Author: Alexander Dugin
Translator: Jafe Arnold
Written in 1992 for publication in the newspaper Den, but rejected for being too “intellectualist”; subsequently published in the book Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya (Moscow, 1994)
The Opposition and the System
In recent times, the delicate balance in the political and ideological opposition’s camp has begun to be disrupted by a burgeoning polemic between the “ethno-centrists” and “Eurasianists,” “reds” and “whites”, etc. On the one hand, this polemic has clarified the doctrinal principles of various tendencies, movements, and parties which before were too often vague and only unconsciously formulated. This is a positive aspect. On the other hand, this process is a sign of the opposition entering a scheme arranged by the System, i.e., its “conventionalization”, taming, and “castration” in sterile, parliamentary, and party “games.” It should be noted that this process of eliminating opposition not through repression, but through domestication, gradual corruption, and “sterilization” has been brilliantly worked out in the mondialist West. In the words of Jean Thiriart: “There are two ways to destroy a revolutionary ideology (particularly communism): bureaucracy and parliamentarism.”
It is rather telling that in developed mondialist societies, there is in fact no opposition which really challenges the very principles of the System. Both right and left are but elements of a deliberate and cunning play. Our opposition, however, which took shape following August 1991, is a genuine opposition embodying the profound opposition of certain segments of society not only to specific actions of the ruling group, but to the very foundational principles of the worldview that has triumphed in the country following the defeat of the coup.
The onset of such extensive polemics within the opposition could lead to its fragmentation and subsequent integration into political niches specially prepared for it by the regime itself. Hence why it is very important to here and now clarify the emerging differences in outlook within the opposition and surmise the logic of their potential development.
The beginning of the polemic: Eurasianists and ethno-centrists
The main line of the emerging division in the opposition runs between the “Eurasianists,” “statists”, and “national-communists” on the one hand and the “nationalists”, “Panslavists”, and “monarchists” on the other. The main criterion and central motive of this debate is the question of our approach to the state and ethnos. It is precisely this understanding that is dividing the opposition today, and not the question of attitudes towards communism, religion, Marxism, etc.
On both flanks there is an extreme right (including anti-Marxists, Orthodox, and fascists, etc.) and an extreme left (including former members of the party apparatus, communists, socialists, etc.). The Eurasianists and “statists” affirm the superiority of the State over the Ethnos. Their nationalism is openly imperial, supra-ethnic, and geopolitical in nature and is often coupled with the traditionally Russian, Orthodox, state-religious messianism of the God-bearing people. For this wing, the dismemberment of the USSR is an Absolute Evil, and the perpetrators of this atrocity are to clearly designated as national criminals with whom no constructive dialogue, conciliation, or compromise can be made. This is the “irreconcilable, radical opposition” which boasts strong political determination to fight the System to the very end. In this struggle, the Eurasianists are ready to ally with any religious, national, and geopolitical forces in both East and West that can help in the fight against mondialism and contribute to the re-establishment of the Empire. Speaking in geopolitical terms, the “statists” consider mondialism and the thalassocratic USA to be the main enemy.
The “Slavophile nationalists”, for their part, assert the primacy of the ethnic factor. Such nationalism is limited to either the Great Russian ethnos or to advocating a pan-Slavic union. This camp harbors two poles: the pole of “ethnic minimalism” embodied in the projects of the St. Petersburg-based ROD organization which proposes to establish a mono-ethnic Great Russian state, and the “ethnic maximalist” pole which at times even proposes to restore the USSR, but only in the context and over the course of Russian national military and economic expansion into the breakaway republics (for example, under the pretext of defending the Russian population). The Slavophile nationalists do not rule out the possibility of dialogue and cooperation with the government under the condition that the influence of open and odious Russophobes and non-Russian peoples is restricted. In all cases, for them the main enemy is other peoples, Jews, etc. For them, geopolitical factors are of secondary and purely practical value.
Both poles of the opposition have a number of fundamental claims against one another which are easily distinguishable. The ethno-centrists accuse the Eurasianists of:
- betraying the interests of the “Russian ethnos” by agreeing to cooperate with other peoples (especially Turkic peoples and sometimes Europeans);
- betraying the interests of Orthodoxy by cooperating with anti-globalist Islam and European Catholic, Protestant, or pagan national revolutionary movements;
- betraying the Russian Monarchy by extending a hand of cooperation to national-communists (who are alleged to be responsible for the October coup and the destruction of the Tsarist regime);
- betraying the unique folk character (Narodnost) of the Russian people by appealing to esoteric teachings and initiatory practices (which are unequivocally associated with “masonry”);
- allowing for elements of socialism in the economic system of the future Empire (which is supposed evidence of a certain continuity with communist theories);
- claiming their ideology to be superior within the entire opposition on the basis of its openness, universality, and globalism (which detracts from the position of pure “nationalists”);
- finally, betraying Conservatism by adopting ideas of technological development, social construction, and state futurism (which contradict national archaic tendencies).
The Eurasianists, in turn, have also presented a number of claims against the ethno-centrists. They accuse the latter of:
- aiding the collapse of the USSR by demanding sovereignty for Russia and the establishment of the foundations of statehood within the RSFSR (which only played into the hands of the democrats and mondialists);
- provoking tensions surrounding the Russian population in the republics (since restricting the Russian nation to a narrow ethnic framework cannot but lead to alienating them from the other peoples of the empire);
- depriving the patriotic movement of geopolitical awareness of the American strategy to conquer Eurasia (an aspect which the Americans take advantage of in extending their hands to those regions which the Russians leave unattended upon deciding to “focus on their own problems”);
- diminishing the “universal”, “imperial”, and “messianic” nationalism of Russians to the level of purely ethnic borders (thus rendering Russian nationalism powerless, passive, and incapable of realizing its state mission);
- conformist engagement in dialogue with the anti-national, mondialist, and pro-American Russian government whenever it makes hypocritical gestures towards Russian traditions (archaic and innocuous national-religious folklore);
- idiotizing Russian traditions in advocating for the restoration of archaic and lurid aspects of pre-revolutionary Russia and renouncing the technological, strategic, and industrial achievements of the Soviet period;
- too often advocating private property (national capitalism), which contradicts Russia’s social traditions;
- finally, for being the main initiators of the split in the opposition by virtue of refusing the alliance consistently offered to them by the Eurasianists in line with the openness and pragmatism of their ideology which sets reconquering the State and restoring the Empire as its main goals.
Who are the Bolsheviks? Who are the Mensheviks?
Such are the fundamental motives of the growing disputes among the opposition which can hardly be stopped at the level of authoritative leaders calling for harmony and unity and offering admonition and personal sympathies. On this issue, however, these contradictions are fundamental in nature and can be circumstantially compared to the dispute between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Eurasianists are the Bolsheviks who refuse to compromise with the corrupt mondialist goverment, stoop down to parliamentary demagoguery, pursue conciliation with the system, and who do not intend to opt for limited and ambiguous compromises. The ethno-centrists are the Mensheviks who are content with limiting themselves to pursuing gradual reforms on the national level and abandoning the planetary National Revolution for the sake of small concessions from the mondialists who are willing to present Russians with a folklorish “national being” in Eurasian reserves.
In addition, it is an extremely important fact that the Eurasianist camp is engaged in a process of ideological creativity which is resulting in the formation of new concepts, such as “Slavophile futurism” and the great idea of the “Eurasian Empire” which in the future will be capable of not only recovering Russia’s lost geopolitical might, but also becoming a center of anti-mondialist doctrine suitable for giving impulse to the planet-wide process of ideological and geopolitical liberation from American bankocratic domination. This ideology is offensive, aggressive, and universally applicable – in both Europe and the Third World.
The “nationalists” are only focused on passive, defensive resistance. They look backwards with passionate nostalgia and sentimental longing for the past. They are loyal not so much to the spirit and essence of the Russian Tradition as to its external forms. Yet the mono-ethnic model of Russia is without a doubt an entirely “modernist” idea, as nothing of the sort has ever existed in Russian in all of her history.
However, it would be wrong to associate the “Bolsheviks” of the opposition (the Eurasianists) with “modernism” and the “Mensheviks” with “archaism.” In fact, both poles contain both modern and traditional elements, albeit only combined in different ways. The imperial orientation, openness towards non-Russian ethnoi, elitehood, and community-based economic traditions make up the deeply traditional aspects of the Eurasianists’ side. Yet the Eurasianists are modernists in terms of industrial, technological, and military-industrial projects and in supporting the establishment of global information systems and modern communications systems. The pure “nationalists” are modernists in their “mono-ethnicism”, their dislike for elites (which is evidence of individualism and egalitarianism), and in their sympathies towards national capital. On the other hand, their rejection of industrialism and technological development is a purely archaic feature.
Are we already that different?
One particularity of this division should be emphasized, namely, that the Eurasianist wing of the opposition is potentially ready for dialogue and cooperation with the ethno-centrists. After all, the Eurasianists largely share the feelings of “ethnic nationalists” on the emotional level, but they refrain from taking such to the level of a doctrinal, ideological principle. The “national reaction” of the Eurasianists is mediated and deferred. For example, although they might experience the exact same dislike for the mafia-capital Caucasians as the ethno-centrists, the Eurasianists nonetheless refrain from escalating this aversion to a political category. While sympathizing and empathizing with those Russians who have found themselves outside of Russia’s borders, they do not blame the indigenous, non-Russian populations of these republics. Rather, in remembering the reason for this state of affairs, they blame the puppets of the Americans who have seized power in Russia itself for such treason.
Similarly, while being overwhelmingly Orthodox, the Eurasianists do not insist on proselytism (which is in fact entirely alien to the Russian Church) and instead seek strategic alliance with all anti-mondialist forces in Eurasia regardless of their religious affiliation (while at the same time taking into consideration the metaphysical specificities of different religious by virtue of which, for example, fatalistic and anti-individualist Islam is typologically closer to Russian Orthodoxy than the Anglo-Saxon, individualist, and subversive Protestant pseudo-Christianity of showmen preachers).
Thus, the “Eurasianist Bolsheviks” stand for unity of the opposition. On the inside, they understand their ethno-centrist opponents, but remain convinced that ethno-centric projects are hopeless and ineffective. Nor are the Eurasianists characterized by such “patriotic spy-mania” in which “agents of Judeo-Masonic influence” are seen everywhere. In fact, it is only those most radical ethno-centrists who refuse to enter into dialogue with the Eurasianist statists, who conform with the anti-people, anti-Russian government, that should be suspect of belonging to the Atlanticist lobby, since a radical rejection of the foundations of Eurasianist geopolitics solely benefits the US’ agents of influence whose main task is weakening and subjugating the Eurasian continental powers at any costs.
Splits benefit the enemy
In summating our remarks, the following point must be expressed: If the opposition were to finally split into “Bolsheviks” and “Mensheviks”, then its internal structure would be violated and its “implacability” and “radicality” would be lost. The ethno-centrist flank would most likely be integrated into the System in the role of a harmless, folklorish “party of reserves” and the slogan “Russia for Russians” would proceed to destroy the last remnants of statehood, alienating other peoples and provoking further separatism within the Russian Federation. Left alone, the Eurasianists would be considerably marginalized and it would be much easier for the System to finally kill them off. The “Bolshevik” wing of the opposition could furthermore be finally weakened by a new showdown, such as one between “communists” and the “right” or “socialists” and “fascists”, etc. In any case, we must anticipate the future outcome of such ideological and political disputes.
It is unlikely that this polemic, which is already picking up, can be avoided. Nevertheless, already today must we realize what it is inevitably leading to and seek not simple party compromise, but genuine ideological synthesis. It is absolutely obvious that the Eurasianists’ openness and their organic solidarity with ethno-centrists yields grounds for this possibility. As long as a showdown is inevitable, we should try to transform such into a constructive, creative process as a result of which the opposition and all patriots will strengthen their ranks and try to distinguish those ideological elements that are interested in quarrels, squabbles, and weakening our whole camp, pushing it towards either conformism or suicide by extremism.
The ideology of victory
The possibility of a true ideological synthesis which could perfectly unite the “Bolsheviks” and “Mensheviks”, “nationalists” and “Eurasianists”, and “national-communists”, “national-democrats”, and “ethno-centricists” is already in view. On the level of geopolitics, the opposition’s ideal should be a powerful and supranational continental Empire that is sovereign on the political, strategic, and economic levels. At the level of domestic national policy, the opposition’s ideal should be the full restoration of national justice for the Russian people which has been oppressed and trampled over long decades of an anti-Russian ideology. This in particular means a radical struggle to the last breath against the Russophobic rabble which has now seized power in the country. On the level of social policy, the opposition should insist on the restoration of social justice and on the state and society caring for each of its members and providing economic guarantees to each and every one of the Great Power’s citizens. Moreover, in the future the country’s economic system might satisfy both national-communists (with public and state ownership of key industries) as well as the advocates of national-capitalism (with private ownership for small and medium enterprises, the promotion of private productive initiatives in industry and agriculture, etc.). The tyranny of international finance capital will be put to an end immediately after the opposition comes to power. However, all spheres of cooperation with foreign industrial enterprises that are beneficial for our state and nation will be developed. All of the opposition’s members should participate in this ideological synthesis, while the only ones excluded from this process should be those who themselves want to exclude others from this all-national process and claim to be in sole possession of the truth in the final instance.
The seriousness of the situation in which the opposition finds itself today and the historic importance of our time is so great that any such stubborn criticism, denial, exclusion, pseudo-prophetism, and sectarianism – in a word, Menshevism – should be seen as “subversive activities” against Russia, the State, and the Nation. Let us not fool ourselves, for what we are living through today is a REVOLUTION. And this means that “revolution-time” and wartime laws hereby enter into force. Our words, our statements, and our articles are no longer private, individual opinions or literary, publicist polemics. We will now have to be seriously accountable for every single written and published phrase.