is the possibility for peoples and civilizations to follow their own path and, if the logic of the path demands such, not only a non-Western one, but even an anti-Western path. This is Eurasia. This idea was understood by the first Eurasianists, Trubetzkoy, Savitsky, and Alekseev in the 1920’s. We too understand it. And Vladimir Putin understands it, since there is no other meaning of Eurasia.

If we understand what is at stake, then all the rest becomes crystal clear. If we are Eurasia, then it therefore follows that:

First, we must strengthen and defend our identity, our culture, faith, ethics, philosophy, our own Russian Logos. Eurasia means reliance on our own strength and allying with all those who share our attitude and reject the hegemony of the West.

Secondly, we must construct a foreign policy that allows us to be completely independent from the West in the spheres of defense, politics, culture, economy, and technology. Eurasia is the principle of self-sufficiency of a large space.

Thirdly, we must integrate the space adjacent to contemporary Russia into a single confederation or union in order to together create the potential sufficient for being a fully-fledged pole in a multipolar world, not a unipolar world as the West is trying to impose on us to this day. Eurasia is multipolarity.

And finally, we must create a Eurasian Order symmetric to what is called the World Government and strives to manage global processes from the standpoint of the West’s interests. Eurasia is a principally new elite thinking globally but most often oppositely to what the West’s intellectual headquarters think and, most importantly, do.

This is the only way to treat talk of Eurasia at the Economic Forum. If not, then not at all, and this will remain but empty talk. If we really mean what we are saying, this demands a radical shift in all policy, ideology, the entire course. We do not have historical time to move cautiously step by step.

Modern Populism

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Dugin’s Guideline – 

As of late, European intellectuals are discussing a new political concept that is becoming increasingly relevant: the populist moment.

They are worried by left-wing Schmittians in the likes of Chantal Mouffe on the one hand and, on the other, the brilliant ideologist of European conservatives and the “New Right,” the most formidable and influential figure in intellectual Europe, the philosopher Alain de Benoist. Both right and left are publishing texts dedicated to the populist moment, each offering different interpretations, arguments, and predictions for the future.

What is the populist moment?

First of all, it is the emergence in politics of leaders who become extremely popular by appealing to the broad masses while not concerning themselves with the ideological coherence of their platforms and positions. These are first and foremost Putin and Trump, whose views are difficult to qualify in conventional categories of right, left, etc. Such leaders understand and feel society, what it genuinely wants, what it is striving for, what it thinks, what it fears, and they answer these expectations directly without bothering to couch such in some kind of system. And this is working better and better. Whether by accident or system failure, this is gradually becoming a trend. After Trump, this is already a global reality that cannot be ignored.

Secondly, liberal democracy is in blatant, complete crisis. Wherever it tries to act openly and directly insist on its ideological values – human rights, gender politics, cosmopolitanism, the open society, globalization, etc. – its representatives consistently suffer failure. Liberalism still controls many spheres such as global finance, the global corporate media, culture, education, and technology, but in society it is already essentially rejected. The end of history did not happen and Fukuyama himself, like a complete loser, is now muttering about how the United States is, you see, a failed state. Liberalism is dead. But it is not its old enemies, Communism and Fascism, that destroyed it, but something new. Populism. Any populist, whether right or left, can now beat any liberal.

Thirdly – and this is already becoming more serious – a new subject, a new phenomenon is emerging in the forefront of politics: the people, or populus, hence “populism”. The people is absent in the ideologies of modernity. There is no people in liberalism, whose main subject is the individual. There is no people in communism, where class is the most important. Nor is there the people in fascism, since the emphasis is on the state. All of this remains in the 20th century. Now from around the corner is being mobilized something forgotten or altogether never considered: the People. This is not simply the sum of individuals, classes, or citizens with passports and residence permits. It is something living, organic, whole, ever-changing, and avoiding strict definitions. The people lives longer than people. It has different cycles and different scales. It trusts in myth and is skeptical of science. Even if the people is cowardly, it is admired by fearless heroes. Even if it is crooked, it sincerely loves beauty. And now this People is coming into active contradiction with the existing political system.

The people is neither left nor right. The people stands all at once for order and for freedom, for a powerful state and for social justice, for strength and for continuous holiday. The people easily unites opposites without even noticing. The people lives according to a particular logic that has nothing to do with the norms of modern political science or sociology. The people is always not what others think about it. It does not lend itself to be calculated or counted. It proceeds from a different logic than that of the Enlightenment and societies of modernity. In some sense, the people is very ancient. It is nurtured by the juices of eternity.

The people as a political concept is appearing today in opposition to liberalism. The liberals are hollering about a fascist or communist-fascist threat, and they are incapable of understanding the essence of the populist moment, which they interpret through old clichés. Hence why they are losing. Hence why they are doomed.

And yet both left and right are unanimous in thinking that this is only a moment, a limited period of time, a kind of quantum in historical movement. Probably no one can say whether the People and consequently populism is a system, program, strategy, or merely a temporary correction on the path of liberal globalization. The globalists had their moment in the early ’90’s – the unipolar moment. They ruined everything they could over thirty years, turning globalization and the unipolar world into a hideous caricature. The reformers in Russia in the ’90’s did the same with democracy. Now a different moment is arriving. The people is appearing on the stage of world history. This is a chance, a risk, a responsibility, and a challenge. But it is our moment. Not utilizing it would be a real crime.

Yes, that’s right, not taking advantage of such a populist moment would be foolish and even criminal. But is there such a crime that we have not yet committed? Alas, everything rests on our shoulders. Nevertheless, this is a wonderful, open opportunity for a true alternative, a Russian alternative.

The Rus of Rurik

Author: Vladimir Karpets

Translators: Jafe Arnold, Nina Kouprianova

Chapter 1 of Tsarsky Rod (2016)  

“He who correctly explains the name of Rus will find the key to explaining her primordial history,” wrote the Polish historian A.R. Brueckner. What’s more, not only its primordial history, but the very “seed of its logos,” its meaning, and he will find the key to the Russian future. As the monk Andronik (A.F. Losev) wrote, “the Greek expression EIS ONOMA or EN ONOMAK, ‘in the name’, itself proves that a name is a certain situating of divine energies, and the immersion and residence in it of all created beings leads to enlightenment and the salvation of the latter.”

Today we are beginning to grasp, to understand our name. Our own name. Our name – “Russians” – transcends the division into Great Russians, Belarusians, Little Russians, and Rusyns. It is derived from Rus.

And now the first and oldest question: Where are you from, Rus? In her book, Prizvanie varyagov [The Calling of the Varangians], Lydia Grot says:

Scholars have long paid attention to the abundance of hydronyms in Eastern Europe, the formation of whose names involved the root component ras/ros/rus’ or rus. The most ancient of known names for the main river of Eastern Europe, the Volga, was Ra. This was maintained by Ptolemy (the middle of the second century A.D.) and has been discovered in Herodotus (the fifth century B.C.) with the same vocalization of the root ra-. The historian A.V. Podosinov believes that there are even more ancient names for the Volga. One of them was preserved on the ancient Iranian Avesta, the commonly accepted dating of which is believed to be the end of the second and first half of the first millennium B.C. The text on this artifact mentions a river called Ravjha (Rangha or Rankha) in which many Iranian scholars see the Volga. In the hymns of the ancient Indian Rig Veda (from the end of the second to the beginning of the first millennium B.C.), there is reference to the northern river of Rasa which scholars equate to the Avestian Rangha and the Volga. In one Greek treatise from the third or fourth century A.D., the authorship of which is attributed to Agapimeno, there is mention of the Volga in the form of Ros. In the space stretching from the Volga/Rasa/Ros to Neman/Ros’ (Rus) can be found Ros’ or Rusa, a river in the Novgorod province; Rus’, a tributary of the Narew; Ros’, the famous tributary of the Dnieper river in Ukraine; Rusa, a tributary of the Seym; the Ros’ of the the Emajõgi river; the Ros’ of the Oskol river; and Poruse, a tributary of the Polist, etc.

The presence of the land of Rus and the Rusians themselves on the territory between rivers with the names Ras/Rus/Ros’/Rus’ speaks to the fact that Rus was supposed to be the ancestral territory of a people bearing the same name.

But it is completely clear that this is not only and not so much of a matter of ethnonyms. The Rig Veda also contains the word rasa which stands for “liquid,” “juice,” or “main substance,” and in the Mahabharata means “water,” “drink,” “nectar,” or “milk” i.e.,  it possesses related semantics.

Another example: in studying the etymology of the river in the Novgorod region named Poruse, which in antiquity was called Rusa, some scholars have come to the opinion that the river’s name is ancient Baltic and descends from the root rud-s/roud-s meaning red. However, this is a root word with the same meaning as in Sanskrit, hence it could have been borrowed to Lithuanian (given their proximity). This word is also in the Russian language. In Sanskrit, the word rudhir means red, blood-red, or blood. The Indologist N.R. Guseva explains: “the meaning of red in Sanskrit traces back to the ancient route rudh which meant ‘to be red or brown.’ This ancient meaning can be juxtaposed to the ancient Russian words rodry, rudy, or rdyany which denoted the color red, as well as the ancient Russian word ruda – blood.”

But what is this “blood”? What kind of blood?

Lydia Grot concludes that the name Rus, from which many rivers in Eastern Europe received their names, was the sacred name of the ancestor of the Rusian people.

The entire Hungarian and Romanian region is covered with names reminiscent of Rus: Poiana Rusca, Ruskberg, Russ, Rusor, Rusanesti, Ruscova, Rusova, Ruspoliana, Rustina, Rutka, Rostock, Rossia, Rosaci, Roschina. Many villages’ names are conjuncted with oros or orosh, which in Hungarian is rus.  They can also include olah or vlah, i.e., Roman, Magyar, horvat, roman, and nemet. This serves as undeniable proof that the population, at least in the old days, distinguished between themselves Rus, Walachians, Croatians, and Germans.

But this is by no means limited to “Eastern Europe.”

Besides the conventional singling out of an “Eastern European” Rus (Kuyaba, Slaviya, Ar(s)taniya), the scholar of “paganism” (we employ this concept with a certain degree of reservation), M.L. Seryakov, also distinguished “another Rus” far in the West. Later, over the course of our narrative, we will see the proto-geopolitical meaning of this.

M.L. Seryakov points to the Primary Chronicle’s testimony of the existence of Rus on both sides of the Varangian sea, i.e., also in the “English land.” Of course, Seryakov stipulates that he is not speaking of Jutland which, in his opinion, was inhabited by the Angles before their relocation to Britain. He also refers to the Jewish Book of Yosippon (from the 10th century), whose author “places one Rus in the neighborhood of the Saxons and Angels, and the second on the Dnieper.”

This testimony is important because the “Russian-British drama” has lasted across all memorable centuries. But more on this later.


The phrase “Ancient Rus” was artificial in its common usage (before the 17th century). It arose from the desire of the official historiography of the 19th and especially the 20th century to identify Russian history with the histories of other peoples and states. The very desire for such an identification, however, betrays the poorly concealed doubt in its subject. In one way or another, it must be recognized that the Russian state of the 8th-10th centuries which is discerned as the epoch of “Ancient Rus” (no more nor less up until Peter the Great) has no relation whatsoever to the ancient, i.e., classical world. Before us is a typical medieval state. As for the actual period of Russian antiquity, then, guided by the methods of positivist science, i.e., documents whose dating is always doubtful, it is difficult here and now to speak of anything at length. It is necessary to draw only the most general outline.

Certain revelations which, not coincidentally, appeared at the very beginning of the Second World War in the journal Bulletin of Ancient History, appear to us to be extraordinarily valuable. The author of the article “On the Question of the Origin of the word ROS, ROSIA”, Russia, M. Syuzyumov, merely summarized the Old Testament and in particular Byzantine evidence of this ancient sacred name which later became a generally accepted ethnonym. M. Syuzyumov writes:

“It can be asserted with full certainty that the ancient Russians never called themselves ‘rossians’. There is no such word in Russian language in ancient artifacts. Moreover, it can be assumed that even the Byzantine Greeks themselves hardly called the Russians ‘rossians’ in spoken language…Liutprand, the bishop of Cremona who visited Constantinople the mid-10th century, mentions the Russians in his work Antapodosis. He reports that the Russians received their name from the Greek word ROYSIOS (which means ‘red’) and that this name was given to the Russians for the particular color shade of their bodies…In the Greek translation of Ezekiel, one encounters more than once the name ‘ros’ in the form of ‘rosh’: ‘Son of man, set your face toward Gog of the land of Magog, the prince of Rosh, Meshech and Tubal, and prophesy against him’ (Ezek. 38:2)…However, if one carefully follows the epithets of Patriarch Photios addressed to the Russians, then it turns out that Photios falls into an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, he calls the Russians  a world-famous people. On the other hand, about the same Russians in his second speech, Photios speaks of a people entirely unknown, ETNOS AFANES AL NASION, a mysterious, unknown ETNOS ASEOMOS, unclear people who are MEZE MEKHRI TES KAT EMON EPEL YSEOS GIGNOSOMENON, incomprehensible and unrecognizable upon approach. How can we combine his words TO TRYLLOYMENON, i.e., that they are those ‘about whom everyone speaks,’ ‘commonly-known’, and ‘infamous’ with his words that they are, AGNOSION, ‘unknown’ and AFANES, ‘shady’? If in mind is a concrete nationality, the Russians, who attacked Constantinople, then we are left with a contradiction, a genuinely irreconcilable one.

We will return to this “irreconcilable contradiction” again, and more than once. As for an “introduction to the problem,” let us recall the Varna caste system of Aryan society that was preserved (of course, in a diminished, rudimentary form) up until the French Revolution of the 18th century with its uprising of the “third estate” against the first (the aristocracy) and the second (the clergy). In the ancient Aryan (Japhetic) languages, sur, ms, kyr, syr, and sar meant not only the color red, but sun, gold, blood, (metal) ore, race, and generation (all of these concepts are essentially synonymous) and, of course, imperial power, the imperial-warrior, Kshatriya caste – in other words, the Golden Type or Royal Blood (Sang Royal). In addition, as noted in the 19th century by A.A. Kunik and V.R. Rozen: “Rus is from the Gothic hrodh, or glory (hence the definition of the Black Sea Goths as the Hrudgoths. This word was part of the name Rurik (Hrodhrekr) and originally meant the dynasty, only to then transition to mean the country where this dynasty ruled.”

Is it not interesting that in “Biblical Hebrew”, there is also this letter? Resh means head (including beheading) and prince, i.e., the ruler. The “mystery” of the “Rus race” (which is mentioned as the future race of the liberators of Tsargrad in The Tale of the Capture of Constantinople from the 15th century attributed to Nestor Iskander) is entirely explainable given that Byzantium did not develop dynastic elements. Anyone could become the emperor. At the moment of the fall of Constantinople, the Russians had an obvious, solid ruling princely dynasty. In this sense, the adjective “Russian” which has caused confusion among some modern authors becomes a quite natural designation for the royally anointed, the sovereign. Moreover, it turns out that for Russia the ethnonym and state name coincide with the name of its first ruling line. The meaning of this for Russian historiosophy, as for the Russian consciousness, cannot be overestimated.

There are just as many meanings and designations in the ethnonyms of the Slavs, or Novgorod Slavs called Slovene in Russian. In fact, we know from so-called “academic history” the names of the “Slavic tribes” – the Drevliane, the Vyatichi, the Poliane, Radimichi, etc. – who did not directly bear the name Slavs or Slovene and, despite the closeness of their languages, frequently did not understand one another.

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” – everyone knows this beginning of the Fourth Gospel (John 1:1). The Word of God, or the Eternal Sacrifice slain before the beginning of time (here we cannot speak of time, but of aeonic dimension) is an image both ‘about’ and ‘before’ created from the red (ros) land of man (if we combine the Russian word for “word,” slovo and for “man”, chelovek, we have slovek). This is the “voiced image” (MEROIS or MERORIS) – the “first born from God” and the “first sacrifice” in one and the same name. The eternal sacrifice of the Son of God and God, the Second Face of the Holy Trinity, the “uncreated”, precedes the creation of created man in the sense known to him as materia prima. Jesus Christ from the heavens is the eternal Adam (the Red Clay) and is in one and the same name the new Adam and His Resurrected Flesh. Fallen Adam himself is in one and the same name the ruler, bestowing the names to creations, and the priest is the sacrifice of the mystery of Paradise (“fruit and prayer”). However, with the fall of the first man, the heavenly mystery was been deprived of its fruit and turned into bloody pagan sacrifice (all pagan cults, including the Dionysian), since for the restoration of the heavenly dimension and the new bloodless, Eucharistic sacrifice, the phenomenon of the sacrifice of the God-man himself in history was necessary. The pagan priests, however, and their Varna caste and tradition, preserved a corrupted memory of serving the God Word, of course in “shadow, not truth” in the words of Metropolitan Hilarion. The “shadow”, however, was so profound, down to the depths of the underworld, that it “demanded” human sacrifices as inevitable in a world outside of Christ. These dedicated priests originally, as far as is apparent, were originally Slavs or Slovene. It is from them, as some authors believe, that the ancient city of Slovensk probably received its name, which is precisely in the place of modern Novgorod (some trace it a bit further north and closer to a modern city on the Neva). “The Ilmen Slav sovereigns that founded Slovensk and Rus were the masters of all of Pomerania and even up to the Arctic Sea and along the great Pechora river and Vyma through the high, impassable mountains in the country of Siberia to the great river Ob and to the mouth of the whitewater river.”

One of the “gods” of the pre-Christian Slavic pantheon was Veles or Volos. Volosy, meaning “hair” in Russian, are an attribute of solar light, the king-priest (let us remember that the Word of God is the King and the High Priest). The first to draw attention to the anagram of the Volos-Word was the outstanding translator and writer Vladimir Mikushevich. In addition to a direct reference to the Adamic, heavenly rites even in “paganism,” before us is a direct indication that “Slav” or “Sloven”, i.e., the “voiced image” (MEROIS), is first and foremost a sacrifice and priest, albeit, of course, before the sacrifice, the God-Word, abolishes the “bloody, human sacrifice.”

Applying this to the “social structure” of the ancient society of the Slovene, there is the priest who is identical to a druid or sorcerer. Thus, the Slavo-Russian language is the royal, priestly language just as how in Europe, for example, the Franco-Celtic combination is a combination of free (francs) soldiers, i.e., the same people bearing light-brown hair and Celtic druids (kit-kchld – Chaldean – koldun) and the magi-“Slovene.” With the adoption of Christianity, the Varna caste division of Aryan society was, of course, cleansed of its “pagan abomination” and “mystery of iniquity,” i.e., specifically of blood sacrifices. Thus, it was miraculously transformed into the symphony of the Orthodox Empire and yielded the Bloodless Sacrifice of the Orthodox Priesthood. The concepts of “Russian”, “Slav,” “Frank,” or “Gaul” (hl-kl-klt), “Goth,” or “Celt” were gradually transformed into ethnonyms. This can only be realized upon setting aside the famous dispute between the “Normanists” and “anti-Normanists.”

The point is that both the Slavs and the Rus (like the Franks and Celts) ethnologically belonged to one Northern Aryan ethnos today known as the Veneti. In the days of old, one could stumble upon the name mentioned by Strabo – Vindelicum or Vendelicum (and the Baltic Sea was the Sinus Venedicus). Moreover, one of their names was Franks (the “free ones”) and the other was Slavs. As Eckhard wrote, “The Franks once dwelled near the Baltic Sea, where there is now the Vagria” (Franci olim ad mare Balthicum, ubu nune est Vagria). It should thus be clearly borne in mind that all of these ethnonyms are from later times. “The Franconian Slavs,” writes the 19th century Russian scholar Y.I. Venelin (Gutsa), “did not call themselves Vindelicum, just as they did not call themselves Slovene as the name existing only in ethnographic books. The very word Franks is a modern ethnonym derived from one of the names of the kings who ruled the ancient Vagria called Reges Francorum and who, according to Fredegar and the later chroniclers, were the descendants of the Trojan kings (the line of Priam). These are the Trojan Veneti settlers who formed the ruling, princely caste of whom Polybius wrote. According to him, they “differ little from the Celts, but speak their own language. The writers of tragedies often mention this people and speak of its many miracles.”

Everything thus turns out to be very simple: in the West they were called Franks, and in the East, Rus. This also renders clear the process of the transformation of the Varnas (the castes) into ethnoi (and not vice versa, contrary to Marxist and Liberal science) and renders it easier to trace the evolution of the remnants of the old law of the land.

The modern scholar of the history of law, M.A. Isaev, writes:

Rus could finally merge with the Slavs no early than the 12th century. The Russian Truth knew very well the Rusin opposed to both the Varangian Kyfling (the foreigner) and the Slav. This is a very characteristic feature of the Russian tradition. The sources of barbarian law usually secured legal position not only among different layers of the population, but also in different forms between ethnoi. The barbarian laws knew a similar differentiation between the conqueror peoples and, for example, the Romans, who continue to live according to jus Quiritium. But what distinguishes the Russian legal as well as cultural and state civilization among the whole lot of barbarian and ancient samples of Western European culture is the rejection of ethnic particularism as a principle of state life…

The latter is quite natural based on the Divine and Theophonic, not ethnic origin of royal (i.e., Russian) authority. Wherever authors more based in tradition do not literally, i.e., like “foreigners,” understand, for example, the Varangians (we will see below what this word meant among the ancient Aryans), the picture manifests itself more clearly, acquiring intelligible outlines.

The Primary Chronicle of the 15th century and the praise of the Russian language contained therein, the sources of which date back to the Kiev dome, says:

This will be known by all languages and all peoples that the Russian language is from nowhere and this holy faith and Russian alphabet was not introduced by anyone but God the Almighty, the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit imbued/breathed faith and the acceptance of baptism and other Church customs from the Greeks to [St.] Vladimir [the Great], whereas the Russian alphabet was given by God in Korsun [Chersonesos Taurica in Crimea] to the Russians, and from this philosopher Constantine learned it, from this he wrote books in the Russian language. […] That same Russian man was virtuous in thought and action, in pure faith he isolated himself, and from the Russian language came early Christians, and it is not known by anyone where it came from. [1]

A.G. Dugin writes: “The Russian monarchical tradition began, as is known, with the calling of Rurik from the Varangians to kingship over a group of Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes. In the later period, descending from the first prince – Rurik – was the spiritual and genealogical justification of royal authority, its legitimacy and sacred legality. This tradition was so persistent and deep, so self-evident and absolute in Russians’ understanding, that it simply could not have been inconsistent with the indigenous archetypes of ancient forms of consciousness which, although they moved into the sphere of the unconscious, nevertheless did not lose their efficiency and validity. In our opinion, the calling of Rurik from among the Varangians was seen as a great, nationwide mystery embodying in itself the script of the supernatural origin of royal power which is characteristic for all ancient, traditional dynasties.”

Thus, Slavo-Russian means simply Divine-ruling. ROS and MEROIS. MEROIS is the “voiced image,” i.e., the voiced, or slovesny in Russian, and thus Slovensky – one of the names of the First Adam.


The modern world has an exceptionally short memory. While extolling “European civilization” as the kingdom of democracy, i.e., Laodicea (which sounds like the Greek synonym of the word laocracy, or rule of the people), it is forgotten that the history of the latter is the history of a mere three centuries. Moreover, the Russian liberals of the last century, dreaming of the “Novgorod Republic,” did not remember, did not know, and did not want to know of the sacred center of our ancient homeland which had nothing in common with their understanding of the “principles” of the French and American bourgeois revolutions as they envisioned and reflected upon in their minds.

It must be said that the most significant refutation of liberal forgetfulness is the historical and archaeological science of recent years that has paradoxically confirmed the Church Tradition (the chronicle tale Of the Slovene and Rus, the Christian Cosmography of Saint Cosmas Indikoplov and others), just as has practically all of the archaic Byliny, ancient Japhetic, and semi-fantastic corpus. A scholar of the Romans from the ’80’s and ’90’s of the last century who compared the results of historical-archaeological science with legend speaks of a place approximately covering the space between present-day Novgorod and St. Petersburg:

Great Slovensk. The ancient northern capital of the Japhites founded in 2409 B.C. and defunct after the rejection of the Apostle Andrew and the outbreak of hostilities by Princes Lalokh (Khalokh) and Lakhern against the ‘scepter of the Greek kingdom.’ In the 9th century, under the reign of Rurik, the northern capital was transferred down the river Volkhov and called New City, or Novy Grad. The works of the eastern geographers containing data related to the 50’s-’80’s of the 9th century speak of three groups of the Rus, the main of which was As-Slaviyu with its center in the city of Slava…usually identified with the Ilmen Slovenes and their center with the precursor of Novgorod, whose name has been preserved by eastern authors (see the works of A.P. Novoseltsev and V.Y. Petrukhin). The oldest part of Novgorod bears the name ‘Slavno’ which is consistent with the names in Arab sources. Based on this, it is clear that the expanses of Slovensk should, if not surpass, then at least match the square of the ancient part of Novgorod. However, contrary to common sense, the majority of Soviet archaeologists have identified such an enormous metropolis as Slovensk presented in sources as a small, princely ‘Rurik settlement.’ The real Great Slovensk, whose kilometer-long ramparts are covered by forest, remains unexplored and is not marked on archeological maps to this day.

Speaking of the history of Novgorod (from the 8th-9th centuries), much allows the assumption to be made that it was conceived of long before the official Baptism of Kiev as an Orthodox Christian city, as early Novgorodian Orthodoxy, with its special veneration of the Sophia, the Holy Wisdom, which also houses the genealogical mystery of (and indeed answer to) the House of Rurik itself.

Conventional historiography depicts the baptism of the land of Novgorod as the deed of the famous Dobrynya Malkhovich, the “uya” (uncle) of Saint Vladimir, done “by fire and sword”, and Novgorod itself and the Russian North in general as “pagan Wandea.” However, an attentive reading of local Novgorodian literary sources reveals a significantly more complex picture. Let us recall that in ancient times, Northern Rus was an integral part of Northern Europe as a whole in which the confrontation between Christianity and “paganism” – before the mass genocide orchestrated in the 9th-10th centuries on the order of the Carolingian papacy – did not acquire such tragic severity as in the Roman Empire. Let us also recall that behind the “round table” of King Arthur, the Druid Merlin sits adjacent to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and in the Edda both pre-Christian cosmogony and Christian historiosophy coexist. Only under the Carolingians did the destruction of entire ethnic groups, such as the Saxons and Bretons, begin on religious grounds…

And yet was the Russian North “pagan” or Christian on the eve of the official Baptism of Rus?

In the Tale of Bygone Years that Passed in Great Novgorod, it is said:

In the age of our pious Russian great princes living in Novgorod and voluntarily at peace with all the lands, the Germans [foreigners] sent their envoys from all 70 cities. They bowed to the earth in front of the archbishop of Novgorod, and the local government, and military, and the entire city of Novgorod and said, “Dear neighbors! Give us a piece of your land in the middle of Great Novgorod where we can place a shrine according to our own faith and customs. [2] 

The Novgorodians responded, saying:

By the grace of God and that of the Most Pure Mother of God and our father, the archbishop, through blessing and prayer, in the birthplace of our lords, great Russian princes in Great Novgorod, there are only Orthodox churches of our Christian faith here. After all, how can light and darkness join forces? How can your shrine be built in our city? […] Mayor Dobrynia, blinded by a bribe and taught by the Devil, ordered to move the Church of St. John the Baptist to a different location and gave its place to the Germans [foreigners]. […] And when the Germans [foreigners] built their own church [of a different faith], they hired Novgorod icon painters and ordered them to paint the image of the Savior on the southern wall at the top in order to appeal to and seduce [Orthodox] Christians. And when these icon painters painted the image of the Savior in the [foreign] church without informing the archbishop about this, and took off the covers, then immediately at that moment came rain and hail, and the place where the image of the Savior was painted was knocked out by hail and washed away by rain without a trace. [3] 

At first glance, the Tale of Bygone Years was compiled and written by the zealots of piety. However, a reading of the commentary to it written by L.A. Dmitriev leaves one to think somewhat differently about its origins and – especially! – the reasons for its emergence and distribution. Dmitriev writes:

This tale dates figures among those landmarks of Novgorodian literature at the heart of which lie oral traditions of local origin…V.L. Yanin believes that the ‘there exist visible signs of the reliability of this legend.’ The legend itself apparently appeared very early, no later than the 12th century, but the tale was written down considerably later. E.A. Rybina noted that the Khutyn abbot Zacchaeus is named in literature dated to the years 1477-1478. Accordingly, the Tale of Bygone Years could not have been written earlier than the second half of the ’70’s of the 15th century. The pronounced anti-Boyar orientation of the Tale of Bygone Years, the words in its beginning on the independence of Novgorod, and the clearly evident condemnation of Novgorodian customs – all of this speaks to the fact that it was written after Novgorod’s loss of independence, i.e., once again no earlier than the late ’70’s of the 15th century. We cannot say what the thrust of the original legend of Dobrynya was, but the character of the Tale of Bygone Years is evidence that this work was forged in a democratic environment, and religious motives are no longer at the fore in the Tale…

But if not religious motives, then what kind? Let us pay attention to the words of this historian, namely, that this work was created in a democratic environment.

The book of the Novgorodian historian and archaeologist of the last century, Vasiliy Peredolsky, which we shall have to repeatedly cite (the book was published only in Novgorod in 1898 and has never been reprinted, neither before nor after 1917) indeed speaks of several mysterious temple (and not only temple) buildings somehow subsequently destroyed over the course of approximately the 8th-16th centuries. First and foremost, this most inquisitive historian, who was also the author of studies on the prehistoric tombs of the Novgorodian Slavs, points to the existence in Novgorod at least until the 13th century of an Orthodox church named after the Apostle Peter whose services were held in Latin. This church is also mentioned in the famous The Questions of Kirik. During the war with the sword-bearers, i.e., the Catholics, this temple was not disturbed but, moreover, all Novgorodians came to it for sacrifices. “Was it not Fryazian, i.e., did it not at all belong to the Christians of Roman Orthodoxy, the Fryazians, and did its original appearance have no relationship to the centuries before the division of the Church into East and West?” According to V.S. Peredolsky, this church standing on the corner of Malo-Mikhailovksaya and Nutnaya streets was destroyed. Overseas merchants established the Orthodox Pytatnitskaya church in 1156. The first Novgorodian church in general was thus, according to Peredolsky, the Orthodox church of St. Lazarus established in the pre-chronicle times (i.e., in the 9th-10th centuries at latest), and was completely destroyed. After the destruction of the temple, in its place remained Lazarev Hill on the Volkhov, upon which the temple was rebuilt in the 18th century in honor of the same saint. This Novgorodian historian also tells us that then, i.e., before the construction of the churches of Saint Elijah and Saint Sophia and before the famous Dobrynin campaign unleashed upon the “pagans” with “fire and sword,” an Orthodox church of Saint Mary Magdalene (who according to the Gospel of John and more detailed interpretations of the ancient Western exegetes was Saint Lazarus’ sister) stood in Novgorod. Peredolsky does not say where this church stood and what subsequently happened to it. However, his analysis of the history of the other churches points to certain peculiar points.

In the official chronicle, it is said: “In 1194 was established in Great Novgorod a wooden church of the Holy Trinity on the Sofia side, on Redyatin street of Shchetishcha Yugorsha which is now called Novinka.” In the same parchment book under the year “6673 since the Creation of the World”, it is written: “there was built the Church of the Holy Queen of Shchetitsinita.”  Soon after the name of this church was changed to the Church of the Holy Trinity of Shchetinitsa. But in honor of what queen was the church built and why was its name changed? It was officially claimed that it was erected by German merchants from the city of Stettin. However, in 1194 they could not have built an Orthodox church. In such a case, what was meant was clearly not the city of Stettin (Szczeczin), but a holy queen covered in shchetina, or “bristles.” The merging of pre-Christian with Christian symbolism is obvious in the name of the church. Here one can, of course, recall the ancient Hyperborean totem of the White Boar traceable back to the “primordial tradition.”

If we recall the purely northern location of the lands of Novgorod, the “Land of Saint Sophia” as the Novgorodians themselves called them, then we have an unexpected confirmation of the guesses of some contemporary authors. A.G. Dugin, whom we have already cited, wrote in particular: “But this country, as we have already said, was also called Varakhi, the ‘land of the Wild Boar,’ which corresponds exactly with the Greek root bor, i.e., north, or the country of Hyperborea (‘lying in the far north’)…And it is no accident that, according to Ancient Greek sources, the Hyperboreans sent symbolic gifts of wheat to Delphi via the Scythian and more northern Russian lands. It is curious that the word varakhi reminds us also of varyagi, i.e., the legendary people who gave the Russians a sacred monarch.”

In antiquity, both a woman’s comb for long hair and long hair itself were called bristles. The ancient Christian legend of Saint Mary Magdalene describing her voyage to Rome and Gaul (together with the righteous Lazarus, St. Martha, St. Joseph of Arimathea, and St. Maxamin) took particular note of her ascetic life in Sainte Marie de la Mer in southern France, where the saint appeared with long, ankle-length, reddish-brown hair. But is such a reference to the Land of the Wild Boar and the equally-apostle woman who bore the world not incompatible? Let us recall the ancient art of “making the incompatible compatible” which penetrated the entire medieval worldview and all of science from the apophatic theology of the Eastern Fathers to Western alchemical investigations. Let us also recall that the image of the “long-haired woman” or even “queen” in folk legends often bears an obviously chthonic-infernal shade. This should not surprise us. Traditional, sacred symbols are always twofold, just as the ‘smart light’ for the holy turns out to be the flames of hell for the sinner. The Nativity of St. John the Baptist is the day for flowering the fern and “rusalli merrymaking” (which was repeatedly pointed out in the lectures of V. Mikushevich), and so on.

What can be said of the mysterious “Shchetsinitsa”? This is the Slavic Marena, Marina, Mara, mora, kikimora, the French Cauchear (female kind). For the Carpathian Rusyns, this is lisova panna, nyauka, perelestnitsa, vtreshcha, mayka  a young woman with long hair but backless and with exposed entrails. This is the divje devojka, the mistress of the reindeer who nurtures them with milk. To her come the young, but they leave as the very old…According to the “Golden Legend”, Mary Magdalene was of the Japhetic royal family (her parents were Sir, i.e., Kir, and Eucharia) who ran from Herod, and in the canonical Gospels the Savior casts seven demons out from her (Luke 8:2), i.e., precisely those Japhetic “deities” who she, as princess, could serve.  Such a figure so teeming with canonically unconfirmed (but nowhere denied) dualistic characteristics could, among other things, have affected the fate of the most ancient temple built in her honor still during the time of the united church before it was later destroyed and, as part of the gradual “moralization” and institutionalization of a consciousness, she acquired new names – the “Holy Queen of Shchetitsinita” and the “Holy Trinity.”

No fewer mysteries are to be found in V.S. Peredolsky’s reference to two ruined monasteries. The first of them was destroyed in approximately the 10th century which bore the name of Zverinsky Monastery. The second suffered such a fate in the 16th-17th centuries – the monastery of Saint Arcadia or the Arkadsky Monastery in the place of which also existed the similarly destroyed village of Arkazha. What’s more, the location around the former Zverinsky Monastery also bore the name Zverinets up until the 18th century. Herein are revealed the mysteries of these names (and the causes of the monasteries’ ruin), and here it is sufficient to offer a few most general observations. Homer referred to the Arcadians’ role in the siege of Troy and how later the Priam line of Trojan kins moved to the North through Arcadia. The Arcadians themselves claimed that they descended from the fabulous deity of the land of Arkas which translates to mean “bear.” According to mythology, Arkas was the son of the nymph Calypso, the main star of Ursa Major (the star of Arkas “heads” the Ursa Minor). Artaios (the “bear-like”) is an epithet of the Celtic Mercury (the Gaelic arto – bear; Greek ARKTOS – the name of the Centaur). The name of Hesiod’s centaur is ARKTOYROS, a designation of Arcturus, the guard of of Ursa Major in the Boötes constellation. The bear is the ancestor and the pervotsar (“first-king”), hence the Celtic King Arthur as well as the “secret,” “unpronounced” names of the beast – urs, rus, syr = tsar. At the same time, in Christian symbolism, the bear, like the lion, is a symbol of royal authority. Artos is the blessed Paschal bread distributed in the Orthodox Church on the Saturday of Bright Week in memory of the Risen King of Kings and Lord of Lords. The North, the Arctic, is the polar paradise, the land of the bear (ber, bjorn) and the white boar, the unity of the King and High Priest, the military element and the spiritual, the red and white castes. Understood in a meta-historical and eschatological perspective, the symbolism of such unity is genuinely Orthodox. It was revealed and then found expression in the famous images of the Reverend Sergey on Makovtsa and the Reverend Seraphim of Sarov who nurtured the bear in the forests of Russian Paradise – Diveeva.

As regards the Zverinsky Monastery, in the local Novogorodian dialect only the bear was called a beast (zver) and the name Rus (Urs) was taboo, never to be pronounced even in Christian times. In Latin, urs remained. The very name of the beast, “bear”, or in Russian medved is clearly a euphemism. In remote areas in the North and Siberia, hunters to this day still cautiously call a bear “that” or “the main one” or even “forest Archimandrite.”….Saint Urs from Ravenna can still be found among the Latin saints.

A certain semantic tie between the two “bear” monasteries and the church of the semi-folkloric “Holy Queen of Shchetitsinita” cannot escape our attention. After all, the bristle, schcetina, is an attribute of the boar. In the Golden Bristled Pig tale, for example, it brings prosperity and belongs to Baba Yaga. In any case, we believe that there apparently exists a link between the destruction of the churches of Saint Lazar and Saint Mary Magdalene (perhaps the “Queen of Shchetitsinita”) and the Arkad and Zverinsky monasteries. It is so obvious that it can be considered proof of the existence of Christian temples in the epoch of the still united – Orthodox! – church during the period that preceded the baptismal campaign of Dobrynya Malkhovich hitherto famously described as accomplished “by fire and sword” and as having met widespread resistance from the Novgorodians. Thereafter, this resistance was often represented as the resistance of the “Russian people” to allegedly “foreign” Orthodoxy. Moreover, the question begs itself: what kind of “paganism” did the “son of Malekh Lyubechanin” fight? We stand before the fact that at the time of Rurik’s calling to rule, the Russian North-West (the land of Rus and Sloven) was fully, if not to a considerable extent Christian, Orthodox. The worship of ever since unknown saints was observed there.

As an example which could serve as a further guide and key to the Introitus Apertus ad Occulusum Regis Palatium, we can refer to the testimony of the so-called Old Russian treasure found in 1892 in the Seltsa district of the Old-Russian district. Among the images on the coins of this treasure dating back to the 12th-13th centuries, V.S. Peredolsky discovered an unknown martyr in a hat like in the case of Boris and Gleb, with a cross and two lilies on both sides of the image. Who is this clearly royal martyr with lilies who was unknown to later Russian history?

We will come back to this. In the meantime, let us recall how in 679, in the Ardennes not so far from Novgorod, per dolum ducum et consensuum episcoparum (“with the participation of the leaders and consent of the bishops”), Dagobert II, the last truly reigning representative of the Merovingian dynasty, was killed under an old oak tree near a stream while hunting. He was killed on the orders of Pepin of Heristal, his own attendant, the grandfather of the future usurper of Pepin the Short, the founder of the “second” Carolingian “race” of the Frankish kings. Soon, however, the remains of the king turned out to be miracle-working and even defended the city of Stene from a Viking attack. One hundred years later, the martyr king was canonized by a meeting of Frankish bishops without the Pope’s approval. The spring of Saint Dagobert can be found in the Verdun forest in the Ardennes to this day and is revered as a shrine. However, Dagobert was put on the official list of French kings only in the 17th century and is absent in some French textbooks to this day.

We meet the cult of “unknown saints” as it once was directly preceding the history of ancient Novgorod in Europe (part of which in those ages was Northern Rus, named in some chronicles “Bretania”. G.P. Fedotov, who wrote a series of outstanding works on medieval studies alongside his passion for “Christian socialism”, summarized his observations on these phenomena in the following way:

Question can be raised as to such a peculiar phenomenon as the veneration of nameless saints confined to ancient tombs. This is the moment of transition from popular cult to canonization by the church, the transitional moment in the established biography of a saint. When did the church close its altars to these unknown, chosen representatives of the people’s faith?…In the least, the Carolingian Renaissance finds this cult to be still alive in order to inflict a fatal blow upon it…The age of Carolingian “enlightenment” apparently put an end if not to popular worship, then to the church’s reception of nameless cults…In the 17th century, Mabillon tells of a place in his contemporary France where a cult of unknown saints emerged. But this cult repressed by the Carolingian church could never rise again.

Indeed, the Carolingians themselves and the Roman “Catholic” Church that they produced, and the clergy of the Roman diocese, might have thought so.

But centuries pass and

The worm and mob will learn of the Lord

By the flower growing out of his hand

And “worm” and the “mob” – this is a democratic environment.


[1] Translated from Old Church Slavonic by Nina Kouprianova

[2] Translated from Old Church Slavonic by Nina Kouprianova

[3] Translated from Old Church Slavonic by Nina Kouprianova