Alexander Dugin

Foreword to Foundations of Geopolitics

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Foreword to Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (Arktogeya, Moscow: 2000) 



The history and fate of geopolitics as a science is paradoxical. On the one hand, the concept itself seems to have become customary and is actively used in modern politics. Geopolitical journals and institutes have multiplied, the texts of the founders of this discipline are being published, conferences and symposia are being organized, and geopolitical committees and commissions have been created.

Yet nevertheless, to this day geopolitics has still been unable to enter the category of conventionally recognized sciences. The first geopolitical works of the German Ratzel, the Swede Kjellen, and especially the Englishman Mackinder have been met with hostility by the scientific community. Classical science, fully inheriting the hyper-critical spirit of early positivism, has considered geopolitics to be an “over-generalization,” and consequently it is believed to be little more than a variety of “charlatanism.”

In a sense, the sad fate of geopolitics as a science has been associated with the political side of the problem. The opinion has been approved that the war crimes of the Third Reich’s expansion, the war, deportations, etc. were to a significant extent theoretically prepared by German geopoliticians who allegedly supplied Hitler’s regime with a pseudo-scientific basis (first and foremost, this refers to Karl Haushofer, the German geopolitician who at one time was quite close to the Fuhrer).

However, German geopolitics, on a theoretical level, is essentially no different from Anglo-Saxon geopolitics (Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman), French geopolitics (Vidal de La Blanche), or Russian “military geography” (Milyutin, Snesarev), etc. The difference lies not in the specific views of Haushofer, which were entirely logical and adequate for the discipline, but in the methods by which a number of his geopolitical positions were realized. Moreover, the specific foreign policies of Germany in the ’30’s and ’40’s in their most repulsive manifestations were diametrically opposed to the ideas of Haushofer himself. Instead of a “continental bloc” along the axis of Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo, there was the attack on the USSR; instead of an organic understanding of the doctrine of Lebensraum, or “living space” (in the spirit of Schmitt’s theory of “people’s rights”), there was vulgar nationalism and imperialism, etc. It should be noted that Haushofer’s school and his journal Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik were never official elements of the Nazi system. As with many intellectual groups of the so called “conservative revolutionaries” in the Third Reich, their ambiguous existence was simply tolerated, and this tolerance varied depending on political conditions at a given moment.

However, the main reason for the historical suppression of geopolitics is the fact that it too openly reveals the fundamental mechanisms of international politics which various regimes often prefer to hide behind vague rhetoric or abstract ideological schemes. In this sense, it is possible to cite the parallel with Marxism (at least in its, scientific, analytical aspect). Karl Marx more than cogently revealed the mechanics of relations of production and their connections with historical formations, just as geopolitics exposes the historical demagogy of foreign policy discourse and shows the real deep levers which influence international, inter-state, and inter-ethnic relations. But if Marxism is a global revision of classical economic history, then geopolitics is a revision of the history of international relations. The latter explains the ambivalent attitude of society towards geopolitical scholars. The scientific community stubbornly refuses to tolerate them in their midst and harshly criticizes them, often without even noticing that, on the contrary, authorities use geopolitical calculations to formulate international strategy. Such, for example, was the case with one of the first geopoliticians, the true founding father of the discipline, Sir Halford Mackinder. His ideas were not accepted in academic circles, but he himself directly participated in the formulation of English policies for the first half of the 20th century, laying the theoretical basis for the international strategy of England which was passed on to the US in the middle of the century and developed by Mackinder’s American (or, more broadly, Atlanticist) followers.

In our opinion, the parallel with Marxism is a successful one. A method may be adapted and utilized by different poles. The Marxist analysis is important for both the representatives of Capital and fighters for the emancipation of Labor. Geopolitics is important for both the representatives of large states (empires), as it instructs them how to best preserve territorial domination and carry out expansion, and their opponents for whom geopolitics presents the conceptual principles of the revolutionary theory of “national liberation.” For example, the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the hands of Mackinder’s geopolitical school which expressed the interests of the West and aimed at weakening the states of Central Europe and the suppression of Germany. The German student of Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, proceeding from the same assumptions, developed a directly opposing theory of “European liberation” which was a total negation of the logic of Versailles and which formed the basis of the nascent ideology of National-Socialism.

These considerations show that even though it has not been accepted into the commonwealth of classical sciences, geopolitics is extremely effective in practice and its value is superior in some aspects to many conventional disciplines.

Be that is at may, today geopolitics exists and little by little it is gaining official recognition and the corresponding status. However, not everything is going smoothly in this process. Very often we are faced with a confusion of the concept of “geopolitics,” whose increasing use is becoming common place among non-professionals. The focus is shifted from the complete and global picture, developed by the founding fathers, to limited regional points of geo-economic schemes. The original postulates of geopolitical dualism, competing strategies, civilizational differentiation, etc. are either ignored, hushed, or denied. It is difficult to imagine something similar in any other science. What would happen to classical physics if, operating with the concepts of “mass”, “energy”, “acceleration”, etc., scientists started to implicitly, gradually deny the law of gravity, forget about it, and simply recognize that Newton was “a mythological figure never having existed in reality” or a “dark religious fanatic?” But it is precisely this, mutatis mutandis, which is happening with geopolitics in our time.

The purpose of this book is to present the basics of geopolitics objectively and impartially beyond preconceived notions, ideological sympathies and antipathies. No matter how we treat this science, we can only have a definite opinion of it upon being acquainted with its principals, history, and methodology.


© Jafe Arnold – All Rights Reserved. No reproduction without expressed permission. 


Herman Wirth’s Theory of Civilization

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Chapter 22 of Part 2, “Theories of Civilizations: Criteria, Concepts, and Correspondences”, of Noomachy: Wars of the Mind – Geosophy – Horizons and Civilizations (Moscow, Akademicheskii Proekt, 2017).


The Cultural Circle of Thule

Bachofen’s idea of a primordial matriarchy and his theory of “cultural circles” were developed by another historian and archaeologist, a specialist in paleo-epigraphy, Herman Wirth (1885-1981).

Wirth’s theories are based on the hypothesis borrowed from the Indian author Bala Gandhara Tilak (1856-1920) [1], that the original Proto-Indo-European civilization was formed in the late Paleolithic (the Aurignacian culture) in the lands of the northern polar circle. This hypothesis was based on the interpretation of the data of Indian astrology, Vedic texts, and the myths of the Hindus, Iranians, and Greeks which speak of the existence in remote antiquity of a populated country lying in the Far North (Hyperborea). This continent was described in the Vedas as the “land of the white boar”, Varahi, and the “island of light”, or Sweta Dvipa. The Zoroastrian tradition speaks of the ancient abode of the first man, the city of Vara, located in the Far North, from which he was forced to descend southwards as the dark deity Angra Mainyu, the enemy of the god of light, Ahura-Mazda, unleashed a “great cold” across these lands. Tilak argues for the existence of this “Nordic” proto-civilization on the basis of Indian astrology, the symbolism of which, according to Tilak, becomes clear only if we accept that the constellations were originally observed in the circumpolar regions, where the day of the gods is equal to the year of men.

Wirth adopted this hypothesis and constructed his own theory upon it, the “Hyperborean theory” [2] or theory of the “cultural circle of Thule” [3], which represents the Greek name for the mythical city lying in the country of the Hyperboreans. According to this theory, before the latest wave of global cooling, the circumpolar zone in the North Atlantic Ocean was home to inhabitable lands whose inhabitants were the creators of a primordial cultural code. This culture was formed under conditions when the natural environment of the Arctic was not yet so harsh, and when its climate was similar to the modern temperate Central European climate. There were present all the annual and atmospheric phenomena which can be observed in the Arctic today: the Arctic day and Arctic night. The yearly solar and lunar cycles of the Arctic are structured differently than their counterparts in middle-range latitudes. Thus, the symbolic fixations of the calendar, the trajectory of the sun, the moon, and the constellations of the zodiac necessarily had a different form and different patterns.

On the basis of an enormous swathe of archaeological, paleo-epigraphical (cave paintings, Paleolithic symbols, ancient carvings, etc.), mythological, and philological material, Herman Wirth undertook an attempt to reconstruct the primordial system of this Arctic proto-civilization’s cultural code. At its heart he put the reconstructed proto-calendar, the last traces of which Wirth believed are constituted by the Scandinavian runes, which he attributed to remote antiquity. Wirth proposed to examine this calendar, which records the key moments of the Arctic year, as the key to all later versions of mythological, religious, ritualistic, artistic, and philosophical heritages which continued and developed this primordial algorithm over the course of the wave-like migrations of the bearers of “Thulean culture” into the southern regions. When applied to other climatic conditions, however, many of the symbolic patterns of this calendar, otherwise crystal clear in the Arctic, lost their meaning and rationale. They were partially transferred to new realities, partially frozen as relics, and partially lost their meanings or acquired new ones.

First and foremost, this change entailed a fundamentally new understanding of the basic unit of time: instead of the Hyperborean day, equal to a year, the daily circle, which is much more clearly defined in the regions south of the polar circle, became the measure of events of human life. What is more, the localizing points of the spring and autumn equinoxes changed in relation to southward movement. All of this gradually confused the crystal clarity and simplicity of the primordial matrix.

Wirth believed that his reconstruction of the sacred complex of the culture of Thule lay at the heart of all historical types of writing and language, as well as musical tones, the symbolism of colors, ritual gestures, burials, religious complexes, etc.

Studying this culture formed the basis of Wirth’s attempts at reconstructing what he called the “proto-writing” or “proto-script” of humanity. Wirth published the results of his studies in two monumental works, Der Aufgang der Menschheit (The Emergence of Mankind) [4] and Die Heilige Urschrift der Menschheit (The Sacred Proto-Script of Mankind) [5], both equipped with an enormous lot of synoptic tables, comparative illustrations of archaeological excavations, writing systems, etc.

Nordic matriarchy

Wirth embraced Bachofen’s notion of primordial matriarchy and attributed to the “Thule culture” a matriarchal form of civilization. He suggested that the belief that the female gender is inclined towards materiality, corporeality, chthonicity, and empirical specifics is purely a product of patriarchal censorship, and that matriarchy could be no less, indeed even more of a spiritual phenomenon than patriarchy. Wirth believed that societies dominated by women and female priesthoods, religions, and cults represented the more advanced types of Hyperborean culture, which he termed the “culture of White Ladies” (weisse Frauen).

Wirth thus presented an altogether peculiar view on the relationship between matriarchy and patriarchy in the archaic culture of the Mediterranean region. In his point of view, the most ancient forms of culture in the Mediterranean were those established by bearers of the Hyperborean matriarchy, who in several stages descended from the circumpolar regions, from the North Atlantic, by sea (and that ships with shamrocks on the stern were characteristic of them). These were the people mentioned in ancient Near Eastern artifacts as the “sea-peoples”, or am-uru, hence the ethnic name of the Amorites. The name Mo-uru, according to Wirth, once belonged to the very main center of the Hyperboreans, but was transmitted along with the natives of the North in their migration waves to new sacred centers. It is to these waves that we owe the Sumerian, Akkadian, Egyptian (whose pre-dynastic writing was linear), Hittite-Hurrian, Minoan, Mycenaean, and Pelasgian cultures. All of these Hyperborean strata were structured around the figure of the White Priestess.

Patriarchy, according to Wirth, was brought by immigrants from Asia, from the steppe zones of Turan, who distorted the primordial Hyperborean tradition and imposed upon the Mediterranean cultures quite different – rude, violent, aggressive, and utilitarian -values which contrasted (for worse) the pure spiritual forms of the Nordic matriarchy.

Thus, in Wirth we have the following reconstruction: the Hyperborean cultural circle’s primordial, spiritual and highly-developed type of matriarchal culture spread from a circumpolar center, mainly be sea, penetrating the Mediterranean, scraping Africa, and even reaching the southern coast of Asia all the way down to Polynesia, where the Maori culture still retains traces of the ancient Arctic tradition. Another offshoot of the center of Mo-uru in the North Atlantic migrated to North America, where it laid the foundations of the cultural code of many tribes. One of Wirth’s undertakings was to demonstrate a homology between these two branches that dispersed out of the culture of Thule – the European, Mediterranean, and further African and Pacific on the one hand, and the North-American on the other.[6]

Meanwhile, in continental Asia there formed a cultural pole which represented the embryo of proto-patriarchy. Wirth associated this culture with crude naturalism, phallic cults, and a martial, aggressive, and utilitarian type of culture, which Wirth believed to be lower and Asian. We have devoted a whole separate volume to a more detailed outline of Herman Wirth’s views.[7]

The significance of Wirth’s ideas to geosophy

Many aspects of Herman Wirth’s unjustly forgotten works deserve attention in the study of plural anthropology. First of all, his extremely fertile hypothesis of the cultural circle of Thule, which is usually discarded from the outset without any careful analysis of his argumentation, is so rich that it deserves serious attention in itself. If such an hypothesis allows for the resolution of such numerous historical and archaeological problems associated with the history of symbols, signs, myths, rituals, hieroglyphs, the calendar, writing, and the most ancient views of the structure of space and time, then this alone is enough to warrant thorough inquiry. Even though Wirth’s works contain many claims which seem either unequivocally wrong or highly controversial, we can set them aside and try to understand the essence of his theory which, in our opinion, is an extraordinarily constructive version that expands our understanding of the archaic epochs of the ancient history of mankind. The theory of the cultural circle of Thule need not be unconditionally accepted, but an assessment of its interpretive potential is necessary.

Secondly, Wirth’s positive appraisal of matriarchy is extremely interesting and adds weight to sympathy for Bachofen. Indeed, we are dealing with an interpretation of a conditionally reconstructed matriarchal civilization from the position of what is the, in the very least nominal, patriarchy to which our society has become accustomed. Wirth proposes an alternative interpretation of the female Logos, an attempt to view the Logos of the Great Mother through different eyes. This is also an extremely unconventional and fertile proposal.

Thirdly, in Wirth’s theories we can see clear analogues to the reconstructions of both Spengler and Frobenius. If Frobenius and especially Spengler took the side of Indo-European (Turanian, Eurasian) culture, i.e., the side of patriarchy as they interpreted it, then Wirth proposes to look at things from the standpoint of the civilization of the White Ladies, i.e., from the position of the primordial Mediterranean culture that preceded the invasion of the “people on war chariots.”


[1] Tilak, B.G., Arkticheskaiia rodina v Vedakh (Moscow: FAIR-PRESS, 2001). In English: Tilak, B.G., The Arctic Home in the Vedas: Being Also a New Key to the Interpretation of Many Vedic Texts and Legends (Poona City: Tilak Bros, 1903). 

[2] Dugin, A.G., Znaki Velikogo Norda: Giperboreiskaiia Teoriia (Moscow: Veche, 2008). English translation of introduction available here

[3] Wirth, H., Khronika Ura-Linda. Drevneishaiia istoriia Evropy (Moscow: Veche, 2007). In German: Wirth, Herman. Die Ura-Linda Chronik (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1933).

[4] Wirth, H., Der Aufgang der Menschheit. Forschungen zur Geschichte der Religion, Symbolik und Schrift der atlantisch-nordischen Rasse (Jena: Diederichs, 1928).

[5] Wirth, H., Die Heilige Urschrift der Menschheit. Symbolgeschichtliche Untersuchungen diesseits und jenseits des Nordatlantik (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1936).

[6] The full title of Wirth’s Die Heilige Urschrift der Menschheit specifies “on both sides of the North Atlantic.” See footnote 5. 

[7] See footnote 2. 

Dugin in Shanghai: International Relations and Geopolitics – Lecture 2

“Geopolitics: Theories, Concepts, Schools, and Debates” 

Author: Alexander Dugin

Transcript prepared by Jafe Arnold

Lecture #2 read at the China Institute of Fudan University, Shanghai, China, December 2018 [VIDEO]

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.17.28 PM.png

Geopolitics is a separate branch of strategic analysis. There are some links between International Relations theories and geopolitical theories, but Geopolitics is an absolutely original and independent field of strategic thinking and analysis. In this lecture, we are going to speak about the paradigms, concepts, schools, and main debates of geopolitics.

Geopolitics can be defined as a discipline that studies the relations and interactions between Spaces (Territories), States, Civilizations, Peoples, and Economics. This is a much broader context than that in International Relations, because theories of International Relations study only state-to-state relations. Geopolitics is much broader. First of all, it is centered around the relations between the state and space (territory) – and not only, but also culture-to-culture and people-to-people, all put into space. Space in geopolitics plays the same role as time for history. Geopolitical analysis is based on the centrality of space.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.17.57 PM.png

Space, in any sense, not only the material, is synchronicity. It is something that happens simultaneously. It is a synchronistic, not diachronistic approach. Historically, Geopolitics was developed from political geography and “anthropogeography”. It is a kind of political and human geography. Both terms were introduced in the 19th century by the German professor Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). Political geography means the relation between the state and territory, or space. The same Ratzel also used in his research the term anthropogeography, which means human geography. The anthropos, or man, is the most important here. In International Relations, nobody speaks about man or the human, but only the state. In Geopolitics, this is not so. Geopolitics tries to involve more levels of analysis than International Relations. This is why there have been problems with this discipline, because some scholars think it is too broad and includes too many levels in one concept, and so is not a precise science.

The next element in Geopolitics was the idea of the Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922). He proposed the idea that the state is a living being. This was an organic attitude towards the state. If there are living beings that move, then states move, or they have certain relations to the earth. This is an organicist concept. Kjellen and Ratzel belonged to the same philosophical school of organicism. They considered life, including political life, as something natural, not mechanical, but organic.

So what is the space of Geopolitics? It is qualitative, not quantitative. It is not “physical” space or “scientific” space. The quality of space is something like “life-space.” The concept of living space, or Lebensraum, was introduced by Ratzel. Afterwards, the term was used to mean a space which a growing people needs to occupy in order to satisfy needs. But that was a practical, pragmatic use of the term. Originally, Lebensraum, in the context of Ratzel’s ideas, meant precisely the space that lives – “living space”, in an organic attitude that is qualitative. Space is  quality, where orientations do matter. This is much more of Aristotelian space than the space of modern physics. This is quantum-mechanical space, with different orientations. Space is different if you go to the North, South, East, or West – they are not relative concepts. There is a kind of absolute South or absolute North, absolute West, or absolute East. This space is a kind of category charged with proper characteristics. Space or territory is destiny. With such an attitude, space obtains a kind of historical meaning. Space is not indifferent; it is a very special, organic category. Space is also more important than time. This remark, as well, makes Geopolitics a post-modern discipline, because modernity is centered around time, history, and how everything is changing in the irreversible process of time and progress.

Geopolitics affirms that the most important category of human life and political relations is space. If you, your country, your culture, or your people, live in one kind of space, it will have special values, special politics, and special political organization – if, for example, you live on an island or in a coastal space, you will be obliged to have a different political system, cultural set of values, and so on.

Space, as the foundation of strategy, was also evaluated by the pragmatist and American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). The term “Geopolitics” was used for the first time by the Rudolf Kjellen; “political geography” and “anthropogeography” by Ratzel, and “geostrategy” by Mahan. These are the founding fathers or forerunners of Geopolitics.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.09 PM.png

But properly speaking, Geopolitics as a discipline was formed later, in the beginning of the 20th century. The context of the birth of Geopolitics was British imperial strategy. The real founder of Geopolitics was the British Sir Halford Mackinder, an English imperialist and partisan and promoter of reinforcing the British empire. He thought about the basic principles of the British imperial strategy, and tried to conceptualize them, basing himself on the political geography of Ratzel and the geostrategy of Mahan, and other authors – some British, some Americans.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.14 PM.png

The context is very important. Geopolitics as a discipline was born in the context of the British Empire in the beginning of the 20th century when the British Empire was still flourishing – not at the end or amidst decline, but at what might have been the peak of the British Empire, when the Britons ruled the world through the oceans, and had such colonies as India, China – which was almost a colony, not formally, but under Great British influence – Japan, Iran, the Middle East, Turkey, and almost all of Africa. Whereas the German colonies there were very small, the French and Britain shared most of Africa. The British Empire was alive and flourishing. The context of Geopolitics was thus the “Great Game.”

The “Great Game” was the idea that the most important enemy of the British Empire, just before the “age of geopolitics”, was Imperial Russia, which exercised growing control over Central Asia and threatened English colonies in the Middle East and India, trying to go South to Afghanistan,  and also considering Russian expansion in the Caucasus – all of this growing power of Russia was considered the main enemy of the British Empire. This was the “Great Game.” Many aspects of global international geopolitics during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries can be explained in terms of the Great Game.

It is British imperial strategy, including the Great Game, that was the context of the birth of Geopolitics. The British Empire needed to control trade routes on the continent, but mostly throughout the oceans and seas, as the power of the British Empire was based on the control of trade routes. That was almost the “law” – that the British Empire control trade routes throughout all the world. That was the basic aspect of British strategy, the system of colonies, as Britain controlled and exploited many colonies in Africa, Asia, and so on. The idea, one of the main concerns of British imperialism, was to conserve the British Empire. Geopolitics was born as the theoretical reflection on Anglo-Saxon imperialism. It was a purely Western, imperialist approach. That was the context. It is very important to put science and methods in concrete historical conditions.

The real founder of Geopolitics, Sir Halford John Mackinder, was a political geographer as well as founder of the London School of Economics. He was one of the leading thinkers of British imperialism. In trying to put together all the threats, principles, perspectives, and “logic” of British imperialism, as well as trying to prepare its future in a practical way, Mackinder came to the first vision that was a kind of result of previous approaches to political geography. He published in 1904 in England a very important text composed of small articles, called The Geographical Pivot of History. In these articles, Mackinder laid out the real basis and principles of Geopolitics. We can speak of political geography before Mackinder, but we can speak of Geopolitics sensu stricto only after Mackinder. The line is drawn between the preparation and the creation of the scientific method. Mackinder is a central figure, and that is the main view up to now. His actuality is absolute. We cannot dismiss Mackinder. There is no Geopolitics except Mackinder’s – like in Islam, there is no God but Allah. Mackinder created this science, this method, based on previous ideas, theories, and doctrines, but here is precisely the essence of Geopolitics: Mackinder affirmed that there is a fundamental opposition between two global powers – and that is Geopolitics, precisely.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.21 PM.png

There is Land Power, identified as Heartland, the “geographical pivot” or “axis” of history. All history moves around this pivot, this axis, this Heartland. History is a process, a dynamic, and here is the point of “no dynamics”, the static point, the pivot, around which the wheel moves. That is Land Power.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.30 PM.png

There is Sea Power, which is precisely history. History, or time, is Sea Power. Eternity or the unmoved point is Heartland or Land Power. They represent two kinds of civilization. Land Power is based on constancy and eternity, as Land is fixed, doesn’t move, it is fixed space. It is fixedness itself, which is what Mackinder understood by Land Power. Sea Power is something that moves.

This dualism served Mackinder to explain the meaning of history. According to Mackinder, the fight or dualism between Land Power and Sea Power is the key to understanding history. We can see that this is exactly a kind of explanation or theorization of the Great Game. But this is  also Mackinder’s generalization, because it is not only an explanation of the Great Game. The Great Game – which saw the British Empire trying to control the seas and oceans against the Russian Empire – was a concrete, historical, strategic moment. But Mackinder generalized that the Great Game reflects something deeper, something universal, the basic principles of how human history goes on. This is the basic principle of Geopolitics.

When Mackinder tried to apply his ideas to history, he discovered that there is not only the British and Russian confrontation of the last centuries that can be explained by this geopolitical map, but he saw Sea Power in history, and identified Sea Power in: Athens, as coastal, as  a maritime sea power, in Carthage, the opponent of Rome in the Punic Wars, in Venice as the sea power and trade civilization, in the Dutch colonial empire, and finally in Great Britain. This was a kind of geopolitical continuity between different forms of Sea Power in history. So it is not only an explanation of the Great Game, but is a law. All Sea Powers in history were based on trade, on oligarchies, on technical development, and on control over seas, not land – because Sea Power never goes too deep into the continent. They control the continent by controlling the coast. The coast is much more important than the continental mass. That is, in the final analysis, the control of all space where humans live “from outside”, from the seas and oceans. The standpoint of Ocean, Sea, or Water, is the main element. This is the power of Water, where you cannot trace borders. There is nothing fixed in Water. The ocean, sea, and lakes are ever-changing space. You cannot domesticate creatures living in water. You can only fish them. You cannot feed yourself freely in the water. You need a ship – something artificial. That is the difference between the nature of Water and Earth. Earth is stable. You feel good, safe, and secure on the earth, and you can domesticate animals. The Earth is a kind of natural ambience, while the Ocean is unnatural. You need some kind of technology in order to be there, such as a ship. There is a kind of alienation from space, from ambience, that is at the center of Sea Power. Sea Power already in Mackinder’s work obtains a kind of metaphysical or cultural dimension. It is not only about the Great Game and British imperial strategy – it is about something much deeper. This was expounded only in small remarks in these articles, but it was absolutely underlying.

Land Power in history is quite the opposite. It is Sparta fighting against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. It is Rome against Carthage in the Punic Wars. It is Austria, Germany, and Russia against Western – English and French – imperialism. This analysis is much broader than concrete situations. Mackinder proposed the key to deciphering the logic of history, namely, that all human history is based on this kind of cosmology or mythology, a political mythology of two opposite principles fighting against each other and trying to win – sometimes Sparta wins, sometimes Athens, sometimes Rome, sometimes Carthage, and so on, sometimes Russia, sometimes Britain. There is a balance, an everlasting war of continents.

Already in Mackinder’s works, Sea Power means trade, liberalism, democracy, progress, technical innovation, oligarchy, science, adventure, the entrepreneur’s spirit, and capitalism. All these marks or characteristics created capitalism. Capitalism was born in Britain during its colonial experience. Sea Power is linked to liberal capitalism, to democracy. Sea Power thus also obtains a political and ideological dimension already in Mackinder. This is why Sea Power is “good” for capitalism. Here arises the self-fulfilling prophecy: Sea Power is progress, Land Power is regress or stagnation. Land Power represents force, conservatism, hierarchy, order, ascetics as morals, aristocracy, religion, ethics, and stability. If we compare these concepts, then it is not necessarily socialism. It is something that is not liberalism. It could be a traditional empire, a pre-modern or conservative society, but it could be socialism as well. Everything that is not capitalism and liberalism can be Land Power. This is precisely geopolitics.

The modern geopolitics of the 21st century is the same. It is still good old Mackinder’s point of view. Here we see the main terms and concepts of geopolitics.

Rimland is a very important concept, because it is the coastal zone. In geopolitics, Rimland is precisely the most interesting part of the structure of space, because there is sea space, land space, and Rimland space, which is something “between” land and sea. The coast of Rimland can be controlled from the sea, or from land. Who controls Rimland, controls everything.

Here we can see the famous map of Mackinder, which was published in National Geographic in his article “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Here we see all of geopolitics in one map. It is so “classic” and so fundamental that today all who study geopolitics and apply geopolitical analysis to the modern situation still use this map, drawn in the beginning of the 20th century. This map, drawn more than a hundred years ago, is so actual that it is a kind of prophetic map. What we see here is Sea Power in what is called the Outer and Insular Crescent. This is the territory controlled by the British Empire and the Anglo-Saxon world.  There is the pivot area, the same as Heartland, which is the landmass of Land Power. Here resides Land Power. And there is the Inner or Marginal Crescent, which is Rimland or the coastal area.

World history begins when both Land Power and Sea Power have acquired planetary dimensions. Earlier, the fight was on a reduced scale, but now it has acquired a planetary dimension, and there is only one explanation for what is happening on the planetary level: Sea Power is fighting against Land Power, trying to control the Inner or Marginal Crescent. The object of the fight between the two geopolitical powers, according to Mackinder, is the control of this zone, which could be controlled in one of two ways. The first is by Sea Power, which means that the metropolis, the center of the British Empire, is the master of all this space. Really, actually, in the beginning of the 20th century, all of this space was controlled by the British Empire. They needed (and need) to control Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Iran, India, at least the coastal part of China, Japan, and the part of the Far East that belongs to Russia. The idea was that the Inner Crescent, or Rimland, should be controlled by Sea Power, and that is the way to global domination by the Anglo-Saxon world. The conceptualization of the British Empire led Mackinder to this conclusion, and drawing this map was the foundational act of the creation of Geopolitics.

But what should Land Power do in the field of history? Mackinder honestly recognized that Land Power will fight back. Land Power, or Heartland, will try to do quite the opposite: to expand its power to the West, to conquer Western Europe, or all of Europe, impose its influence in the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Turkey, trying to use the territory of declining Turkey, and Heartland will try to destroy the British Empire’s control over Afghanistan, Central Asia, and India and, coming to China, to eject British Empire there, as well as in Japan. This was a kind of Great Game, balanced on a planetary scale with – most importantly – some philosophical dimension. Mackinder’s law was: Whoever controls Eastern Europe, controls Heartland, and whoever controls Heartland, rules the world. For Mackinder, it was crucial to control all of Heartland, or Land Power. Eastern Europe is only part of the truth, because all the Inner Crescent should be controlled by Sea Power.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.39 PM.png

But let us concentrate on this part of the sentence: “Whoever controls Heartland, rules the world.” This is the most important point. If Heartland is controlled from outside, the world is ruled by Sea Power. That means the democratic ideal, progress, modernity, and capitalism on a global scale. If Heartland is ruled by itself, by Land Power, it is something opposite: eternity, tradition, order, hierarchy, conservatism.

In Mackinder’s eyes, Heartland is an object. This object begins with Eastern Europe, as in the Inner Crescent, the coastal line of Eurasia. If the control of this coastal line or zone is strong enough, there is no possibility for direct confrontation between Eurasia, or Heartland, and Sea Power. Heartland becomes an object. But of Heartland. But if Heartland begins to be a subject, affirms itself as a geopolitical subject, is awakened or wakes up on its own, then there is a problem for the global domination of the British Empire. This was the main rule of geopolitics from then on. The fight for Eurasia is an application of this principle.

Mackinder’s follower, Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), developed his theory of a kind of enlarged version of Mackinder’s, with the emphasis put on Rimland. Spykman said: Whoever controls Rimland, controls Herartland. Whoever controls Heartland, rules the world.” Mackinder was concentrated on Eastern Europe – after all, he was a high commissar of the entente in Ukraine, trying to divide and separate Ukraine from the Russian Empire. The same idea was taken over by Brzezinski and put into practice in 2014 on the Maidan. We are living inside Mackinder’s world, and we cannot get out of it. 

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.44 PM.png

Spykman said that we need to attach the main importance to Rimland in general. In order to rule the world in general, we should separate the Far East from Russia, exercise all control over China from the sea, control the Middle east, Northern Africa, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and all Europe, and lessen Heartland’s zone of control.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.51 PM.png

This is the map of the American mind. American strategy follows all of this line. These maps were drawn in the beginning of the 20th century, and this one in the 1920’s. They are so actual today. In the Anglo-Saxon vision, Sea Power is the subject and Land Power is the object. In 2005 I met Zbigniew Brzezinski in Washington, and there was a chessboard between us. I asked: “Mr. Brzezinski, do you consider the game of chess to be for two players?” He said: “No, it is for one.”  That is the typical Western understanding, the Anglo-Saxon vision, of geopolitics. Chess is a game for one player, i.e., there is only one subject, and the other is not a player, but an object, whose hand must be moved. That is the basic attitude of the Anglo-Saxon vision of geopolitics. The main goal of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics is to surround Heartland by controlling Rimland, preventing Heartland from gaining access to the warm seas and breaking through the coastal blockade. The main goal is to rule the world by controlling Eurasia from the sea.

The future decline of Great Britain and the rise of the United States was predicted already in the end of the 19th century by some British imperialists, such as Sir Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902) and his group, the Round Table. Admiral Mahan, as I have already said, considered the US to be Sea Power. It was not evident that the US was a Sea Power when Mackinder wrote his first article. He considered North America to be a kind of Land Power – isolationist, outside of global politics,  and not in competition with Great Britain, but a marginal, peripheral space. But Mahan considered the United States, based on the growth of its navy, to be Sea Power. After Woodrow Wilson involved the US in the First World War, there began a very important geopolitical event or process: the shift of the center of Sea Power from Great Britain to the United States of America. That was accomplished over 20 years from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second World War. During this gap of time, all of Great Britain’s colonies were ‘given’ to the United States. There was a shift of the center of global domination inside the Anglo-Saxon space from Great Britain to the United States. That was the main event on the geopolitical level.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.18.58 PM.png

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.05 PM.pngVery symbolically, Mackinder’s last article was published in an American journal, Foreign Affairs, whose editor’s organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, was created by the American elite just after the First World War in order to promote the Wilsonian vision of the United States as a global power operating in defense of capitalism, democracy, and so on. That was a theoretical, intellectual shift of the center of decision-making and the subject. This was a kind of transition of Sea Power. After that, Great Britain became the “old power”, the “senior”, “old man” tending his garden who offers some advice, but is not the real subject.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.11 PM.png

The real subject, from now on, from the first half of the 20th century, has shifted from Great Britain to the United States. Everything that Mackinder said about the strategy of Great Britain was applied, point by point and word by word, to the United States of America, above all in the second half of the 20th century. Before the founding of the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States did not “think of the world”; they had no foreign relations, and were absolutely concentrated on their internal issues before the First World War, before Wilson and his 11 points which declared that the United States of America should be a global power and global defender of liberalism, capitalism, democracy – precisely Sea Power. After the Second World War, the United States became the main, the only Sea Power par excellence. The rest became objects or tools in the hands of the Americans.

The first to carefully read the ideas of Mackinder were the Germans – not the Russians, who were involved in other intellectual and political problems. The Germans awakened to geopolitics and, within the first 20 to 30 years of the 20th century, began to read Mackinder and accept geopolitics.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.20 PM.png

First there was Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), a German political geographer and general who was military attaché in Japan during the 1920’s. He brought back with him from Japan an interesting word 地缘政治 chi sei gaku, or “geopolitics.” He discovered and accepted the ideas of Mackinder afterwards, and recognized Germany, just as Mackinder affirmed, to be part of the Continent, to be Land Power.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.28 PM.png

Thus Haushofer began to develop the concept of how to create a Continental geopolitics, not as an object of Anglo-Saxons, but as a subject that will fight back consciously, not only as a tool, but as a kind of conscious power. His idea was exactly opposite to that of Hitler, as Haushofer said that there are only two possibilities for Germany. First, Germany is part of the Continent, or Land Power; it is conservative, traditional, hierarchical, and so on, has almost no colonies or “progress”, but is a traditional society. And if this is so, according to Haushofer, then Germany must be aligned in an axis, on which Haushofer published the article “The Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo Axis.” So, in order to be Land Power in its proper dimension, Germany should be allied with Russia – then, Nazi Germany should be allied with Communist Russia. This was the law of geopolitics that went against Hitler’s idea. But Haushofer said that if you want to follow the rules of geopolitics, you could come to the side of Sea Power, and in that case, Germany should conclude a treaty or alliance with the British and the Americans. But you cannot fight [on two fronts], or you will be destroyed – that was Haushofer’s prophetic saying. Geopolitics is therefore a kind of prophecy that is always fulfilled, whether ignored or open. Hausehofer told Hitler to find a way for an alliance with Russia, as was tried in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, or with the West, as was tried with the Munich agreement between Western countries and Germany. The only thing that was geopolitically impossible was to fight on two lines – this was a geopolitical heresy, according to Haushofer. That was the German school that enriched geopolitics by creating new doctrines, new texts, new intellectual analysis, based on the acceptance of Mackinder’s analysis.

But a deeper understanding of geopolitics, Land Power and Sea Power, was given by another German philosopher, who is much more serious and profound than Karl Haushofer: Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). Schmitt was the greatest political thinker of the 20th century. He is known in all countries and universities of Europe, except in Germany, where he is prohibited. In the United States there is huge interest in Schmitt, and his follower Leo Strauss is considered the teacher of the Neo-Conservatives. There is a huge following of Carl Schmitt on the left as well, on the part of both the post-modern European left and the Latin American, by communists, anarchists, etc. He is the most read author in political science, and I am very happy that he is very well known in China. In Russia he is very popular as well.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.37 PM.png

In his book Land und Meer, Carl Schmitt deepened the understanding of what Land and Sea are. He used the biblical names Leviathan, the serpent of the sea, and Behemoth, the Land Power. The fight between Sea Power and Land Power was presented by Schmitt as the eschatological fight between Leviathan and Behemoth, two great monsters, that correspond to two opposite world-visions, or Weltanschauungen in German. He made a clear identification between Sea Power and modernity, capitalism, liberalism, democracy, materialism, modern science – all of these were a kind of ‘result’ of Sea Power. Carl Schmitt gave to the concept of Sea Power a huge, new meaning, that was a development of what Mackinder already had in mind, but was so brilliantly exposed that it transformed geopolitics into a philosophical approach and political philosophy, not only on the strategic map.

The same was declared by the British conservative author – a Catholic like Schmitt – Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936), who had two wives, both of whom were Serbian. Here as well, geopolitics acquired a metaphysical dimension. The Great War of Continents was considered to be a kind of eschatological, biblical battle for the End Times. It was not only about who controls Heartland and the world, but about what the goal of controlling such is. Carl Schmitt asked what is the goal to control – not power in itself, not only in a pragmatic sense, not as a power play, but as something deeper, as the final battle for the End Times, which in the Christian vision means the Kingdom of the Antichrist or the future Kingdom of Christ. This was a Christian, moral attitude added here. With that dimension, geopolitics obtained an eschatological dimension. Eschatology is the science of the end times, or what should happen as the result of history, at the end of history, in the Hegelian, not Fukuyaman sense.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.44 PM.pngThe result of the Second World War was that Hitler totally neglected Karl Haushofer’s advice. There was no more Germany, no more Hitler, no more National Socialism, because of the suicidal war that cost humanity many millions of victims. Just after the Second World War, the Cold War started, where there was again a pure illustration of the classic map of geopolitics. There was the Soviet camp, of which China was a part, the socialist camp, against the capitalist camp. There was a moment when the Soviet camp and communist, anti-capitalist countries acquired the geopolitical dimension of Behemoth. Communism was Behemothic in some ways. It was Land Power. That’s why communism won not in the industrial, liberal countries which had a big amount of proletarians, but in peasant, agrarian countries like Russia or China – because they were Land Powers. Communism won in Land Power, in the context of anti-liberal, anti-Western, anti-Sea Power. That is the geopolitical explanation of the Cold War.

But the science of geopolitics, and the destiny and fate of this science, was different. In the United States, it was considered to be the main strategy, used always. They did not stop ever since Mackinder and Spykman’s times to use geopolitics as a basic vision of what is going on in the world and politics. But with the German effort to create an alternative geopolitics with the Continent as the subject, this experience bore a kind of demonization due to Haushofer’s relations with Hitler and the crimes committed by the Nazis. The Continental part of geopolitics was destroyed as a “pseudo-science”, while the Anglo-Saxon part of geopolitics continued to be accepted as a main strategy. So, after the Second World War, geopolitics came to have two meanings: (1) something completely rational and positive in the United States, and (2) something impossible, Nazi, and fascist outside of the United States and England. This is precisely like someone who wants to always win in a game of chess – the best solution is to not teach the other how to play. This is the “game of one”, as Brzezinski honestly explained.

Geopolitics was demonized for Europe, but taken as a normal tool for elite-learning in the United States. That is why Brzezinski, Kissinger, the Trilateral Commission, and the Council on Foreign Relations think exactly with the same map and concepts, but geopolitics is prohibited for the others. It is as if there are two geopolitics: “geopolitics” in English, which is a good, correct, and rational science, and German Geopolitik which is pseudo-science. If you look at Sea Power from Land Power, it is “pseudo-science.” If you look at Land Power from the standpoint of Sea Power, it is “science.” This is completely biased by virtue of standpoint.

Unluckily, in the Soviet Union, because of Haushofer’s reputation as well, geopolitics was considered a “bourgeois science.” It was prohibited as well, so we lost Continental geopolitics altogether. There was Sea Power geopolitics, while everyone else was left without geopolitics. So there was a reduced geopolitical awareness on the part of Land, considered to be an object. We do not teach dogs or cats human language or science, so we consider them to be “stupid.” The same is the case with geopolitics. While some declare that geopolitics should be reserved for the Anglo-Saxon ruling elite, they treat the others as enemies who should not be taught this “pseudo-science.” This is why there are so many debates on geopolitics, because it is a prohibited science for the Other, while in the Anglo-Saxon world, it is flourishing as a normal and necessary tool for the learning of the Anglo-Saxon, American elite.

After the fall of communism, Soviet, Russian society lost an understanding of what is going on. Everybody felt that something had gone wrong, but nobody had any explanation. We lost a line. We were no longer communists, but were capitalists and liberals left wondering why NATO is expanding, not accepting us in their club, continuing to still treat us as an enemy after the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet countries. We were “liberating” Eastern Europe, including some parts of the Soviet Union, while NATO tried to get them, still expanding. Before the North Atlantic alliance was a sea power, fighting on the geopolitical level of Land Power represented on the ideological level by the communists. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was no longer any “reason” to fight, but the battle went on. This created a kind of stress, an intellectual shock for our political elite, our army, and secret services, because Russian liberals tried to become part of the global world. They didn’t care about sovereignty, tradition, or conserving Russian values, everything of which was for them negative. But the real state, the Russian Deep State, had to react somehow.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.51 PM.png

The collapse of the communist system disarmed Moscow ideologically, as they could not explain or understand foreign policy. The foreign policy and military strategy of the USSR was based on the concept of confrontation between the socialist camp, the East, and the capitalist camp. The reason of this confrontation was seen precisely only in ideological terms. Outside and beside ideology, there should have been no conflict, yet conflict still continued. When this ideological vision was lost, Russia unilaterally disarmed itself and pretended to be as capitalist, democratic, and liberal as the West. There was no ideological reason to continue opposition. But the West continued to expand NATO to the East, swallowing Eastern Europe and strangling Russia. That created a cognitive dissonance. Something didn’t fit. There was a kind of schizophrenia in the state and society. Why were they against us, when we were no longer against them? We were not defeated in this situation, so it was our free will to stop the confrontation, but they continued the confrontation. Why? Where is the rational, logical reason?

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.19.58 PM.png

It was precisely at this moment, in the beginning of the 1990’s, that geopolitics was discovered in Russia in the Military Academy of the General Staff and elsewhere. This was done with our help, because I was not a communist; I was very interested in other philosophies, and I discovered conservative values before the fall of communism, being a little bit at a distance from the ruling ideology. Very few people were prepared to respond. I established in the late 1980’s relations with some conservative and traditionalist circles in Europe who were very interested in Carl Schmitt and geopolitics. And when there was the fall of communism, we tried to explain to our generals, our military men, what happened from a geopolitical point of view. That was the only reason: to give a rational explanation of what was happening now, after the end of the Soviet Union, outside of communist ideology, to answer how we can explain this confrontation, opposition, and fight outside of ideology. The liberals in the government and society rejected this approach, because they continued to follow the rules of the West. Geopolitics was a “forbidden” or “pseudo-science” – Soros came to Russia in order to say that “geopolitics is all wrong” – meaning for Russia and for China, but not for them.

Little by little, we have succeeded in establishing geopolitics as the main strategic approach of the Russian Federation. Through the deep state, through military circles, through patriots, we have succeeded in making geopolitics very famous, known, and now in all universities and institutions in Russia, in both the humanitarian and social sciences, they teach geopolitics. That is how geopolitics became the main theoretical field in Russia.

In Shanghai in China, a few months ago in June, I met Dr. Feng Shaolei (director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University) at a press conference with Prof. Zhang Weiwei organized by, and he said that he had just returned from Russia’s Valdai Club and met Mr. Putin. This Chinese professor asked Mr. Putin: “What is the theoretical basis on which you make your political orientations?” Putin responded: “Geopolitics, not ideology.”

We started in the 1990’s, but there has been a serious paradigm shift with Putin. Now, geopolitics is the prevailing attitude in Russian strategy. That is how the Russian geopolitical school was established, as a continuation of Haushofer’s ideas, except for the role of the subject in geopolitical dualism, as in the case of Russia we had much more of a foundation and many more reasons for this: since Germany was the European Heartland, we are the absolute absolute Heartland, according to Mackinder. This is the Eurasia concept, born at that moment.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.03 PM.png

This was the acceptance of the title, rank, or position of a subject on the geopolitical map. This was the acceptance of the relevance of classical Anglo-Saxon geopolitics and the basic dualism of Mackinder. With the affirmation of Heartland as a subject, Behemoth becomes conscious in that moment. There was the identification of the US and NATO as antagonistic forces, but recognized as subjects too – that is a difference. In Eurasian geopolitics, we recognize that Sea Power is a subject. There is not only a one-subject/one-object game. There are two subjects. We are against them, but we recognize them as a formal enemy in accordance with Carl Schmitt’s theory. They constitute themselves as such for us and help us to understand ourselves, as in the pair of Carl Schmitt’s concept of Friend and Enemy. We consider that they have the right to exist, but they have no right to rule us and the space that we consider naturally ours.

All of Putin’s politics is about that: the restoration of sovereignty, getting them out of our space, not letting them impose on us their principles or their Sea Power strategy, because we have a different identity. Taking into account the German Continental tradition, which was ambivalent and not so much really Continental and taking into account the metaphysical depth in Carl Schmitt was very important in the creation of the Russian school of geopolitics. Then we discovered that, already in the beginning of the 20th century, in the White Russian emigration, there was a movement that was called the Eurasianist movement and, to my astonishment, one of the founders of this movement, Petr Savitsky, who was a geographer, had read Mackinder and had already made the first efforts to propose the understanding of Russia as Eurasia, as Heartland, against Sea Power. This was a continuation of the Slavophile tradition in Russian culture.

Starting from the Anglo-Saxons and passing through the Germans, we have discovered in our own proper Russian tradition a marginal [affirmation of such]. Before, the Eurasianists were almost unknown, because they were anti-communist, and therefore were not known in Soviet Russia, but they were in favor of the Soviet Union against the West – they were marginalized in the emigration because they were not in favor of the West, and were anti-Nazi and anti-CIA, while the other part of the White emigration collaborated with Western special services in order to fight communism. The Eurasianists were a small minority in this emigration because they were in favor of Soviet communism for geopolitical reasons, because of hatred for the West, but they were not communists. Thus we re-founded the Eurasianist movement, because we discovered that there was someone like us who precisely predicted earlier that there will be a moment when communism will fall as an anti-Russian ideology – too materialistic and without an understanding of identity, tradition, spiritual traditions, the Christian tradition, having been destroying all that – and after that should come the Eurasianists, in order to continue the fight for independence and sovereignty, which was a positive side of the communist regime, including in Stalin’s opposition to the West and Soviet opposition to the West in general. We discovered our own Eurasianists from a very special way or path, from the Anglo-Saxons to the Germans to our proper roots.

While the first program on this was published in 1997 in my Foundations of Geopolitics, the first texts were published just after the fall of communism, in 1991 in a magazine called Den’ [“Day”], whose editor in chief was Alexander Prokhanov, now the president of the Izborsky Club, one of the main conservative think tanks [in Russia]. That was precisely when we started the promotion of Eurasianism, and the creation of the Eurasian movement came 10 years afterwards. The beginning of the creation of the Russian geopolitical school and Eurasian attitude started just after the fall of the Soviet Union, and that is precisely what the first Eurasianists thought would happen.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.10 PM.png

Now for the counter-strategy of the Eurasian geopolitics. If there is one subject, then there is a second one. There is Sea Power and there is Land Power. There is the old Rimland. There is the fight for control, because Sea Power wants to make this zone broader, and Land Power seeks to make this zone smaller. What is important is that now Russia is not the Soviet Union; it is not one of two poles. We have no capacity, no possibility, no resources, and no ideology to impose ourselves as the main ruling power of Rimland. That is a very important shift from bipolarity in the Sea Power-Land Power dualism to multipolarity.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.20 PM.png

We can make this Rimland safe for us without colonizing it, which is just impossible, by creating friends, an alliance, and helping in a symmetric way different powers to grow and become more and more independent from Sea Power. Now this explains why we have no real desire or capacity to follow the Tsarist or Soviet strategy of more or less bipolarity, and we have no ideology. There is no ideology in Russia – Russia is pragmatic, it is a little bit liberal, but not liberal like in Sea Power, a little bit nationalist, patriotic, and conservative, with a partly traditional society under the growing role of the Orthodox Church and a growing feeling of identity. But that is not ideology: we could not go to Iran and say “accept our ideology”, for we have nothing of the sort, and we could not go to Turkey, India, or China with tanks, and we cannot export anything of the sort.

But how, in that situation, can we save ourselves from Sea Power? By way of friendship, accepting the Other as they are, accepting their identities. For us is not so much important for Rimland to be pro-Russia or not – most important is that Rimland should not be pro-American. That is the main question. You could hate us, but if you don’t like the Americans, if you are not under their control, and if you are independent, that’s enough. We can support you, while being completely indifferent. We don’t suggest any ideology, direct rule, or domination, because we don’t have the power to do so. Compared to the Soviet Union or Tsarist Empire, our weakness is our main privilege. We are playing with our weakness. When the Turks see us, they understand that in such a situation we could not make war against them – we have no idea, no reason for such. If they are Muslims, and we are Christians with many Muslims inside of Russia, we have no problem with them if they do not attack us. When the peoples of our ancient enemies, like Turks or Persians, start to understand that Russia does not represent a threat anymore, they start to see in us a kind of possible ally. And little by little, this alliance is growing. In Syria we have organized such an alliance in a very practical way. This is the fight for the Rimland. Iran is totally anti-Sea Power and Turkey is becoming such. The more anti-Sea Power that Erdogan is, the more he is a friend of Putin. That is all the geopolitics that are actual now.

The main shift was precisely with Putin, who has accepted this vision. Yeltsin and the liberals rejected this vision. Why? Because they were tools of the West, and nothing else. They were not Russian politicians properly speaking, but Western politicians trying to dissolve Land Power. They are called the Fifth Column in Russia, as they tried to open the door for the enemy and let him in.

The new Heartland strategy cannot be bipolar anymore. It can only be multipolar, with all sincerity. This is not a kind of “hidden” version of old bipolarity, as such is impossible in the present situation. We cannot let Sea Power rule Land Power. That is essential, in the end. We can make this possible only with the help of other poles.

At the same time, we have discovered the ideas of another Schmittean concept: Big Spaces. Big Spaces are more or less “poles”, but some Big Spaces are already fully established, some are in the process of being created, while some are in the process of decline.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.26 PM.png

Here is a map where there are the different Big Spaces which we have started to deal with approximately, in a practical sense. Of course, they could be arranged differently. If some are too weak, they can become part of the stronger ones. This is a very dynamic situation, not something fixed. Nevertheless, this map representing Big Spaces is the same as Huntington’s map of civilizations. These Big Spaces roughly coincide with “civilizations.” Hence the concept that a pole in the multipolar world should not be a country or power in the ancient understanding, but new players, who should be civilizations. The forms or strategic expressions of these civilizations are Big Spaces. The content and sense of these are civilizations. We see in these Big Spaces, in this concept, the main power lines of Russian politics.

What we want from the European Big Space is one thing: for NATO to get out, and to create with us a kind of Eurasian strategy. For that reason we are helping everybody who shares with us this idea and who is against Atlanticism – Left or Right, it doesn’t matter. Hence the support for populists. That is our counter-strategy. Putin affirms the concept of Greater Eurasia-Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. That is the idea towards Europe. But that is not all: we need something to propose to the Islamic continental Space, including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and we cannot impose on them our vision, Christianize them, or impose some idea – nobody wants that. We should accept them as Islamic and try to establish a strategic alliance with them. The same goes for the Arabo-Islamic space, the same with India, the same with China, the same with Japan. I am speaking of all possibilities.

Why does Putin want to give the Kuril Islands to Japan? In order to try to transform Japan from an enemy, under the control of the West, into a neutral power. Maybe it will not happen, but what is important is the logic I am trying to explain, of how the logic of Big Spaces is reflected in Russia’s concrete foreign policy. That is pure geopolitics. We are coming into the Trans-Saharan space as well together with the Chinese. We are trying to help some forces in the South American Big Space, in the Central American Big Space, and if the North American Big Space will be limited by this region, they can be our friends. Why not? They are very interesting guys, when they are put in their natural civilizational borders. When Trump began his campaign, he promised to stop interventions, to take American forces back from all around the world and to concentrate on inner problems. We didn’t believe him, but we applauded him. That is absolutely the right way to Make America Great Again.

We are not alone in this world with our plans. There is another map, much more terrifying I would say, which is what the globalists of Sea Power want to do. This is a completely different vision. We are shifting from the standpoint of Land Power to that of Sea Power.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.34 PM.png

What they propose is a completely different situation. They cannot ignore the Chinese anymore, so their idea is to include China in their future plan, proposed as “G2” by Hillary Clinton when she came here and was accepted very politely, but without much success. China is thinking about what to do in this situation while dealing with all the geopolitical possibilities, not ready to accept anything too early or too easily. But the globalists are ready to include China as a capitalist, liberal Sea Power, with Shanghai, this coastal area of prosperity, but maybe without the inner part of Xinjiang, Tibet, and continental China with its peasantry and traditional society, that is the main basis of the Communist Party that cannot be accepted in the Americans’ plan. So they will bother to change the situation, to push more liberalization, capitalization, and “human rights” here; that is the work of the network of Soros, the Fifth Column, and the Sixth Column, as everywhere. China is to be the main satellite in this concept, with certain conditions. The other main satellite is the European zone. This is more or less the wishful thinking of the American political elite, to see the world as such. They have already sown chaos in North Africa, and in the Middle East, such as by creating a Kurdish state, trying to diminish the influence of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and destroying everything, but not creating anything instead.

Chaos strategy does not suggest creation or a new political system or order instead of the destroyed political systems. It is manipulated, moderated chaos – a new way of strategic thinking. If we carefully read Brzezinski’s book, The Grand Chessboard, it is written that they need a balkanized Eurasia, to transform it into a zone of permanent conflict between different groups – between Muslims, between ethnic groups, between Russians and Ukrainians, for example. This was Brzezinski’s idea. Chaos is already sown in Africa, so they don’t have to bother too much about that, while now the Russians and Chinese are coming here to bring another order, maybe not the best, but not bloody chaos as is the current situation. There are different points – smaller proxies, partly India, partly some pro-Western little states, and Israel for aggravating and make the chaos bigger. Smaller proxies, like Ukraine for example, are not allies in this concept, but just points in order to make chaos bigger. That is more or less how they understand the situation.

That is why the concept of peace and independent poles is absent in any of their plans for the future. It is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. They don’t let even a quadripolar system have any appeal; they cannot let it happen, even theoretically, because they know the power of words. They destroy any mention of quadripolarity. All the books of American experts, strategists, “fortune-tellers” as a I like to say, and political analysts try to destroy and eliminate these poles. There should be only chaos, and by having chaos, they can create a world in which they can still have global power and rule the world. They will not properly rule Eurasia with a better government – they don’t need Russia at all; they blame Russia and Putin not because they don’t like Putin, but because they won’t let Russia be. This is ontological. It is Sea Power vs. Land Power. Nothing personal. Putin could follow some concrete agreement with them, but they don’t regard Russia as a subject, only chaos.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.43 PM.png

But if we recognize the pole of Eurasia, we see a completely different situation. First of all, the European and Chinese zones immediately become independent. They lose their certain dependence on the West, while not exchanging this dependence for dependence on Russia. In Japan, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have tried to explain this to the Japanese, but they said: “You want to establish Eurasian rule instead of American rule. When the Americans go out, you will come.” I said: “You have not understood the main idea.” If they are here, there will be only chaos. China and Europe will be dependent on the West, whether recognized as “multilateral allies” or something else, but with Russia here, you will be independent – from them, but from us as well, because we cannot threaten you. Everybody else obtains independence.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.20.53 PM.png

Independence is not happiness or a happy end. It is a challenge, because you should be strong and have an identity. Independence is the burden of the multipolar world. It is not a gift. It is a chance to affirm identity. For the partisans of identity, culture, and the spirit of civilizations, it is a gift, but for governments, it is a huge burden, because you are responsible for organizing and managing without ready-made solutions. Now, in the unipolar world, they suggest you should follow their rule, do this and that, and everything will be alright – maybe not now, perhaps you should pass through some shock therapy, and so on. But independence is real freedom and a real chance, a chance that is open. History does not end there. History is open.

Today, geopolitical dualism acquires a new dimension. It is not anymore bipolar as in the West vs. Heartland. It is unipolarity and globalism vs. multipolarity, the order of civilizations or Big Spaces.

Can we identify the Eurasian project with the famous Chinese win-win strategy? Certainly not. Because Sea Power is going to lose its domination and leading role, as was the case in the unipolar moment. They had the chance after the fall of communism to have global domination and rule. They enjoyed this chance, this possibility, over 10 years. But with 9/11 and Putin’s coming to power, their domination has been limited. So why not a win-win? Because someone has to pay for multipolarity. If there is multipolarity, someone has to lose. Will Continental Heartland pay for multipolarity? Or will there be the global domination of the West, that will lose? This is a win-lose strategy that is an open, continental fight in which there is no neutral solution.

Screen Shot 2019-01-02 at 1.21.00 PM

One solution is multipolarity. On the other side is unipolarity and globalization. That is not a win-win. But at the same time, the exit, the success, or the end of all this is not granted. It is open history. The end of history has ended. I spoke about this with Fukuyama in Washington, and he has since recognized that he was in too much of a hurry to declare that the end of history has already happened. Now the end of history is finished. There is no more end of history. History is here, with all the possibilities, dangers, all the risks, all the open ends, and moving ends within the context of open history. In history, there is no win-win. Someone should lose. The conclusion, according to the Eurasianist world-vision, is that Sea Power should lose this time, and we should win.


Abe I. Chiseigaku nyumon. Tokyo: Kokon-Shoin, 1933.

Achcar G. Greater Middle East: the US Plan – www. 2004. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 03.09.2010).

Agnew J. Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics. Londres: Routledge, 1998.

AgnewJ., Mitchell K. & O’Thuatail G.(eds.) A Companion to Political Geography. London: Blackwell, 2002.

Al-Rodhan N.R.F. Neo-statecraft and meta-geopolitics. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009.

Aldrich R. J. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. Duckworth, 2006.

Ambrosio Th. Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005.

Amin S. Eurocentrism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010.

Amin S. The Liberal Virus. London: Pluto Press, 2005.

Amin S. Transforming the revolution: social movements and the world-system. Delhi: Aakar Books, 2006.

Ancel J.  Géopolitique. Paris: Bibliothèque d’Histoire et de Politique, 1936.

Ancel J. Geographies des frontiers. Paris: Gallimard, 1938.

Aras B. The new geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s position. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Armstrong D. Drafting a plan for global dominance // Harper’s Magazine. October 2002.

Attali J. Lignes d’horizon. Paris:Fayard, 1990.

Axelos K. Vers la pensée planétaire. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964.

Barnett T. P. M. Great Powers: America and the World after Bush. New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 2009.

Barnett T. P. M. The Pentagon’s New Map. New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 2004.

Beales A. C. F. The history of peace; a short account of the organised movements for international peace. New York: Garland Pub., 1971.

Beck U. Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt a.M.:Suhrkamp, 1986.

Behar P. Une géopolitique pour l’Europe, vers une nouvelle Eurasie. P.: Editions Desjonquères, 1992.

Benoist A. de. Europe, Tiers Monde Meme Combat. P.:Laffont, 1986.

Benoist A. de. L’idée d’Empire/ Actes du XXIVe colloque national du GRECE. Nation et Empire. Histoire et concept. Paris: GRECE 1991.

Bhagwati J. N. Free Trade Today. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Bhagwati J. N. In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Bowman I. Geography in relation to the social sciences. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1934.

Bowman I. Geography vs. Geopolitics. New York: American geographical society, 1942.

Bowman I.  International Relations. Chicago: American Library Association, 1930.

Bowman I. The new world: problems in political geography. Chicago: World Book Company, 1928.

Braudel F. (dir.) La Méditerranée. L’espace et les hommes. Paris: Arts et métiers graphiques, 1977.

Braudel F. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XVe-XVIIIe siècles). 3 volumes. Paris, Armand Colin, 1979.

Brechtefeld J. Mitteleuropa and German politics. New York, 1996.

BRICs and beyond. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group. NY, 2007.

Bruhnes J. Geographie humaine. Paris: Michelet, 1910.

Brzezinski Z. America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York: Basic Books, 2008.

Brzezinski Z. Between Two Ages : America’s Role in the Technetronic Era. New York: Viking Press, 1970.

Brzezinski Z. Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.

Brzezinski Z. Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1989.

Brzezinski Z. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux,1983.

Brzezinski Z. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, New York: Basic Books, 2004.

Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Brzezinski Z. Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower. New York: Basic Books, 2007.

Brzezinski Z. Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, N.Y. Harvard University Press, 1967.

Burnham J. The Struggle for the World. New York: The John Day Company, Inc, 1947.

Canagarajah A. S. A geopolitics of academic writing. Pitssburgh: University of Pitssburgh Press, 2002.

Chauprade A., Thual F. Dictionnaire de géopolitique. Paris: Ellipses,  1999.

Chauprade A. Géopolitique – Constantes et changements dans l’histoire. Paris: Ellipses, 2007.

Chauprade A. Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique. Paris: Ellipses, 1999.

Chauprade A. Les Balkans, la Guerre du Kosovo (en collaboration). Paris/Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 2000.

Chauprade A. Géopolitique des États-Unis (culture, intérêts, stratégies). Paris: Ellipses, 2003.

Chauprade A. Une nouvelle géopolitique du pétrole en Afrique //Chronique du choc des civilizations. Editions Chronique. Janvier, 2009.

Cheradame A. L’Allemagne, дa France et la question de l’Autriche. P.:Plon, 1902.

Chomsky N. The Cold War and the Superpowers// Monthly Review. Vol. 33. № 6. November 1981. С. 1–10.

Chomsky N. Profit over people: neoliberalism and global order. New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999.

Chomsky N. Hegemony or survival: America’s quest for global dominance. New York: Penguin, 2007.

Cohen S.B. Geography and Politics in a World Divided. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Cohen S.B. Geopolitics of World System. NY: Rowman&Littlefield publishers, 2002.

Cohn N. The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages. London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Coudenhove-Kalergi R. Paneuropa. Wien, 1923.

Coutau-Bégarie H. 2030, la fin de la mondialisation? P.: Artege, 2009.

Coutau-Bégarie H. Géostratégie du Pacifique. P.: Economica, 2001.

Coutau-Bégarie H. La Lutte pour l’empire de la mer. P.: Economica, 1999.

Coutau-Bégarie H. Marins et océans. 2 v. P.: Economica, 1999.

Coutau-Bégarie H. Pensée stratégique et humanisme. P.: Economica, 2000.

Crocker D. A. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Cunningham L. A. From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis//George Washington Law Review. 1994. Vol. 62

Daly H. E. Globalization and Its Discontents// Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly. 2001. 21, 2/3.

Daly H. E. Globalization’s Major Inconsistencies//Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly. 2003. 23, 4.

Debrix F., Lacy M. The geopolitics of American insecurity: terror, power and foreign policy. Abingdon: Routlede, 2009.

Desan W. The Planetary Man, Vol. 1: A Noetic Prelude to a United World. Washington,DC: Georgetown University Press, 1961.

Dodds K. Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Dodds K. Geopolitics in a changing world. London: Prentice Hall, 2000.

Dodds K. Global geopolitics: a critical introduction. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2005.

Dolman E. C. Geostrategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis/ Gray Colin S., Sloan G. (ed.) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Dorrien G. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Douguine A. Le prophete de l’eurasisme. Paris:Avatar, 2006; Idem. La grande guerre des continents. Paris:Avatar, 2006.

Douhet G. Command of the Air. New York : Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1942.

Dughin A. Continente Russia. Parma: All’isegno di Veltro, 1992.

Dughin A. Eurasia. La Rivoluzione Conservatrice in Russis. Roma, 2005.

Dughin A. Fundamentele geopoliticii. Bucarest.:Andersen Media, 2010.

Dugin A. A grande guerra dos continentos. Lisboa, 2010.

Dugin A. Geopolitikis safudzvlebi. Rusetis geopolitikis momavali. Tbilisi: Gamomgtsemloba, 1999.

Dugin A. Misyonin avrasyagilik Nursultanain Nazarbaevin. Ankara, 2006.

Dugin A. Moska-Ankara aksiaynin. Istambul: Kaynak, 2007.

Dugin A. Osnove geopolitike. Beograd, 2004.

Dugin A. Rusia. Misterio de Eurasia. Madrid:Grupo Libro 88, 1992.

Dugin A.Rus jeopolitigi avrasyaci yaklasim. Ankara, 2003.

Dugin A. Seminal writings. 3 v. L., 2000.

Dugin I. Feisaliny jeopolitidgi. Beyruth, 2004.

Dyer G. Climate War. Montreal: Random House of Canada, 2009.

Ebeling F. Karl Haushofer und die deustche Geopolitik 1919-1945. unpubl. diss. Hanover, 1992.

Engdahl F.  Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order. Boxboro, MA: Third Millennium Press, 2009.

Engdahl F. Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. London: Pluto 2004.

Foster J. B. Imperial America’ and War// Monthly Review. 2003. May.Vol. 55.№. 1. С. 1–10

Fouere Y. Contre les etats: regions d’Europe P.:Presse d’Europe, 1971.

Fouere Y. Europe aux cents drapeaux. P.:Presse d’Europe, 1968.

Foucher M. Fronts et Frontières, un tour du monde géopolitique. P.: Fayard, 1988; Idem. L’invention des Frontières. P.: FEDN, 1986.

Foucher M., Dorion H. (dir.) Frontière(s), scènes de vie entre les lignes. P.: Glénat, 2006.

Friedman T. L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization .New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Friedman T. L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

Fukuyama F. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. New York: Cornell University Press, 2004.

Gallois. P.-M. Géopolitique, les voies de la puissance. P.:Plon, 1990.

Gill S. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Boston: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Gray C.S. The geopolitics of the nuclear era: heartland, rimlands, and the technological revolution. New York: Crane Russak & Co, 1977.

Gray C.S., Sloan G. Geopolitics, geography and strategy. London: Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999.

Gray C.S. Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice. Abingdon, UK:Routledge, 2006.

Gray C.S. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Other Evidence of History. London: Frank Cass, 2002

Gray C.S. The Geopolitics of Super Power. Lexington, KY:University Press of Kentucky, 1988.

Gray C.S. The Leverage of Sea Power:The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

Gray C.S. War, Peace, and Victory:Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

Greenberg A. S. Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. Cambridge U. Press, 2005.    .

Grossouvre de H. Paris, Berlin, Moscow: Prospects for Eurasian cooperaion // World Affairs. Vol 8. Jan–Mar 2004. №1.

Haass R. The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?//Foreign Affairs. 2008. 87 (3). p. 44-56.

Hackmann R. Globalization: myth, miracle, mirage. Lanham: University Press of America, 2005.

Haushofer K. Bausteine zur Geopolitik. Heidelberg: K. Vowickel, 1924.

Haushofer K. Dai Nihon. Betrachtungen uber Gross-Japans Wehrschaft und Zukunft. Berlin:E.S.Mittler, 1913.

Haushofer K. Das japanische Reich in seiner geographischen Entwicklung.Wien, Seidel, 1921.

Haushofer K. Das Reich: Grossdeutches Werden im Abendland. Berlin: Karl Habel Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1943.

Haushofer K. Der Kontinentalblock. München : Eher, 1941.

Haushofer K. Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen. Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931.

Haushofer K. Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans: Studien über die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Geographie und Geschichte. Mit sechzehn Karten und Tafeln. Heidelberg: K. Vowickel, 1924.

Haushofer K. Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen bedeutung. Heidelberg: K. Vowinckel, 1939.

Haushofer K. Japan baut sein reich. Berlin: Zeitgeschichte Verlag, 1941.

Haushofer K. Weltmeere und Weltmachte. Berlin: Zeitgeschichte Verlag, 1941.

Haushofer K. Weltpolitik von heute. Berlin: Zeitgeschichte Verlag, 1936.

Held D., McGrew A. Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies. Polity, 2007.

Held D., McGrew A., Goldblatt D., Perraton J. Global Transformations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Heim M. The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. Oxford, 1993.

Hesse F. Das gesetz der wachsende Raume/Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik. 1924. 1 Jg. С. 1-10.

Hettner A. Die Geographie, ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Methoden. Breslau: Ferdinand Hirt, 1927.

Hettner А. Die Geographie, ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Methoden. Breslau: Ferdinand Hirt, 1927.

Higgott R. Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy. – 2010. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 28.08.2010).

Hiro D. After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World. Yale: Nation Books, 2009.

Hirst P., Thompson G. Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

Hock D. Birth of the Chaordic Age. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1999.

Holbrooke R. America, A European Power.//Foreign Affairs. March/April, 1995.

Horowitz D. From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War.  N.Y., 1967.

Hugon P. African geopolitics. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2008.

Hulsman J. Cherry-Picking: Preventing the Emergence of a PermanentFranco-German-Russian Alliance. – 2003. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 03.09.2010).

Huntington S. P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Iimot N. Iwayuru chiseigaku no gainen/Chirigaku Hyoron, 1928.

Immerman R. H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: SR Books, 1998.

Johnson R. Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947. London: Greenhill, 2006.

Jones St. B. Boundary-making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1945.

Jones St. B. Unified Field Theory of political Geography//Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 1954. June. V.XLIV  n.2 С. 111-123.

Joyaux F. Géopolitique de l’Extrême-Orient, Espaces et politiques. Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1991.

Kagan R. Dangerous nation. New York: Vintage, 2007.

Kagan R. Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order. New York: Vintage, 2004.

Kagan R. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York: Vintage, 2009.

Kagan R., Kristol W. Present dangers: crisis and opportunity in American foreign and defense policy. New York: Encounter Books, 2000.

Kagan R. The Case for a League of Democracies// Financial Times. 2008. May 13.

Kaplan R.D. Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond. NY: Vintage, 2006.

Kaplan R.D. The coming Anarchy: Shaterring deram of the Cold War. NY: Random House, 2000.

Katz M. Primakov Redux. Putin’s Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.

Kennan G. F. The Sources of Soviet Conduct//Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

Kennan G. F. Russia, the Atom, and the West. New York: Harper, 1958.

Kennedy P. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.

Keohane R., Nye J.S.Jr. Power and Interdependance in the Information Age//Foreign Affairs. 1988. 77/5 (Sept.Oct.). С. 81-94.

Khanna P. Der Kampf um die zweite Welt – Imperien und Einfluss in der neuen Weltordnung. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2008.

Kilinc T. Turkey Should Leave the NATO – 2007. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 03.09.2010).

Kincaid  C.  McCain, Soros, and the New «Global Order» – 2008. [Электронный ресурс]URL: (дата обращения 20.09.2010.)

King A., Schneider B. The First Global Revolution: A Report by the Council of Rome. London: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Kirk W. Historical geography and the concept of behavioral environnement//Indian geographical journal& Silver Juvelee volume. 1952. С.152-160.

Kissinger H. Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Kissinger H. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Kissinger H. Does America need a foreign policy?: toward a diplomacy for the 21st century. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Kissinger H. White House Years. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

Klare М. Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy. New York: Henry Holt & Company Incorporated, 2008.

Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990/1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. С. 23-33.

Kristol I. Neoconservatism: the autobiography of an idea. Lanham: Ivan R. Dee, 1999.

Lacoste Y. Dictionnaire geopoliqiue. Paris: Flammarion, 1986.

Lacoste Y. Geopolitique: la longue histoire d’aujourd’hui, Paris: Larousse, 2006.

Lacoste Y. Géopolitique de la Méditerranée. Paris: Colin, 2006.

Lacoste Y. La Géopolitique. Paris: Centre national de documentation pédagogique, 1990.

Larson A. Geopolitics of oil and natural gas // Economic Perspectives vol. 9. №2. May 2004.

Lash S., Featherstone M. (eds.) Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage, 1999.

Lash S., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. (eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity. London: Sage (TCS), 1996.

Lash S., Featherstone M., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage, 1999.

Lash S., Lury C. Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things. Cambridge: Polity, 2005.

Laurant J.-P. Le Regard ésotérique. Paris: Bayard, 2001.

Layne C. The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Le Billon P. Geopolitics of resource wars: resource dependence, governance and violence. Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005.

Lechner F. J.,  Boli J. The Globalization Reader. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003.

Leech H. J. The public letters of the Right Hon. John Bright. London: Low, Marston & Co., 1895.

Lefebvre H. La production de l’espace. Paris: Anthropos, 1974.

Liu Henry C. K. Obama, change and China.Brzezinski’s G-2 grand strategy – Asian Times. 2009.22.04. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 24.08.2010).

Lohausen H.J. von. Denken in Völkern. Die Kraft von Sprache und Raum in der Kultur- und Weltgeschichte. Graz: Stocker 2001.

Lohausen H.J. von. Ein Schritt zum Atlantik: Die strategische Bedeutung d. Ostverträge. Wien: Österr. Landsmannschaft, 1973.

Lohausen H.J. von. Les empires et la puissance: la géopolitique aujourd’hui. Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1996.

Lohausen H.J. von. Denken in Kontinenten. Berg am See: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1978.

Lohausen H.J. von. Reiten für Russland: Gespräche im Sattel. Graz: Stocker, 1998.

Lohausen H.J. von. Zur Lage der Nation. Krefeld: Sinus-Verlag, 1982.

Lonsdale D. J. Informational power: strategy, geopolitics and the fifth dimension/ Gray Colin S., Sloan G. (ed.) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Lorenz E. The Essence of Chaos. Washington: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Lorot P. Guellec J. (ed.) Planète Océane. L’essentiel de la mer. P.: Choiseul, 2006.

Lorot P., Thual F. La Géopolitique. P.: Montchretien, 1997.

Luttwak E. Sea Power in the Mediterranean: Political Utility and Military Constraints. California, 1979.

Luttwak E. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.

Luttwak E. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009.

Luttwak E. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third. Baltimore, 1976.

Luttwak E. The Political Uses of Sea Power. Baltimore, 1974.

Luttwak E. Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook. London, 1968.

Luttwak E. From Geopolitics to’Geoeconomics. Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce//The National Interest.1990.Summer. С. 17—23.

Luttwak E. The Endangered American Dream: How To Stop the United States from Being a Third World Country and How To Win the Geo-Economic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy. New York, 1993.

Luttwak E. Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy. New York, 1999.

Mackinder H. J. Britain and the British Seas. Charleston: BiblioLife, 2010.

Mackinder H. J. Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.

Mackinder H.J. On the Scope and Methods of Geography//Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography. 1887. New Monthly Series, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Mar.).

Mackinder H. J. Situation in South Russia 21 Jan. 1920//Documents on foreign policy 1919-1939. Fisrt series. V. III, 1919. London, 1949. p. 786-787.

Mackinder H. J. The geographical pivot of history The. Geographical Journal.1904.№ 23, С.421–437.

Mackinder H. J. The Nations of the Modern World: An Elementary Study in Geography and History. London: George Philip, 1924.

Mackinder H. J. The Round World and the Winning of the Peace//Foreign Affairs. 1943. Vol. 21& № 4 (July).

Mackinder H. J. The Scope and Methods of Geography and the Geographical Pivot of History. L., 1951.

Mackinder H. J. The world war and after: a concise narrative and some tentative ideas. London: G. Philip & Son, Ltd., 1924.

Mahan A.T. The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies. London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1900.

Mahan A.T.  The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1897.

Mahan A.T.  Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905.

Malraux A. La Tentation de l’Occident. Paris: Grasset, 1926.

Manifeste de la GRECE. Paris: Labyrinthe, 2001.

Mann St. R. Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought//Parameters. 1992. Autumn. № 55. Русский перевод:  Манн С. Теория хаоса и стратегическое мышление. – [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 05.08.2010).

Markedonov S. Unrecognized Geopolitics // Russia in Global Affairs. № 1. January — March 2006.

Maull O. Das Wesen der Geopolitik. Leipzig: B.G. Taubner, 1941.

Maull O. Politische Géographie. Berlin: Gebrüder Borntraeger, 1925.  Mauss M. Sociologie et anthropologie. P.:P.U.F.,1966.

McCain J. League of Democracies (op-ed)//Financial Times. 2008. March 19.

McFaul M. Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

McFaul M. Russia’s unfinished revolution: political change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

McFaul M. U.S.-Russia Relations in the Aftermath of the Georgia Crisis. Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,  2008.

Meyer J., Boli J., Thomas G., Ramirez F. World Society and the Nation-State// American Journal of Sociology. 1997.№ 103(1). С. 144-181.

Meyer J. The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State/ Bergesen A. (ed.) Studies of the Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Mill J.S. On liberty and other essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Millin S. G. Rhodes. London : Chatto & Windus, 1952.

Mittelman J. Globalization and Its Critics/ Stubs R., Underhill G.(eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Mondialisation without the world. Interview with Kostas Axelos –, 2005. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 02.08.2010)

Moreau Defarges Ph. Où va l’Europe ? P.: Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.

Moreau-Defarges Ph. L’ordre mondial. P.: Armand Colin, 2003.

Moreau-Defarges Ph. La géopolitique pour les Nuls. P.:Générales First, 2008.

Moreau-Defarges Ph. La mondialisation. P.: PUF, 2010.

Mowle Th. S.,  Sacko D. H. The unipolar world: an unbalanced future. NY.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Murray D.,  Brown D. (eds.) Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010.

Naumann F. Mitteleuropa. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1916.

Nishida K. An inquiry into the Good. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990.

Nishida K. Intelligibility and the Philosophy of nothingness. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1958.

Nozomi-Horiuchi R. Chiseigaku Japanese geopolitics. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1980.

O’Sullivan P. Geopolitics. Beckenham: Croom Helm Ltd, 1986.

Ó Tuathail G. Rethinking Geopolitics. Londres, New York: Routledge, 1998.

Ó Tuathail G. Critical Geopolitics : The Politics of Writing Global Space. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996.

O’Thuatail G., Dalby S., Routledge P.(eds) The Geopolitics Reader. London & New York: Routledege, 1998

Ó Tuathail G. The geopolitics reader. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Ó Tuathail G. Understanding Critical Geopolitics: geopolitics and risk society/ Gray C.S., Sloan G.(eds) Geopolitics, geography and strategy. London,Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993.

Obst E. Grossraumidee in der Vergangenheit und als tragender politischen Gedanke unserer Zeit. Breslau, 1941.

Oppenheimer F. The State: Its History and Development viewed Sociologically. New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1922.

Overholt W. Asia, America, and the transformation of geopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Owens M. T. In Defense of Classical Geopolitics // Naval War College Review, Autumn 1999. Vol. LII. № 4.

Owens W. A. Lifting the Fog of War. Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Parker G. Geopolitics: past, present and future. London: Pinter, 1998.

Parvulesco J. Les Fondements géopolitiques du grand gaullisme. P.: Guy Trédaniel, 1995.

Parvulesco J. Une stratégie transcendantale pour la «Grande Europe». P.: Arma Artis, 2004.

Parvulesco J. Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie. P.: Amis de la Culture Européenne, 2005

Peral L. (ed.) Global Security in a Multi-polar World. Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2009.

Pfaff W. Barbarian Sentiments: America in the New Century. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000.

Pirchner H. Reviving greater Russia?: the future of Russia’s borders with Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine. Wash. D.C.: American Foreign Policy Council. Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 2005.

Rahr A., Krause J. Russia’s new foreign policy. Berlin: Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, 1995.

Rahr A. Putin nach Putin: das kapitalistische Russland am Beginn einer neuen Weltordnung. Tübingen: Universitas, 2009.

Rahr A. Wladimir Putin: Präsident Russlands – Partner Deutschlands. Tübingen: Universitas, 2002.

Ramonet I. Géo-politique du chaos. Paris: Galilée, 1997; Idem. Guerres du xxie siècle – Peurs et menaces nouvelles. Paris: Galilée, 2002.

Ramonet I. Nouveaux pouvoirs, nouveaux maîtres du monde. Montréal: Fides, 1996.

Ratzel F. Anthropogeographie – Die geographische Verbreitung des Menschen. Stuttgart, 1882 – 1891.

Ratzel F. Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse – eine politischer- geographische Studie. München / Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1900.

Ratzel F. Die Gesetze des raumlichen Wachstums der Staaten. Ein Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen politischen Geographie/ Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen. 1986. Jg. 42. С. 97-107

Ratzel F. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika. Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1878.

Ratzel F. Politische Geographie oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehrs und des Krieges. München, 1897.

Ratzel F. Deutschland. Einführung in die Heimatkunde. Leipzig : FW Grunow, 1898.

Ratzel F. Die Erde und das Leben. Leipzig, 1902.

Ratzel F. Die geographische Lage der grossen Stadte/Grosstadt, Jahrbuch der Gehe-Stiftung. Vol. 9. Dresden: Zahn&Jaensch, 1903.

Ratzel F. Städte- und Culturbilder aus Nordamerika. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus,1876.

Ratzel F. Uber den Lebensraum//Die Umschau. 1897. Vol.1. С. 363-366.

Renner G. Human geography in the air age. NY:Macmillan, 1942.

Richard H. The Recent Progress of International Arbitration. London, 1884.

Robertson R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992.

Rockefeller D.  Memoirs. New York: Random House, 2002. p. 405.

Ronson J. Who pulls the strings? (part 3)// The Guardian. 2001. 10 March.

Roosevelt C. The science of government, founded on natural law. New York: Dean & Trevett, 1841.

Rosamond B. Theories of European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Rosenberg F. The avant-garde and geopolitics in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pitssburgh Press, 2006.

Rufin J.-C. L’Empire et les nouveaux barbares. Rupture Nord-Sud. P.:Hachette, 1996.

Sadowski Y. The Myth of Global Chaos. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.

Savin L. Necessity of the Fourth Political Theory.// Ab Aeterno. Issue No. 3. June 2010. p. 48-50.

Schmitt С. Das Begriff des Politischen. Berlin-Grunewald: W. Rothschild, 1928.

Schmitt С. Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West (1959)/Schmittiana – III von prof. Piet Tommissen. Brussel, 1991.

Schmitt С. Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum. Koeln: Hohenheim,1982.

Schmitt С. Das Reich und Europa. Leipzig, 1941.

Schmitt С. Land und Meer. Koeln: Hohenheim, 1981.

Schmitt С. Politische Theologie. Munchen-Leipzig, 1922.

Schmitt C. Raum und Grossraum im Volkerrecht// Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht. 1940. Vol. 24. No. 2.

Schmitt C. Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung und Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin;Wien;Leipzig, 1939.

Shiva V. Earth democracy: justice, sustainability and peace. London: Zed Books Ltd, 2006.

Sempa F. Geopolitics: from the Cold War to the 21st Century. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

Seversky A. de. Air Power: key to survival. NY: Imon & Schuster, 1950.

Siegfried A. Géographie économique. Cours de Université de Paris, Institut d’études politiques, année 1953-1954. Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire, 1954.

Siegfried A. Géographie électorale de l’Ardèche sous la 3e République. Paris.: A.Colin, 1949.

Siegfried A. La Crise britannique au xxe siècle. Paris: A. Colin, 1931.

Siegfried A. La Crise de l’Europe. Paris.: Calmann-Lévy, 1935.

Siegfried A. La Mer et l’empire. Série de vingt-deux conférences faites à l’Institut maritime et colonial. Paris, J. Renard, 1944.

Siegfried A. Tableau politique de la France de l’Ouest sous la Troisieme Republique. Paris: A. Colin, 1913.

Siemple. E C. Influences of Geographic Environment: On the Basis of Ratzel’s System of Anthropo-Geography. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1911.

Singer H. W., Ansari Javed A. Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International Disorder. London:Routledge, 1988.

Slater D. Geopolitics and the post-colonial: rethinking North-South relations. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Sloan G. Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.

Sloan G. The geopolitics of Anglo-Irish relations in the Twentieth Century. Leisester: University Presss, 1997.

Smith N. American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalizaton. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Smith N. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. NY.: Basil Blackwell, 1984.

Smith E. A. Jr. Effects-based Operations. Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War. Washington: DC:DoD CCRP, 2002.

Sombart W. Handler und Helden. Patriotische Besinnungen. Munchen/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1915.

Soros G. The Way Ahead – Open Society Institute.  2009.October 30. [Электронный ресурс]URL:. (дата обращения 24.08.2010).

Spencer H. The Proper Sphere of Government. London: W. Brittain, 1843.

Spencer H. First Principles. London: Williams and Norgate, 1904.

Spencer H. The Principles of Sociology.3 vols.  London : Williams and Norgate, 1882-1898.

Spykman N. America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

Spykman N. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944.

Starr F. A ‘Greater Central Asia Partnership’ for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors – www. 2005. [Электронный ресурс] URL: (дата обращения 03.09.2010).

Stephanson A. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (Critical Issue Book), Hill and Wang, 1996.

Stiglitz  J. Globalization and its discontents. Norton, 2002.

Stirk P. (ed.) Mitteleuropa. History and prospects. Edinburgh, 1994.

Strausz-Hupe R. Geopolitics. The struggle for space and power. New York: G.P. Putnam’s sons, 1942.

Strausz-Hupe R. The Balance of Tomorrow. Power and Foreign Policy in the United Stales. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1945.

Terracciano C. Nel Fiume della Storia//Orion. 1986-1987. №№  22-30.

Terracciano C. Rivolta contro il mondialismo moderno. Torino: Noctua, 2002.

Thiriart J.F. La grande nation: 65 thèses sur l’Europe (L’Europe unitaire, de Brest à Bucarest. Définition du communautarisme national-européen). Bruxelles: Gérard Désiron, 1965.

Thiriart J.F. L’empire Euro-Sovietique de Vladivostock a Dublin l’aprés-Yalta: la mutation du communisme : essai sur le totalitarisme éclairé. Bruxelles: Edition Machiavel, 1984.

Thiriart J.F. Un empire de quatre cents millions d’hommes, l’Europe: la naissance d’une nation, au d?part d’un parti historique. Etampes: Avatar Editions, 2007.

Thual F. Contrôler et contrer. Stratégies géopolitiques, Paris, Ellipses, 2000

Thual F. Encel F.Géopolitique d’Israël : Dictionnaire pour sortir des fantasmes. Paris: Seuil, 2004.

Thual F. Géopolitique de la franc-maçonnerie, Paris, Dunod, 1994.

Thual F. Géopolitique de l’Orthodoxie. Paris: Dunod, 1993

Thual F. Géopolitique des Caucases, Paris, Ellipses, 2004.

Thual F. Géopolitique des religions. Le Dieu fragmenté. Paris: Ellipses, 2004.

Thual F. Géopolitique du Bouddhisme. P.:Editions des Syrtes, 2002.

Thual F. Géopolitique du chiisme. P.: Arléa, 1995.

Thual F. La crise du Haut-Karabakh. Une citadelle assiégée ?, Paris, IRIS, 2003.

Thual F. La nouvelle Caspienne. Les nouveaux enjeux post-soviétiques (avec André Dulait), Paris, Ellipses, 1998.

Thual F. La planète émiettée. Morceler et lottir, un nouvel art de dominer. P.: Arléa, 2002.

Thual F. Le désir de territoire. Morphogenèses territoriales et identities. Paris: Ellipses, 1999.

Thual F. Le Fait juif dans le monde : Géopolitique et démographieю Paris: Odile Jacobs, 2010.

Thual F. Les conflits identitaires. Paris: Ellipses, 1998.

Thual F. Méthodes de la géopolitique. Apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité. Paris: Ellipses, 1996.

Thual F. Repères géopolitiques. Paris: La documentation française, 1995.

Thual F. Repères internationaux. L’évènement au crible de la géopolitique. Paris: Ellipses, 1997.

Thual F. Services secrets et géopolitique (entretiens avec l’amiral Pierre Lacoste). Lavauzelle, 2004.

Tomlinson J. Globalization and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

Turner S. Russia, Chine and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. p. 159-184.

Ueda Y. The Road To Chaos. Santa Cruz: Aerial Press, 1993; Smith P. Explaining Chaos. Washington:Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Vidal de la Blache P. La France de l’Est.. Paris: Livres Herodote, 1994.

Vidal de la Blache P. Tableau de la geographie de la France. Paris: Hachette et Gio, 1903.

Wallerstein I. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Wallerstein I. The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s. New York: Academic Press, 1989.

Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

Wallerstein I. After Liberalism. New York: The New Press, 1995.

Wallerstein I. The Twentieth Century: Darkness at Noon? Keynote address. Boston: PEWS conference, 2000. p. 6.

Wallerstein I. Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century. New York: The New Press, 1998.

Waters M. Globalization. London: Routledge, 1995.

Weatherford J. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004.

Weinberg A. K. Manifest Destiny. A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935.

Whittlesey D. The Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography. New York: H. Holt and company, 1939.

Dugin in Shanghai: International Relations and Geopolitics – Lecture 1

“International Relations: Theories, Paradigms, Concepts, Schools, Debates”

Author: Alexander Dugin

Transcript prepared by Jafe Arnold

Lecture read at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, December 2018 [VIDEO]


This lecture will include all knowledge of International Relations. It is dedicated to the discipline, the science, that is called International Relations. The general course will have four lectures. The first lecture is dedicated to International Relations as a discipline. The second, to geopolitics. The third, to the theory of the multipolar world. The fourth will be dedicated to China in all these fields of theoretical and academic thought.

But we cannot follow the logic of this course without knowing the basis of International Relations, geopolitics, and multipolarity. We need to understand that International Relations is a Western discipline. What does “Western discipline” or “Western science” mean? Now, in the present situation, we should be very careful, because knowing what post-modern is, modern critiques, and modern anthropology, we should carefully distinguish what is “Western.” The Western science and Western approach often tries to impose itself as the universal one. This is the imperialist aspect of the Western mind. It is racism that is implicitly present in any kind of Western thought. Western thought is ethnocentric and, more than ethnocentric, it does not recognize itself as ethnocentric. This kind of implicit racism is worse than explicit racism. Western liberals say “we are defining universal values”, but when you ask them what they mean by “universal values”, they begin to explain Western values as universal – individualism, libertarianism, progress, materialism. There is no place for metaphysics, the spirit, no belief in the soul or afterlife. This is a product of Western civilization, an historical product, that pretends to be universal.


When we forget that International Relations, and many other, indeed, almost all sciences which we study at university, are Western, then we are losing a very important aspect. We fall into the trap of regarding this discipline, theory, and science as something universal. We need to always remember that we are dealing with the Western vision – in International Relations more than elsewhere. Because that is the Western vision of how things are.


Above all, in China or in Russia today, if we consider ourselves to be subjects of history, not simple objects of history made by others, then we need to always remember this distinction. This does not mean that we should refuse Western science, resist against Western science, or ignore Western science. It means that we must always remember that it is a Western ethnocentric vision. We need a kind of theoretical Chinese wall in the epistemological field.

When you stop some internet connections at the border of your country, you are trying to make a distinction between what is wrong and what is possible for Chinese culture. We need to establish the same wall in the epistemological field.

International Relations deals with the State as such. This is very important. In the very name of this science, this discipline, there is the concept of “nation.” In the Western understanding, the nation is a political value. The West thinks of politics in terms of the “national State” that is normative since the Westphalian peace, and is the normative attitude. The Nation is the national State (Etat-Nation), it is not the people or an ethnic group. International Relations are relations between these States. What kind of State? Modern, Western States. This is the first, very important principle. When we are dealing with the concept of the State, we are dealing with historically Western concepts about how political reality should be organized and studied.

This is a modern paradigm. “Modern paradigm” means Western, but not in all the history of the “West”, but only in modernity. Modernity has transformed the Western mentality and has taken only part of the traditional Western mentality of the middle ages or antiquity and transformed it into a new kind, a new version. International Relations was born as a discipline in the beginning of the 20th century. It is Western and modern. Western modernity is different from Western pre-modernity. This is very important from an historical point of view.

The next point is that there is always an implicit hierarchy in International Relations. We can say that this is a “hidden” hierarchy. The Western concept of International Relations is based on the idea that there are examples of a “normal” State and “normal” relations, and that is precisely the Western world. All the rest are thought to be un- or underdeveloped and under-Western, but striving and tending to become Western. This is a kind of hierarchy.

These are the four principles which we should always remember in studying International Relations, and, I would suggest, other sciences as well. International Relations is a Western and modern discipline. The science is not universal, but is historically, geographically, and ethnically defined. It reflects Western ethnocentrism or “Eurocentrism.”

International Relations is not universal, but reflects the standpoint of the Western part of humanity. This remark opens up the possibility or question of how non-Western International Relations theory should look. Are they possible? Are they desirable?

International Relations is essentially a modern discipline which deals with the modern State and international system created under the Westphalian treaty, when there was a very important shift from pre-modernity in the international political system to modernity, when national, sovereign States were accepted as normative actors in global politics. This was not the case before, when religion and dynasties played an essential part. There was no concept of purely rational calculation of national interests or the sovereign body as the State. Instead, the State had a mission, a religious mission, a religious dimension – such as with Catholic politics in Europe. With the end of the Thirty Years War, a new political system was established that was accepted as universal, normative, progressive, and necessary for everybody else.


IR was born in the beginning of the 20th century in England and Switzerland as “tentation” to conceptualize international political science, and now it is established as an acknowledged academic science and discipline in the West, and in imitation of the West elsewhere. When I was teaching International Relations in Russia, it was exactly as it was represented in the rest of the world.


So, International Relations studies the relations and interactions of States. The fundamental subject is State-to-State relations, not people-to-people or culture-to-culture. The State is considered as the modern Western State – sovereign and secular. Secular means that there is no religious aspect or mission recognized in the State, so it is purely rational. Sovereign means that there is no higher government above the State. The State is the highest point. There is no god above the State, and the State is the prophet of itself. This is a kind of absolutization of the liberty of the State to do anything and everything. There is no other authority. That is the basic concept of sovereignty. Sovereign is he who has no other ruler or legitimate instance above himself. That is Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty. It was applied first in the Protestant concept of politics, and directed against the authority of the Catholic Church, which pretended to be a supranational authority above the State, and after that it was recognized as normative. Sovereignty is modern in its essence, and it is anti-empire.

For example, in Chinese history, according to Professor Zhao Tingyang [1] (赵汀), badao (霸道) and wangdao (王道). Badao (霸道) is power based on the force of hegemony, which does not recognize any other authority. Wangdao (王道)is a kind of moral and spiritual or mystical power of the emperor. This is not only the biggest, but is completely different, a qualitative change. This is not sovereignty. It is a mission. Wangdao (王道) is a mission. Sovereignty is modern and is badao (霸道).

The State is conceived as separate from religion, ethnic traditions, culture, and civilization. The State is national. But what does national mean in the modern political sense? The State is based on individual citizenship. The concept of the normative State considers the individual to be the subject of the State, and all individuals, united in the nation-State, are citizens. He who is not a citizen is outside of the State. All citizens are politically equal. The concept of nation-State is bourgeois and modern. It is not traditional. It does not recognize classes or other forms of professions or different layers of society – they have no political meaning in the modern national State. Nationality is based on individual citizenship.

The modern State, as the subject of International Relations, without a mission, is rational, egoist, and has clearly calculable national interests. It is a rational body. The nation is a rational creation [which exists] in order to organize individuals and to propose to them some kind of order and structure. If individuals are not happy with that, they can change it. Hence the concept of “social-public treaty” (contract). Because the State has nothing transcendental, nothing above it, no mission, it can be reshaped, recreated, destroyed, and created anew, if individuals or citizens decide to do so. It is based on a public treaty or agreement, that is the contractual nature of the modern State. It is almost like a contract agreement between, for example, economic groups. They can decide to put together their capital, and they can decide to stop and to create a new firm. So the State is conceived or is thought to be a kind of commercial firm. This is bourgeois in its roots.

This modern State is believed to be sovereign, so there is no higher authority above it. And the modern State is opposite to empire. It is opposite to the religious State, to the archaic community. It is based on the concept of progress. It is regarded as something that comes historically “after” empire, religious States, and archaic communities, all of which are considered to be pre-modern,  while the modern State is “new” and the “more progressive” form of political organization. So the modern State, as a bourgeois concept, obtains or acquires a sense of meaning only in the context of “progress.” If we challenge the concept of progress, everything will fall apart. No modern State has any sense outside of progress. Progress, modernity, and the modern State always go together. The concept of progress is embedded implicitly in the concept of the modern State.

The implicit hierarchy in International Relations conceives all States as being “Western” or “similar to the West”, “modern”, and “equal”, and deals with them as such. Reality is different, because States, as they are, not as they are thought to be, are not equal. There are big States, huge States, and small States – all of them are “sovereign”, and all of them have a place in the United Nations organization, but Monaco and small Luxembourg – sovereign States – and China, for example, are incomparable, like the huge sun and a small grain of sand. They are not equal.


But, interestingly enough, the hierarchy of International Relations contradicts the basic concept that every sovereign State is equal to one another. [2] Nevertheless, it exists, and there are debates in International Relations on how to explain and represent this hierarchy. The old Western racism comes into play here. [3] Racism was formed during colonial times and, little by little, step by step, acquired three layers. Normative racism consists of the first class of humanity – “white” humanity, a second, “yellow” class of humanity, and the third class, the lowest of all, is “black” humanity. This was reflected in the so-called “anthropology” of the 19th century, in Morgan, for example, with some explanations for these terms. “White” means “civilization”; “yellow” means “barbarity” or “quasi-civilization”, something like “civilization”, but not “civilized”, and “black” means “savagery”, or “savages” with no image of civilization, living in wild forests as gatherers, small farmers, and hunters.

Now we can see the exact same in International Relations – although formally without racism, because it was discredited by Nazi Germany – where we have an implicit, unofficial hierarchy that divides all countries into three groups: the First World, or the center in Wallerstein’s system [4], which is the Rich North. This is precisely the Western, white, European, American civilization. This is an old racist concept, in which the “whites” are the First World because they are “more progressive”, richer, more “developed”, have more “human rights”, are more liberal, freer, and happier. This is the old, normative ethnocentric history of the imperialist, hegemonic, colonial system. Although now it is not linked to “racism”, the First World is a purely racist concept. It is a transposition of the old racism onto the new, liberal political plane. The Second World in Wallerstein’s system is called the “semi-periphery”, represented by China, Russia, Latin America, India, and some eastern States, presented as “barbarity.” The West says that they are “corrupt”, “authoritarian”, “totalitarian”, and do not have proper “human rights.” They have dictatorships and corrupt Caesarist regimes, but they are like “us” – that is the First World – “in delay”, and we will “help them” to develop human rights, liberal values, transparency so that they will, one day, maybe, catch up with us and will be “white.”

Then there is the Third World. This is the “periphery” and, as Thomas Berger and Huntington said, this is the “rest” of the “West and the rest.” It is undeveloped and under the influence of the hegemonies of the second and first.

This is a more or less implicit hierarchy. We cannot understand anything in International Relations if we ignore this implicit hierarchy. The most sincere authors, such as Krasner [5], Hobson [6], and others, recognize this. But this is a little bit of an awkward moment, because to recognize the implicit hierarchy of International Relations is the same as to recognize the “racist” nature of the liberal way of thinking. This is a problem for “political correctness”, so they try to avoid this aspect. But it is implicitly, always, in any case present.

Now we will see the content of the science of International Relations.


International Relations as a discipline has different schools. They are different in many senses. The first, fully established, “classical” school is the positivist school. What does “positivist” mean? Positivism means that this school recognizes that there is an “external” or “material” reality that is the subject of International Relations. There are States, interactions between States, nations, and economies, and these exist somehow independently of how we describe them. There is the “positivist” fact that can be regarded, studied, and explored without our subjective relation to it. This is a pre-quantum-mechanical vision. It is “good old materialism” that regards that everything goes by itself, and the human presence is here to describe or deal with the positive reality that is always there outside of and independent of our interpretation. Our interpretation depends on reality, which is not dependent on our interpretation, but is as such.


There is also the post-positivist school, which has been gaining more and more ground in the science of International Relations. It is based on post-modernism, such as Michel Foucault’s epistemology, which challenged the existence of the positive fact and described the positive fact as an epistemological struggle. The will to knowledge is the will to power, according to Michel Foucault. This is the basis of post-modernist, hyper-critical ontology, that does not believe in the existence of anything outside of our explanation. This is a quantum-mechanical attitude. In quantum mechanics, the position of the observer is linked to the process itself. Processes with and without observers are different. This is a concept introduced into post-modern philosophy based on the deconstruction of discourse. According to post-positivists, there are no International Relations. There is only discourse on International Relations. There are no States without explanations, documents, and texts. Everything is written, everything is in speech and discourses, and by changing discourse, we change reality. This is very important. I suggest Chinese students to study post-modernism very carefully. It is a growing field of research, and without understanding the basic principles of post-modernism, we cannot understand anything in the present West. Because the present West affects us, we would not be able to understand ourselves without understanding post-modernity. The semi-periphery does not pay sufficient attention to post-modernity. We need to study it because, otherwise, we will be easily tricked in many aspects.


The post-positivist school does not believe in the existence of independent material reality. They think that material reality is created in the process of speaking, thinking, and discussing this “material reality.” This is the late concept of Wittgenstein that there is no positive fact, because the positive fact is always embedded in the interpretation. This is the so-called “language game” that creates meaning. Without meaning, there is no thing. The thing is born in the process of the language game. This is the basic principle of post-modernity.

The post-positivist school challenged the status quo in modern science generally, and in International Relations. Post-positivists attack the positivist school as “idiots” affirming things that belong to the past. Post-modernists are progressivists as well, but critical progressivists. The majority of them are from the left, such as from Cultural Marxism, from Trotskyism, from nihilism, and different forms of the leftist, socialist, and pro-communist schools. That is why post-positivist challenges exist in the world order. This is a little revolutionary, because it tries to transform the epistemology of International Relations and, thus by this means, transforms the reality, which is the same as the discourse about reality. This is the test in Derrida’s version. There is nothing but the text. If we change the text, we change reality. This is the revolutionary aspect of post-modernism and the post-positivist school.

The positivist school is fully established with a hundred years of debates, schools, different conferences, and hundreds and thousands of books and manuals written in favor of one or another theory. And there is controversy.

But post-positivism in International Relations is new, is gaining more and more ground, and needs to be taken into consideration. At any conference dedicated to International Relations, there will normally be a representative of this school. They create scandals and may look marginal, but now they are part of an established attitude. In modern manuals dedicated to International Relations, a part is always reserved for expositing post-positivist doctrines. It is not an innovation anymore. Now it is already a part of the discipline, developing and growing,  remaining controversial and scandalous, but as a part of the discipline.

There is a third kind of school of International Relations that does not exist in the form of an accepted academic theory in the proper sense yet. But it is has been born and is beginning to expand. Only the first steps are being made. I call it the multipolar school that is in the process of creation. It does not exist as an established school, but this approach is making its first steps. It is precisely to this concept that I will dedicate the third lecture, explaining it in more detail, but in order to have a general vision of International Relations, we must introduce it.


The multipolar school challenges Eurocentrism, modernity, universalism, and the global hegemony of the West. It forms a kind of parallel to some post-positivist structures. It is based on the presumption that there is a multitude of civilizations, which is not the case for post-modernists. Post-modernists are universalists, progressivists, and believe in liberation, democracy, and enlightenment, but they try to “enlighten enlightenment”, to “develop development”, and to “make modernity more modern.” They think that modernity is not modern enough. They try to liberate and bring to its end the process of liberation. Post-modernity is a kind of futuristic modernism.

The multipolar school does not accept linear progress nor the normative status of the West. The multipolar system deals with different civilizations, with no hierarchy at all. It is based on the complete incomparability of different civilizations, which we need to study without regard for any normative status for the West. That is the new aspect of multipolarity. It is based on anthropological pluralism and a positive evaluation of diversity. Here the concept of the Other is decided completely differently than in the traditional Western approach. We can say that the multipolar approach is not Western, and is an anti-Western school of International Relations. That explains why it is not so much developed and why it is not present in manuals, and why it is not mentioned during discussions and debates. It stands outside of globally “understood” Western-centrism. It is not Eurocentrism. So it is not by chance that this theory has been developed in the semi-periphery. Based on the new anthropology of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and of Eduardo Kohn, which affirms that archaic traditions have their own ontology and gnoseology and that we need to accept them as human and not as sub-human, as in progressivist, racist, Western-centrist epistemology.


But as for the main, positivist school of International Relations, there are two main schools: Realism, represented and founded by Morgenthau and Carr, and Liberalism, represented by Angell, US President Woodrow Wilson, and Zimmerman. At any normal university, you can pass exams if you understand realism and liberalism, because these are the main approaches which they teach about International Relations in conventional, normative, Western (and non-Western) institutions.

What is realism in International Relations? Realism is the idea that there should not and cannot be supranational organizations. Realists believe in sovereignty in the sense as I have explained it. Because realists believe in sovereignty, they think that there is chaos in International Relations. Chaos in International Relations is something other than “chaos” in normal language. It is not disorder, but is the absence of a higher level of authority which could legally oblige the State to do anything. States are absolutely free, and if you cannot oblige them to do one thing or prevent them from doing another or punish them legally, then you can only punish and oblige illegally. So International Relations as a field is always based on this chaos, because sovereignty is sovereign, and by recognizing sovereignty as an absolute principle, there can be only relations of power. If you are more powerful, you can oblige another, but not by law, legally, but by force. That this is possible and normal – that is realism. You measure forces. For example, how can survive countries and States survive? Either there is something that is “bigger” or “biggest” that is against the other “bigger.” For example, there is small Ukraine and big Russia. Russia attacks Ukraine, and Ukraine calls Washington and says “please, come here, we are attacked by Russians”, and the Russians don’t come. There is always an open situation. But when Ukrainians repress Russians living in Ukraine, they call Russia: “Moscow, please, come here, we want to go back to the motherland.” Everything here is not “legal” or “equal” – these are relations of power. If you can do it, just do it. Take Crimea, take Taiwan, take Hong Kong, if you can do it. You cannot wait when you will be strong enough. That is the realist attitude. You can accept that you will be disappointed with some position, and you can be a loser, or you could gain; you could deplore or you could start a war, and you can conclude a peace. War is not destiny in that situation, but it is possible, and it is real during all of history.


That is realism – the idea that everything will be like this forever, as in history, as now, and as forever. The greater part of American experts are realists. When we speak about the West, and above all the United States or Great Britain, at least half, maybe more of them, are openly realists. That is not nationalism, not fascism, but is called realism in International Relations, which represents a school of thought which is implicitly Eurocentric, and was created in Europe based on the normative concept of the State and sovereignty.

The other “half” are liberals. What is liberalism in International Relations? It is different from liberalism in arts, politics, and the economy. Liberalism has a very special and precise meaning in International Relations. It is not a liberal, funny hipster guy who is open and friendly, while realists are hawkish, evil, and aggressive. In International Relations, the term liberalism has a concrete and precise meaning. What does it mean? It means that there is progress in International Relations, which proceeds from State systems, or from a realist system, towards a new world system with a world government. The idea of liberalism in International Relations recognizes the necessity of creating a supranational level of decision-making that should be legally applied to every State. This is the creation of another type of State – a State above a State. In this sense, when the global government is established, everyone should follow the order of the global government just as citizens should follow the orders of nation-State governments. It is the same system, but established on a global, planetary level. This is explained with the concept of progress. Both realists and liberals accept progress, but realists accept it in some relative sense, while globalists believe in progress more than anything else. There is pacifism as well in liberalism, because they might consider war to be the worst and try to avoid war by means of manipulation and destruction of those who think otherwise than they themselves. War for them is to kill those who don’t accept global government.


This idea, as well as human rights theory, is based on liberalism in International Relations. It tries to make citizens and humans equal, which is possible only on a supranational level if we recognize the same rights of a citizen, as part of the nation-State, and man as a human being with no concrete connection to political status, in a cosmopolitan version. If you recognize both as legally equal, then you need a global government in order to empower and force this. You need a kind of level of authority that should oblige different nation-States to treat human beings as the global government of liberals thinks they should – legally. Liberalism tries to weaken nation-States, to reduce their sovereignty, and to install an international order instead of chaos. That is precisely the other half of Western scholarship of International Relations.

Liberalism in International Relations is globalization, cosmopolitanism, individualism, human rights ideology, progress, and the idea of destroying nation-States and destroying any form of citizenship in order to create “citizens of the world.” In order to do so, you should dissolve nation-States, because they pretend to be sovereign.

The debate between these two schools represents the history of the twentieth century. The creation of the League of Nations after the First World War, the creation of the United Nations, the Hague Tribunal, the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights – all of these moments were forms of implementing the theory of liberalism in International Relations. This is not by chance, by agreement between States, but is an idea of liberalism in International Relations. It is a theory based on progress and the affirmation that the Nation-State is not the best thing, as realists affirm, but a stage in human social, political, and cultural development.


Globalism and globalization are first of all a theory, a thought, not a fact. They are a discourse represented by liberals. Liberalism in International Relations openly advocates the creation of a world government and the deconstruction of Nation-States. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is part of manuals, which you can see if you carefully read any existing manual on International Relations in any country. Perhaps with astonishment, you will discover that the concept of global governance is not a conspiracy theory or the idea of some small elite trying to impose it, but is an openly recognized theory – one of the two main theories of International Relations.

There are two other schools, which are also positivist. One is the English school, which is a kind of “middle way.” Representatives of the English school say that there should be the sovereignty of States, and no world government, but more progressive States should create a “club” that will not punish, but exclude or put pressure on others – such as when the G8 was transformed into the G7. Russia was punished by the “club” in the English school. It was illegal. There is no such institution – it is a club. They can accept some and exclude others. This is a constant of the English school – there can be order, but based on agreements and the rules of the club – not law, not global government, but a global club. Hedley Bull, John Burton, and Barry Buzan, who is one of the brilliant scholars of the English school – I like him very much – and who explains the transformation of the international system through history, in an historical sociology of International Relations.


There is the Marxist school in International Relations. But it is not so familiar to you or to us because it is not Stalinist, Maoist, or Soviet. It is rather Trotskyist. Our Chinese and Russia politics and traditions in China and Russia were based on realism, with some special “details” about progress, socialism, and social systems, but they were more or less openly Russia-centric or China-centric. But the Marxist school in International Relations is something different. It affirms that there has been a global world from the beginning: capitalism. Capitalism is global, and the divisions between nation-States are a kind of formality that does not represent reality. Capitalism was born in the West, and it should expand to all the earth. And only when everybody will be capitalist and will be liberal, there will be no more nations, peoples, or races, but only classes – two of them: capitalists on top, international in nature, and proletarians below, also international. Marxists in International Relations are against the Russian and Chinese examples because they are a kind of “national version” of communism. They insist that International Relations – everything – should be absolutely international – no nationality, no tradition, no languages, only class relations between the international bourgeois and the international proletarian. And when they say international, they mean that capitalism should win. And after that will come revolution. But first of all, it should be global. So they are very close to the liberals: they say “let them win, and after that we will come.” This is Negri and Hardt’s concept of the multitudes and Empire. [7]


These are more or less the two main schools, representing the majority of discourse in International Relations. In the United States, for example, everybody is either liberal or realist. That is the normal position, even if they debate. Trump is a realist, and Hillary Clinton is a liberal. So there can be good realists, bad realists, crazy liberals – this does not mean anything. We are speaking of ideas.

Slide18But the post-positivist schools are much more interesting in my opinion. There is the normativist theory that affirms that if we create a norm, then it does not reflect reality, but creates the reality, and everybody will follow the norm. If you try to punish people who violate some rule on the street, little by little this norm, which does not reflect anything, creates people who very carefully behave “correctly” because of these norms. By changing norms, we change reality – that is the modest version of post-positivism.


Critical theory, such as that of Cox [8], Gill [9], and Linklater [10], tries to criticize the ideas of the liberals and realists which are inconsistent from the post-modern point of view, showing that they defend the status quo and are biased – politically, intellectually, structurally. Critical theory shows how discourse in International Relations is biased. That is their main purpose. Post-modern theory, such as that of Ashley [11] and Der Derian [12], says that International Relations consists of texts and only texts. This is an application of Derrida to International Relations. If you deconstruct texts, you will see that there is nothing behind them. Everything is based on corrupted information currents. If you change the information currents and rearrange the “facts”, you immediately receive a completely different image and reality. This is the “tail wearing the dog.” Soft power is an applied part of this idea. Post-modern theory is based on the deconstruction of the discourses of International Relations.

Next is the feminist theory of Enloe [13], Tickner [14], and Donna Haraway [15]. Feminists in International Relations affirm that all International Relations have been made, conceived, described, proposed, and promoted by males in what is a kind of hierarchy…If we put a female instead of male, she presumably will create peace, prosperity, friendship, and good relations between countries. There will be no State, no patriarchy, no hierarchy, no verticality in International Relations. There will be a completely different description of reality. If a woman will not pretend to be a man in dealing with International Relations, and if the woman tries to wrest “the woman” and describe reality from a woman’s point of view, then there will be a completely different construction of International Relations. This is a relativization of male dominance in International Relations. This is a growing theory, and I suggest that feminism should be taken seriously. It is not a joke; it is part of modern civilization.

In the historical sociology of International Relations, Hobden and Hobson [16] try to put the discourse of International Relations in historical contexts. They criticize the Western-centric, Eurocentric point of view.

And there is the constructivist theory of Onuff [17], Katzenstein [18], and Wendt [19]. They affirm more or less the same as the others. They say that we need to construct, and not only deconstruct, International Relations. Onuff’s main thesis is the “world of our making.” We live in a world which we make. There is no world. The only world that exists is the world we are making. This is the main idea. We are dealing with a fixed, frozen hallucination or imagination. There is no positive reality, so let us construct the world we dream of, the world we want. This is possible because we are living in an imaginational order.

Slide11 (1)

The multipolar school, which I will only evoke some aspects of, includes Eurasianism and the Theory of the Multipolar World and Fourth Political Theory, which is precisely what I am working on. There are many texts which are more or less accepted as the position of the Russian strategy in International Relations and the Russian tradition of realism. This is gaining popularity in Russia. You can see how Putin has introduced the Eurasian Union. Multipolarity is very important and has been approached by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov. That is something I am working on.

There is the Chinese school, including Zhao Tingyang (赵汀阳) [20], Qin Yaqing (秦亚青) [21], Yan Xuetong (阎学通) [22], and Zhang Weiwei (张维为) [23]. The concept or approach of these authors is not only realism, but Yan Xuetong is mostly a realist. Nevertheless, all of them try to establish the particularity of Chinese civilization, and I like above all the concept of Tianxia Tixi (天下体系), which regards the historical relations of China and other people not as a pure hegemony, not as an order of force or imposition. For example, Vietnam is a very interesting case. It accepted all of Chinese culture up to the details, but never recognized the direct right of physical, brutal rule, fighting against Chinese attempts to submit, at the same time being part of the Chinese universe, as opposed to the case of the Japanese who subjugated Korea. The empire of Tianxia (天下) is not only China as such as a State, but China as a pole of civilization with multiple layers. The idea of defending it in the present situation is a revolutionary idea, because it challenges all other discourses, just as Eurasianism challenged Western-centrism. There are many similarities between them.

There is also the European New Right of Alain de Benoist, the French GRECE and French New Right. They are not liberal, but are right anti-liberal, not nationalists, but Europeanists, not Catholic or Christian, but pagans, with the very interesting idea to recreate European civilization by returning to pre-modernity. Because they are living inside of globalization and modern Western civilization their remarks and theories are very important for the countries and cultures outside of the West.

La Teoría de la Insubordinación Fundante [24] is a very interesting theory of Marcelo Gullo Omodeo from Argentina which represents the idea that, basically, Latin America should not submit to North America and global world order. This is an idea that is very famous and developed in Latin America. It is growing in importance. Marcelo Gullo Omodeo is part of this multipolar discourse which is completely new in International Relations.

And there is the Brazilian author, Andre Martin, with his O Meridinalismo, which is the important idea that the South should be a united alternative to the North, not following or trying to catch up with the North, but creating different links between Latin America and, for example, Africa, and South Asian countries. This is a very interesting concept based on multipolarity.

What is important in all of these is that they challenge Eurocentrism. They consider International Relations to be provincial in its present State, a provincial Western concept with hegemonic, universalist, colonialist, imperialist pretenses. They try to reduce Western theory of International Relations in a much broader context, defending the rights of peoples and civilizations instead of modern States or global government. They are liberals and realists and post-modernists.

We can also consider the debates in International Relation, such as that of Realism against Liberalism in International Relations. That is a major part of the science. The discipline of International Relations is dedicated to this question: how liberals think that universal peace is possible if we reduce the sovereignty of the State, and how realists respond that such is not the case, because everyone will try to use this international institutions in their favor. The realists say that the United Nations fails, while the liberals say that it is better than the absence of international institutions. There are thousands of books on this. Precisely what is going on in International Relations on the practical level in the West is only about that. The Americans speak honestly about this and call things by their names. They have no shyness and speak about hegemony, realism, chaos, internationalism, confronting arguments, and attacking each other. But they are honest in that, and only they are. When they come to Europe, there is pure political correctness. There is no realism in Europe. In Europe it is impossible. In Europe realists in International Relations are “fascists”, with whom there can be no good relations. There is an overwhelming liberalism in International Relations in Europe. In manuals, certainly, you will read the debates of realism and Morgenthau, Carr, and chaos in International Relations, but in official debates in European diplomacy, there prevails exclusively liberalism in International Relations. And the realization of it is the European Union, which is a supranational structure that shows how to turn liberalism in International Relations in reality. They are not joking. They are liberals. Before there were different points, such Gaullism of Charles de Gaulle, for example. There was realism in the history of Europe, and all of its modern history were struggles, wars, and fights between Nations, but now liberalism is absolutely and overwhelmingly prevailing. Realists don’t recognize that. That is hypocrisy. They are promoting human rights always and everywhere, including when they simply destroy some countries in order to rob them, as with Libya, for example, but that was all about “human rights.” You can kill in favor of human rights, invade, destroy, and support radical Islam if it corresponds to “human rights.” Americans can say “it’s our business, business like business, nothing personal” and close our eyes to Saudi Arabia in some situations because they are our allies, and open our eyes when something is happening in Russia, and when nothing is going in Russia, we will just imagine and create a story.

In that sense, I suggest America as an example of a normal and honest field of debate between realists, who are recognized as an absolutely normal part of this society – half of American politicians are realists – and the other half are liberals, who try to demonize the realists now, and this is the European case, as in Trump’s election. He is a realist, he is honest, they are allies, America First, and the liberals go “no no, that is nationalism.” And they, the liberals, have lost. That is a sign that realism is half of the population of the political spectrum of the political elite of the United States, and they recognize that – “nothing personal.” There is a pure and honest International Relations school in the United States of America. In Europe, there is now no such clear possibility. Liberals try to demonize the realists, call them “fascists”, “extremists”, “Putin’s agents”, “Russian hackers”, and so on. But now, for example, in Italy, Hungary, and so on there are realist governments. There are left and right realists. Realism exists in Europe in spite of the European rules of political correctness and globalism.

The other debate – more interesting and charged with irony and humor – is that between positivism versus post-positivism, which is philosophical, but which in International Relations acquires a special dimension. I suggest philosophers, and Chinese philosophers, to pay attention to post-modernism in International Relations as broader than post-modernity. It is not only abstract philosophy and playing with concepts as in Deleuze’s plateau or Lacan, but in the everyday life of International Relations you will see how post-modernity works.

The next terms of debate are universalism and Eurocentrism versus the plurality of civilizations. This is precisely the multipolar theory that is only in its first stage of development. The main principles of realism are:

absolute sovereignty

  • chaos in International Relations,
  • national interests which discount everything based on rational calculation,
  • mercantilism in foreign trade, which means that the State should control foreign trade by taxes,
  • no supranational legitimacy,
  • anthropological pessimism

It is interesting how realists explain that the State should be because men are “evil”, and in order to put them order, we should have a State – otherwise they will behave in an unpredictable way and destroy everything. So they are pessimists and try to put humans in their place based on mutual agreement. They do not believe that human nature can be changed in progress. Humans are more or less the same.

The main principles of liberalism are:

relative sovereignty

  • from chaos to order in International Relations creating a supranational legal system, international interests should prevail – which is something incomprehensible to realists, for whom there are no international interests as there can be no international interests
  • liberalism in foreign trade, direct seller-buyer links with no State monopoly on foreign trade, no taxes, and no regulation in foreign economic policy
  • and universal peace is an imperative. War is worst of all, if it is not a ‘holy war’ against the enemies of the open society
  • world government, political globalization, and internationalism (and sometimes “pacifism”)
  • anthropological optimism, or the idea of progress, that humans can be better, more peaceful, more friendly, more hipster, more equal
  • education and progress should be political means destroy Nation-States using epistemology in order to promote their vision
  • human rights and the individual are the universal norm. There is no concept of the citizen as in realism, but the individual is a global concept.

If we put these together, we can see quite a symmetric opposition – term against term, affirmations against negations. What realists affirm and accept, liberals in International Relations challenge and deny. We see a symmetry in this debate and, to say the truth, we can find some intellectual bases in both. It is not a case of “stupid” against “wise.” This is one form of mentality against another form of mentality. You can choose your position.

For the English school or “middle way”:

States are sovereign

  • there is no legitimate supranational organization, but chaos in International Relations should be organized somehow nevertheless. This can be done through the concept of the club of the most powerful. The club of the less powerful has no influence.
  • States form the International system, and this system can be reflected, corrected, and indirectly controlled by the club.
  • Potestas indirecta (in Latin), a concept developed by Carl Schmitt

For Marxism in International Relations:

  • the capitalist system is global
  • Nation-States are fictions,
  • the differences between realists and liberals are useless and misleading, and the division between the capitalist States are lesser than vertical antagonism between the bourgeois and proletarian.
  • Capitalism, globalization, cosmopolitanism, and the reduction of society to the individual status are necessary. This creates real internationalism.
  • Contradictions in the capitalist system will grow – this is the difference with liberals, for whom contradictions will decline.
  • The growth of the middle class is a lie according to Marxists, and pauperization will become total.
  • All peoples and cultures of the world are obliged to repeat the economic development of the West. In that sense, they are racists.
  • In the globalist future, the proletarians will also become global, will rise from the global revolution and will overcome the bourgeoisie. This is the difference in the far future.

The main principles of post-positivism are:

  • the theoretical fields of International Relations are an artificial construction.
  • There is no independent reality, and the subjects of International Relations are not States, peoples, and civilizations, but are created in the process of discourse. By speaking of International Relations, we are creating the subject of International Relations.
  • All discourses are necessarily biased – you cannot have neutral or scientific, objective discourse, because you serve one or another power. International Relations reflect not the State but the will of their creators.
  • International Relations is the fight for domination and hegemony, and nothing else. This is pure political propaganda. All International Relations, according to the post-positivists, is nothing but direct political propaganda in order to submit all of humanity and install their operational system instead of others.
  • There is a need to create a new critical theory against discourses of power in International Relations. There is hard criticism of of all positivist theories as varieties of dominant, authoritative discourse – this is a post-modern concept.
  • There are a variety of proposals that should be based on post-positivist version of IR. It is very diverse, not united.



[1] Zhao Tingyang (2005). Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

[2] Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

[3] Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

[4] Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System. Cambridge:Press Syndicate, 1991.

[5] Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

[6] Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

[7] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000; Idem. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: Penguin Press, 2004.

[8] Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

[9] Gill S. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991

[10] Linklater A. Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity. L, NY: Routledge, 2007.

[11] Ashley R. The Eye of Power: The Politics of World Modeling // International Organization. Vol. 37. No. 3 Summer 1983.

[12] Derian Der J. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. NY; London: Blackwill, 1992.

[13] Enloe Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.London: Pandora Press 1990.

[14] Tickner A.B., Wæver O. International Relations Scholarship around the World. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

[15] Haraway Donna. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” // Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York; Routledge, 1991. C. 149–181.

[16] Hobden Stephen, Hobson John M. Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[17] Onuf Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South California Press, 1989.

[18] Katzenstein Peter J. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge, 2010.

[19] Wendt Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[20] Zhao Tingyang (2005). Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

[21] Qin Yaqing. (2007). “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory”// International Relations of the Asia Pacific. vol. 7, No.3.

[22] Yan Xuetong. (2015). Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition]. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.

[23] Zhang Weiwei. China Wave, The: Rise Of A Civilizational State. New Jersey: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

[24] Marcelo Gullo Omodeo. La Teoría de la Insubordinación Fundante. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2008.


Acharya Amitav, Buzan, Barry (eds.). Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia. London: Routledge, 2010

Adler E. Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Aldrich John H., Sullivan John L., Borgida E. “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience’?”// American Political Science Review. 83 (1) (March 1989). P. 123–141.

Allison G. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

Almond G. The American People and Foreign Policy. NY: Praeger, 1950.

Amin S. Mondialisation, comprehendre pour agir. Paris, 2002.

Angell N. The Great Illusion — a Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage. London: Heinemann, 1910.

Angell N. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage. New York: G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, 1910.

Aron R. La Société industrielle et la Guerre, suivi d’un Tableau de la diplomatie mondiale en 1958. Paris: Plon, 1959.

Aron R. Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962.

Ashley R. “Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance”// Czempiel Ernst-Otto, Rosenau James N. (eds.). Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Ashley R. “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War” // Derian Der, Shapiro M.J. (eds.). International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Ashley R. “The Achievements of Poststructuralism” // Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds.). International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. С. 240–253.

Ashley R. “The Eye of Power: The Politics of World Modeling” // International Organization. Vol. 37. No. 3 Summer 1983.

Ashley R. “The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life” // Derian D. (ed.) International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Ashley R., Walker R. B. J. (eds.). “Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies” // International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34. No. 3. September 1990.

Babst Dean V. “Elective Governments—A Force For Peace” // The Wisconsin Sociologist. 3.1. 1964.

Bakker I., Gill S. Power, Production and Social Reproduction. NY: Macmillan-Palgrave, 2003.

Baran P.A. The Political Economy of Growth. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957.

Baran P. The Political Economy of NeoColonialism. London: Heinemann, 1975.

Barkin J.S. Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Batistella D. Theories des relations internationales. P: Presse de Sciences Po, 2003.

Beck U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage, 1992.

Bhagwati Jagdish N. Free Trade Today. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002

Bhagwati Jagdish N. In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Boas F. The Mind of Primitive Man. New York: Macmillan, 1938.

Boli J., Thomas G. “World Culture in the World Polity” // American Sociological Review. 1997. № 62 (2). С. 171–190.

Braudel F. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XVe-XVIIIe siècles). 3 volumes. Paris, Armand Colin, 1979.

Brewer A. Marxist theories of Imperialism: a critical survey. London: Routledge, 1990.

Brown Ch. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approach. NY: Harvester Press, 1992.

Brown Ch. Understanding International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishing, 2005.

Bull H. The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Bull H., Watson A. (eds.), The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Buzan B., Little R. International Systems in World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Buzan B., Woever O. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Buzan Barry, Acharya Amitav Conclusion: on the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia // International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (3). 2007.

Buzan Barry, Acharya Amitav. Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?: an introduction // International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 7 (3). 2007.

Buzan Barry, Little Richard. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Buzan Barry, Little Richard. The historical expansion of international society // Denemark, Robert Allen (ed.). The international studies encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell in association with the International Studies Association, Chichester, UK., 2010.

Campbell D. National Deconstruction:Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis, 1998.

Carr E.H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis. London, 1939.

Caspary W.R. The Mood Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy // American Political Science Review. 64. 536–547. 1970.

Clinton W.D. The realist tradition and contemporary international relations. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2007.

Clough P.T. Feminist Thought. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

Cobden R. Political writings. 2 vol. London: Fisher Unwin, 1903.

Code Lorraine. Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories. London; New York: Routledge, 2002.

Cohen R., Kennedy P. Global sociology. N.Y.: New York University Press, 2007.

Cohn C. Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals // Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Vol. 12. No. 4. Summer 1987.

Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Cox R., Jacobson Harold K. The Anatomy of Influence: decision making in international organization. London, 1973.

Cox R., Schechter M. The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization. Routledge: London and New York, 2002

Cox R.W. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method // Gill S. (ed.). Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1987

Cox Robert W. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory // Millennium 10. 1981.

Crocker David A. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008

Crocker David A. Development Ethics, Globalization, and Democratization/ Chatterjee D., Krausz M. (eds.) Globalization, Democracy, and Development: Philosophical Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

D’Anieri P. International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Derian Der J. (ed.). International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Derian Der J. Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations// Millennium. Vol. 17. No. 2. 1988.

Delgado R., Stefancic J. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. NY: NYU Press, 2011–12.

Derian Der J. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1987.

Derian Der J. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. NY; London: Blackwill, 1992.

Derian Der J., Shapiro M. (eds). International / Intertextual Relations; Postmodern Readings of World Politics. New York: Lexington Books, 1989.

Devetak R. Post-structuralism // Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Devetak R. Postmodernism // Burchill S., Linklater A. Theories of International Relations. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.

Devetak R., Burke A., George J. An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Donneli J. Realism and IR. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Doyle M. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs//Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 12. No. 3 (Summer, 1983). Р. 205–235.

Doyle M. Liberalism and World Politics//American Political Science Review. 1986. 80 (4). 1151–1169.

Dumont L. Essais sur l’individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l’idéologie moderne. Paris: Le Seuil, 1983.

Dumont L. Homo Æqualis I: genèse et épanouissement de l’idéologie économique. Paris: Gallimard/ BSH, 1977.

Dunne T. Inventing International Society. A History of the English School. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.

Dunne T., Kurki M., Smith S. International relations theories: discipline and diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Durand G. Les Structures anthropologiques de l’imaginaire. Paris: Borda, 1969.

Durkheim E. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Libraire générale française, 1991.

Edkins J.,Vaughan-Williams N. Critical theorists and international relations. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Eisenstadt S.N. The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization// International Sociology, 16 (3). 2001. С. 320–340.

Elshtain J. Women and War: Gender Identity and Activism in Times of Conflict. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010.

Enloe C. Margins, Silences, and Bottom-Rungs: How to overcome the Understanding of Power in the Study of International Relations // Smith S., Boot R., Zalewski M. (eds). International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge, 1997.

Enloe Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. London: Pandora Press 1990.

Everett D. Don’t Sleep, There are Snakes. New York: Pantheon Books, 2008.

Featherstone M. (ed.). Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992

Finnemore Martha. National Interests in International Society. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1996

Fox J. Paradigm Lost: Huntington’s Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century // International Politics. 42. 2005. Р. 428–457.

Fox J. Paradigm Lost: Huntington’s Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century // International Politics. 42. 2005. Р. 428–457.

Friedman George, LeBard Meredith. The Coming War With Japan. New York: St. Martin’s. Press, 1991.

Friedman Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Friedman Thomas L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005; Idem. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Frobenius Leo. Paideuma: Umrisse einer Kultur — und Seelenlehre. München: Beck, 1921–1928.

Frost M. Ethics in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Frost M. Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations & Ethics and International Relations Consensus. Cambridge: CUP, 1986.

Fukuyama Francis. After Neoconservatism // The New York Times Magazine. 2006–02–19.

Furtado C. A nova dependência, dívida externa e monetarismo. RJ: Paz e Terra, 1982.

Geertz Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. NY: Basic Books, 2000.

Geertz Clifford. Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture/George J. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Introduction to International Relations. NY: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Giddens A. Risk and Responsibility // Modern Law Review. 1999. № 62 (1). С. 1–10.

Gill S. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991

Gill S. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Gill S. Power and Resistance in the New World Order. London; New York: Macmillan-Palgrave, 2003.

Gill S. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies with David Law. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

Gilpin R. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. NY, 2001.

Gilpin R. Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Gilpin R. The Theory of Hegemonic War // Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18 (4). 1988.

Gilpin R. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gowa J. Farber H. Polities and Peace // International Security. Vol. 20. Issue 2 (autumn 1995). P. 123–146.

Gray C.S. War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2007.

Griffiths M. International relations theory for the twenty-first century: an introduction. N.Y.: Routledge, 2007.

Griffiths M., O’Callaghan Т., Roach S.C. International relations: the key concepts. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008.

Guddzini Stefano. A reconstruction of Cоnstructivism in IR // European Journal of International Relations Copyright. Vol. 6 (2). 2000.

Guzzini S. Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold, New York: Routledge,1998.

Guzzini S., Leander A. Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics. N.Y.: Routledge, 2006.

Haass Richard N. The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance//Foreign Affairs. May / June 2008.

Halliday Fred. Rethinking International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1994.

Haraway Donna. A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century // Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York; Routledge, 1991. C. 149–181.

Harris Lee. Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History, New York, The Free Press, 2004.

Harrison Lawrence E., Samuel P. Huntington (eds.). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, 2001.

Haslam J. No virtue like necessity: realist thought in International Relations since Machiavelli. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit (1927). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.

Held David, McGrew Anthony, Goldblatt David, Perraton Jonathan. Global Transformations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Henderson E.A., Tucker R. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict // International Studies Quarterly. 45. 2001.

Hiro Dilip. After Empire. The birth of a multipolar world. NY: Nation books, 2009.

Hobden Stephen, Hobson John M. Historical sociology of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Hobden Stephen. International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries & L. NY: Routledge, 1998.

Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

Holsti Ole R. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus//International Studies Quarterly. 36 (4) (December 1992). P. 439–466.

Huntington Samuel P. (ed.) The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate // Foreign Affairs, New York, 1996.

Huntington Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon, 1996.

Hurd I. Legitimacy and authority in international politics / International Organization. 53. 1999.

Ikenberry G. John, Slaughter Anne-Marie. Princeton Project on National Security, Forging a World Under Liberty and Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century. September 2006.

Ikenberry J. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Jackson R., Sorensen G. Introduction to International Relations. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010.

Reus-Smit Ch., Snidal D. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kaiser K. Interdependence and autonomy // Morgan R., Kaiser K. (ed.). Britain and Germany. London. Oxford University Press, 1971.

Kaplan M. System and Process in International Politics. NY: Wiley, 1964.

Kaplan R.D. Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond. NY: Vintage, 2006.

Katzenstein P. (ed). Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives NY: Routledge, 2009.

Katzenstein P. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in World Politics NY: Palgrave, 2010.

Katzenstein Peter J. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge, 2010.

Katzenstein Peter J. (ed.). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Kegley C.W., Blanton L.B. World politics: trend and transformation. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Kelsen H. Reine Rechtslehre. Vienna, 1934

Kennedy Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Keohane R. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane R. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Keohane Robert O., Nye Joseph S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

Khatami Mohammad. Dialogue among civilizations: a paradigm for peace. NY: Theo Bekker, Joelien Pretorius, 2001.

Kindleberger Ch.P. World Economic Primacy: 1500–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Kissinger H. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.

Klotz A., Lynch S. Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007.

Köchler, Hans (ed.). Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1999.

Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Krasner S. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

Krasner S.D. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990/1991 Winter. Vol. 70. No 1. С. 23–33.

Krauthammer Charles. The Unipolar Moment Revisited // National Interest. Volume 70. Рages 5–17. Winter 2002.

Lash S. Another Modernity, A Different Rationality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Lash S., Featherstone M. (eds.) Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage, 1999.

Lash S., Featherstone M., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage 1999

Lash S., Lury C. Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things. Cambridge: Polity, 2005.

Lash S., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. (eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity. London: Sage (TCS), 1996.

Layne Ch. Kant or Cant. The myth of the Democratic Peace // International security. 19 (2). 1994. P. 5–49.

Lebow R.N. A cultural theory of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Lebow R.N., Lichbach M.I. Theory and evidence in comparative politics and international relations. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Lederach John Paul. Preparing for Peace. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Richmond Oliver P. Peace in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2008.

Lederach John Paul. Preparing for Peace. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Linklater A. Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations& London: MacMillan Press, 1990.

Linklater A. Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, sovereignty and humanity. L, NY: Routledge, 2007.

Linklater A. Marx and Marxism / Theories of International Relations. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. P. 117

Linklater A., Suganami H. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Lippman W. Essays in Public Philosophy. NY: New American Library, 1956.

Little R. The balance of power in international relations: metaphors, myths and models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wittgenstein Ludwig: Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition. Herausgegeben von Joachim Schulte. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Frankfurt, 2001.

MacLean J. Marxism and international relations: a strange case of mutual neglect// Millennium. Vol. 17. No. 2.

Mahan A.T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. New York: Dover Publications, 1987.

Mann M. The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results //Archives Europeennes de sociologie. № 25. 1984.

Mansfield E., Snyder J. Democratization and the Danger of War // International Security, Vol. 20. No. 1. Summer, 1995.

McCain John. America must be a good role model // Financial Times. March 18. 2008.

Mearsheimer John J., Walt Stephen M. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Mearsheimer John J. E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On // International Relations. Vol. 19. No. 2.

Mearsheimer John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.

Merton Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press,1968

Mesquita Bueno de, Lalman David. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Meyer J., Boli J., Thomas G., Ramirez F. World Society and the Nation-State // American Journal of Sociology. 1997. № 103 (1). С. 144–181

Meyer John W. The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State // Bergesen A. (ed.). Studies of the Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, 1980. С. 109–137.

Michael M.S., Petito F. (eds.). Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions, and Civilizations in International Relations. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009.

Miliband R. Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Moravcsik A. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics //International Organization. 51 (4): 513–53. 1997.

Morgenthau H. In defence of the national interest: a critical examination of American foreign policy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Morgenthau H. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–70. NY: Praeger, 1970.

Morgenthau Hans J. Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. Second Edition, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1955.

Morin, E., Le Moigne, J.-L. L’intelligence de la complexité. Paris: L’ Harmattan, 1999.

Mühlmann Wilhelm Emil. Methodik der Völkerkunde. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1938.

Muir Ramsay. The faith of a liberal. London,1933.

Niebuhr R. Christian Realism and Political Problems. York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953.

Nitzan J., Shimshon B. Capital as Power: A study of order and creorder. London: Routledge, 2009.

Nye J. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization L.,NY: Routledge, 2004.

Nye Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. PublicAffairs, 2004.

Nye Joseph S. The Future of Power. NY: Public Affairs, 2011.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Onuf Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South California Press, 1989.

Patomäki H., Teivainen T. A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions. NY: Zed Books, 2005.

Petitio F. Dialogue of Civilizations as Global Political Discourse: Some Theoretical Reflections // The Bulletin of the World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’. Vol. 1 No. 2/ 21–29. 2004.

Petito F., Odysseos L. (2006) Introducing the International Theory of Carl Schmitt: International Law, International Relations, and the Present Global Predicament (s // Leiden Journal of International Law. Vol. 19. No. 1. 2006.

Petito F., Odysseos L. The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, liberal war and the crisis of global order. London and New York: Routledge, 2007

Petito Fabio. Dialogue of Civilizations as Global Political Discourse: Some Theoretical Reflections // The Bulletin of the World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’. Vol. 1. No. 2, 21–29. 2004.

Pijl K. van der. The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London, 1984.

Pijl K. van der. Transnational Classes and International Relations. London, 1998.

Pijl K. van der. Global Rivalries — From the Cold War to Iraq. London, 2006.

Pijl van der K. Modes of foreign relations and political economy. Vol. 1: Nomads, Empires, States. London, 2007

Pijl van der K. Modes of foreign relations and political economy. Vol. 2: The foreign Encounter in Myth and Religion, London: 2010.

Prebisch Raul. The Economic Development of Latin America. New York: United Nations, 1950.

Qin Yaqing. Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory. International Relations of the Asia Pacific. vol. 7, No.3. 2007

Reus-Smit C., Snidal D. The Oxford handbook of international relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Reus-Smit Ch., Snidal D. International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Reuss-Smit Ch. Constructivism // Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Reuss-Smit Ch. Constructivism / Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Richmond Oliver P. Peace in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2008.

Robertson R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992.

Robinson W.I. Capitalist globalization and the transnationalization of the state // Rupert M., Smith H. Historical materialism and globalization. London: Routledge, 2002.

Rosenau J. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, 1990.

Rosenau J., Fagen W. A New Dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly Skillful Individuals? //JSTOR. Studies Quarterly. 41. 1997.

Ruggie John. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge // International Organization. 52. 4. Autumn 1998.

Rummel R. Understanding Conflict and War. NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.

Rupert M. Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995

Rupert M., Smith H. Historical materialism and globalization. London: Routledge, 2002.

Russet B. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Russett B.M., Oneal J.R., Cox M. Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence // Journal of Peace Research. 37. 2000.

Russett B., Starr H., Kinsella D. World Politics: The Menu for Choice. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Safire William. The End of Yalta // New York Times. July 09, 1997.

Said Edward. The Clash of Ignorance // The Nation. October 2001.

Salmon T.C. Issues in international relations. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008.

Sanbonmatsu J. The Postmodern Prince: Critical Theory, Left Strategy, And The Making Of A New Political Subject. Quebec: Monthly Review Press, 2004.

Savarkar Vinayak Damodar. Hindutva. Delhi: Bharati Sahitya Sadan, 1989.

Schmitt C. Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Berlin, 1938.

Schmitt Carl. Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte — Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991.

Schmitt Carl. Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte — Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991.

Sen Amartya. Democracy as a Universal Value // Journal of Democracy. 10.3. 1999.

Shapiro M.J. Textualizing Global Politics/ Darian Der J., Shapiro M. J. (eds.). International // Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Shapiro M.J., Hayward R. Alker (eds.). Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Sharp P. Diplomatic theory of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Sheeran P. Literature and international relations: stories in the art of diplomacy. Bogmin: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007.

Shilliam R. International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2010.

Shimko K.L. International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Singer D. Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale // World Politics. Vol. 24. No. 2. Jan., 1972.

Singer Hans W., Ansari Javed A. Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International Disorder. London: Routledge, 1988.

Small Melvin, Singer J.D. The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965 // Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1: 50–69.

Smith S. Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Osterud // Journal of Peace Research, 1997. Vol. 34 (3). P. 330–336.

Smith S.M., Booth R., Zalewski M. (eds.). International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Smith S. New approaches to International Theory / Baylis J, Smith S. (eds). The globalization in world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. P. 181.

Snyder R., Bruck H., Sapin B. Foreign policy decision making. NY:The Free Press, 1962.

Spykman N. America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

Spykman N. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944.

Strange S. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Strange S. States and markets. London: Pinter, 1988.

Sumner W. Folkways. Boston: Ginn, 1907.

Teivainen T. Enter Economism, Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy. London; New York: Zed Books, 2002.

Telò M. International relations: a European perspective. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009.

Thomas W.I., Znaniecki F.W. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: A Classic Work in Immigration History. Urbana.: University of Illinois Press, 1996.

Thurnwald R. Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen, 5 B. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1931–1934.

Tickner A. Yans Morgentau’s Political Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation // Millenium. 17 (3). 1988.

Tickner A.B., Wæver O. International relations scholarship around the world. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Tickner J. Ann. Gendering World Politics. Columbia University Press. 2001.

Tickner J. Ann. Hans Morgentau’s Principles of Pjlitical Realism. A Feminist Reformulation // Derian D. (ed.) International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Tilly Ch. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Tretschke von H. Politics. London: Constable, 1916.

Tshiyembe Mwayila. Would a United States of Africa work? Le Monde diplomatique (English edition). September 2000.

Vincent R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Walker, R.B.J. Inside / Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

Wallerstein I. After Liberalism. New York: New Press, 1995.

Wallerstein I. Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. New York: New Press, 2003.

Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

Wallerstein I. Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization. London: Verso, 1995.

Wallerstein I. The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Wallerstein I. The Twentieth Century: Darkness at Noon? Keynote address. Boston: PEWS conference, 2000. С. 6.

Wallerstein I. Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century. New York: New Press, 1998.

Wallerstein I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004:

Wallerstein I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004.

Walt S. American Hegemony: Its Prospects and Pitfalls // Naval War College Review. Spring 2002.

Walt S. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. W.W. Norton, 2005.

Walt S. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. W.W. Norton, 2005.

Walton Dale C. Geopolitic and the great Powers in the Twenty-first Century. Multipolarity and the revolution in the strategic perspective. L; NY: Routledge, 2007.

Waltz K. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Waltz K. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton & Company. New York, 1995.

Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

Waltz. M. Man, State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Walzer Michel. Thinking Politically. Yale: Yale University Press, 2007.

Yan Xuetong. Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Transition of World]. 2015.

Zhang Weiwei. China Wave, The: Rise Of A Civilizational State. New Jersey: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

Zhao Tingyang. Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe. 2005.

Time, History, and Katechon: Part I

Author: Vladimir Karpets
Translator: Yulian Orlov

Source: (8/11/2006)

Introduction by will begin publishing selected lectures by V. I Karpets on the history of political theories that were read by mister Karpets in one of Moscow’s universities. The lectures will be published on the basis of transcriptions and will thus reflect the peculiarities of conversational speech.

The subject of this course on the history of political and legal theories is the study of the doctrinal foundations of state and law in their historical development. Here we ask ourselves the following question: does this historical development exist at all, or are we faced with a kind of conditionality which, strictly speaking, is not all that important? In relation to this, some authors, particularly Aleksandr Dugin in his “Philosophy of Politics”, identify three fundamental historical paradigms. However, what is a paradigm? This is a word that we will encounter often and which actually forms the foundation of our course. This term was first used by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato and was employed to designate the invisible yet true reality that lies behind phenomena. The original Greek word is παραδειγμα. ‘Para’ is that which is located behind, beyond. For example, if someone wants to say that some kind of knowledge is beyond science, they call it ‘parascience’. As a rule, this last word is used by us in a negative sense (for example, to designate some kind of parapsychology or something else of that kind), while the word paradigm is used neither in a negative nor positive context, but rather in a totally neutral one; that is to say, a paradigm is that which lies behind phenomena. I repeat that this term was first introduced by Plato, and I will ask you to fix your attention on this, as we will return to Plato many times. Thus, we first meet Plato here, and it is probably telling that it is precisely he who is the first figure we encounter.

Thus, it is as if there exist three fundamental paradigms. The first is the traditionalist paradigm. It operates based on the idea that history is absolute degradation. In other words, history and, correspondingly, time have a negative character. Once, at a certain (and this is already a weighty question in and of itself) fixed or unfixed historical moment, absolute unity, absolute harmony existed; some traditions called it the golden age, others the heaven on earth or paradise; what is more, the most radical traditions place this state entirely beyond time. Further, an event occurs, as a result of which the intrusion of a negative moment, a defacement, corruption, degeneration is completed (this is called primordial sin in the Christian tradition), as a result of which the flow of historical time begins. Properly speaking, this is the beginning of history. In this paradigm, history begins with sin and corruption; consequently, the path of history is a descending one, a path of degradation. All of history is degradation. On the one hand, such a pattern first appears in the Indian tradition, which speaks of manvantaras, that is to say cycles of the expansion and contraction of the universe; within each manvantara there exist yugas, that is to say eras, and in this case we find ourselves at the end of the last yuga, after which everything must collapse and a new manvantara will begin; only spermatic logoi will be left and nothing else. All of this will repeat in the next manvantara.

In the Greek tradition, such a conception of history was first articulated by Hesiod, who identified a Golden Age, Silver Age, Bronze Age, and a final Iron Age. If we take the viewpoint of the Greek tradition, we also find ourselves at the end of the last age, the Age of Iron. Although history recurs endlessly, there is only degradation and degeneration until the final turn. Strictly speaking, there is no hope. Correspondingly, the development of state and law is a continuous degeneration from those higher forms, forms which best safeguarded their ties to that state which is beyond time and is, properly speaking, called the tradition, or, as one of the most famous representatives of the traditionalist approach, the French thinker René Guénon called it, the integral tradition. This is the traditionalist approach towards time. The second approach is radically opposed to it. This approach can be provisionally called the progressive view. The progressive approach is actually the one we encounter the most in the modern world. However, we must remember that it is only around 300 or 400 years old. That is to say, it is a very great innovation. It properly appears in the era of the so-called Enlightenment; first of all, this is the French Enlightenment of the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century; it had its strongest manifestation in the era of the so-called French Revolution, which is often called ‘the Great’ in the modern world, but which in a Traditionalist point of view appears as something entirely contrary. We are speaking here, of course, of the bourgeois revolution of 1789-1793. It was followed by another bourgeois revolution: the American Revolution.

The progressive approach was concretely formed in the era of the French and American bourgeois revolutions. Although the preconditions for it did exist earlier (including in ancient times), and we find the roots of this approach in ancient Israel, Greece, and Rome. Nonetheless, this approach was solidified in a finished and coherent form only in the 18th century. It was purely optimistic. History was seen as a movement from something highly negative towards some kind of bright perspectives that will happen somewhere in the future. A development of the progressive paradigm of history was the so-called formational approach, which became most widely spread in the 20th century. It is known, for example, that it was Marxist theory that first advanced the concept of formations (although we will further say that Marx is also not such a simple figure, although his apologists and critics would like to believe the contrary to be true). But this we will save for later: we will say that we are speaking of the kind of Marxism which we learnt about in all our school textbooks and for the time being limit ourselves to this variant. According to it, history is seen as a gradual improvement, as a progressive change of societal and economic formations from less to more perfect forms. Correspondingly, the primordial form of society transitions to a slave-owning form, the slave-owning form to a feudal form, the feudal form to a capitalist form, and the capitalist form to, well, the highest stage of socialism which is communism or vice versa, that is to say that socialism is the first stage of communism, but these are specific details. What is more, the history of all humanity in general independently of concrete civilisations is seen in this vein.

Modern liberal philosophy emerges from the very same principle. This is why in our days all Marxists have changed into liberals with such ease [1]. This is important to understand. We often hear today that communism forms one bloc and liberalism another. What is more, it is often said that Russia and, let’s say, China are communism, and that liberalism is everything that lies to the West of Russia, including the Ukraine. Actually, there is no opposition between communism and liberalism. There are only some disagreements between the communist and liberal parties in a certain period of Russia’s development; to be precise, in the 90’s. Now, by the way, there are less and less of these disagreements, and the communists and liberals practically form a unified oppositional bloc in modern Russia that actually opposes the historical Russia. However, these are questions of modern politics. We will not speak of them here. Paradigmatically speaking, the communist and liberal approaches are not different from each other at all. There is a very simple reason for this: because both of them assume a change of societal-economic formations; furthermore, these formations develop into better forms. The only difference is that Marxists call this better form communism and liberal post-history, as was done by, for example, Francis Fukuyama, an American of Japanese extraction whose book is called just that: “The End of History”. Or the famous Karl Popper or, for example, a very influential ideologue of modern globalism like World Bank president and simultaneously undoubted intellectual and erudite man Jacques Attali, who speaks of a “society of new nomads”.

In this case, that which communists call the ideal society in the face of communism is what those people [liberals – transl.] call the end of history, the post-industrial society, the open society, the global society, the society of nomads (the most original definition) and so on. Actually, the essence of these concepts is one and the same: development from the lower to the higher. Correspondingly, in the progressive paradigm the state is the absolute apparatus of violence (of which there should be less and less) and which should eventually make way for something new. In the communist perspective, this is societal self-rule, as is described by Lenin in his book “The State and Revolution”. In the liberal perspective, this is the open society, which in actual fact is not truly ruled by the state, but by transnational corporations (TNCs). In any case, there becomes less and less state as such in the liberal paradigm; however, (if we speak of the liberal paradigm), there are more and more rights. In the communist paradigm, the law dies off together with the state. However, these are actually but details.

Incidentally, when Stalin said in the ’30s that the path towards communism lied not through the dying off of the state but through its strengthening, he actually very decisively broke with both the liberal and communist paradigms and practically set out on a traditionalist path. We will speak of this repeatedly.

Finally, we come to the third paradigm of the development of history. It is a very interesting one. It has not always been examined and has often been ignored. Actually, it is implied in history ‘by itself’ as it were. In his “Philosophy of Politics”, Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin named this paradigm ‘permanentism’. This is a term he himself created, but it fairly accurately represents the essence of the matter. What does it mean? It means that nothing changes. As everything once was, so is it and shall it be. There exists a kind of reality that lies beyond (properly speaking there where paradigms are born), and there exists our manifested world in which essentially nothing changes. To what kind of philosophical teaching is this most of all related. To a teaching which we shall speak the most of in relation to the Middle Ages, although it was born in very deep antiquity. It is called hermeticism. This teaching is linked to the semi-legendary Hermes Trismegistus or Hermias the Thrice Greatest, a figure that is sometimes identified with the Egyptian Thoth, and is sometimes even seen as some kind of pre-Christian proto-image of the Christian Trinity. By the way, in ancient churches (including the Cathedral of the Annunciation in Moscow), the image of Hermes Trismegistus was placed in the number of the so-called external wise men, alongside that of Plato. In other words, Christianity (full-fledged, medieval Christianity) rejected neither the teachings of Plato nor those of Hermes Trismegistus.

Hermeticism was generally known in history mainly for its relationship with medieval alchemy; however, this is but one of its manifestations, and, generally speaking, hermeticism is a fairly universal philosophical apparatus that can also be applied to the historical process. For example, it is written in the semi-legendary Emerald Tablet (which is attributed to Hermes Trismegistus) that: “As above, so below. This is the Miracle of the One”. In other words, essentially nothing changes, all is one. What was in the beginning will be in the end. By the way, it is precisely to this paradigm that the so-called civilisational approach that we often speak is related. It is precisely the civilisational approach that we juxtapose with the formational approach, both in its liberal and Marxist forms.

The civilisational approach was developed in special detail in the 19th and 20th centuries by Oswald Spengler, N. Ya. Danilevsky [2], Toynbee, our Eurasianists etc. In a certain sense, elements of the civilizational approach can even be found with Marx, as strange as this may seem. To be more precise, he thought that his formational approach could basically not be applied to Russia at all. We are wont to forget this, but Marx thought that his theory had no bearing on Russia at all, for Russia was a totally different civilisation. Marx’s hanger-on Friedrich Engels said that not one revolution in Europe and in the entire world could not be victorious while the Russian state still existed. That is to say, the founders of Marxism saw Russia as the main obstacle to their own theory and praxis. The Soviet Union (which was not Marxist at all) was a traditional Russian state (of the Muscovite or even the Horde type) that was lightly covered in a Marxist costume. Not to mention the fact that the main work of such a highly influential American political scientist as Samuel Huntington (who, needless to say, serves the interests of his own country, just as Popper did) is called “Clash of Civilizations”. Therefore, we can find the civilisational approach to history not just in the East, but in the West as well. It is self-evident that emphases are generally rearranged. But this is not very important for us. What is the conclusion that we come to if we operate under the auspices of a permanentist or civilisational plan? We conclude that nothing changes. If, therefore, shall we say that, in the case of the West and Western civilisation, something like the Habeas Corpus Act [3] and the droit de seigneur [4] have the same meaning-giving fact as the modern Western society with its financial nomads. In other words, these are singular individuals. This is what the individual is (‘unable to be divided further’, ‘in-dividual’), that is to say, we are dealing with a kind of atoms, an atomic society.

By the way, the theory of the atomic society in its most rudimentary form appears very far back with Democritus. In this sense, even the ancient Greek polis with its democracy and, let’s say, medieval Europe with its Habeas Corpus and the modern Western society of nomads headed by TNCs are manifestations of one order. Nothing changes. Everything is the same: as above, so below, precisely as Hermes Trismegistus said. We can also say the same in relation to, for example, Russia. Properly speaking, although they might have been ideologically different, the Muscovite ‘draught’ government [5] and the Soviet Union were nonetheless barely any different on a structural level. As far as Russia in its present broken, crushed, and scattered condition is concerned, then we see a very clear resemblance to the era of princely strife as well as to an even earlier era. It is interesting to note, that everything even repeats on a terminological level. For example, the word “наезд” [“raid”, “incursion” – transl.] can be found in old Russian sources with the very same meaning it has today. China is another example. The emperor was an ‘unmoved mover’ in the ancient Chinese state, and the leaders of modern China are in an equal state of non-doing. In the memoirs of Mao Zedong’s personal doctor (now living in Canada), we find that he lived in a palace and changed his concubines after every lunar phase. Or take Deng Xiaoping, a man who did not fulfil any duties in his state yet was nonetheless the unmoved mover of the reforms that lifted China to the second place in the world economy and that will soon bring it to the first place. In this case, the Chinese leadership is no different from the Medieval or even ancient Chinese emperors. That is to say, civilisation remains the same: as above, so below.

Essentially, time does not exist for the permanentist approach. However, we also cannot absolutise permanentism and, consequently, hermeticism. Here is why. If in the traditionalist and progressive approaches history changes into something else in some way or another, the permanentist approach, for all its attractiveness, [implies] a transformation into malevolent infinity. This is something like the struldbruggs, the so-called immortals who want to die but can’t from the second part of Swift’s “Gulliver’s Travels”. Sadly, the permanentist approach (which as a scientific apparatus teaches us more than any other, especially when compared to the progressive approach) suffers from this fateful flaw. It houses a struldbrugg.

We will now continue. Why am I sketching out some of these historical paradigms for you at all? Well, in a certain sense, this course will differ quite strongly from what is written in your textbooks on the history of political and legal theories. We will basically attempt to refuse a chronological approach, and we will transition more and more to paradigmatic approaches. Therefore, if we, for example, discuss the Middle Ages, we will each time speak of the relationship between that period and, say, the 20th century. What is more, our course will have a far more paradigmatic than a chronological character, although elements of the chronological approach will undoubtedly remain.

Thus, what is history? To a great extent, history has a conditional character. This is the root of the appearance of all kinds of new chronologies, each of which in a certain sense describes a certain reality; however, these chronologies nonetheless hold more answers than questions. To be more precise, the answers that the creators of these new chronologies propose are, truthfully speaking, nonsense. It is as if they say that the official chronology that is now in existence should be replaced by a new one that they apparently developed by counting stars or something and which, if it is applied, would clarify everything. This is nonsense. However, the questions they raise are very interesting. In particularly, they objectively raised the question of historical cycles, cycles which so happen to entirely correspond with the permanentist approach. Why is it, for example, that the civilisation of Ancient Egypt (which they discuss a lot) typologically almost coincides with different eras in the history of the Ryurikovich dynasty? They think that this is because both civilisations are one and the same. Although the first part is true, they are not one and the same. These are totally different eras and totally different cultures; however, the very same paradigms manifest themselves within them. In other words, history is ontophany, that is to say, the manifestation, the revelation of being, which, naturally, reveals itself in a singular fashion. To come up with a new chronology for this is totally unnecessary, but it is necessary to understand, that as above, so below. This is the Miracle of the One. Thus, history (any history) does not demand answers from us, but questions. The ability to correctly pose a question means that you will receive an answer.

Generally speaking, from the perspective of the Christian worldview, the entry of Christ the Saviour, the second Person of the Holy Trinity, already marked the end of history. Why? Because the main event for which humanity existed, i.e. the Incarnation (later followed by the Resurrection of the Saviour) has taken place. Therefore, history as such, that is to say, as something detached and developing according to its own laws, could (from the Christian point of view) only exist in the unredeemed world, both equally in the pagan, manifestations sphere (this is the East and Hellenism) as well as the Judaic, Old Testament world. We really cannot examine concrete questions of a historical-religious (and actually theological) nature, but at certain points we will have to stop and examine them within the boundaries of our questions. Still, what type of worldview does Christianity belong to when considered within the framework of the duality that we discussed earlier? In other words, what actually is Christianity: a manifestationalist or a creationist worldview? Does it belong to the Eastern or Indo-European tradition, or does it nevertheless belong to the Judaic or (to use a now fashionable word) ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition?

On the one hand, Christianity recognises the Old Testeament with all consequences that entails, including the idea of the creation of the world from nothing. On the other hand, the question of the relationship between God and man is radically inconsistent with Old Testament Judaic [theses]. As Saint Athanasius the Great said, “[The Son of] God became man so that man might become God” [6]. This is impossible for something that has been created from nothing. The two fundamental ideas that lie at the foundation of Christianity absolutely do not correspond to the idea of a faceless, single God who is infinitely removed from man and creates an alien, lifeless world; these two ideas are the Incarnation and the Resurrection of the Saviour, the latter of which is even more unthinkable in the creationist consciousness. Finally, the third element that directly point to Christianity as a third way is the very idea of the Trinity, which has absolutely no resemblance neither to the ancient-Indian worldview with its metaphysics of principles, nor to Old Testament creationism.

So, what are we looking at here? In other words, within Christianity we see not just a manifestationalist picture, but a kind of supermanifestationalism, as not one of the Hellene or Aryan traditions go so far in their view of man as an element of the divine as to say that God Himself becomes man. What is more, he does not just become man, but also walks an earthly path, dies, and is resurrected. If we remember the manifestationalist (the Indian and Zoroastrian) worldview, we will necessarily remember that kings are generally speaking direct, including in a physical sense, descendants of the gods. Every man as such is god, and every man is god to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, the divine is everywhere. As the modern Mari pagans say (who, in contrast to our ‘neopagans’ from the Literature Institute have kept their authentic tradition) “the forest is holy, the brook is holy, the raven is holy, the tree is holy” [7].

In the creationist worldview, everything is entirely reversed. Man is separated from the divine beginning by an utterly impenetrable wall. They [he and God – transl.] are entirely different things and there can be no contact at all between them. Within Christianity, we see an absolutely manifestationalist worldview, or even more: a supermanifestationalist worldview.

How can this be squared with the acceptance of the Old Testament? Here, a paradox rears its head. Within the Church and also within the world to the degree that it becomes part of the Church and becomes Christianised, the laws of manifestationalism and of the non-alien world reign, including, naturally, a most important political idea: the idea of the sacred kingdom. Simultaneously, in and over the non-Christian world (i.e. the world that is in sin, as the world was before the coming of Christ), Old Testament law holds sway, that is to say, creationist law. Thus, by simultaneously accepting creationism for the non-Christian world (the world without Christ) and manifestationalism (including the idea of the sacred kingdom) within the Church and the world (to the degree that the world is the Church), Christianity presents us with a third path, which is neither Hellenic manifestationalism nor Judaic creationism. I can recommend Dugin’s book “Metaphysics of the Gospel” on this subject. This is actually the source of the famous Christian postulate that “there is neither Jew nor Greek” [8]. “There is neither Jew nor Greek” does not relate to the ethnic affiliation of man (as modern liberal theology very frequently states, including many who call themselves Orthodox). It is related to man’s metaphysical status. “There is neither Jew nor Greek” means neither manifestationalism nor creationism, neither the dissolving of man in the world nor his extreme alienation from it. This is what this famous formula of the Apostle Paul actually means. It indicates a third way that is pointed out to us by the very Trinity of God, a structure that has been accepted in Christianity and is inconceivable both in the metaphysics of the manifestation of the absolute (i.e. in the ancient Aryan world) as well as the alienated creation of the world from some alienated ‘four-letter’ thing, as is the case in the ancient Judaic world. Above all else, this formula contains a metaphysical hint of the third way, the third essence of Christianity as such.

If Christianity indicates supermanifestationalist principles within itself, it correspondingly cannot fail to accept the idea of the sacred kingdom, which is fundamental for political theories of a manifestationalist character. But what kind of sacred kingdom is this? It is located both within and outside of the world. “My kingdom is not of this world” [9], – the Saviour says in the Gospels. This means that it is not related to the fallen world in which the laws of the Old Testament are in force. It is located within man himself, but, in a certain situation that we will speak of later, it can also be manifested within the world: in the form of the Orthodox Kingdom or Empire. The very nature of the Christian Church is distinguished and removed from the Old Testament church, thereby emphasising that Christianity should not be identified with the Abrahamic religions of Judaism and Islam.

In the Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews, it is said that the Christian priesthood is a priest in the order of Melchizedek. What does this mean? If we remember the Book of Genesis, before he meets the God of time (the ‘Four-Lettered’ One), Abraham makes a sacrifice to the king and priest of the Lord Most High who has a different name than the Four-Lettered One (El Elion) and also occupies a higher station than him. We are speaking here of Melchizedek, a priest-King. The very name Melkhi-tsedek means ‘Sacred King’ [10]. We have spoken about how Melchizedek is identical to the king of the world or Manu of the Indian and Aryan traditions. Thus, Melchizedek is not the lord of time, but the lord of eternity: he is king and priest in eternity. It is in the order of Melchizedek that Christ creates the Christian priesthood, which what is more brings a bloodless sacrifice in exactly the same way that Melchizedek did: as bread and wine. Thus, Christianity distinguishes itself of the Abrahamic tradition while essentially drawing closely to the ancient Aryan tradition, though it also surpasses this tradition.

Simultaneously, as Christ Himself incarnated within the Jewish people, Christianity forms as it were a link between the higher and the lower, between the most ancient, primordial, Hyperborean tradition and the second tradition, the Abrahamic, Atlantic, Western tradition. In other words, it is through Christ that a link between the metaphysical East and metaphysical West manifests itself. This is the source of the metaphysical relationship between law and anomie in the New Testament. I ask you to pay special attention to this. Anomie is the absence of the law. To translate it as ‘lawlessness’ is incorrect, because the word ‘lawlessness’ has a negative meaning, while anomie is entirely positive. Perhaps it could be translated as ‘supra-nomie’. Anomie is the absence of the law. In the epistle of the apostle Paul, it is said that “for the law having a shadow of good things to come” [11]; that is to say, the law has ended. This is a very important moment: with the resurrection of Christ, the law as such ended, it ceased to exist, it lost its meaning. On the other hand, the beneficial qualities of man (which are located outside of the law) are moved to the forefront: these are qualities such as peace, love, continence, and meekness, of which it is said that “against such there is no law”. That is to say, the absence of the law in the highest meaning of the word is accepted as the norm. Simultaneously, a highly paradoxical, shall we say, dialectic makes itself known. The thing is that the first Christians expected a very fast return of Christ (His Second Coming). However, because of reasons that are unknown to us, this did not occur in the first century of Christianity. Thus, Christianity was faced with the need to exist within this truly fallen world, a world that was seen either as subordinate to the Old Testament (the Judaic world) or as Hellene (pagan and polytheistic).

In this situation, the question of the nature of power in this world arises. That is to say, this is primarily the question of the nature of power in the Roman Empire, as Christianity appears within its boundaries. Christianity’s appearance within the Empire was covertly seen as a prefiguration of the future symphony of powers, of the future Christian empire. In other words, from the very beginning the Christian Church aspires to the Christianisation of [the] Empire. While not acknowledging the law in a Judaic sense, the first Christians simultaneously had an entirely different relationship to the laws of the Roman Empire. Properly speaking, the foundation of Christian political theory can be found in the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians, where the concept of the “what withholdeth” [12] (Greek “katechon”). What does this concept mean? The Apostle Paul speaks about how at the end of the world (the end of the world, the day and hour of which we cannot know and a description of which is given in the Apocalypse of saint John) will not come while the “what withholdeth” or katechon exists. As long as he is not removed from the centre, the end of the world will not come. However, when he is removed, the lawless one will appear [13]: that is to say, the one that the Church identifies with the antichrist. He is not above the law as Christ is, but explicitly “lawless”. This lawless one will appear in the world and manifest out of the mystery of lawlessness, which is already at work.

In this case, “lawlessness” is not interpreted as anomia in the Christian sense, but as lawlessness in a negative sense, as a corruption of human nature. We should not so much relate the word ‘corruption’ to this in its most commonly used sense, but, above all else, to the rule of this alienated principle, the alienation of man from God. We will return to this and discuss how the term lawlessness was interpreted in different eras. Lawlessness and anomie in a positive Christian sense are totally different things. Thus, the man of lawlessness will not appear while the what withholdeth exists. Properly speaking, the first Christians saw the Roman emperor as the what withholdeth (this has been recorded by Saint John Chrysostom). Why is this so? Because the lawless one must appear in the world as a man who copies and imitates Christ in every way and might even try to pass himself off as His descendant. Simultaneously, he must appear in the guise of a world king. The Apostle Paul says: “so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God”. On the one hand, he is king of the world; on the other, he is the world hierarch of some kind of unified religion. The holy fathers presumed that he will appear in the earthly Jerusalem and come from one of the tribes of Israel, or, to be more precise, from the tribe of Dan. Therefore, as long as Roman power exists, or, as John Chrysostom put it, the “power of the strong Romans” exists, the man of lawlessness will not appear in the world. This is the source of the first Christians’ recognition of the Roman emperors, however cruel and harsh they may have been towards the Christians themselves.

This is an interesting problem. On the one hand, the Roman emperors subjected the Christians to all kinds of suffering; there have never been as much martyrs as during the Roman Empire. On the other hand, those very same emperors were seen by the Christians as the what withholdeth and were the subject of their prayers. Why is this so? Because the Roman emperor, whoever he may have been and whatever he may have done, is not the lawless one that must appear at the end times, he who will mark man with his own seal, thereby robbing man of his inner freedom. External freedom is of no importance at all to the Christian. However, the seal of the Antichrist that is mentioned in the Apocalypse primarily robs man of his internal freedom. That is to say (and using a modern expression), it zombifies man, and though the emperors may have put them to death, they did not rob Christians of their internal freedom. In other words, there is a difference here between external and internal freedom.

Thus, external freedom has no value at all to the Christian. This is very important. The first Christians acknowledged the Roman emperors and prayed for them because external freedoms and personal rights had no value at all to them, while the lawless one will rob man not of his external freedom; it is possible that external freedom will most likely flourish under him, and he might finally create a society of human rights. On the other hand, man will be robbed of his internal freedom during his rule. Sects are a component part of the modern world (‘New Age’). The consumer society is also a component part. The very principle of capital (capital on top of capital with the expropriation of capital) would also be a typical manifestation of lawlessness from the point of view of the first Christians, just like, for example, the banking system. The Church canon forbids the principle of the accumulation of capital from nothing, ex nihilo, which would also mean the alienation of capital from labour. In principle, the Church should live by the work of its hands. According to the Kormchaya Kniga [14], the priest should feed himself from the donations of his parishioners. Today, this is not the case. The clergy receives a salary, just like civil servants do; this system appeared in the times of Peter I. A lot is happening nowadays. We are today facing postmodernity, post-culture… In a certain sense, we could even say that we are today seeing post-Orthodoxy. We would most likely have to go and learn from the Muslims, at least on the issue of resisting the temptations of the modern world. But this is another question entirely.

So, the relationship of Christianity to the Roman state. The Roman state is that “what withholdeth”. The acceptance of the Roman state was to the Christians simultaneously the acceptance of Roman law and [Roman law], which is entirely natural. It is precisely for this reason that internal Church law was built by the Church Fathers on the basis of Roman law, and Church law was built from the very beginning according to the same principles as Roman law. This is a source of strength, but also of weakness; weakness in the face of the “spirit of this age”. In the early Christian community, there was no property at all. By this I mean the principle of equal (in this case spiritual) punishment for equal sins, the principle of justice: this is the principle of equitas, the principle of the formal equality of subjects within their acts etc. The strength of this system, however, is that within the Church itself, people were not treated differently according to their social or any other differences. If the emperor converted to Christianity and violated some kind of canons, he would be forced to undertake the same sort of penance as any other person. In a later era, our Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich (the Terrible) was banned from Communion until his very death for breaking canonical marital law; however, this did not prevent his being the recipient of royal honour as an “living image of the very King of Heaven” (saint Maximus the Greek) [15]. In this sense, the principle of equitas was taken by the Christians from Roman law precisely because they lived in the Roman Empire and, correspondingly, adopted a great deal from imperial law.

Together with Christianity and at times in close interaction with it, there existed another worldview which is commonly called Gnosticism. What is this movement? Gnosticism could be called negative creationism. Very frequently, the Gnostics themselves were members of the first Christian communities. Properly speaking, the entire history of early Christianity is the history of the separation of Orthodoxy (and this Greek word is translated precisely as православие [lit. ‘correct-belief’ – transl.]); that is to say, the separation of the correct-belief from Gnostic heresy. Thus, Gnosticism is negative creationism. What does this mean? This means that on the one hand, the world is seen as created; according to the Gnostics, however, it was created by some kind of negative principle or Demiurge. This Demiurge was identified by the Gnostics with the Four-Letter God of the Old Testament. The most famous Gnostic is Marcion (end of the 1st – beginning of the 2nd century), who proposed the wholesale removal of the Old Testament from Christian teachings. This is a very radical point of view, which was later rejected by the Church. It was rejected, mainly because it is impossible to describe the state of the fallen world without the Old Testament. Marcion, on the other hand, demanded the rejection of the Old Testament on the basis that it describes the creation of the world by the evil Demiurge. In other words, the Four-Letter God of the Old Testament was for the Gnostics strictly speaking nothing else but the adversary of the human race, i.e. Satan himself. To put it bluntly, according to the Gnostics, the world was created by Satan. Another Gnostic movement was called Ophitianism – serpent-worship. That is to say, if the world had been created by the evil Demiurge, then, correspondingly, all negative characters of the Old Testament (beginning with the serpent who appeared to Eve in Paradise and ending with the Cainites, Sodomites etc.) had (according to the Ophites) all been slandered, while it were exactly these images from the Old Testament that ‘represented’ the image of the God Most High (El Elion).

All ‘positive’ characters of the Old Testament, on the other hand, were the carriers of the spirit of this evil Demiurge. This is a very logical and coherent conclusion: if the world has been created by an evil principle, then, consequently, the entire meaning of the Old Testament had to be flipped, minuses had to be turned to plusses. On what basis? On the basis of the evil that rules the world. Something that is alive cannot exist without devouring another living being. The world is ruled by a total lie, and the primary carrier of this lie is the Old Testament. As a rule, Christ was acknowledged by the Ophites, but He was not seen as the Son of God (in that he was not the Son of the Old Testament God). According to the majority of the Gnostics, Christ never incarnated at all, and is nothing but a kind of spirit who can be known within oneself. That is to say, they generally rejected the incarnation of God and his appearance as a man, as man by himself is evil and God could not incarnate in evil. However, there are special pneumatics who can receive a spark from the God Most High, and this spark can save them from the fallen world. They entirely reject the world as such.

This is the most interesting conclusion: the so-called real world, the world within matter, is seen by the Gnostics as an evil as such; consequently, they consider the only task of man to be liberation from this evil. There are two paths to affect this: the first is absolute asceticism, i.e. entire asceticism up to the mortification of the flesh. Incidentally, some sects who claimed direct descent from the Gnostics (for example, the Medieval Albigensians [more commonly known in the West as Cathars – transl.] practiced the ritual mortification of the flesh, the so called endura, i.e. death by starvation. Thus, the first path is radical asceticism. We also knew such a movement in the 17th century: the “Kapitonovschchina” [16], which took place before the Raskol and which also included ritual self-mortification by hunger. In a sense, even the self-immolations of a few Old Believer confessions are also in a fashion related to these concepts. We could also include the Skoptsy. These examples all have one thing in common: the vivification of the Divine spark within oneself. The more the flesh is mortified, the more this Divine spark is vivified. It turns into a flame. Yes, yes, precisely like this: “One spark will start a flame” [17]. That is to say, the Gnostic turns into a totally different man. He is not resurrected in the Christian sense, he is transfigured without a resurrection, when he is still alive. This is ‘right-handed’ Gnosticism.

On the other hand, there also existed a ‘left-handed’ Gnosticism, something entirely opposite. It had the aim of passing through all stages of evil in order to finally vanquish it within oneself and definitively free the Divine spark. This path presumes self-liberation through the perpetration of all sins and crimes that exist. Examples of this path are also telling: we could point out Gilles de Rais (famously known as Bluebeard) as an example; at the very least, the influence of left-handed Gnosticism is clear here. That is to say, to pass through all kinds of evil, perversion, sadism or masochism, torture, and all else that is needed to finally free oneself. There are no guarantees of any kind here, because this is actually a desperate jump into nothingness. Because man dies anyway, he is doomed in any case to dwell in the lower worlds; therefore, there are no guarantees. The logic here is as such: get involved in a fight, and then see what is going to happen. The impossible is inevitable.

Something else is of interest here. From the point of view of political-legal theories, a very important concept is hidden in Gnosticism. If the world is the creation of the evil Demiurge, correspondingly, all worldly political and legal institutions are evil. This is clear. This primarily has a bearing on man’s political-legal institutions. All of them are evil. Correspondingly, it is the task of the Gnostics to re-create this world. In other words, the re-creation of the world presupposes what would later receive the name ‘permanent revolution’. This is the root of the idea of the permanent revolution, an idea that we find with Marx, Trotsky, and, properly speaking, in all revolutionary ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries. By the way, we also encounter it in occult Nazism. De-creation and re-creation. “We will destroy this world of violence / Down to the foundations, and then / We will build our new world. / He who was nothing will become everything!” [18] This is an entirely Gnostic idea. We are dealing with on the one hand a left-wing version of revolutionary ideas (communism), and on the other hand a right-wing version of revolutionary ideas (National-Socialism). This must be understood: National-Socialism has the same Gnostic roots as Communism. I ask you to pay special attention to this. Socialist and communist ideas have no relation to economic materialism. For them, economic materialism was simply a means to awaken this spark. All communist ideas primarily carry within themselves this sub-foundation. Properly speaking, the Gnostics were the first socialists and the first communists, and in a most radical form at that.

Of course, a pure Gnostic should not aspire to power. A pure Gnostic will destroy the world for the sake of its destruction. But here we find a lacuna. The human element that remained within them truly did lead to communities of these Gnostics to try and rule the world. Properly speaking, all manner of secret societies that are constantly active in history trace their roots to Gnosticism. [A question from the audience: “the Freemasons?”]. Of course, they too. What is more, there are two movements in Freemasonry. On the one hand, we have ‘irregular’ Freemasonry: this form is a raw descendant of Gnosticism. This is the so-called Egyptian Rite. On the other hand, we have the so-called regular Scottish Freemasonry. It aspires to a maximal conservation of existing institutions. In contrast to the Egyptian Rite, it has Protestant roots. The fact is that, that Freemasonry initially existed in a form that is different from its current one. It initially was a community of builders of Gothic cathedrals. Actually, it was purely pagan and Hermetical-alchemical. It followed Hermetic and alchemical ideas under the cover of Catholicism. This is the first consideration we have to consider. On the other hand, Biblical ideas start to enter Freemasonry in the 17th century, immediately resulting in the birth of two movements: the irregular, Gnostic group (this is the Egyptian Rite) and the so-called Scottish Rite, which aspires to the conservation of existing rituals. Therefore, Freemasonry is generally a fairly diverse system, although it ultimately is unified. That is to say, it contained both this irregular, revolutionary movement and an extremely conservative party. Properly speaking, Biblical ideas enter Freemasonry only in the 16th-17th centuries, and through England at that. Therefore, we must differentiate medieval Freemasonry from the phenomenon that we encounter today: they are two entirely different things. It appears that Medieval Freemasonry has bene entirely lost, although some seem to know of it; Fulcanelli, for instance [19]. But I digress.

Thus, early Christianity was formed in opposition to (and at times in interaction with) Gnosticism. Many Gnostic ideas entered the Christian canon in a softened form. However, the Christian canon itself was formed only when the Roman state itself became Christian. If the power of the Roman emperors was considered by the Christians to be indispensable even before this very same Empire converted to Christianity, and if the Christians marked off the Kingdom which is not of this world and, consequently, existed as a Christian community (outside of the state), then after the Edict of Milan of Emperor Constantine (272-337) and after the even later First Ecumenical Council, everything changes. To put it in a modern and purely political way, Christianity moves from a left-wing to a right-wing discourse. The same thing happened with Marxism, which changed when it transitioned from Lenin to Stalin, although this comparison is lacking in many ways. In this period of around 50 years, the empire still exists as a unified whole, with only the capital changing. Thus, after the Edict of Milan of 313, and later after the conversion of Constantine the Great himself to Christianity, the Empire enters the Church. The Christianisation of the Empire takes place. What are the reasons for this? There is a historical point of view, according to which Constantine realised that Christians already constituted the overwhelming majority of the Empire’s population, and there is no reason for an Empire to fight its own population. On the other hand, there are two other versions that describe the reasoning behind Constantine’s conversion.

The first version holds that Constantine fell severely ill and summoned a Jewish doctor, who told him that he could only be cured through the use of infant blood. Constantine gathered infants from over the entire empire and prepared all of them to be sacrificed. However, seeing the tears of their mothers, he rejected the cure. Having rejected it, he saw a cross and understood that he should convert to Christianity, and that the blood of infants symbolised communion with the holy Mysteries of Christ. After he converted to Christianity and partaken of the Blood and Body of Christ, he was healed. This is one version. It is primarily dominant in the Western Church and described in the Catholic Golden Legend.

The second version, which, by the way, does not contradict the first, is primarily dominant in the Eastern Church. It describes how Constantine saw a cross carrying the message in hoc signo vinces [in this sign you shall conquer] in the heavens during the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, a sign that pushed him towards converting to Christianity. However, it must be said that (at least, according to the Eastern version) Constantin was actually baptised only at the very end of his life, when he was on his deathbed.

Thus, we are here faced with a purely positivist historical point of view and two ecclesial ones, one Eastern, one Western. It is here that the most important political idea of Christianity as a legal, imperial discourse is born: the idea of the city of Rome as the guardian of the Christian faith. Later, the New Rome (Byzantium) and the Third Rome (Muscovite Rus) will spring forth from this idea. That is to say, Rome unites within itself imperial power and the Christian katechon. However, the city does not simply become katechonic. It becomes exclusively katechonic. As a result, as Christianity within the Church accepts a supermanifestationalist image (it also does this in relation to sacred power), so too does it treat empire and imperial power, creating such a high conception of imperial power that it is alien even to the ancient Persians with their sacred power of their kings, which was called khvarenah and referred to a special, visible royal grace. The Orthodox Emperor becomes the animated image of the Heavenly King Himself. From that point onward, the idea of empire and the idea of the Church have been indelibly linked to each other; separating them is impossible. Properly speaking, there is only one Empire, just as there is only one Church. This is the most important provision of the entire post-Constantine history of the Christian world. That is to say, the idea of Christianity presupposes the idea of empire and imperial power. If in the first Christian communities the idea of the worldly Kingdom and Divine Kingdom were separate from each other, in the Christian Empire (be that the First, Second or Third Rome) they are united. The idea of the sacred monarchy is lifted to heights that were never before seen, neither in India, nor in Persia, nor in China.

Additional notes:

[1]: Karpets makes a difficult to translate pun here. The verb used, перестроиться, shares the same root as the word perestroika, the reforms that saw many hard-line communists transform into liberals overnight.
[2]: Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822 – 1885) was a Russian sociologist and geopolitician. His most famous book, Russia and Europe, proposed a historiographical scheme that envisions history as a chain of civilisations that are born, live, and die, much like living organisms.
[3]: Habeas Corpus is a legal recourse that allows a prisoner or detainee to demand a court session to see if his or her detention is lawful.
[4]: The droit de seigneur [lord’s right], also known as the ius primae noctis [right of the first night], is a supposed right that allowed feudal lords to have sexual relations with subordinate women, especially on their wedding nights. Historians dispute whether it actually existed.
[5]: The word ‘draught’ is a translation of the Russian tyaglo [тягло], a system of taxation and other duties that saw widespread use in Medieval Rus.
[6]: From his sermon “De incarnatione Verbi” (in Migne’s Patrologia Graeca 25 p. 192).
[7]: The Mari are a Finno-Ugric group living in the Volga River region. The Mari faith referred to by the author is based on the veneration of a pantheon of deities while recognising the dominant position of the Great God (Kugu Jumo). It has seen a revival after the fall of the Soviet Union.
[8]: Galatians 3:28. This and all further Bible quotations are drawn from the KJV.
[9]: John 18:36.
[10]: A more correct translation would be ‘king of righteousness’.
[11]: Hebrews 10:1.
[12]: 2 Thessalonians 2:6.
[13]: The translator has chosen to translate the word беззаконный as ‘lawless’ and беззаконие as ‘lawlessness’. The KJV uses the term iniquitous, which does indeed carry the sense ‘lawless’; however, as this sense is somewhat archaic and is mostly used in fixed expressions (e.g. ‘den of iniquity’), lawless and lawlessness have been chosen as more modern replacements.
[14]: The Kormchaya Kniga (Book of the Helmsman) is an Orthodox nomocanon (collection of Church law) that was adopted by all of the Slavic Orthodox Churches.
[15]: Saint Maximus the Greek (1475 – 1556) was a Greek monk, scholar, and public figure who became an active religious reformer in sixteenth century Russia. He eventually fell out of favour with both the tsar and the clergy and spent a large part of his life in exile in various monasteries.
[16]: Starets Kapiton (end of the sixteenth century – somewhere in the middle of the seventeenth century) was a monk who first became known as a critic of what he saw as decadence in Russian society. Later, he became drawn to the Old Believers and emerged as one of the fiercest opponents of the reforms of patriarch Nikon. Karpets mentions him here as Kapiton is often mentioned as the ideological originator of the Old Believers’ proclivity towards self-immolation; however, there is little to no evidence for this claim. In addition, he practiced an extremely strict form of asceticism which in a certain sense resembles that of the Cathars. 
[17]: This phrase is drawn from the poem “Струн вещих пламенные звуки” (“The fiery sounds of prophetic strings”) by Decembrist poet Aleksandr Odoevsky (1802-1839). It became one of the leading slogans of the Russian revolutionary movement.
[18]: These lines are from the Russian version of the Internationale (re-translation mine).
[19]: Fulcanelli (date of birth and date of death unknown) was a French alchemist and esoteric author whose precise identity is still hotly debated. He first rose to prominence in the 1920s with the publication of his work Le Mystère des Cathédrales (The Mystery of the Cathedrals, co-authored with his student Eugène Canseliet). Fulcanelli was a prominent figure in French esoteric circles until disappearing after World War II, although Canseliet claimed to have met his master one last time in 1953.

The British Crown Against Rus – Part V

Author: Vladimir Karpets

Translator: Yulian Orlov

Source: Zavtra 40 (933), 5 October 2011

It is precisely starting in the middle of the sixteenth century (on the eve of the creation of John Dee’s main designs, and later with his active participation as well) that British intelligence agencies began ‘working on Russia’. In 1553-1554, the British merchant Richard Chancellor, a confidant of the English court, appeared in Rus. He was able to acquaint himself with the Muscovite state and was even honoured with an audience with the young Ivan IV. The conclusion that the Chancellor drew on Russia was such: “If they knewe their strength no man were able to make match with them.” [1] As pointed out by A. Efremov, an historian specialising in the history of the British intelligence services: “Richard Chancellor appeared in Russia as a result of an unfolding geopolitical conflict of a religious-civilisational character between the intensively Protestantised England and the rest of the Christian world, primarily catholic, that then surrounded it…The analytical conclusions that were sent to London by him were essentially geopolitical. He especially emphasised that at the beginning of his reign, Ivan IV had already “eclipsed his ancestors in both power and virtue” (incidentally, other Englishmen gave analogous evaluations in their reports to London). Chancellor also paid close attention to the fact that Rus:

“has many enemies and is pacifying them. Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Livonia, Crimea, and the Nogay are terrified by the Russian name…Towards his subjects, he is surprisingly lenient and amiable. In a word, there are none in Europe more devoted to their sovereign than the Russians, who equally fear and love him. He is unceasingly ready to listen to complaints and help Ioann in whatever arises and resolve everything; he is not bored with affairs, nor does he engage in merrymaking, neither catching beasts nor music, but is engaged exclusively with two thoughts: how to serve God, and how to exterminate the enemies of Russia.” [3]

Chancellor spent eight months in Moscow. After his return to England, a special ‘trading’ company was founded, the main partners of which were members of the Most Honourable Privy Council [3]. During the thirty years of its existence, the company was unprofitable, and financed by the coffers of the monarch. The ‘special’ nature of its activities is clear to see.

Soon, events started occurring that remain mysterious to this day. These events have already received widespread publicity (see php? p=2822 [dead link – transl.]). After the Commission for Graves of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR opened the tombs of Ivan the Terrible, his sons (Ivan Ivanovich and Fyodor Ivanovich), as well as that of voivode [4] prince Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky in 1963, a terrible picture emerged. An excessively high concentration of one of the most poisonous metals (quicksilver) was found in the remains of Ivan IV the Terrible. What is more, the amount of quicksilver reached thirteen grams per tonne, whereas the amount of quicksilver in a normal human body is not more than five milligrams per tonne! This is a difference of 2600 percent. What is more, during the analysis, the fact that Ivan IV had been buried in a robe that had been richly embroidered with golden threads had not been taken into account. Gold, however, is a very strong absorber of quicksilver. Consequently, the true amount of quicksilver in the remains of the tsar should have been far higher. The remains of Ivan Ivanovich were also found to contain quicksilver of up to several grams per tonne, which is also absolutely abnormal. Finally, in the remains of the tsar’s younger son (Fyodor Ioannovich), no quicksilver was found! The simple collation of these facts leads us to a single conclusion: Ivan IV and his family were purposefully poisoned with quicksilver. These are the facts.

The first-born (Dmitry) of Ivan IV and Anastasia Zakharina (Romanova-Yuryeva) was born a healthy and normal child, but died of the common cold (he caught the disease during a pilgrimage he made with his father), which at that time not even royal physicians could not cure. No traces of quicksilver were found in his remains.

The second son of Ivan IV and Anastasia was Ivan, the very same son that was apparently killed by his own father in 1581 with crook (there is not even a hint of such a death in those historical documents that concern this period of the rule of Ivan), was born in 1554 when his father was only twenty-four years of age. He grew up to be a healthy and strong man. Based on evidence from documents and chronicles, it is very clear that the tsarevich ‘passed’ during four days of horrific suffering caused by a severe illness, which, in turn, was (as has already been proven in the twentieth century) caused by severe quicksilver poisoning. 0,18 grams of quicksilver are enough to end in a lethal result. Meanwhile, as has been indicated above, the amount of quicksilver that was found in the tsarevich’s remains was several tens of times higher than the minimum lethal dose! The myth about Ivan’s filicide was ‘invented’ by the papal legate and Jesuit Antonio Possevino, who had arrived in Moscow in 1581 to serve as an intermediary in the negotiations between the Russian tsar and the Polish king Stefan Bathory, who in turn had invaded Russian lands during the Livonian War. Before this, he had offered Ivan a royal and later imperial title from the pope in exchange for the organisation of a “crusade” against the Ottoman Empire and the “liberation of Constantinople”; the tsar refused both offers. We do not want an all universal state”, the Russian Tsar answered at the time, for which he received in return from Rome a dose of ritual slander that has not been repealed by neither the Church nor historians up until this day. Later, Possevino’s theory would be adopted by the ‘German oprichnik’ Henrich von Staden, who would subsequently go on to propose one of the first projects for the conquest of Muscovy [5]!

In 1560, tsaritsa Anastasiya passes away. What is more, at this juncture Ivan Vasilyevich himself had no doubts that she was poisoned. Poisonings with quicksilver (mercury chloride) have been known for a long time. For example, in the entire recorded history of Europe we find an ailment called ‘mad hatter disease’: the disease was widespread among haberdashers, who used lethal quicksilver compounds when preparing the then fashionable felt. The illness is now known as the ‘Minamata disease’, as it was first encountered in Japan as the result of mass quicksilver poisoning.

Soon after Chancellor, another envoy of London appeared at the height of the Livonian War in 1570: a German (or rather Dutchman) who had married an Englishwoman called Eliseus Bomelius (1530 – 1579). He would go on to become the Tsar’s royal surgeon and was a highly skilled poisoner.

The influence of the new chirurgeon and astrologer became practically limitless after Bomelius revealed to Ivan IV that he was under the influence of dark magic and that two of his wives had been killed by jealous courtiers and black mages (the attempt to ‘shift’ the blame on the Russian boyars is telling). According to several historians, it was due to the instigation of Bomelius that such prominent and respected men of that time as the princes Mikhail Vorotynsky, Nikita Odoevsky, and Petr Kurakhin [6], the boyar Mikhailo Morozov and his two sons and wife Evdokia, okolnichy Petr Zaitsev [7] and Grigory Sobakin, the Pskovian hegumen Kornely, and finally, the Novgorodian archbishop Leonid were all punished by the tsar.

What is more, Bomelius himself soon entered into an agreement with the Pskovian boyars who hated Ivan the Terrible and one night, having taking the gold he had acquired, fled from Moscow; however, after as little as a day, the physician was captured on the road to Pskov and taken to Moscow. After harsh torture during which the astrologer revealed all his accomplices, Bomelius was given the penalty of the death: the disgraced mage was first strung up on the rack, all his joints were turned inside out, and, finally, his legs were dislocated with his heels forward (the version given here has been created with the help of materials provided by S. Kozhushko. Source: “Mysteries of the Twentieth Century” no. 19, 2010).

“A geopolitical layer is present in the remaining folktales about Russian enmity towards Bomelius: as they hated him and were convinced that the evil German Bomelius had ingrained brutality in the Tsar through his magic, the Russian people crafted an explanation that the Germans (i.e. all foreigners) [8] apparently had found out through their scrying and magic that they would be utterly destroyed by the Russian Tsar. In order to prevent themselves from having to suffer such a fate, they sent one of their sorcerers to Rus” – A. B. Martirosyan, another historian of the activities of the British intelligence agencies in Russia, tells us. – “The actions of the young Tsar were an absolutely adequate reaction to the then sharply growing onslaught against Rus which came primarily from the Catholic West, which was searching for an overland route to the East, to India: in those days it was already known that it lied through Rus. It is not by chance that this onslaught, especially in the first period of the Rule of Ivan IV, met with deservedly fierce resistance from Muscovy, which, in addition, aspired to reacquire its historically legitimate exits to the Baltic Sea. In this arena of the harsh geopolitical confrontation of Catholicism and strongly growing Protestantism, London came out with its spies, mages, and poisoners in a highly cunning combination.” ( [dead link – transl.]).

To this very day, many questions surround the so-called ‘English courting’ of Tsar Ivan which is widely used to compromise the Tsar, as if he had initially courted the British queen and then called her a “simple broad” in a letter because she was “not autocratic” [9]. This is what A. B. Martirosyan says on the matter: “As he aspired to the development of Anglo-Russian cooperation, Ivan IV granted the Muscovy Company a monopolistic right to trade with the Russian state, as a result of which the British traders turned into absolute monopolists overnight. Later, the company received the right to toll-free trading, and in 1569 it even received the unique right to toll-free transit trading with Eastern countries via the Volga trade route! The Brits purposefully worked towards acquiring these privileges. For example, there is a letter dated to 1568 that was sent by the lord Burghley to the English resident ambassador in Moscow Randolf, in which the lord indicated the need to demand the expansion of privilege for English traders from the Russian government, especially that of independent trade with Persia. After all, the main task of the English was to reach the East in any possible way, while bypassing the control of Catholic countries…. However, the unrestrainable greed of the British led the Tsar to deprive the Company of all its privileges after one of his fits of brutality in 1570. That is to say, the British lost their privileges after only a year! In that time already, ‘special means’ prevailed to such a degree in the activities of British diplomacy that Moscow’s patience ran out. In cooperation with the dyaks [10] of the Ambassadorial Prikaz [11], the autocrat executed an interesting action of strategic influence: he sent the English queen Elizabeth a missive on 24 October 1570 in which he directly accused her of allowing her entourage to conduct the affairs of the British state… Actually, what kind of negotiations or unions can we speak of if Lord Burghley knew very well that his own agent was poisoning the Tsar and his relatives with catastrophic consequences for the Russian royal dynasty?!” Later, this missive would come to be interpreted as the hysterics of an offended husband, and this interpretation enters into all history textbooks… How else?

Translator’s notes:

[1]: Quotation from a partial online edition of Richard Chancellor’s The booke of the great and mighty Emperor of Russia, available at .

[2]: EIA was unable to track down the original source of this quotation in the above-cited accessible version of Richard Chancellor’s The Booke of the Great and Mighty Emperour of Muscovy. Karpets references the following dead link: See above. 

[3]: The Most Honourable Privy Council is a body of advisors to the Sovereign of the United Kingdom. It consists mostly of senior politicians who advise the Sovereign on various legal issues. In the past, however, it was vastly more powerful and influential, being made up of various nobles. 

[4]: ‘Voivode’ is a Slavic term that denotes a high-ranking military leader. Its meaning is now dependent on the country in which the term is used. In West-Slavic use, it denoted a noble roughly equal to a duke. In Rus, the term eventually came to denote a noble who acted as a high-ranking official with civil and military powers.

[5]: Henrich von Staden (1542 – date of death unknown) was a German mercenary and maverick adventurer who joined the service of Ivan IV in 1578. His main occupation, however, was that of a spy for the Teutonic Order. The plans mentioned by Karpets are recommendations for a conquest of Rus that Staden sent to the kings of Poland and Sweden. He wrote one of the few eye-witness descriptions of the so-called oprichnina, which can be read here.  

[6]: Mikhail Vorotynsky (1516 or 1519 – 1573) was an outstanding military leader and the founder of the first Russian border service. Nikita Odoevsky (date of birth unknown – 1573) was another prominent military leader. Petr Kurakhin (date of birth unknown – 1575) was a voivode in service to Ivan IV.

[7]: An okolnichy (окольничий) was a high-ranking civil servant with either military or purely civil duties.

[8]: The general Slavic term for foreigner, ‘nemets’ (derived terms include Polish niemiec, Russian немец), literally means ‘mute one’. The term eventually came to be applied exclusively to Germans.

[9]: The term used here (‘autocratic’) is not meant to carry any pejorative connotations. Rather, Ivan IV is accusing Elizabeth of not being truly sovereign, with her power being depending on various third persons.

[10]: A dyak (дьяк) (derived from the Greek διάκονος, from whence English deacon) was a civil sergeant in charge of a prikaz in Muscovite Rus.

[11]: A prikaz (приказ) was a Muscovite governmental entity that is roughly equal to a ministry in power and importance.   

The British Crown Against Rus: Part IV

Author: Vladimir Karpets

Translator: Yulian Orlov

Source: Zavtra 39 (932), 28 September 2011 

The ‘era of great geographical discoveries’ was above all else the beginning of the ‘restoration of Atlantis’ for the British crown. “The New Atlantis”: it is precisely this name that was chosen by Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) for his work on the ideal island of Bensalem, which is ruled by the House of Solomon [1]. With the Abrahamic religions having formed in the East and the Mediterranean, the Atlantic tradition emerges in the West as the legacy of the Thuata de Dannan, a legacy located in the first instance within the framework of ‘grand geopolitics’ and even ‘transcendental geopolitics’ (an expression of Jean Parvulesco [2]). During the sixteenth century, when the New World had not yet been given the name America, these lands were often called Atlantis, especially in England. For example, the famous seafarer Adrian Gilbert was granted an official allowance in 1583 for the development and establishment of English ways in “the northern part of Atlantis, which is called the New World” [3].

The very name ‘New World’ is highly characteristic. The year 1492 was the end year of a computus [4] that had been created many centuries earlier. This event coincided with the seventh century “from the creation of the world” (if we are to take the Bible literally, as the Western tradition demanded at the time). This date was connected with the coming of apocalyptic events and the end of the world, as well as the manifestation of a “New Earth and New Heaven”. Earlier in 1453, the Byzantine Empire, considered to be the New Rome by Eastern Christianity and the last redoubt of the one true faith, had fallen after the Ferraro-Florentine Union with the Catholic West [5]. The grand prince of Moscow, Vasiliy the Second (the Dark) of the Ryurikovichi-Danilovichi line rejects the Union and enters the spiritual legacy of Byzantium. In the north-east, the Third and last ‘Rome’ begins, located strictly in the region of the heritage of Hyperborea.

The end of the world did not come. Rather, it arrived ‘prefiguratively’. The ‘New Earth and New Heaven’ did not ‘descend from the heavens’, but were rather discovered within the realm of earthly dimensions, strictly speaking, as a ‘grand parody’ (R. Guénon), the realm of which starts to quickly develop precisely at that very moment. We are here speaking purely of the reestablishment of a ‘New Atlantis’, the ‘empire of the Thuata de Dannan’ or the ‘empire of the Danites’, which opposes the ‘New Hyperborea’.

MIGIMO Professor N.A. Barabanov  [6] points out:

“A special symbolic rationale accompanied the process of the discovery of the new lands in the northernmost part of the New World, i.e. Greenland, Canada, and the islands between them. Here, many of the newly discovered islands evoked reminiscences of the legendary Ultima Thule of medieval myth, and therefore their acquisition acquired a special ideological meaning. The use of the symbolism of Thule in this region has been preserved to this day. Even today, the American military base in the extreme northwest of Greenland has the name Thule”.

Ultima Thule (‘extreme Thule’, ‘last Thule’) is the name of a fabled, ancient northern land in Virgil’s “Georgics” (I. 30) [7]. In the Greek language, the toponym of the ‘ultimate North’ is written with the letter theta and pronounced differently in different languages, both as Tule (Tula) and as Thule (Thula). Strabo provides information on Tule (Thule); he is followed by Arab authors in the Middle Ages. Al-Kindi (died 961/962) wrote about the enormous island of Tulia and a great city “at the northern end of the inhabited earth, near the North Pole.” There is a story in the Gothic Wars by Procopius of Caesarea (sixth century) that reads: “Now Thule is exceedingly large; for it is more than ten times greater than Britain. And it lies far distant from it toward the north. On this island the land is for the most part barren, but in the inhabited country thirteen very numerous nations are settled; and there are kings over each nation. In that place a very wonderful thing takes place each year. For the sun at the time of the summer solstice never sets for forty days, but appears constantly during this whole time above the earth. But not less than six months later, at about the time of the winter solstice, the sun is never seen on this island for forty days, but never-ending night envelops it…” [8] The most interesting here, however, is that the cosmographer Dimeshki in his explication of this information, stresses that the land of Tulia was inhabited by Slavs [9]. This echoes the information about the Isle of the Ruses provided by Arab travelers. In Russian medieval ‘Cosmographies’ and supplements to them, the territory of Russia was up until the eighteenth century depicted as an archipelago, the islands of which form a semicircle. In Karelian-Finnish runes, the Northern Land of Pohjola (the setting for the events of the Kalevala) has a second, more archaic name: Sariola [10]. The root of this name is clear. A reminiscence of the Hyperborean homeland also resounds in the name of one of the oldest cities of the Russian part of the East-European Plain [11].  

The matter at hand is the polar homeland itself. Rene Guénon gave a very stern warning on this subject: “On the other hand, the Atlantean Tula must be distinguished from the Hyperborean Tula, which latter represents the first and supreme centre for the entire current Manvantara and is the archetypal ‘sacred Isle’, situated, as we have seen, in a literally polar location. All the other ‘sacred isles’, although everywhere bearing names of equivalent meaning, are still only images of the original. This even applies to the spiritual centre of Atlantean tradition, which only governed a secondary historical cycle, subordinate to the Manvantara.” (Guénon R. “The King of the World”, translated by Yu. N. Stefanova, included in the book Guénon R. “Symbolism of the Cross”, M., 2004, p. 289) [12].

Here, the problem of the primary or secondary nature of the tradition makes itself very apparent. If the ‘Atlantic tradition’ was acknowledged as secondary by its bearers and its very separation as the ‘original sin’ of history, everything could have been different; however, that which is desired is not that which is real. The capture and substitution of the Russian island, and, consequently, of Rus (Kings) as well is the metapolitical foundation of Atlantism as such and, above all else, of the ‘British project’.

The formation of ‘neo-Atlantic’ ideology as such belongs to the famous ‘Elizabethan magus’ John Dee (1527 – 1608), an esotericist (he is said to have engaged in alchemical exercises; however, they were most likely theoretical, and he received his ‘powder’ from a certain Edward Kelley [13]), geographer and mathematician. Dee’s name is linked to the development of the idea that forms the foundation of later British colonial empires, the idea of the special mission of the New World, and also an attempt to unite magic with world politics. He is considered to be the creator of the British intelligence agency MI-5. It is interesting to note that Dee signed his secret messages to the queen with the pseudonym ‘007’. In turn, English intelligence agencies used the ‘Enochian language’ [14] that was ‘revealed to John Dee by angels’ in coded messages during World War II.

N. A. Barabanov [sic] points out: 

“John Dee was a long-time confidant of Wueen Elizabeth I. It is precisely to him that the appearance of the very term ‘British Empire’ and the development of the concept of an English right to colonial conquests and world domination belongs. He developed this idea between 1577 and 1578 in his treatises. Dee envisioned the term ‘empire’ as encompassing Britain and its colonies. He emphasised that the British Empire surpasses any monarchy on earth from the time of the creation of the world and could become a universal monarchy. This new, “non-Roman” empire (this point received special emphasis: the British Empire was supposed to be a counterweight to the ‘Roman inheritance’ of the continent, from the Orthodox Third and Second Rome to the Roman Catholic Holy Roman Empire) was called the “Green Land” by John Dee. The colour green is a key concept in alchemy. An alchemist who has begun the Great Work must necessarily leave for the Green Land, in order to find vitriol, the Stone of Philosophers (the beginning) through which the Philosopher’s Stone is acquired (the end). The “Green Land” of John Dee is a way of transforming the world towards the “New Atlantis”. It is a ‘hermetic brew of global history’. Dee openly juxtaposed the British Empire with both the Christian ideal of the ‘mystical universal city’ that unifies the entire world as well as the ‘cosmopolitan government’ that is meant to rule it. Thus, he simultaneously gave the British Empire a universal, global character. He also spoke in this regard of the concept of ‘world citizen’ and of cosmopolitism under the auspices of empire.”

John Dee’s template was later adopted by the Puritans as well as modern American Protestant fundamentalists.

The entrepreneur and politician Cecil Rhodes (1853 – 1902) directly continued John Dee’s ideas at the end of the 19th century. According to Rhodes, long-term global peace can only be maintained under the auspices of a global empire. Therefore, the goal of empire becomes the “foundation of so great a Power as to render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity” [15]. The planned universal British Empire was declared by Rhodes to be the inheritor of the universal empires of the past: “it is in the interests of this country, and, as Mr. Lawley very neatly put it at Bulawayo, what was attempted by Alexander, Cambyses, and Napoleon, we practical people are going to finish.” In other words, the whole world must be united under one rule. The Macedonians, Persians, and French failed. We, British, will succeed [16].”

The symbolism of ‘Ultima Thule’ was projected by Rhodes onto the south, the other edge of the world. What’s more, the ‘Primordial’, ‘Aryan’ tradition was also used in its ‘Atlantic’ redaction by Rhodes at the end of the 19th century; he would go on to add to its ‘Middle Eastern’ paradigm in strict accordance with the earlier ‘Atlantic paradigm’. When Rhodes’ colonists set off to conquer future Rhodesia, their first fortified settlement beyond the boundaries of the white settlements was named Thula, reminding us of the legendary ‘Ultima Thule’ of North-European medieval myth: an island on the very edge of the world, lying on the edge of the otherworld. After the discovery of gold deposits in South Africa, a legend began to spread that claimed that those lands were the mysterious land of Ophir from which (according to the Bible) the Israelite king Solomon had brought gold for the decoration of the Temple in Jerusalem [17]. Here, Rhodes emphasised that it was he who was developing a “copy of King Solomon” [18]. 

The heirs of the Thuata de Dannan are singularly oriented towards the ‘secondary Thule’ of the Atlantic tradition, contrary to the primary, Hyperborean Thule.

Before us is the direct esotericism of the ‘North-Atlantic alliance’ versus the esotericism of the Northern Pole, of Rus.


Translator’s notes: 

[1]: The New Atlantis is available here.

[2]: Jean Parvulesco (1929 – 2010) was a French philosopher and author of Romanian extraction who wrote several geopolitical treatises, as well as a large number of novels with esoteric themes.

[3]: Adrian Gilbert (1539 – 1628) is a little-known seafarer and government official who was instrumental in the exploration of the northern areas of North America.

[4]: A computus is a (meaning ‘computation’ in Latin) is a calculation used to determine the date of Easter.

[5]: This Union attempted to bridge the Great Schism of 1054, with the result being that the Byzantine Orthodox Church as well as most other Orthodox Churches briefly entered into full communion with the Roman Catholic Church. Although the Union was later rejected, it did result in the formation of several Eastern Catholic Churches, creating sources of tension in the Orthodox world.

[6]: The professor in question is actually named Oleg Nikolaevich Barabanov. The article mentioned is available in Russian here.

[7]: “…or whether thou come as god of the infinite sea, and thy deity only be adored of sailors, to thee utmost Thule be tributary, thy hand Tethys purchase for her daughter with dower of all her waves…”. Translation drawn from The Georgics of Virgil translated from the Latin into English by J. W. Mackail Fellow of Balliol College Oxford (Boston 1904; The Riverside Press), p.8. The translation is available here.   

[8]: Translation drawn from the Loeb edition of Procopius’s History of the Wars: Books V and VI, translated by H. B. Dewing (New York 1919: G. P. Putnam’s Sons), p.417. The text is available here

[9]: Khems-ed-Din Abu Abdallah Mohammed ed-Dimeshki (date of birth and death unclear) was a medieval Arab cosmographer. His main cosmographical work is available in Arabic here.

[10]: The Kalevala is a compilation of Karelian and Finnish oral folklore and mythology. The work has for all intents and purposes become the national epic of the Finnish and Karelian peoples. The work can be found online here.

[11]: This is probably a reference to the Russian city of Tula. 

[12]: Translation drawn from René Guénon. The Lord of the World (Moorcote 1983; Coombe Springs Press) p.56.

[13]: Edward Kelley (1555 – 1597) was John Dee’s “skryer”, i.e., medium for conversing with angels. In addition to angelic rituals, Kelley worked extensively on alchemical operations. 

[14]: The ‘Enochian language’ was the language revealed to Edward Kelley and John Dee by angels in 1583.

[15]: From a will drafted by Rhodes in 1877. The full text is available here.

[16]: This quote is drawn from a speech given by Rhodes on September 17 1898 at Port Elizabeth in South Africa. The speech can be found in its entirety in Vindex (F. Verschoyle). Cecil Rhodes, His Political Life and Speeches 1881-1900 (London 1900: Chapman and Hall), pp.603-613 (for the quote see p.609), available online here. The ‘mr. Lawley’ mentioned is Arthur Lawley, sixth Baron Wenlock (1860 – 1932), a colonial administrator. The quote originates from a speech made by Lawley at the opening of the railway from Mafeking to Bulawayo in 1897. The original article also groups the three sentences that follow it with it, though these are absent from the speech itself. 

[17]: The following passages relate to Ophir: “And they came to Ophir, and fetched from thence gold, four hundred and twenty talents, and brought it to king Solomon” (Kings 9:28) ; “Even three thousand talents of gold, of the gold of Ophir, and seven thousand talents of refined silver, to overlay the walls of the houses withal…” (1 Chronicles 29:4); “And Huram sent him by the hands of his servants ships, and servants that had knowledge of the sea; and they went with the servants of Solomon to Ophir, and took thence four hundred and fifty talents of gold, and brought them to king Solomon.” (2 Chronicles 8:18); “And the servants also of Huram, and the servants of Solomon, which brought gold from Ophir, brought algum trees and precious stones.” (2 Chronicles 9:10). All quotations are drawn from the KJV.

[18]: The precise source of this quotation has not been discovered. 

The British Crown Against Rus – Part III

Author: Vladimir Karpets

Translator: Yulian Orlov

Zavtra no 38 (931), 21 September 2011

King Alfred (871 – 901) is seen as the greatest British monarch in the entire history of the isles. Some hold that it is precisely this historical person that inspired Tolkien to create Aragorn. At the foundation of his Doom Book lies Biblical law and the Doom Book in turn lies at the foundation of all future English, American, Australian etc. law, i.e. the system of Common Law. It is especially important to pay attention to the thirty-third codex of King Alfred (there are forty-eight provisions in this text in total that are directly based on the text of the Old Testament Book of Exodus): “You should not oppress wanderers and those who come from afar, for once you yourself were wanderers in the Egyptian land” [1]. “These words directly hint at the descent of the Anglo-Saxon tribe from the ancient Israelites. Such a declaration from the man who is practically the father of the English nation is worth quite a bit!” – states a Russian diplomat and specialist in international law who goes by the nickname “evolist” online [2].

One way or another, it is known that the tribe of Dan knew two branches: one northern and one southern. We will speak of the southern branch later. The northern branch had a fleet and busied itself with trade. Attempting to save itself from the Assyrians, the northern branch sailed to Ireland through the Mediterranean. It is identified with the Thuata de Dannan, an identification that, of course, appears to contradict the ‘Atlantic-Nordic’ theory, although both theories coincide on the level of ‘metahistory’ in a surprising way. One way or another, in those historical chronicles that have been found in Ireland, there are reports of a strong populace appearing on Irish territory that was called the Thuata de Dannan, the “tribe of Dan”. This people arrived on ships and drove away the settlements of the autochthonous Irish inhabitants… Part of the tribe of Dan moved to other regions from Ireland; to be more precise, it laid the foundations for the highest English government and aristocracy, a fact that British symbolism pays witness to. Symbols personifying Dan appear on the image of the royal crest of Great Britain. “This spirit of the tribe of Dan penetrated America along with the Anglo-Saxons. This is the spirit that rules that country to this day” [3], — writes T. V. Gracheva, head of the department of Russian and foreign languages of Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

According to various narratives, the Danites gradually “went underground, into the hills” (Irish sidhe, si), or, in other words, became part of the genetic inheritance of those families that carried Danite blood. It is they who became the forefathers of the druidic priesthood and those royal lines that carry a specific ‘serpentine’ inheritance and hold within themselves the archetype of the civilisation of the ‘sea’, which, we will repeat, is secondary in relation to the Hyperborean, continental civilisation. A syncretic (not a synthetic) link manifests itself through the Danites, i.e. a kind of ‘intermediation’ of two traditions: the Aryan (manifestationism) and Semitic (creationism) as well as the ‘building of civilisations’, with all the consequences that follow from it, including its alienation and degeneration. The “serpent by the way” of Dan is the “prince of the world”, with both its physical (gravity, causality) as well as social laws. In a certain sense, the tribe of Dan is also the intermediary for a certain compromise (‘covenant’, brith), including between the ‘monarchy’ and the ‘judges’.

According to the Jewish midrash, the mother of the ‘Mashiach’ must come from the tribe of Dan (Beresheit Rabba 49:9). Correspondingly, the Church Fathers univocally state that the Antichrist will be born from the tribe of Dan (of a “mortal woman and prostitute” from that tribe). Jacob’s prophecy concerning the snake is in fact juxtaposed with the enumeration of the one hundred forty-four thousand virgins from all the tribes of Israel with the stamp of God on their heads in the Book of Revelations (Rev. 7: 4) [4]; the tribe of Dan is entirely excluded from their ranks. From this the Holy Fathers drew the conclusion that the Antichrist will originate from the tribe of Dan. Saint Andreas of Caesarea writes: “This should be noted, as the tribe of Dan, since the Antichrist would be born from it, was not included with the rest (of the tribes), but instead of it that of Levi, as the priestly (tribe) of old which did not share in the division (of the land of Israel)” [5]. Saint Irenaeus of Lyon, speaking about the antichrist, notes, that: “And Jeremiah does not merely point out his sudden coming, but he even indicates the tribe from which he shall come, where he says: “We shall hear the voice of his swift horses from Dan…” (Jer. 8:16). This, too, is the reason that this tribe is not reckoned in the Apocalypse along with those which are saved.” (Rev. 7: 5-7) [6]. [7]

We can or cannot accept today’s widespread ideas on the direct descent of the ‘global elite’ from ‘snakes’, ‘nagas’ [8], or ‘reptiloids’ (the American [British – transl.] investigator David Icke is most famous for his theories on this subject). We will agree that we are speaking of a ‘totemic history’, and, correspondingly, of a battle between totems. The presence of a serpentine genotype in the human strain is confirmed by Orthodox patristic anthropology. When contemplating the mysteries of fallen human nature through eyes enlightened by the Spirit, they saw a “serpent that lies under the mind beneath the surface of the thoughts, and burrows into what we call the secret chambers and storehouses of the soul and murders thee…” [9].

The most important information here is the ‘effect on history’: first through the introduction of the ‘serpentine genotype’ in the strain of the ruling dynasties, and in the ‘global’ elite of the end times. It is possible (and, apparently, necessary) to reject the neospiritualist theories of Western conspiracy theorists (such as David Icke) on “alien reptiloids”, and rather speak of the ‘mental serpent’, the “dragon down in one’s own mind” [10] legitimately and from any point of view. On the subject of the royal lines, we are speaking of the ‘reptilisation’ of Vamsa Surya, the main subject of which is the very tribe of Dan. Actually, the ‘secondary nature of the tradition’ is ‘reptilisation’, the fall of man. This is the meaning of the ‘birth’ of the new, ‘Danite’ lines and dynasties. The Russian Orthodox researcher Nikolai Kozlov (Andrei Alekseevich Schchedrin [11]) offered an important hint as to the fate of the ‘northern branch’: “From the time of the wanderings in the desert, the standard of the tribe of Dan occupied a northernmost position, as was remarked by the historical holy writer: “The standard of the camp of Dan shall be on the north side by their armies” (Numbers 2:25). According to one historical hypothesis or hunch that is confirmed by the classical scientific silence that surrounds all more or less important…mysteries, one of the princes of the tribe of Dan was the ancestor of an ancient European royal dynasty and granted his name to those lands that lie in Northern Europe and Scandinavia, thus receiving the name Dania or Denmark, the land of Dan. It is thought, that the name of the legendary king Dan the Proud is also borne by the inhabitants of the land of Dania: the Danes. One of the descendants of Dan the Proud, Skjold Scefing, became the patriarch of the Scyldling line of Danish kings (Skjold meaning shield)…”

On the other hand, the southern branch of the tribe of Dan was taken captive by the Assyrians, as a result of which it settled around the Caspian Sea and in the Caucasus. Later, the southern Danites spread to the north and occupied the area around the Black Sea: these are the very same lands in which the Khazar Khaganate would later take shape. This subject is treated by T. V. Gracheva, who later indicates, that: “Thus, the tribe of Dan was at the source of the creation of the Khaganate; that is to say, Jews from that tribe who had abandoned the faith of their forefathers had become the leaders of the Khazars, even when this group still lived in tribal communities… The fact that the first wave of migration consisted of Danites also confirms the fact that the Khazars worshipped the serpent” [12]. The northern and southern branches were in a sense called (by whom is another question) to step on the road of future history.

Rus (and later Russia) is the direct heir of Hyperborea, the ‘land of kings’; Britain is the heir of Atlantis, the ‘land of the covenant (brith)’. There can be no coincidences in language: after all, it is, according to Martin Heidegger, the House of Being.

Translator’s notes:

[1]: translation mine; there are currently no complete translations of the Doom Book in modern English available.

[2]: evolist’s LiveJournal (in Russian) can be found here.

[3]: T. V. Gracheva: Невидимая Хазария : Алгоритмы геополитики и стратегии войн мировой закулисы (The Unseen Khazaria: The Algorithms of Geopolitics and The War Strategies of the Global Backroom) (Ryazan 2011: Zyorna-Slovo), p. 192.  

[4]: This and all further biblical quotations are drawn from the King James Version. “And I heard the number of them which were sealed: and there were sealed an hundred and forty and four thousand of all the tribes of the children of Israel.”

[5]: Translation drawn from Eugenia Scarvelis Constantinoi; Andrew of Caesarea and the Apocalypse in the Ancient Church of the East part 2: Translation of the Apocalypse Commentary of Andrew of Caesarea (Quebec 2008: Faculté de théologie et des sciences religieuses, Université Laval) p.91.

[6]: “Of the tribe of Juda were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Reuben were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Gad were sealed twelve thousand. f the tribe of Aser were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Nephthalim were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Manasses were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Simeon were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Levi were sealed twelve thousand. Of the tribe of Issachar were sealed twelve thousand.”

[7]: Translation drawn from The Writings of Irenaeus (Vol. II) (part of the Anti-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, edited by the Rev. Alexander Roberts, D.D. and James Donaldson, L.L.D.) (Edinburgh 1871: T. &. T. Clark), p. 137.

[8]: A naga is a supernatural being in Buddhism, Hinduism, and several other religions of Asia. They usually take the form of a great snake or a dragon.

[9]: Translation drawn from Fifty Spiritual Homilies of St. Macarius the Egyptian (translated by A. J. Mason, D.D. (New York 1921: The Macmillan Company) p.149. The text can be found here.

[10] This is most likely a reference to the myth of Saint George and the Dragon. The relevant Russian phrase used by Karpets literally translates as “the dragon below one’s own mind”, whereas modern English commentaries on the myth use the phrase “the dragon of the abyss.” 

[11]: Andrei Alekseevich Schchedrin (1954) is an Orthodox researcher and political activist. He was active in several monarchist organisations until eventually coming to lead a traditionalist oprichnik brotherhood from the village of Kaschcheevo.

[12]: Невидимая Хазария , p. 188.  

China and Multipolarity

Author: Leonid Savin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

The following is an excerpt from a forthcoming book…


Contemporary Chinese political scientists derive their doctrine of multipolarity from the Cold War era, and in particular the five principles of peaceful coexistence which formed the basis of the 1954 treaty with India. These five principles are:

1.     Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;

2.     Non-aggression;

3.     Non-interference in internal affairs;

4.     Equality and mutual benefit;

5.     Peaceful coexistence.

China began actively participating in the development of the multipolar strategy under discussion today more than 30 years ago, for which there exists a specific Chinese term, duojihua – 多极化, meaning multipolarity or “multipolarism.”[1]

      In an article from early 1986 entitled “Prospects for the international situation”[2], Deng Xiaoping’s national security advisor, Huan Xiang, who also boasted experience in diplomatic service abroad and cooperation with Shanghai academic circles, indicated that insofar as the Cold War conflict had become relatively stable, the world’s superpowers were effectively losing the ability to control their own camps, hence the beginning of political multipolarity. The first step in this direction was the emergence of the strategic USSR-USA-China triangle following which, in the author’s opinion, a quintipolar world would appear including Japan and Europe.

         Two years before this article’s publication, Huan Xiang noted in 1984 that: “The old world order has already disintegrated and the new world order is now taking shape, but up to now it still has not yet completely formed.. U.S. domination of the Asia-Pacific will end … Japan knows what role it should take, but it still hesitates… China must go through a long period of hard work . . . 30 to 50 years time will make it truly powerful.”[3] Huan also pointed to what the confrontation between the USSR and USA was leading to: “The two largest military powers are weakening and declining . . . militarily they are developing in the direction of multipolarization . . . if the Star Wars plan develops, multipolarization could develop toward bipolarization, and could again return to bipolarization. If secondary ranked countries want to carry out a Star Wars plan, it will be very difficult. The position of those countries will immediately decline.[4]

         In January 1986, however, any uncertainty regarding the future structure of the world evaporated[5] and its transformation and transition acquired clear traits and stages. In Huan Xiang’s words: “Future international politics and economics are facing a new period.”[6] By 1986, Huan Xiang was no longer alone in his forecasts. Another author published an article in China’s National Defense University’s journal entitled “The development of global strategic multipolarity.”[7] After some time, multipolarity was already regarded as the trend of the 21st century.[8]

         It bears noting, however, that this concept of multipolarity eventually came to be met with opponents, albeit not immediately. In 1997, senior analyst for the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yang Dazhou, published an article entitled “My opinion on the global structure after the Cold War” which subjected the traditional Chinese view on multipolarity to thorough, detailed criticism.[9] The article’s main arguments consisted of the following theses:

–     The United States will maintain its superpower status for at least three decades.

–     The United States will maintain its alliances with Japan and Germany.

–     In the next two to three decades, there will be no period of “uncertainty.”

–     There will be no extended transition period from this trend towards multipolarity.

–     There already exists a “pluralist” global structure of “one superpower and four powers.”

–     Only the United States is a genuine “pole” capable of resolving key issues in any region, as exemplified in the case of the Dayton Accords. “The United States plays a leading role which no other nation can replace…it is the only country which is a ‘pole.’”

–     China “does not possess sufficient qualification to be a ‘pole.’”

–     For more than 20 years, no other nations, including Third World countries, will become major powers capable of challenging the five strongest. Thus, the phrase which many analysts adhere two of “one super, the rest strong” is actually inappropriate.

–     It is unlikely that large local wars will break out between nations.

Of course, these theses drew criticism first and foremost from conservative Chinese circles, such as the military. The editor of the National Defense University’s journal, International Strategic Studies, subsequently decided that an article by General Huang Zhenji would be suitable as a response despite the fact that it was rather sharp in tone and “unusual” in style.[10] General Huang mentioned excerpts of Yang’s article without directly quoting it and confirmed the original point of view on each of these points:

–     The US’ decline is inevitable and underway.

–     The US’ global influence is already severely restricted.

–     Quintipolar multipolarity is inevitable, especially in terms of the growing tensions between the United States, Japan, and Germany (as was evidenced by fresh meetings of the highest level between the European Union and Asia which excluded the declining United States).

–     The emergence of the “Third World” has changed global politics and will contain the United States.

–     Local wars are certain even though “peace and development” will be the main trend in the “uncertain” transitional period of coming decades.

Here it is also necessary to note how the Chinese have understood the global political order of the past two centuries while taking into account the fact that the country was effectively a colony and under occupation until only the second half of the 20th century. China’s authorities believe that global politics is a system or “strategic pattern”, among which they distinguish five different pattern periods:

1.     The Vienna System: 1815-1870;

2.     The Transitional System marked by Germany and Italy’s unification and the Meiji reforms;

3.     The Versailles System: 1920-1945;

4.     The Yalta System: 1945-1989;

5.     Transition period…

As can be seen, such an approach shares common elements with Braudel and other authors’ concepts. However, there are some differences, namely, minor differentiations which allow us to draw conclusions on the different criteria for evaluating the global system that are peculiar to the Asian (non-Western) type of thinking.

By the end of the 1990’s, three approaches to future multipolarity had been developed in China. Xi Runchang from China’s Academy of Social Sciences who, like Yang Dazhou, said that there will be “one superpower and four strong powers”, suggested that this pattern represents the new global structure: “Currently there has already basically formed a new embryonic structure supported by the five powers . . . in the 21st century, this new structure will further form and be perfected.[11]

         Yan Xuetong from the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Studies presented a second scenario known as the “theory of the completion of the main project of multipolarity.” Yan argues that the “The basic establishment of the great nations’ strategic relations in 1996 caused the post-Cold War transition from a bipolar structure to a one super many strong structure to be completed.[12]

          Song Baoxian and Yu Xiaoqiu’s works from the same institute suppose a third scenario closer to that envisioned by Huang Zhenji and the conservative camp in which “multipolarity is formed” and other countries besides the five strongest only become stronger. They argue that “the development of trends of multipolarity is accelerating” and “a new group of powers is arising” which will play “the role of restricting the five main powers” thus making the trend of multipolarity as the global structure more attractive and diverse.[13]

         In 1997, another senior analyst at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Li Zhongcheng, summated these three differing views on the future global structure put forth by the institute and Academy of Social Science’s analysts. Li does not criticize any of the authors, whose ideas he merely presents, but his own expressed views are evidently closer to the third purported scenario.[14]

         Yan Xuetong from the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Studies became the one who genuinely attempted to develop an alternative approach to questions of multipolarity, as when he wrote: “The new international structure has some special characteristics, the most important of which is the replacement of ‘poles'(ji) by ‘units’ (yuan). The nature of ‘poles’ is long-term stable confrontation, but the nature of ‘units’ is that the dominant position of key countries is determined by the nature of specific affairs.”[15]

         These distinctions deviated from the conservative line. For example, a large part of Yang Dazhou’s article centered on challenging this point of view by means of the tactic of establishing and clarifying definitions for such key words and phrases as “pole”, “transition era”, “pluralization” (duoyuanhua), “multipolarization” (duojihua), “large nation” (daguo), and “power” (qiangguo). Dazhou defined a “pole” as something founded on the standards of the Cold War era when the only poles were the United States and Soviet Union. Accordingly, the “four strong powers” are not poles because “when compared to the Soviet Union, there still is a great distance.”[16]

         In a similar vein, in his argument against those who claimed that the world is in a transition era set to continue for an indefinite period of time, Yang argues that any transition is by definition not uncertain: “Some people believe that the post-Cold War transition period could continue for 20, even 30 years. This type of argument is not appropriate; a ‘transition period’ always has an ending time. Suppose the ‘transition period’ goes on for 20 or 30 years, then this itself already constitutes a new structure different from that of the Cold War period.”[17]

         Overall, Chinese analysts have argued that China should not be purely passive, but can and even should aid the inauguration of the multipolar trend and accelerate its tempo.

For example, China is purported to be in a position to help Europe become a pole. One Chinese author has claimed that the EU wants to play a more important international role as a “powerful, independent pole” in the unfolding multipolar world, and thus is “seeking to at the same time strengthen its ties with the world’s major powers”, hence the release of the important political document, “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China” in March 1997. The Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Studies’ Feng Zhongping calls this “strategic partnership.” In Feng’s opinion, these new relations with China will “help the EU in its long quest to establish itself on the world stage and become and independent ‘pole’ in global affairs.” The basis for the EU possibly becoming such a “pole” is explained by “China’s status in the unfolding global balance of power.”[18]

         A similar argument was advanced by Shen Yihui, who claimed that the “EU should count on China’s support” because “the establishment of closer ties with China will allow Western Europe to play a greater role in international affairs.” Shen adds that China can not only help the EU gain authority in world affairs, but also that improved relations between China and the EU could help the latter in other problems.” In economic terms, he argues, “the Chinese market is needed to catalyze economic growth in Europe.” Even in the sphere of security, “China can be used to create a fortnight security zone around the EU.”[19]

         Subsequent years have shown that Beijing has been met with certain resistance despite the fact that China has partially penetrated Europe’s market. It should also be noted that current Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, highlighted the concept of multipolarity, economic globalization, and the development of science and technology as the fundamental global trends of the era.


[1] John Lee, “An Exceptional Obsession”, The American Interest,  May/June 2010,

[2] Huan Xiang, “Zhanwang 1986 nian guoji xingshi” (Prospects for the 1986 international situation), in Huan Xiang wenji (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994): 1291. Originally published in Liaowang, no. 1 (1986).

[3] Huan Xiang, “Yatai diqu xingshi he Mei-Su de zhengduo zhanlue” (The situation in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S.-Soviet rivalry strategy), in Huan Xiang wenji, 1115. This article originally appeared in Guoji zhanwang (International Outlook), no. 14 (1984).

[4] Huan Xiang, “Xin jishu geming dui junshi de yingxiang” (The influence of the new technological revolution on military affairs), in Huan Xiang wenji (The collected works of Huan Xiang)(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 2: 1263. This article was originally published in Liberation Army Daily, June 7 and June 14, 1985.

[5] It cannot be ruled out that this Chinese author’s opinion was influenced by the shift in the USSR’s political course. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of CPSU and subsequently launched Perestroika.

[6] Huan Xiang, “Wo guo ‘qiwu’ qijian mianlin guoji zhengzhi jingji huanjing de fenxi” (An analysis of the international political and economic environment that China is facing during its seventh five-year plan), in Huan Xiang wenji (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994): 1300.

[7] Gao Heng, “Shijie zhanlue geju zhengxiang duojihua fazhan” (Development of global strategic multipolarity), Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defense University Journal), no. 2 (1986): 32-33.

[8] Luo Renshi, “Strategic Structure, Contradictions and the New World Order,” International Strategic Studies 19, no.1 (March 1991): 1-6.

[9] Yang Dazhou, “Dui lengzhan hou shijie geju zhi wo jian”, Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development) 60, no. 2 (June 1997): 41-45.

[10] Huang Zhengji, “Shijie duojihua qushi buke kangju” (The inevitable trend toward multipolarity), Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no. 4 (October 1997): 1-3.

[11] Xi Runchang, “Shijie zhengzhi xin geju de chuxing ji qi qianjing” (The embryonic form of the world’s new political structure and its prospects), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development), no. 1 (1997), cited in Li Zhongcheng, Kua shiji de shijie zhengzhi (Trans century world politics) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997): 29.

[12] Yan Xuetong, “1996-1997 nian guoji xingshi yu Zhonguo duiwai guanxi baogao” (A report on the 1996-1997 international situation and China’s foreign relations), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), supplementary issue (1996-1997), cited in Li Zhongcheng, Kua shiji de shijie zhengzhi, 31.

[13] Song Baoxian and Yu Xiaoqiu, “Shijie duojihua qushi jishu fazhan” (The world’s multipolarity trend continues to develop), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), December 28, 1994, cited in Li Zhongcheng, Kua shiji de shijie zhengzhi , 32.

[14] Wu Hua, Shen Weili, and Zhen Hongtao, Nan Ya zhi shi–Indu (The lion of South Asia–India) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997): 2.

[15] Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (Analysis of China’s national interests) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996): 55.

[16] Yang Dazhoug, “Dui lengzhan hou shijie geju zhi wo jian,” 43.

[17] Ibid, 42.

[18] Feng Zhongping, “An Analysis of the China Policy of the European Union,” Contemporary International Relations 8, no. 4 (April 1988): 1-6. Feng was Deputy Director of the Division for Western European Studies at CICIR.

[19] Shen Yihui, “Cross-Century European-Chinese Relations,” Liaowang, no. 14 (April 6, 1998): 40-41, in FBIS-CHI-98-114, April 24, 1998. For an additional article discussing improving Sino-EU relations see Wang Xingqiao, “A Positive Step Taken by the European Union to Promote Relations with China,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, July 1, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-191, July 10, 1998.

Breaks and Ties

Author: Georges Vasilievich Florovsky

Translator: Yulian Orlov

Source: Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: an Affirmation of the Eurasians (Sofia 1921), accessible in Russian here. 

Why? saith the Lord of hosts. Because of mine house that is waste, and ye run every man unto his own house.
Haggai 1:10.

Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin–; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written.
Exodus 32: 32. [1]

For many long years, ‘revolution’ has been the Russian ideal. The image of the ‘revolutionary’ has appeared to the social consciousness to be the highest kind of patriot who combines within himself eminence of intention, love for the people, the destitute, and the suffering, and a readiness towards oblational self-sacrifice on the altar of common happiness. However different the contents that different men put into these concepts may have been (from the monarchic to the anarchic), all versions have been similar to each other in one respect: in the faith that, be it through organised civil society, the good sense of the people, or by the selfless courage of ‘those dying for the great cause of love’, they had the strength to and, by way of exerting their will, they could break the ties of the social and political evil that had ensnared Russia and establish the highest and most perfect form of social-cultural life. In this faith in themselves, in the glorious essence of their inner being, in the true goodness of their internal constitution concurred all men, from inveterate Zimmerwaldians [2] to rabid reactionaries. They thought that it was necessary and sufficient to put on a mask and change into costume a l’européenne; others thought it enough to tear off the Western clothes they had so quickly put on, while yet others sought recourse in a restructuring of classes. There were debates about what the true people were; however, almost everyone was a ‘narodnik’ [3] deep down: all believed in the messianic calling of the entire people or some part of it. Gorky’s ‘prayer’ was close to them all to a greater or lesser degree: “…and I saw her master, the all-powerful, immortal people and I prayed: There shall be no God but thou, for thou art the one God, the creator of miracles.” [4]

It is in this sentiment that we entered and ‘accepted’ the war, placing it in the magnanimous scope of Utopian, ‘progressive’ humanism. Misanthropy and fratricide were seen under the mark of the “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people”; the mysterious contradictory nature of the task (buying and securing a thousand lives at the price of a thousand murders and a thousand deaths) was hidden with hypnotising words about this war being “the last”, a “war for peace”, for “universal disarmament, internal overcoming, the self-exhaustion of belligerence”.

The sharpness of the moral tearing that must be passed by all those who pick up the sword was softened by the transfer of pathos to the straightforwardness of formal duty to the fatherland and one’s tribesmen, to the good of humanity, and to civilisation. It was truly believed that “the cross and sword are one”, that for the revealing of the bestial elements of human life their enlightenment would magically arrive and that the war would be followed by the blessed time of “eternal peace”…  Men would make themselves perfect to such a degree that it would be possible to turn swords to plough-shares. It is for this alluring dream that men happily went off to kill and die…

In its [war’s] name, the ecstatic hymns of the “magnanimous and merciful” revolution sounded four years ago. When from beneath the ‘bloodless’ image, which was known from legend and dear from tradition, the demonic contours of the growing collapse started to brazenly make themselves manifest among the carbon-black and wandering wafts of incendiary catastrophe, when beneath the reddening smoke before our very eyes chaos was ”startled into action”, the uncomprehending societal mind started to speak of some form of errors or miscalculations, about prematurity, about tardiness, about the confusion of the idea, about the uncouthness of the masses, all the while not losing its faith in an easy and possible correction, and, as if it were seeking to defend itself, it concentrated its gaze on squabbles of daily life, on all kinds of crisis, from that of production to that of paper, all in order not to see the all-encompassing, terrible dash into bottomlessness, the rupture of body and soul.

There, where death and disease

Have been passed by the slashing gauge –
Disappear into space, disappear
Russia, my Russia… [5]

And Russia has disappeared… Not only has Russian “statehood” disappeared, not only our hereditary way of life: national unity has collapsed, all social fasteners have fallen away, and, as was the case with the Tower of Babylon of old, a mixing of the tongues has taken place within our consciousness. In the currents of this historical maelstrom has been drawn everything that Russia had become through the ages, everything She was when we first started loving Her, a “strange love” though it may have been.

Peering into the mouth of the “silent Russian sphinx”, which is covered with a wise smile, we suddenly, unexpectedly see the ghoulish image of an “enormous, disgusting beast, a-hundred maws and barking” [6], and, what is most horrifying, we recognise within it the concretion of our own, ancient, great-grandfathers’ hopes. The longer we stare at this terrible riddle, the clearer we feel that these old dreams have not yet lost their power over our souls as well, and that we still believe, or want to believe in a “successful conclusion”, in a “natural sequence of things”, in the creative power of lofty ideals.

In this great cataclysm, all fissures and crevices have opened, primordial breeds have been carried up the surface, the depths have been laid bare…  We have felt the bifurcation of the Russian national element… And we have seen Russia standing

at a crossroads,
neither daring to take up the sceptre of the Beast,
nor the light yoke of Christ [7]

And we have seen that we love Russia precisely for this two-facedness of hers, for her endlessness, in which two abysses, above and below, are joined. Atavistically enchanted by the straining of raging forces, we once again dream of strength and glory on an elemental scope… human strength and glory.

There is truth in the fact that the ‘disappeared’ Russia was stronger than the West, which persists until now; however, the truth of repudiation does not redeem the possible mendacity of affirmation. This is precisely the reverse of the pink optimism of the author of the “Theodicy” [8]:  they are all right in the fact of their affirmation and only err in their repudiations; only someone who believes in his omnipotence, in his inborn goodness, one for whom evil is an error and not a sin. Of course, no one ‘made’ the revolution, and no one is guilty of its horror and sorrow. It created itself, was irresistibly born as the result of the entire Russian historical process that preceded it. Everything in the revolution is irresistible, everything is marked with the seal of Judgement. However, what did it grow from: from the good, holy, eternal, sacred elemental forces of our people, from its ‘idea’, from the fact that “God thought about it in eternity”, or from a spiritual lie, a twisting that was put at the foundation of our historic existence by human will?… .

We will comprehend the past and become worthy of the future only when it does not become a sweet hope for us, but a duty, when hopes are reborn into a thirst for victory, when the thickened, almost apocalyptic atmosphere of our days pours streams of true religious pathos, of the ‘fear of God’ into our souls, when behind the collisions of finite human will with the blind occurrences of the ‘great Faceless Nothing’ we comprehend the Christian tragedy of internal bifurcation: I do not do the good that I wish to do, but the evil that I wish not to… When we understand that only

With the Lord Creator  
There is the eternal obliteration
of all earthly suffering…

We are not speaking of ‘repentance’. There has been a great deal of repentance in Russia, a very great deal, even to an excessive and exuberant degree. Repentance managed to become so habitual that it became a pose, a caricature, transforming into prideful self-deprecation, into the most exquisite and refined form of spiritual delusion [9].The computation and all-national confession of our own sins (as well as those of others at the same time) became not the laborious achievement of providential rebirth, but a stylised sentiment, and good deeds and worthy penitence were replaced by the over-exertion of a self-flagellating and self-comminating voice. We are now speaking not of the arithmetic of sin, but rather about the need to feel horror in the face of current events, feel the entire mystery of life that is splitting into two, to see through the reality of evil and temptation…  

“Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?” [10]. This is the question Dostoevsky posed to himself, and he shuddered in agony as he did not understand, did not accept this harsh world…

However, it is not by the tears of one tortured child, but by the hands of tears and blood that the “fabric of human destiny”, the fabric of the fate of Russia is founded and created. It is now being forged by bloodied hands, there, in emptied spaces… For years upon years we have lived in hatred, rage, a desire for vengeance, a desire for victory and punishment. Some kill. Others die. All hate. There are even those who dare to call their hatred “sacred”, who dare to speak of the “sweetness of hating one’s homeland”, as in the old days [11] … All kill: some with words, some with looks, some with swords. There is no love in anyone. There is no exit, as there is no desire for repentance. We are suffering. We even cry, bitterly and inconsolably. However, our tears are still those of an offended child, not the tears of a man who has stood face to face with his ‘second death’. We are confidently capable of justifying our lowest means with a ‘higher’ goal: we still hope all too stubbornly that pride will melt away entirely. The downfall of our ‘geographic fatherland’ is hiding the horror of the dying of human souls from us…  It is not terrible that men die, but rather that they cease to be human. There is only one exit from this horror and fear. Our hearts should burn not only for our ‘Great Russia’, but above all else for the cleansing of the darkened Russian soul. It is not in prideful guesswork, nor in prophesies, nor in the enjoyment of a flowing forth of national forces, nor in the contemplation of the superhuman strength and power of elementary popular forces, but in repentance created by tears, burning prayer, and providential forgiveness from Above that will we acquire the right to believe, hope, prophesy, and call out.

Sophia, 31 March 1921


Translator’s notes:

[1]: all translations of Bible quotations are drawn from the King James Version.

[2]: a reference to the Zimmerwald conference, which was held in Switzerland from 5 to 8 September in 1915. It marked the start of a split between reformist socialists and revolutionary socialists in the Second Internationale.

[3]: although this term can be translated as ‘populist’, the meaning is slightly different and does not necessarily indicate a supporter of ‘populist’ policies; rather, it very broadly means ‘someone who plaсes special importance on the Russian people (narod) and wants to either change or reinforce the Russian state through it’, with different sub-meanings depending on the characteristics of individuals or political movements.

[4]: the translation of this quote has been drawn from Maxim Gorky: Confession: A Novel, translated by Rose Strunsky (New York 1916: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers), accessible here.

[5]: the quotation is from a poem named Ash by the well-known symbolist poet and author Andrei Bely (1880 – 1934). The poem can be found in Russian here.

[6]: a quotation from the famous opening epigraph of the Russian liberal author and social critic Aleksandr Radischchev’s (1749 – 1802) work A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow.

[7]: this quotation is drawn from the poem Vengeance of the Sword (Месть мечная) by the symbolist poet and literary critic Vyacheslav Ivanov (1886 – 1949). The translation is mine. It can be found in Russian here.

[8]: the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646 – 1716). The Theodicy is available in English here.

[9]: the term used here, прелесть (prelest) is usually translated as spiritual delusion. It is a theological term that indicates a type of spiritual delusion that involves demonic influence, usually manifesting itself sensorially (for example, a Christian in a state of prelest might think that he sees an apparition of Christ while he actually sees a demon) and in thought.

[10]: a quote by the nihilist materialist Ivan Karamazov from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (1880). The translation has been drawn from Fyodor Dostoevsky; The Brothers Karamazov, translated by Constance Garnett (New York: The Lowell Press), p. 308; accessible here.

[11]: this is an infamous quote from the autobiographical work Apologia pro vita mea (Apology of My Life) by the Russian liberal political emigreé and author Vladimir Pecherin (1807 – 1885). The work can be found in Russian here.

The British Crown against Rus – Part II

Author: Vladimir Karpets

Translator: Yulian Orlov

Zavtra 36 (929), 7 September 2011

In the Orthodox Tradition, Jesus Christ (‘The King of the World and Saviour of our souls’) is called a ‘priest in the order of Melchizedek’. As the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, He also becomes a universal symbol (an archetype, to be more precise) of the Line of Kings. “The figure of the king symbolically depicts the figure of Christ, and thus acquires a kind of duality in its semantic content”, Aleksandr Ivanov writes in his work From Paganism to Christianity: On the Paths of the Last Austrasia: “On the one hand, the king is a part of the people. On the other hand, however, through the universality of his general imperial role, he ascends his own people and in a certain sense becomes a representative of the single proto-people that had not yet lost its link with the Creator in the entropic flow of being.”

The British Isles are located directly on the interstice northern polar world (although it has sunk and disappeared under the ice) and the Western oceanic world (even if it has disappeared under the waves). Two traditions: a continental, kingly one, and an Atlantic, priestly, judiciary one. From the very beginning, they have collided in that far-off land together with the surrounding islands, which together form, as it were, the Ocean’s bulwark against the Continent. On the basis of excavations, archaeology has come to the conclusion that the territory of Britain was settled by humans roughly between 10000 and 8000 b. C. The separation of the islands and the mainland (if we do not pay special attention to the myth of Atlantis) was (or coincided with) the beginning of the segregation of the “Atlantic tradition”. The ‘newcomers’ transition from a nomadic way of life to a settled one while the ‘Hyperboreans’ (who were initially settled) are forced to change their place of life (or ‘topogenesis’ [1]) only because of circumstances.

Beginning roughly from the fifth millennium B.C.  in a wide area ranging from modern Spain and Portugal to Bretagne, Ireland, England, Scotland, and Scandinavia, stone constructs (Newgrange in Ireland, Maeshowe in the Orkney Islands, and Brin-Kelly-Dee near Anglesey) that remain mysterious to us moderns begin to appear. Their distinguishing trait is an underground corridor, the ceiling, walls, and floors of which are covered with stone plates. This corridor leads into an underground cave upon which a burial mound has been built. Many megalithic stones (especially in Ireland) are decorated with drawings of an unknown meaning. In Martin Brennan’s book The Stars and the Stones, it is proven that several of these symbols are depicted with extreme precision in order for a ray of sunlight or moonlight to fall upon it at a certain moment of the year. Brennan also claims that the corridor leading into the subterranean chambers was partially oriented in such a way so that a ray of light could enter it at a certain day of the year. What happened in these structures?

Some years ago, it was thought to have been proven that the builders of the megaliths had moved to the North from a kind of Mediterranean “cradle of European civilisations”. However, recent studies have shown that the monuments on the European Atlantic coastline are significantly older than their apparent Mediterranean prototypes. Before our very eyes, theories that were earlier considered ‘exotic’ come to life, such as the hypothesis of J. Foster Forbes [2], an author who wrote several books on British history, among which is the book called The Unchronicled Past (1938), in which it said that “these stones were erected from the eight millennium B.C. onward; their builders were men from the West, or, to be more precise, the priests that had survived the catastrophe that struck Atlantis. They erected their grand constructs in order to establish and support social order.” The sacred construction works of the ‘aliens’ (newcomers) [3] took place on the sites of the Neolithic temples of the ‘autochthonous inhabitants’… In turn, the ‘aliens’ acquired the status of ‘deities’ and became the founders of the ruling dynasties as well as priests. For example, according to a legend found in the work of Geoffrey of Monmouth [4], the honour of the construction of Stonehenge belongs to the sorcerer Merlin. Despite common opinion, the site has nothing to do with the Celtic druids that appeared in Britain one and a half thousand years after its construction. The mythologems related to Arthur and Merlin have no direct relation to ‘Celticism’, as has been shown in particular by Laurence Gardner.

The Celts arrived in Britain about 600 B.C. According to all recent data, this group originated in the Mediterranean and Middle East. It is most likely that the invasion of the Celtic tribes was not a single moment at all, but rather had an extended character. Together with their language, the Celts brought their religion of druidism to Britain while still preserving many elements of the pre-Celtic mytho-religious constitution of the country. The druids (the Celtic priestly caste) served as a form of ‘connecting link’ between the various tribes. Their power was higher than that of any chieftain or king. The druidic calendar (like the calendar of the megalithic period) was founded on a combination of the lunar and solar cycles. The social structure of Celtic society was fundamentally theocratic and anti-monarchical, strongly reminiscent of the structure that is described in the Biblical Book of Judges.

The conquerors of Britain (the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes) had continental origins. The king had sacred functions that were accorded to the clergy in the ‘Celtic-Atlantic’ worldview. The eldest continental tradition places ‘monarchy’ above the ‘clergy’ and accords the ‘king-konung’ sacred functions. The continental pantheon was headed by Odin (Wotan, Wodan), the guardian of warbands, the god of wisdom, the ‘supreme shaman’, and the patron of initiation: later tradition associates Odin with the origins of the various Germanic royal houses.

In a certain sense, we can say that according to the primordial, Hyperborean tradition, Monarchy stood higher than the ‘clergy’ (or, to be more precise, that it encompasses the ‘clergy’). ‘Atlantism’, on the other hand, places the ‘Clergy’ (or ‘priests’) higher than ‘Monarchy’. A special role in the ‘Atlantic tradition’ is accorded to judicial power.  As far as the concrete question that we are examining is concerned, two mutually exclusive traditions lie at the foundation of ‘British identity’: the Atlantic (the initial tradition in Britain, but secondary in the larger picture) and the Continental (‘Hyperborean’), which is the general primordial tradition, but secondary for Britain.

The presence of these mutually exclusive traditions is the root of the fundamental duality of the British monarchy: on the one hand, it is indeed a monarchy comparable to its continental brethren; on the other, it is something totally different.

Departing from all that has been said, we must make mention of one important piece of information: René Guénon points out a most important circumstance: the ‘Jewish tradition’ (and, consequently, the ‘Abrahamic religions’) are the most important component of ‘Atlantism’:

“Since this last [the Atlantic tradition – transl.], on the other hand, is located in a region that corresponds to the evening in the diurnal cycle, it must be regarded as belonging to one of the last divisions of the cycle of present terrestrial humanity and therefore as relatively recent… Besides, just as the autumn of the year corresponds to evening in the day, one can see a direct allusion to the Atlantean world in the fact that the Hebraic tradition (whose name moreover betrays its Western origin) indicates that the world was created at the autumn equinox… And it seems also that the biblical deluge corresponds directly to the cataclysm in which Atlantis disappeared…  But what we wish to say is that, although the Atlantean cycle was taken as a foundation in the Hebrew tradition, it seems that the transition was either made by the mediation of the Egyptians – which at least has nothing improbable about it – or by altogether different means. If we make this last reservation, it is because it seems particularly difficult to determine how, after the disappearance of Atlantis, the current coming from the West was joined with another current coming from the North proceeding directly from the Primordial Tradition…” [5].

Actually, even the Bible itself indicates the ‘secondary nature’ of the ‘Abrahamic tradition’ several times, most importantly when the text speaks about the blessing Abraham receives from Melchizedek (Gen. 14: 18-20). The apostle Saint Paul indicates this in an entirely unambiguous fashion:

“1 For this Melchisedec, king of Salem, priest of the most high God, who met Abraham returning from the slaughter of the kings, and blessed him; 2 To whom also Abraham gave a tenth part of all; first being by interpretation King of righteousness, and after that also King of Salem, which is, King of peace; 3 Without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days, nor end of life; but made like unto the Son of God; abideth a priest continually. 4 Now consider how great this man was, unto whom even the patriarch Abraham gave the tenth of the spoils. 5 And verily they that are of the sons of Levi, who receive the office of the priesthood, have a commandment to take tithes of the people according to the law, that is, of their brethren, though they come out of the loins of Abraham: 6 But he whose descent is not counted from them received tithes of Abraham, and blessed him that had the promises. 7 And without all contradiction the less is blessed of the better” (Hebr., 7: 1–7) [6].

At the foundation of the ‘second tradition’ (the Atlanto-Abrahamic, the beneficiary of the ‘blessing of Melchizedek’ for a certain historical cycle) lies not the cyclical, calendarian  holism of death and Rebirth, but rather a “radically innovative mission” as Dugin calls it, in light of which the “theme of monarchy is combined with the subject of sin” [7].We are speaking of the relations of the “covenant” i.e., “agreement” (brith), a “contract” in a purely judicial (even ‘notarial’) sense. Therefore, we are dealing with a special judicial sacrality in which the relations between cause and effect are regulated not by unity, but by an ‘agreement’. This is not purely characteristic of ancient Israel, but through it also for the entirety of Western civilisation, for which the category of law as such is a form of religion.

The interaction between the Atlantic tradition and its most important component (the Mediterranean (Semitic) traditions) according to various hypotheses manifested through one of the most important of the ‘tribes of Israel’: the tribe of Dan. According to Jacob, “Dan shall judge his people, as one of the tribes of Israel. Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder in the path, that biteth the horse heels, so that his rider shall fall backward” (Gen. 49:16–17).

The very word dan means ‘judge’ in Biblical Hebrew, and all the main historical events related to the tribe of Dan take place in the Book of Judges, the very book that is juxtaposed with the Books of Kings (which to Israel are secondary and in a sense incidental, in contrast to Hyperborea and the East). In this sense, the Hebrew (‘hierarchic’, i.e. ‘priestly’) tradition and druidism essentially coincide up to such a point, that today as well precisely this union, or, to be more precise, amalgamation, forms the foundation of the entire ‘national idea’ of both England and the US. As far back as 1840, J. Wilson published the book Our Israelitish Origin, and many of his ideas would go on to (envisioned in an, of course, Protestant light, ‘liberated’ from the ‘pagan’, ‘pantheistic’ sides of druidism) form the foundations of so-called ‘dispensationalism’, which, in turn, would form the foundation for the ideology of the modern American ‘neoconservatives’ [8].

“As has happened with the other lost tribes, a not insignificant number of speculations about the fate of the descendants of Dan has appeared” — an entirely official source reads — There is a multitude of versions (cursive ours. — V. K.) that frequently seek evidence in linguistic similarities that connect the Danites with the Danes (cursive ours. — V. K.), Koreans, Japanese, or even American Indian tribes… (Information drawn from “Drevo: The Open Orthodox Encyclopaedia” – author).

Theories purporting to hold information about the “Koreans, Japanese, or even American Indian tribes” have, of course, a purely exotic character. However, the spread of the Danites through northern Europe is a fact that is openly acknowledged by almost all European and American historiography. In addition, the Old Testament places the tribe of Dan in the north (Numbers 2:25) [9]. In places, the Bible ‘lets slip’ that the Danites possessed maritime lands (Judges 5:17) [10] and had no inheritance among the tribes of Israel (Judges 18:1) [11]. Researchers connect this ancient race to the Atlanteans that spread over the entire globe.


Translator’s notes:

[1]: The Russian term used here (месторазвитие) denotes a fundamental Eurasianist concept that encompasses the relation between a people and the space it inhabits and includes not only the physical characteristics of a space, but also its cultural and historic traits. The term is usually translated as “place-development” or “topogenesis.” 

[2]: John Foster Forbes (1889 – 1958) was a British historian and esotericist who wrote four books on the ancient and paranormal history of the British Isles. He was a member of the Order of the Cross, a mystical fellowship. The influence of several members of the order drove Forbes to reach his eclectic range of subject matter that combines research on psychic phenomena, Atlantis, and pre-Roman antiquities, with UFOs becoming an additional subject of his work in the 1950s.  

[3]: Karpets puns on the terms алиен (derived from the English ‘alien’ with the meaning of ‘extra-terrestrial visitor’) and пришелец (which means ‘alien’ in the broader sense of ‘person from a foreign land’, as well as carrying the meaning of ‘newcomer’). A case could be made for translating the sentence as ‘the construction works of the ‘aliens’ (aliens)’, but, as the pun does not carry over into English well, a choice has been made in favour of translating пришельцы as ‘newcomers’.  

[4]: Geoffrey of Monmouth (c. 1095 – c. 1155) was an English cleric and chronicler. His History of the Kings of Britain attempted to forge a connection between the legendary Trojan hero Aeneas, King Arthur, and the then ruling British monarchs. Although the book was extremely influential in the Middle Ages and early modern period, modern historians see Monmouth’s work as a folk history with no basis in historical fact.

[5]: The translation of these quotes by Guénon has been drawn from pp. 24 to 26 of Traditional Forms and Cosmic Cycles (Sophia Perennis: Hillsdale NY 2004).

[6]: All quotations from the bible are drawn from the King James Version.

[7]: A. G. Dugin. Filosofiia politiki (Arktogeya: Moscow 2004), p. 207.

[8]: John Wilson (1799 – 1870) was a historian and one of the founders of the theory of British Israelism. His main work, Our Israelitish Origin: Lectures on Ancient Israel, and the Israelitish Origin of the Modern Nations of Europe (1840) is available here.  

[9]: “The standard of the camp of Dan shall be on the north side by their armies: and the captain of the children of Dan shall be Ahiezer the son of Ammishaddai.”

[10]: “Gilead abode beyond Jordan: and why did Dan remain in ships? Asher continued on the sea shore, and abode in his breaches.”

[11]: “In those days there was no king in Israel: and in those days the tribe of the Danites sought them an inheritance to dwell in; for unto that day all their inheritance had not fallen unto them among the tribes of Israel.”