Eurasia and Eurasianism in the 21st Century: Security, Identity, and Alliance Culture

Authors: Konstantin Kurylev, Sergey Bazavluk, Leonid Savin, Vladimir Yurtaev

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Originally published in the journal Informatsionnye voyny [Information Wars] 3:51 (2019), pp. 47-51.


The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has a history going back much further than that of the Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), and bears potential exceeding the geographical boundaries of the union itself. The EAEU is indirectly connected to the history of Eurasianism and, since the joint Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS summit held in Ufa in 2015, has gained additional vectors, such as linking up with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative as well as the activities of the SCO encompassing countries of both Central and South Asia. This points to three interrelated factors: the role of alliances, their identities, and security regimes in the broadest sense of the term. In this article, the authors attempt to analyze these factors concerning the EAEU and, more broadly, the SCO as a similar structure operating in Eurasia. A descriptive methodology and interdisciplinary approach are employed, and an attempt is made to yield geopolitical foresight (forecast) with regards to several scenarios.

The process of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union, besides questions of trade regulation, the adaptation of national legislations, and the forging of favorable conditions for the development and growth of participating countries’ economies, inevitably involves questions of ideology and security. The EAEU project itself implies a supra-state identity which is in need of ideological conceptualization and substance. Insofar as, since the collapse of the USSR, all of its former republics have to one degree or another begun to engage in the development of their own national ideologies and politics of identity, any supra-state superstructure will need, in the very least, to re-conceptualize national projects and include them into a broader agenda. A more detailed and systematic approach necessitates the construction of a complex, adaptive architecture linking ethno-national factors, regional security, geo-economic challenges, and inclusive political methods. In technical terms (and in line with one of the principles of the integration strategy of the European Union towards new members) we can speak of the presence of multiple referential layers of integration and of the possibility of enacting varying paces.

The scope of such a study inevitably points towards the geopolitical context and geopolitical dynamics of regional processes. If from the standpoint of classical geopolitics the EAEU embodies the Heartland of Eurasia, which implies adhering to the strategy of land power and, as follows, confronting the challenge of sea power, then through the prism of critical geopolitics this binary opposition is rendered secondary, and instruments of power transcend borders. Unlike classical geopolitics, critical geopolitics pays greater attention to the “lower” levels of power rather than macro- or global economic processes. Critical geopolitics emphasizes not so much the sources and structures of power as the everyday practices of realizing power relations and the mental models which ensure them. Alongside political geography, critical geopolitics posits that spatiality is not limited to territoriality. State power is not wielded only within the territory of a state.[1] 

Such a posing of the question allows for a more flexible approach to projecting inter-state and supra-state projects without depreciating the significance of national sovereignties. In the post-Soviet space, there are two interconnected functioning projects, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the first of which emphasizes economic development, while the second is associated with questions of regional security. However, upon more detailed consideration, the development of the Eurasian integration project – even if exclusively of an economic trajectory – cannot be realized in isolation from security issues.

As pointed out by Professor A.D. Ursul, “security, in its most general form, is a means of preserving a given object in the face of different types of internal and external negative influences…The point of ensuring security lies in preserving an object in a form in which it can continue to exist and develop.”[2]  In previous time, security has been discerned according to rather limited criteria, in which the emphasis was put on the political, social, or ideological dimensions. A certain trend also focused on security in the face of man-made catastrophes and the surrounding environment. Only later did it become clear that, alongside ecological security, it is important to include other characteristics of the real process of development, such as the economic, political, legal, demographic, and informational dimensions, etc.[3] These postulates are also appropriate for the EAEU. Yet disputes are arising over what should be of priority: the economic aspects of integration, or political structure. Nominally, given the name of the union, economics should predominate. However, economics is an instrument for the pursuance of the economy (khoziaistva) of society. In a state, politics is primary before economics, insofar as the very existence of the state depends on such. Certain economic criteria can be set as goals of the state and reflect the ethical code of the people. From Russia’s position, the economic aspect will always be a secondary element.

It has been noted that “Russia’s strategic goal should be the economic and military-political integration of the post-Soviet space.”[4] The EAEU has a special function to fulfill to this end: “Eurasian integration presents Russia with the opportunity to return to ‘superpower status’, one which will not belong to Russia single-handedly, but as one (albeit the largest) element within the construction of the Eurasian space.”[5]

Insofar as the EAEU is an open project, the question of the interests of potential new members is fully, naturally logical. In the opinion of Professor A.I. Smirnov, interest in joining the EAEU will be tied to geopolitical expediency, while economic components will only be secondary.[6] The experience of the European Union and its inclusion of new members from among the countries of Eastern Europe confirms the geopolitical and not economic character of integration within this union. Moreover, the reluctance of multiple countries to abandon their national currencies and switch to the Euro is demonstrative of political priorities. The neutrality of multiple EU members towards NATO as well as, conversely, the active engagement of other members in the North Atlantic Alliance, and the creation of the Visegrad Group out of Eastern European countries – which became possible only after their joining the EU and NATO – must be taken note of. The situation with Brexit is also a reflection of geopolitical contradictions within the EU, not economic instability.

At the same time, the creation of a new geopolitical construct with corresponding security components – even if the role of all participants is agreed upon in technical order – inevitably raises the topic of ideology. When connected to the projection of power, ideology has several dimensions. As pointed out by Franklin Ankersmit, “ideology is always metaphorical. Ideology defines a point of view from which we are invited to see social and political reality.”[7] In Ankersmit’s opinion, “if metaphor defines a certain political ‘point of view’ from which social reality is conceptualized, it is the state onto which this point of view can be projected. The state enables us to translate ideological, metaphorical insight into concrete political action. Without a state, ideology is helpless, without ideology the state has no program for political action.” [7] As follows, there should be some kind of interface or connection where philosophical, cultural, and religious aspects can feed political decisions. Ankersmit also holds that “the nonideological state is a stupid and ineffective state, and its capacity to learn will decrease accordingly.”[8] The absence of ideology automatically means losing one’s position within alliances as well as a decrease in one’s ability to respond to external challenges, insofar as ideology is also directly tied to the foreign policy vectors of a state, whether concerning neighboring or distant countries, partners or opponents.

Independent of whatever school of International Relations, there exists the opinion that “ideologies, or actors’ foundational principles of domestic political legitimacy, are likely to impact leaders’ foreign policies by affecting their perceptions of the threats that others pose to their central domestic and international interests. The greater the ideological differences dividing decision makers from different states, the more likely they are to view one another as substantial dangers to both their domestic power and the security of their respective countries.” [9]

Among such external challenges, “the expansion of NATO and its advance up to the borders of our country has become one of the key geopolitical problems of the present.”[10] In 2014, the contradictions which had accumulated in dialogue between Russia and Western countries reached a critical point and caused an unprecedented aggravation of relations.[11]

Insofar as the space of the former USSR has seen the evolution of so-called “geopolitical pluralism”, it is very difficult to count on the development of deep integration. The good neighbor belt which has been one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities has been fractured, and the West has successfully formed part of an anti-Russian buffer zone.[12] This creates risks for further integration processes in general, and for Russia’s role in the Eurasian space in general. Under the pressure of the West, it is necessary to more articulately substantiate decisions and alternative scenarios for both EAEU partners and other alliances.

A more flexible mechanism for responsive measures and planning can be achieved through the synchronization of key elements of the strategic cultures and national interests of EAEU countries (and more broadly those of the SCO). Firstly, insofar as the main tendencies in international relations are tied to the school of political realism in its different variations, the role of strategic culture and the interests of states will remain rather high. Secondly, the interconnection of strategic culture and national interests will directly shape an ideology on the basis of which a political agenda can be formed. Thirdly, allied partners’ perceptions of their national interests as their own can best be achieved given common value-based motives in cultural and political tradition(s).

Russian military experts have repeatedly noted the need for such a mechanism of a systemic nature, even if such has not been characterized as an ideology per se, but expressed in other terms. Such is often raised in the shape of the notion of a development strategy. “The will to wage war is, in essence, when considered in terms of prospects, the will to rule after war. Therefore, the aim of each side’s army is to develop and choose a strategy for victory for its side. The winning strategy will thereby, for some time, become the strategy of the whole global community.”[13]

Taking into account the ongoing confrontation and potential for conflict, measures for deterring rivals should also take into consideration a detailed analysis of strategic culture, since “Deterrence…as a typical strategic concept, is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave.”[14]

Insofar as strategic culture directly reflects collective identity, this latter concept is also in need of clarification. Identification is a complex phenomenon encompassing self-understanding, community, and connectedness. Rogers Brubaker discerns the existence of relational and categorical forms of identification. The first assumes the existence of some kind of network of connections, whereas the second points towards belonging to a class or group having common attributes, such as nationality, race, language, etc. A state can be a powerful “identifier” insofar as it “has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting.”[15] The optimal scenario is seen as the combination of both forms, in which clusters with clear identities are immeshed in deep and inextricable relationships. This ideal type for the state is somewhat more difficult to realize in systems of associations, unions, and alliances. No single recipe exists. In the West, the emphasis is on Transatlantic values and traditions; in Muslim countries the appeal is made to religious identity (e.g, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), and in ASEAN countries the accent is on poly-cultural dialogue and the need for regional cooperation. At the present moment, the main emphasis within the EAEU is on the common historical past and geographical proximity. Another pivotal (albeit not accentuated) element within the EAEU is the course towards establishing a multipolar world. This provision has been enshrined in the foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation.

As noted by A.Ya. Shcherbakova: “The Russian Federation is the most active state, after the US, on questions of the formation of a new world order, and it meets the following principles: Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, it is increasing its political and military prestige, using the diplomatic experience which it has obtained in resolving the conflict in Syria, it is defending its own sovereignty, strengthening national security, and actively fighting terrorism on a global level.”[16] It has also been pointed out that “our country wields all that is necessary to take a leading position in both the economic and cultural spheres in the new multipolar world.”[17]

However, in strategic documents, multipolarity has been primarily of a declarative character. There has been no precise definition of multipolarity nor – and this is important – has Russia expressed a vision of how a multipolar architecture ought to be built beyond its criticism of the US’ unipolarity and besides its statements on the need to participate in various associations.

Considering Eurasian integration, it has also been noted that “the implementation of a set of measures for strengthening the framework of the EAEU and its consolidation on the current integration track demands the development of an ideology of Eurasian integration.”[18] This testifies to the vacuum of ideas in the current political process. It is obvious that the process of Eurasian integration is rising to a new level, and with time will lead to the formation of a new geopolitical center of world politics.[19] A targeted ideology aimed at developing the EAEU might potentially represent one version of a strategy for multipolarity.

Yet another serious question is the practical realization of potential theoretical models. Specialists have noted that old methods and tool kits are no longer effective, in connection with which there is heightened interest in an “exit strategy”, in the rethinking of traditional views of strategic planning mechanisms, and in continuing work on integrating the priorities of national security policy into Russia’s macro-strategy.[20] 

Without a doubt, it must be agreed that “it is necessary to intensify the work of the EAEU scientific community on formulating an ideology of Eurasian integration.”[21] Russian international affairs experts frequently suggest the use of “soft power” methods for the attainment of set goals. On the one hand, “part of soft power is the potential of partnership, flexibility, negotiability, and the ability to transform – all of these factors determine soft power as a key instrument of integration processes.”[22] On the other hand, however, soft power cannot be used as a “one-for-all.” This is merely a general description of the phenomenon which demands authentic content. Yet there is another side, and “cultural-civilizational differences determine the development of societies to a greater extent than other factors. The transplanting of institutions, methods, practices, and technologies into a different culturo-historical system is not only ineffective but is, quite frankly, often harmful.”[22]

Therefore, it is necessary to prepare multiple development scenarios which have the same priorities and target groups. In the case of a positive development in the situation, several scenarios can be combined to impart overall strategy with a synergetic effect and translate such into a field of integrated complexity.

One such scenario would be an integrated-adaptive approach. In accordance with this option, the EAEU should develop a sufficiently clear ideology to be applied as an umbrella model for members of the union. Such should be flexible, and its main postulates should correspond to the national interests of all the states belonging to the EAEU. To some extent, this also applies to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but then there arises the question of correctly understanding the Chinese perception of world order and Beijing’s long-term strategy.

A second scenario would entail a normative approach. This case envisions the gradual amendment of the Constitutions of the states belonging to the EAEU, as well as the adjustment of the organization’s Charter. This seems unlikely in the short term.

A third approach would be a multilateral mode of interaction. According to this scenario, the EAEU, CSTO, and SCO, as well as other initiatives such as the Belt and Road, would develop autonomously, without visible integration with one another, but within the context of the common interests of all these structures. This is the most likely development scenario. At the same time, it should be taken into consideration that the activeness of all organizations will differ in terms of the scales of tasks and responsibilities. In one way or another, Russia and China will play the role of the two motors, insofar as they are “regional powers belonging to the same subsystem of international relations, as well as great powers which have interests in practically all corners of the world.”[23] The application of the umbrella ideology of Eurasianism in its various versions would be expedient in this scenario.

As for a fourth approach, insofar as the post-Soviet space has already experienced unsuccessful projects, such as the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development and the Commonwealth of Independent States, it cannot be ruled out that the EAEU’s activities might freeze, or even that a member-country may leave for one reason or another. Without a doubt, such would be the most negative turn of events, but such also demands analysis in order to foresee and provide for the timely blocking of such processes. The first three scenarios, including their synthesis in various formats, are therefore the most desirable.


[1] Maruev, A.Yu., Medvedev, D.А., Gulina Е.V. Теоретические аспекты проектирования геополитического пространства в арктическом регионе [“Theoretical Aspects of Projecting the Geopolitical Space in the Arctic Region”],  Стратегическая стабильность [Strategic Stability] No 2 (83), 2018, p. 9.

[2] Ursul А.D. Безопасность в контексте глобальной устойчивости [“Security in the Context of Global Stability”] // Информационные войны [Information Wars] No 2 (46) 2018. p.64 – 65.

[3] Ibid., 66.

[4] Глобальная безопасность: инновационные методы анализа конфликтов [Global Security: Innovation Methods for Conflict Analysis]. Edited by A.I. Smirnov. Мoscow: Obshchestvo “Znanie” Rossii, 2011. p. 159.

[5] Ibid., 164.

[6] Ibid., 167.

[7] F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. p. 357.

[8] Ibid., 358. 

[9] Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. P. 1.

[10] K.P. Kurylev. Украинский кризис и международная безопасность [The Ukrainian Crisis and International Security]. Мoscow: LENAND, 2018. p. 171.

[11] Ibid., 173.

[12] Ibid., 198.

[13] Yuri Matvienko, Военный аспект Четвёртой политической теории [“The Military Aspect of the Fourth Political Theory”] //, 06.08.2012 [

[14] Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1980. p. 

[15] Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups. Harvard University Press, 2004. p. 43. 

[16] Shcherbakova А.Ya. Место России на геополитической карте современного мира [“Russia’s Place on the Geopolitical Map of the Contemporary World”] // Информационные войны [Information Wars] No 1 (45) 2018. p. 24.

[17] S. Baykov. Россия и новый миропорядок XXI века [“Russia and the New World Order in the 21st Century] // Постсоветский материк [Post-Soviet Continent] No 1 (13), 2017. p. 11.

[18] Tkachuk, S.P., Mityaev, D.А. “Мягкая сила” науки и образования в развитии евразийской экономической интеграции [“The ‘Soft Power’ of Science and Education in the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration”] // Экономические стратегии [Economic Strategies] No 2 (152), 2018. p. 182.

[19] Iskakov I.Zh. Политические институты России и Казахстана в процессе евразийской интеграции [“Political Institutions in Russia and Kazakhstan in the Process of Eurasian Integration”], Глобальные тенденции развития мира. Материалы Всероссийской научной конференции [“Global Trends in World Development: Materials of the All-Russian Scientific Conference”] (Moscow, 14 June 2012, INION RAN) Мoscow: Nauchny ekspert, 2013. p. 306.

[20] A.G. Makushkin. Обеспечение стратегического контроля в области планирования безопасности социально-экономического развития [“Ensuring Strategic Control in the Field of Planning the Security of Socio-Economic Development”],  Экономика обороны и безопасности и аналитика [The Economics of Defense, Security, and Analysis]. Edited by A.N. Kanshin. Мoscow: Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2013. p. 82-87.

[21] Tkachuk, S.P., Mityaev, D.А. “Мягкая сила” науки и образования в развитии евразийской экономической интеграции [“The ‘Soft Power’ of Science and Education in the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration”] // Экономические стратегии [Economic Strategies] No 2 (152), 2018. p. 188.

[22] Kazarinova D.B. Политический краудсорсинг, социальные медиа и фабрики мысли как новые акторы глобальной политики: факторы мягкой силы [“Political Crowdsourcing, Social Media, and Think Tanks as the New Actors of Global Politics: Factors of Soft Power”] // [“Global Trends in World Development: Materials of the All-Russian Scientific Conference”] (Moscow, 14 June 2012, INION RAN) Мoscow: Nauchny ekspert, 2013. p. 533.

[23] D. А. Degterev. Прикладной количественный анализ и моделирование международных отношений [Applied Quantitative Analysis and Modeling in International Relations]. Мoscow: RUDN, 2016. p. 415.

Valery Korovin – “Eurasianism Then and Now, Russia and Beyond”

Author: Valery Korovin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Originally published as “The Eurasian Constants of Russian Consciousness”, Izborsky Club (15 September 2019). 


The Russian dream is not a dream of Europe, nor a dream about Asia. The Russian dream is the dream of a special Eurasian civilization.

The notion of Eurasianism has acquired such wide circulation that it has long since seemed to have become something self-evident, that is to say obvious and intelligible. Moreover, the broad circulation of this concept has opened up an equally wide breadth of interpretations, frequently entailing the full freedom to understand Eurasianism to be whatever one pleases. In the same vein, this has allowed those who consider themselves opponents of Eurasianist doctrine to attribute to Eurasianism any and all sorts of negative features.

Eurasianism itself is at once both a fairly strict notion and capacious one, as Eurasianism is a concrete worldview which demands continuous clarifications in order to avoid too broad of interpretations on the part of its supporters which yields, at the same time, equally extensive ground for criticism from opponents.

Eurasianism consists of several basic, constant characteristics whose systematic affirmation is simply impossible to avoid.

Against the Universality of the West

In fact, the point of departure for the very emergence of Eurasianist initiatives was reacting to the West’s (at the time Europe’s) arrogant assertion of the universality of its historical path and the achievements of its own European and, overall, Western civilization. It reached the point that the West appropriated for itself the very notions of “development”, “progress”, and “advancement”, and the very word “civilization” was equated with the phenomenon of Western civilization.

Taking its own experience of development as a foundation, the West simply proclaimed that only its development is really development. Whoever does not repeat the Western path is not developing. Whoever does not follow the West in everything is not on the path of progress and, as follows, is overboard the ship of civilization, for civilization is the West – while all others are either savages catching up with the West or barbarians void of the will to become the West.

At the time, humanity was mesmerized by the steam engine, the first rudiments of the scientific-technological revolution, and the unprecedented wonders created by Western engineers. Taking advantage of this confusion influenced by such fascination with these unprecedented inventions, the West (at the time Europe) proclaimed itself – in a not so ceremonial fashion – to be the ultimate standard of human development, period. By and large, Europe thereby isolated itself from the rest of humanity, at once placing itself at the center. This is precisely what yielded the reactive response of those who refused to recognize arrogant European universality. Nikolay Trubetzkoy’s Europe and Mankind thus became a kind of manifesto which laid the foundation for the development of Eurasianist thought.

Thus follows the main principle of Eurasianism: the rejection of the universality of the West and its historical experience. Eurasianism is not Westernism taken as universality. The West denies other, non-Western civilization their own paths, whereas Eurasianism refuses to recognize the West’s path as being universal for all.

Humanity is diverse and consists of a whole range of, as Danilevsky called them, culturo-historical types, and the West is only one of them – it is neither the only nor the best one, nor universal. This is the main principle at the heart of Eurasianism. Here we could add that the East is also not a source of universality and, even more so, cannot claim supremacy.

Russia as a Civilizational Subject

Of course, it cannot be denied that some peoples and states have genuinely followed the West, been seduced by its achievements, uncritically accepted its cultural codes, and imitated Europe in its way of life, parodying and blindly imitating the logic of actions and the type of thinking of Westerners. There are states which have consistently tried to reproduce the Western culturo-historical type.

Russia has not escaped this fate either, as under the influence of its elites Russia has from time to time plunged into the abyss of frenzied Westernism, virtually dissolving therein and, as a consequence, decomposing, losing fragments of itself, only to recoil and gather new forces. If we examine Russian history in terms of conditional stages, then we will see a history consisting of an internal struggle between Eurasianism and Westernism. Periods of Westernism have meant the surrender of positions, defeat, and decay; periods of Eurasianism mean triumph over the West, conceptualizing ourselves as something special – as neither Western nor Eastern civilization, but as a new reassembly.

Speaking of Russia itself, we can turn to the second postulate of Eurasianism: Russia is a self-sufficient, independent civilization, a special culturo-historical type, a unique, original culture which has synthesized (and not merely mixed or blindly taken over) some of the best manifestations of European and Asian cultures. In this synthesis, which cannot be reduced to a mere blending or imitation, lies the secret of our uniqueness. The particular type of Russian statehood is the synthesis of the political vertical and rigid centralization of the Empire of Genghis Khan with the faith, culture, and flexibility of the Byzantine Empire which, if we look at such from Russia, laid to the West.

The Russian person is a representative of a people which has absorbed the best of the cultures of East and West without merging with them in blind imitation. The Russian, as part of a united, organic community, is whole and subjective, sovereign, and independently determines their fate. This is their Eurasianist essence – which is neither European, in the sense of imitating Europe, nor essentially parodying the European, nor Asian, which is a bit too remote, foreign, terse, and not corresponding to the subtle chords of the Russian soul, which are instead rather consonant with Greek civilization. This essence is independent and Eurasian.

A Russian can love Europe, but at the same time remain himself – for in thoughtlessly accepting European cultural codes, he ceases to be Russian – just as he can love Asia and the peoples of the East and borrow the best from them. In this sense, the Russian is open to cultural exchange, but closes whenever West or East attempt to remake him in their own image. The Russian, as Dostoyevsky wrote, is the “all-person”, by which was meant that the Russian has empathy for the peoples of the East and the peoples of the West. But in order to preserve himself, the Russian must always remain himself – the Russian people, Russian culture, Russian civilization with its own integral, inseparable Russian history spanning centuries.

To be a Eurasian[ist] means to be part of a special, unique civilization, but this concerns more than Russians alone. To be oneself – to be a people, a culture, an organic community – is the right of any people, any culturo-historical type, any civilization, whether in Europe or in Asia. Whoever recognizes this right is a Eurasianist. Whoever does not is most likely an arrogant civilizer of the West, an oppressor of peoples, a colonialist, an arrogant Anglo-Saxon, a hegemon claiming global dominance by virtue of “exceptionality”, i.e., this person is not a Eurasianist but his opponent – ontologically, existentially, and indelibly such.

The Empire of Peoples

The Russian loves his people. Because the Eurasianist loves his people, he understands how a people can be loved, and insists on its organic integrity, its unique identity, its Tradition, and unique selfhood. Thus, the Russian Eurasianist accepts all the diversity of ethnoi, peoples, and political nations as a given, recognizing and accepting their unique identities. In this lies yet another thesis of Eurasianism: the acceptance of the diversity of communities, which is very Russian, open, and broad in essence.

This openness and breadth of acceptance of all other identities, this “all-humanity” of Russians is taken by many to be a mistake, as some call for mixing with others (which is refuted by the Eurasianist thesis on the preservation of one’s unique identity), while others call for absorbing others as if, as others say, Russians are omnivorous and voracious in their imperial manners. Both of these are wrong, naive, or deliberately misleading.

Mixing is an absolutely liberal, post-human principle implanted, like many other things, by the West and its civilizers driving humanity into a global melting pot. This is an anti-Eurasianist approach, as it destroys organic community, cultural identity, and the selfhood of peoples, grinding them into atoms of individuals. The absorbing of other peoples as well, the imposition of one’s cultural codes onto them, is just as absolutely a non-Eurasianist approach, but rather resembles the Westernist, colonial, exploitative one which considers other, non-Western peoples to be aboriginal savages, who are more often than not equated with wildlife.

Yet it is precisely the contributions by many dozens and hundreds of different peoples to our history that gave rise to unique Russian civilization as Eurasian and diverse, not mixed but ordered, in which the subject is not the atomic individual, as in the West, but the organic community, the ethnos or people.

One can become Russian by accepting Russian identity, taking the Russian culturo-historical code to be their foundation, accepting the Russian language as their own, and merging with the organic community of the Russian people. But this can only be done voluntarily. A Russian, especially a Eurasianist, will never force others into the Russian World, for such excesses mean either assimilating to the West’s arrogance and imposition of its own experience, or assimilation to the East, with its crudeness and voluntarism. The Eurasianist approach is open to diversity on the condition that one can preserve their own subjectivity. The Eurasian Empire does not exploit, but equips others, accepting peoples as they are into a common, Eurasian, strategic unity, not a “prison of peoples” or the melting pot of Western colonizers.

The Eurasian Codes of Russian History

During periods of Eurasian enlightenment, Russians have rallied the peoples of Eurasia and beyond to revolt against the West. During moments of blur and madness, they, or more precisely the Russian elites, and following them the pliable masses (such is a sociological law), have followed the West, thus committing to self-liquidation as a large state, shattering into a small one, and abandoning this great project, losing almost everything only to once again re-awaken and re-gather for new, great fulfillments – such is the genuinely Russian, Eurasian scale – in pursuit of the inextinguishable Russian dream.

These constants of the Eurasian-Russian being will never disappear, not even in the darkest midnights of our history. They simply become momentarily invisible, we lose them from view. But sooner or later our Tsars, our leaders, and our General Secretaries rediscover them, reawaken, and are moved by these codes. Russia once again turns into the Eurasian subject, i.e., that which knows, thinks, and acts in contrast to the object of extinction [to which Russia is reduced] during moments of retreat from the Eurasian mission in favor of the West, towards which Western thoughts and deeds are aimed.

Over the past few centuries, we have had too much of the West. The Westernist elites of late Romanov Russia ceased to understand, much less feel their people. Then the Marxist ideological experiments of the Bolsheviks were taken from the West, and only later adapted to the Russian way and the Eurasian civilizational constants during Stalin’s imperial enlightenment. Then once again we fell into the liberal experiment of the “Khrushchev thaw”, then Brezhnev’s slightly frostbitten conservative stagnation, then into final collapse and defeat amidst Gorbachev’s “Perestroika”, and then to the very extreme edge, to nearly ceasing to exist under Yeltsin’s bloody oligarchical rule which nearly killed Russia entirely.

But then the Eurasian constants were once again rediscovered – Russia was reassembled, the regional Fronde of “national republics” was suppressed, and now Eurasian integration has risen with the construction of the Eurasian geopolitical axes of Moscow-Beijing and Moscow-Delhi, and the nearly materialized axis of Paris-Berlin-Moscow, which could destroy Western hegemony, and which almost appeared at the start of the destruction of Iraq.

Yet liberalism has not let go of us. The West is swarming through its networks and color revolutions, continuing to encircle Russia from all sides, all with its own liberal wing within the Russian government, monetary privileges, the liberalization of the economy, pension reform, VAT hikes, and other liberal experiments on this completely non-liberal country and its peoples. There is too much of the West. A new Eurasian breath, broad and large in scale, is needed. It is time to turn our back to the West and turn towards the East.

Applied Russian Eurasianism: Towards the East

Having suffocated in the stifling corner of the moldy ideological closet of Europe, we are now turning towards the East, where wide expanses open up before us, giving us a breath of fresh air and presenting us with what is a truly Eurasian scope. The new course of Russian Eurasianism is the Far East.

In the Far East, Russia can open a new chapter of cooperation with the civilizations of the East, with China, Japan, and Korea, thereby stretching the Russian look all the way to Oceania, to Indonesia and Australia. “There a synthesis is created in which Russia is combined with the great civilizations of the Pacific Ocean”, emphasizes the Russian writer Alexander Prokhanov. But this must now be on our own, Eurasian conditions, without the annoying West and its “exceptionalism”, and accomplished while preserving our uniqueness and respecting the civilizational and cultural specificities of others for the sake of mutual understanding and cooperation within the multipolar world that is taking shape before our very eyes. This is the project of the new Eurasianism of the 21st century.

Without liberalism and nationalism – these chimeras of the West – and without “mandatory” Western interference, control and surveillance, we can initiate a new stage in the development of the world in which the West will be merely one civilization – not the only one – in the new, Eurasian world of equal cooperation between civilizations. This will be a world not of nations, not of liberal, atomic, mercantile individuals in the Brownian motion of the post-human cauldron, but a new world of civilizations uniting culturally close peoples into large strategic blocs. Such are the principles of Russian Eurasianism, of Chinese, Indian, and Arab Eurasianism, of the Eurasianisms of Ibero-America and Africa liberated from Western domination.

We are now forced to think in terms of the interests of the West, to proceed from its premises and criteria, but our Eastern, Eurasian project has its own, non-Western constants which ought to be remembered.

Russian interests in this Eastern-oriented Eurasian project lie in the need to ensure Russia’s strategic security on the entire Pacific coast, and in the Russian Far East in particular. This necessitates pushing American presence as far away from us as possible – indeed, out of sight.

Japan or China, or Japan and China?

The Eurasian[ist] geopolitical imperative lies in liberating the Far East from American military bases, first and foremost Japan, which was subjugated and humiliated by the barbaric bombings of 1945. This is how the West promotes its values: on the wings of strategic bombers inflicting atomic death upon hundreds of thousands of completely innocent civilians. This is how the West has captured its bridgeheads, by setting up military bases outside of local jurisdictions, dictating their own will, and continuing to not only militarily, but also economically and culturally rape Japan and rigidly impose their surrogates.

Russia’s Eastern, Eurasian vector entails direct and open dialogue with Japan – but not merely about the islands known in Japan as the “Northern territories”, as such is a false object to which our attention is being diverted by the current American overlords of the once great Japanese people. Washington whispers into the ears of Japanese authorities about how the Russian took four rocks from them all the while as America itself took all of Japan from the Japanese. Dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo must be address the liberation of all of Japan, rising up against American occupation, dumping American military bases into the ocean, and building a new Eurasian geopolitical axis between Moscow and Tokyo.

At the same time, Russia’s Eurasian geopolitical vector must develop in the direction of China. And once again: it is none other than Western strategists, such as Brzezinski, who is currently burning in hell, and others of his ilk, who claim that it is impossible to have equally developed, balanced strategic relations with both Japan and China at the same time. This is impossible only for the US, because it only plays on contradictions and pitting one against the other, whether Japan and China, Japan and Russia, or Russia and China, in the end of which the US claims all for itself.

Eurasianist geopolitics annuls this false confrontation by opening up the possibility for building a Moscow-Beijing axis. But here dialogue should address another matter. If Japan is weary of American military presence, then sovereign China, possessing its own nuclear triad for deterring any American military encroachment, is weary of American economic oppression. The noose thrown by the US in its attempt to control all the world’s commodity flows, dollar accounting, the endless trillions of loans in American government bonds served as great blessings, and protective tariffs and trade wars – all of this keeps China on a short American leash. ‘Step to the right or step to the left and that will mean the end of your economy’, Uncle Sam laughs.

The New Liberation of the Far East

Russia’s Eurasian strategy in the Far East means restoring relations with North Korea, which liberals have become so accustomed to scaring us with. North Korea is an island of Russian Stalinism which we ourselves created and then, because of our own illness, dropped and abandoned to become a frozen museum of the era of Stalin’s great experiment. But the North Koreans are a hardworking people with powerful economic potential, and this country presents access to the East China Sea, for which our pilots and military instructors have already fought in the past. All of this must be restored to our common, new Eurasian project.

But here [on the Korean peninsula] we are faced with a conflict artificially created by the Americans, one which cannot be healed by their efforts, and one which has remained an unhealed, bleeding wound for decades. Occupied to this day since the freezing of the Korean War, South Korea cannot even conceive of independent policy, much less about reconciliation with the North as long as the latter refuses to surrender to the mercy of the Americans. But they will not surrender, because Koreans, like Russians, do not surrender, but defend their sovereignty to the very end. This means that Korea will not be unified until, following Japan – but perhaps before – it rises up against American military oppression and sends American bases into the ocean.

The fully-fledged unfolding of the Eurasian project in the Far East as a whole lies in the liberation of Japan, China, and Korea. For Korea in particular, this means liberation from intrusive US guardianship and the unification of the two Koreas for the sake of common development as a single state and as one people – under guarantees of nuclear cover from Russia. Only then can our common ocean – the ocean of Russia, Japan, China, and Korea – perturbed by American presence, once again become Pacific and safe.

Returning the Ocean

India lacks our military potential, our arms, and our air defense systems. But most importantly, India does not control its ocean. The Eurasianist strategy for India is a joint Russian-Indian presence in the Indian Ocean which, as in the Pacific Ocean, is currently indelibly ruled by the American 7th fleet, monopolistically and unilaterally determining the fate of all the states of the region regardless of these countries’ interests. As is the American custom, they see only their own interests.

A Russian-Indian maritime base, with its center on the island of Diego Garcia, from which it is high time to get rid of the English and their American allies, and a fleet of Russian and Indian aircraft carriers – this is the Eurasianist strategy for India, and it shall be realized not through a mere truncated economic format, but in the form of a fully-fledged geopolitical axis between Moscow and Delhi.

The Eurasianist strategy in the Far East also entails returning to Vietnam and fully restoring the previously dismantled Russian base in Cam Ranh, which we ourselves closed in hope of reciprocal peaceful steps from the US. Twenty years have passed and these expectations have not been fulfilled, which means that it is once again time to open the Cam Ranh base not only for repairing warships, but for deterring US military presence. With the very same goal, it is also once again time to open up to Vietnam as a military-strategic partner, not merely a trade partner, to guarantee its security, and to cover it with our nuclear umbrella from any repeated incursion by the annoying, ubiquitous Yankees. The same can be said for Laos.

Eurasian Demography

However, the internal dimensions of the realization of this Far Eastern Eurasianist strategy cannot be forgotten. The Russian Far East is an island of European civilization surrounded by non-European peoples. It is a landmark of the ability to remain Russians even where a culturally foreign majority of completely mentally distant civilizations hangs over us. To preserve ourselves, to remain Russians, and to take the best from the cultures of neighboring peoples – this is our advantage, and this is the essence of Russian Eurasianism, the vivid manifestation of the Eurasian civilizational synthesis. And this means that this island must be not only preserved, but transformed into a fully-fledged Russian sea, which means posing the question of demography of the Far East in the first place.

The Russian Far East should be genuinely Russian – not Chinese, and not artificially populated by migrant workers from Central Asia or the Caucasus. Russian culture is a necessary and most important component of our presence in the Far East. Without Russian cultural expansion, without full civilizational representation, we cannot preserve the Far East. Thus, our main priority should be not only extremely attentive treatment of such questions of demography, but also of migration, especially from neighboring, friendly China.

The Eurasianist approach lies in the preservation, not erosion of identity. This means China for the Chinese and the Far East for Russians and the traditional peoples of the Pan-Russian (Rossiiskii) Far East. In this regard, the border with China should be translucent, strict, and attentive if it is to be a Eurasian border, and not merely an administrative line for exploitation for profit. Without a doubt, China will have the right to expansion, but Eurasian, friendly China will realize this expansion to the South. Such is the law of Eurasianism.

Eurasian Russia is a unified power which unites under its wings numerous ethno-cultural units, languages, peoples, faiths, and religions – but without blurring, crushing, and mixing them into a melting plot as is the Western manner. The Eurasian power is not a nation and not a liberal, post-human garbage dump.

Eurasian Russia is an empire of peoples preserving their collective identity and representing the entirety of our Eurasian civilizational diversity, in the center of which stands the great Russian people, the gatherers of lands and the builders of the endless, continental Eurasian state – the ark of salvation for all of these diverse peoples.

However, the primacy of Russians does not mean that they must be at the top of a hierarchy of peoples, as is customarily thought in the West and as has been imposed upon our peoples by Western whisperers rousing them against Russians and blaming Russians for their own Western sins of colonialism, exploitation, and violence against other peoples. Russians have never allowed themselves to do such and they never will, for the Russian dream is one of just unity. Russian primacy is none other than the primacy of the highest responsibility for those whom our continental empire saves from erosion, exploitation, and “civilizing” by the West. Life without the West in harmony, common development, and mutual understanding – this is the Russian, Eurasian dream of the future.

Eurasia: A Special Worldview

Author: Alexander Dugin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Dugin’s Guideline – 

Eurasia is not only a geographical concept; it is also a whole theory, system, and special worldview. Its essence lies in the following.

For centuries the West has striven to impose its norms and criteria upon all of mankind. This is its civilizational policy. And this has not changed over the centuries regardless of what stands at the forefront of the West’s ideology, be it Catholicism, Protestantism, Modernism, Liberalism, or Capitalism. With equal fervor the West builds its Empire at the expense of all other peoples. On the world map this is reflected in expansion from Europe to Asia and, most importantly, Eurasia, i.e., the territory of the Russian Empire situated in the key zone of the absolute center. To the west of us is Europe. To the east – Asia. We ourselves are something third.

The West believes that only its path of development, only its logic, and only its values are universal and common to all of mankind, and that all other peoples have simply not yet understood this. This means that the West, albeit temporarily (until they understand this), can and is even obliged to rule others. With such a blatant agenda, the West has in practice managed to colonize the East. This is no easy feat, but it managed to. But the West faltered in the face of Russia, Eurasia. We, Russians, opposed the West with something that stopped it in its tracks. It repeatedly tried to take us by force and ruse, but we held on. The East fell, but we didn’t. And we are holding out to this day. This is Eurasia as an idea.

Eurasia means not succumbing to the West’s claims to universality, rejecting its hegemony, and insisting that no one has a monopoly on truth, especially not the West. Eurasia is the possibility for peoples and civilizations to follow their own path and, if the logic of the path demands such, not only a non-Western one, but even an anti-Western path. This is Eurasia. This idea was understood by the first Eurasianists, Trubetzkoy, Savitsky, and Alekseev in the 1920’s. We too understand it. And Vladimir Putin understands it, since there is no other meaning of Eurasia.

If we understand what is at stake, then all the rest becomes crystal clear. If we are Eurasia, then it therefore follows that:

First, we must strengthen and defend our identity, our culture, faith, ethics, philosophy, our own Russian Logos. Eurasia means reliance on our own strength and allying with all those who share our attitude and reject the hegemony of the West.

Secondly, we must construct a foreign policy that allows us to be completely independent from the West in the spheres of defense, politics, culture, economy, and technology. Eurasia is the principle of self-sufficiency of a large space.

Thirdly, we must integrate the space adjacent to contemporary Russia into a single confederation or union in order to together create the potential sufficient for being a fully-fledged pole in a multipolar world, not a unipolar world as the West is trying to impose on us to this day. Eurasia is multipolarity.

And finally, we must create a Eurasian Order symmetric to what is called the World Government and strives to manage global processes from the standpoint of the West’s interests. Eurasia is a principally new elite thinking globally but most often oppositely to what the West’s intellectual headquarters think and, most importantly, do.

This is the only way to treat talk of Eurasia at the Economic Forum. If not, then not at all, and this will remain but empty talk. If we really mean what we are saying, this demands a radical shift in all policy, ideology, the entire course. We do not have historical time to move cautiously step by step.


© Jafe Arnold – All Rights Reserved. No reproduction without expressed permission. 

The Eurasian Union and Complex Systems Theory

Author: Leonid Savin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Ideology and the political sciences as a whole are directly tied to the scientific paradigm prevailing in society. In its time, Cartesian logic influenced political processes in European countries just as the principles and methods of warfare (the continuation of politics in its extreme from according to Clausewitz) and diplomacy changed following new scientific discoveries. Religious worldview is also directly linked to political designs. European colonists in Latin America attempted to build “heaven on earth” just as the Jesuits projected their vision of the world onto Indian society not only in terms of ethics and behavior, but also in urban planning and territorial management. In the 20th century, the most striking example of the influence of religious ideas on politics was the establishment of the state of Israel and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The 20th century is also well known for new discoveries in science. Albert Einstein shifted understandings of the nature of physics and Ilya Prigogine reminded the world of chaos in academic terms. The theories of “superstring”, self-organizing criticality, nonlinear geometry, epistemological anarchism, dissipative structures, and complex thinking and others all left their mark not only on natural but also political sciences.

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American diplomat Steven Mann appealed to new fields in physics to explain the nature of ongoing political processes. Drawing on examples from different spheres of research, he showed that the self-dissolution of the USSR reminds one of how a pile of wet sand can crumble once the moisture (for the USSR this was ideology) ceases to play a binding role following evaporation. Unlike his colleagues who were concerned with the collapse of world’s second superpower for the sake of the imbalance in the system of global security as a whole, Mann kept his cool and, as he wrote in his article “Chaos Theory and Strategic Thinking”, after the elements of a system disintegrate, they soon inevitably fall back into place. In the same publication, he compared the state to a computer and ideology to a virus which can be applied as an instrument in capturing a territory without any material damage. In the case of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy was supposed to fill the void of the former ideology after regime change and impose new values which would aid the former Soviet countries in pooling together their material resources and helping citizens transform into the obedient consumers and staff personnel of the new “computer” system. As we know, such a mechanism was introduced into the post-Soviet space and led to disastrous consequences.

But if new scientific discoveries explaining the nature of natural processes are applicable to describing political disturbances, then why can’t we apply them to contemporary geopolitical dynamics and integration processes? After all, Western militaries have long since been considering non-linear thinking, holist theories, and various academic schools and striven to apply them in conflict simulations, combat tactics, and strategy. It might as well be that the philosophical ideas of post-modernity (such as the rhizomatic existence and chaosmos theories of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) as well as more precise sciences preferring complex formulas and mathematical calculations will be sufficiently applicable in modeling new superstate entities, one of which is none other than the project for the Eurasian Union.

Such a term as “complex systems” utilized in modern science will come to be quite suitable for such a new formation. In addition, the presence of numerous actors associated with both the internal politics of this system and international relations compel us to appeal to yet another well-established designation, that of nonlinear dynamics.

Lets us see how a complex system operates in, at first glance, unpredictable conditions from the point of view of the new scientific paradigm the authors of which have long since been busy with such a trajectory. It is possible that such a theory will help us to predict the formation and development of the Eurasian Union as well as to avoid various mistakes in the future and circumvent diplomatic traps set by this project’s opponents on the chessboard of global geopolitics. Of course, it is difficult to limit ourselves to just one or another new discovery. Bearing this in mind, let us begin with the concepts of systems theory. One of the pioneers of this field was Lars Skyttner, whose monograph General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications served as the basis for determining the very laws of a systems’ functioning. There are fifteen such rules.

1. The second law of thermodynamics. Although Skyttner refers to the redistribution of heat between bodies within a closed system, according to a number of authors this law is applicable to complex systems which are fundamentally open.

2. The law of complementarity. In the context of Eurasianism, Lev Gumilev developed the laws of complementarity between peoples. In systems theory, this law appears as the following: any two projections or system models allow one to acquire knowledge about one of the systems, as two systems are by no means fully independent or compatible. Accordingly, Paul Feyerabend and Nicholas Maxwell’s ideas on the existence of competing and alternative theories possess no less of a convincing base of evidence. Undoubtedly, the Eurasian Union is a project subject to numerous descriptions, sometimes even contradictory ones.

3. Holism. According to Skyttner, a system is composed of holistic properties which do not manifest themselves in any of its individual parts or interactions, while its individual parts consist of wholes which do not necessary appear in the system as a whole. In our case, the Eurasian Union is represented only partly by its system as a whole. The numerous details of which it consists escape from view. For example, the Eurasian space is made up of a great mass of different ethni and language groups which inhabit it. However, for one reason or another not all of the nationalities can make decisions pertaining to the supranational, international formation and, of course, not all languages can claim to be recognized as official languages of the union. Something similar can be said about the legal aspects of the union. Traditional laws and religion strongly influence a number of regions while in others they are totally absent. Moreover, the principle of holism leads to the necessity of interdisciplinary studies which reject the narrowness of “specializations” that are often insufficient for studying complex processes.

4. The “darkness” concept states that a system cannot be entirely known inside and out. Firstly, a given system’s elements themselves cannot be totally conscious of themselves and, of course, each one will be responsible for the information available to it in political processes. The armed forces of the US have attempted to solve this problem by means of establishing a global information network and network-centric foundations for combat operations in which the rapid exchange of information between each and every unit is supposed to establish situational awareness. On the tactical level, this is has been partially solved, but on the strategic and global levels such a task is still far from being completed. The deployment of new US bases and installations is partly explained by Washington’s desire to achieve informational superiority for controlling enemies and allies. However, due to fundamental disagreements on this matter by other states and the differences between political cultures, full spectrum dominance is unlikely to be feasible even by means of the US’ military strength. In connection with the darkness principle, the constant complaints of Western politicians as to the unpredictable behavior of the Russian leadership should also be noted. It is likely that these critics, from whose mouths such remarks are heard, have not yet matured enough to understand complex systems theory. After all, no-one  would deny that Russia is indeed a complex country in the broadest sense of this word.

5. The “80-20” principle, according to which the behavior of a system is formed 20% by its elements, while the remaining 80% is fulfilled by the stabilizing functions of the system, i.e., a kind of protective service. This concept in fact confirms the well-known theory that the minority is always behind both the establishment and death of states. The remaining masses are led by this simple minority (the “passionaries” according to Gumilev). This principle appears to be fairly clear. It is possible that mathematical modeling could contribute to an adequate allocation of resources (both human and material) in the creation of the Eurasian Union.

6. William Ashby, who deals with questions of cybernetics, i.e., control, was involved in the formulation of the law of requisite variety. According to this law, the variety of elements governing a system should be no less than the variety of perturbations input into the system. In other words, the greater the diversity of a system’s possible operations, the easier it will be to deal with possible deviations. Although this law is quite straightforward, some actions of the current leadership [of the Eurasian Union] display quite an inability to think in complex categories. Perhaps the very principle of democracy, with voter accountability and the need for a simple language and definite unification of terminology, is necessary in order to describe various operations. However, for such a project as the Eurasian Union, even in its initial format, quite a large number of alternative solutions for this or that issue will be necessary along with operational creativity. Undoubtedly, this involves the presence of this project’s detractors who see it as a serious rival and future opponent in the conduct of global affairs. It can be predicted in advance that these detractors will attempt to create a maximum number of obstacles which will manifest themselves in foreign policy as well as within the nucleus of the Eurasian Union. Therefore, it is necessary to be prepared for a great variety of perturbations in advance.

7. The principle of hierarchy. The word hierarchy immediately brings to mind either the pyramid of castes relevant to the agrarian period of human history, or the layers of political and bureaucratic ladders that reflect the principle of a state’s functioning in the industrial era. In the case of the Eurasian Union, however, such hierarchies are based on natural phenomena and consist of several integrated systems on each level. Thus, in complex systems hierarchy represents itself as a rather complex process instead of a single structure consisting of separated blocks. An example of this in international relations is presented by supra-state structures which need their own managerial language differing from the model used in the states themselves. Something similar to a new language that should qualitatively overcome existing ones must be developed for the Eurasian Union.

8. Modularity. Any system is divided into a certain number of modules. Researchers have noted that the spontaneous emergence of modular organization is peculiar to critical networks. The presence of such modules produces a system in which so-called “walls of resistance” appear which impede the passage of signals. This resistance can be posed by parties, bureaucratic officials, or the specific interests of regional or national elites. The Armenian political scientist Hrachya Arzumanyan noted in his studies on complex systems and contemporary security that modules are horizontal structures while hierarchies (as mentioned above) are vertical structures in complex systems which help one to better understand and instrumentally use a system, i.e., manage it.

9. Redundancy of resources. Such a requirement is needed for ensuring stability under circumstances of disturbances as discussed in the description of the law of requisite variety and the 80-20 principle. It should also be noted that an important condition of the information age is that supplementary channels of communication are needed for the obtainment of proper information and its robust protection. Information leaks or the intentional incorrect interpretation of information can be used to destabilize a system from within.

10. The principle of “large density flow” is also connected with the previous point. If the flow of resources through a system is large enough, then more resources will be available for coping with disturbances. This all seems quite simple, but in addition to the tasks of ensuring the stability of a system, the questions of quantum leap, development, and evolution are might also arise, i.e., those societal imperatives for the realization of qualified policies and new achievements in science and technology.

11. Lars Skyttner’s  principle of sub-optimization is defined in the following way: even if all subsystems are individually designed to operate at maximum efficiency, this does not mean that the system as a whole will operate at the same efficiency. Vice versa, it is possible to develop the most effective model for a whole system, but its individual elements might not live up to such. This brings to mind certain thoughts associated with the unification and standardization of administrative decisions and processes. According to this principle, it follows that there is no single organization or collective which will be effective at all levels of a hierarchy. Hence the conclusion can be drawn that adequate staffing and proper organization is necessary for integration processes. Criticizing officials is totally appropriate especially with the amendment to Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of the rotation of elites and its allogenic origin suggested by sociologists.

12. The next principle, which also bears relevance to the previous one, refers to the redundancy of potential control. In order to achieve a desired approach, it is necessary to possess a sufficiently thorough understanding of a system. But here a problem arises. If complex systems theory takes into account difficulties arising from the description of a model, then for political processes both in Russia and the CIS countries, the potential for effective action is clearly lacking. The increasingly pronounced dichotomy between the top and the bottom, dissatisfaction in society, and the Center’s misunderstanding of the situation prevailing in the regions should serve as a serious warning for those dealing with issues of integration.

13. The principle of causal negative feedback and positive feedback, which is also a staple of physics, is linked to the equilibrium of systems. With the presence of negative feedback, the equalized state of a system remains invariant to a wide range of initial conditions. Lorenz’s strange attractor also fits the description of this principle. Positive feedback produces the opposite effects. This phenomenon is also called the law of creativity since the consideration of a social system depends on examining different results from all groups at once with the most similar initial parameters possible.

14. The principle of relaxation deals with the following: if the relaxation time of a system is less than the average time between disturbances, then a system is likely to be stable. This is directly relatable to integration processes seeing as how they mean the rearrangement of economic, legal, political, and social mechanisms. If this re-organization goes too fast, then it will fail to adapt to and “digest” previous impacts. Of course, the sheer overlay of impacts creates uncertainty as to which decisions should be taken to arrive at certain results. In light of the modernization of society’s requirement of ruling elites, it would be fully logical to think about just how many reforms are good, how they are presented, and how long the “breather” should be between reforms so that unfortunate consequences in the style of “Perestroika-2” are not encountered.

15. The principle of spotting is a quite interesting postulate proposed by Skyttner which says that systems constructed on restrictive rules, where what is permissible and what is not are specified in advance, are less stable than systems which develop randomly. At first glance, this appears to be a quite paradoxical idea. After all, the collapse of the USSR and similar experiences show that rigid, inflexible systems fall apart rather than chaotic ones. This is due to the change in the external environment of a system which drives the system to spend too many resources on following its single, pre-planned model of approach. This is rendered even more difficult when external players understand this and contribute to it from the outside. North Korea is perhaps the most exemplary such political model. The absence of strong dynamics in contrast to a rapidly changing context is particularly evident in this example. But in Russia and, more broadly, the countries potentially relatable to the Eurasian Union, the opposite is happening. Actions which might be contrary to accepted norms can often be directed towards the survival of a system and its effective functions. Of course, such a thesis is not an excuse for inconsistencies in foreign policy or justification for the efforts of oligarchical clans in the countries of the future Eurasian Union to defend their narrow self-interests veiled under integration.

We have briefly described the fundamental principles proposed for complex systems by Lars Skyttner. Yet there are still a number of attributes. In their time on the basis of interdisciplinary studies, scholars at the Santa Fe Institute developed methods for controlling complex, adaptive systems and other definitions. For example, the issue of emergencies inherent to the phenomena which we have discussed, albeit in regards to emergent states, was first discussed and described by them in examining the political processes which collapsed the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. At that time, the big players in Europe preferred to balance issues using suppressive methods against the disturbances which arose in newly-forming states.

The contemporary, no less active processes taking place on the periphery of Russia and at other points of the planet also hint towards paradigmatic geopolitical developments. But if earlier this appeared as a threat to nation-states, then today the idea of nation-state has sunk into oblivion and modern science even possesses an explanation for these processes. Balancing between order and chaos, which necessarily arise out of the properties of complex systems, and the pluralistic and non-linear thinking characteristic of their descriptions will be useful not only for explaining the changes already underway, but will also aid in designing the new reality of the Eurasian Union. The main task is choosing the right equivalents between current geopolitical perturbations and the theories of complex adaptive systems. This is at least totally possible on a theoretical level, and as an experiment it could be extremely useful for forecasting and modeling integration processes and possible threats against them.


© Jafe Arnold – All Rights Reserved. No reproduction without expressed permission. 

Eurasianism in the Context of the 21st Century

Author: Leonid Savin

Translator: Jafe Arnold

Eurasianist ideology has undergone a series of changes over the last 20 years. After Nursultan Nazarbayev, based on a Eurasianist approach, proposed forming a new union in the place of the USSR founded on a new principle, a few years passed before these ideas began to be implemented in state practice. If major milestones associated with intergovernmental projects are considered, then January 1, 2010 can be noted as the date when the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan began to function along with January 1, 2015 when the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) officially began to function. However, in addition to problems of unifying legal frameworks and defending the interests of the citizens of each country entering the EEU, there exists a trajectory of political philosophy which, although it remains outside of official political activities, nonetheless influences decision-making and the progress of scholarly and public debates in one way or another.

For the most part we are dealing with conceptions of Eurasianism developed by Russian emigrants in the 1920’s, the theory of which later began to be implemented in political practice by a number of scholars and politicians in Russia and Kazakhstan. As is characteristic for the pragmatism of Realpolitik and changes to the international situation, the exact ideas which are outlined in the works of eminent thinkers are not always realized.

The issues of new challenges and threats, from obvious geopolitical confrontation to shadowy and disruptive technologies, many of which are being indirectly or indirectly aimed against the Eurasian Union project, have become particularly relevant.

In this article we will try to delineate some of the possible future trajectories of the future development of the Eurasian Union project while focusing on a number of aspects necessary as a minimum for the functioning of a large state or intergovernmental association. These include questions ranging from political theory and economics to rethinking the world order and defensive strategy.

Etymology as a political construct

First and foremost, it is necessary to define a terminological apparatus associated with the prospects of creating the Eurasian Union. It is impossible to miss the opportunity to expand the already existing terminological base by bringing distinctive innovations to political discourse which reflect deep structures of understanding. As Martin Heidegger said, language is the house of being. In formulating (and reproducing) a corresponding etymology, we participate in the process of not only creating new thoughts, but also new processes related to reorganizing the Eurasian region. In addition, it is necessary to overcome the positivist approach in which Latin and, consequently, Western-centric terminology imposes itself upon the subject. Moreover, it is necessary to work out a lexicon, mechanism, and culture of international relations which are appropriate to the third millennium not only for the region under consideration, but for other corners of the planet.[1]

The name “union” in Russian means bond, or a connection, in referring to a certain community. This is essentially a loan word from the Latin conjūnctiō (connection, contingency, agreement) or the Greek word Σύνδεσμος (connection, link). In considering the paths of development of these terms, we see a significant difference. The widespread English term “union” comes from the same Latin term, but only in truncated form, as the word junction has less meaning and does not reflect the idea of community. Moreover, in a political lexicon this can mean an unstable association, including certain contracts or “unions.” There are more negative interpretations of this concept, such as “junta,” which refer to the numerous coups in Latin American countries carried out by militaries. The accepted interpretation is nominally suitable for a future union, but there are also plenty of other synonyms. However, this will be only a label for forms of intergovernmental structures. What will its content be?

The question of forms of governance (or co-governance) and mechanisms for decision-making immediately arises. Will a Eurasian parliament be created or will legislative power be delegated to an inter-parliamentary assembly of the Eurasian Union? Is the form of delegation of authority according to the European parliamentary example adequate in this situation or is there the possibility of creating a structure more flexible and responsive to the interests of the peoples of the Eurasian Union? Will polycentric law or consociationalism be accepted as tools for resolving socio-political and economic issues? Will economics remain the driving force of the Eurasian locomotive or will there be deeper reasons (albeit difficult for politicians to describe in words) for geopolitical consolidation (as Aristotle said – the whole is greater than the sum of its parts)?

At the current moment, the Eurasian Economic Union practically functions in the format of the Customs Union. New elements, especially the defense factor, personnel capacity, as well as a unifying ideology, have not entered the interests of opposing national elites for subjective and objective reasons.

Ancient philosophers believed that the state is the highest form of human creativity. If this is so, then such a unification of states into a unified force with carefully selected internal and external policies, and a system of balances and counters against external threats, would be the highest form of all. But a spiritual component, an ideology, must exist above everyday political constructions. In our opinion, Ideocracy, which is characterized by a common world view and the willingness of ruling elites to serve one common idea and a regent representing “the benefit of all peoples inhabiting this special autarchical world”[2] should become the political system of governance of the Eurasian Union. Unfortunately, this thesis remains only in theory under the current nomenclature. Preparing a new elite is a relevant task today.

Fateful geography

What is Eurasia? Although Eduard Suess used this word in his fundamental work “The Face of the Earth” [3] in pointing to the arbitrariness of the boundaries between Europe and Asia, it is undoubtedly necessary to take into account first and foremost the school of classical Eurasianist thought from Petr Savitsky to Lev Gumilev, as we cannot construct the theoretical foundations for a solid political reality in a purely geographical context [4]. Taking this as a foundation, we discover that the Eurasianists used this term in an exclusionary sense. Eurasia is a special world, not the mere totality of Europe and Asia. It is worth noting that “in this they followed the Slavophile views of the linguist, ethnologist, and geographer Vladimir Lamansky, who was the first to suggest that the Old World was divided not into two but into three continents – Europe, Asia, and Russia, or the “Middle World” of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia – on the basis of geographical and linguistic data.”[5] In this case we are dealing with a melding of cultures and peoples inhabiting this space who do not “fit” into the European and Asian margins of Eurasia [6]. A similar method of apophatic geopolitics can be used to model our possible future of the Eurasian Union.

The new political configuration will not be a recreation of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. It will also not be in the likeness of the European Union, where countries are divided according to linguistic, administrative and, in some cases, currency differences, but rather will be united on the basis of political-economic administration. Due to the fact that a number of the states of our future union have their own languages, it will not be similar to Latin-American integration projects [7]. On the other hand, in this process there is not only a continuation of a common past, but also common cultural and linguistic roots which allowed the Eurasianists to speak of a linguistic union. For example, Roman Jakobson’s designation of the common space of soft correlation practically coincided with the borders of the USSR, with the exception of the Far East, where the border ran roughly along the Omolon river separating Chukotka and Kamchatka (this zone was covered by Mongolia and the northern regions of China). And Lev Gumilev pointed out the complementarity of the Turkic, Slavic, and Finno-Urgic peoples inhabiting Eurasia over the mountain ranges ranging from Hindu Kush to Tian-Shan.

In addition, the formation of the Eurasian Union entails the the opportunity to assess all the insufficiencies of previous projects, from the level of the governing system to the interests of local communities.

But, first and foremost, we should look at the Eurasian mass from a global perspective.

In their imperialist ambitions, Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians speak of the Old World and the continuity of Western European political culture while forgetting the holistic picture of the world. The geographical axis of history, as well as Middle Earth (Heartland), are located in Russia [8]. Hence the famous formula of world domination which was corrected by Nicholas Spykman, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Henry Kissinger and which, despite modification, has not lost its essence. But, as with any geographical organism, this Heartland would be incomplete without other vital elements. Thus, Kazakhstan is the soft underbelly of Eurasia offering access to the other countries of Central Asia, as to China and Russia [9], which represent Innerland, or the Inner Earth of Eurasia remote from the coastal zone (Rimland) as well as Middle Earth. In the West, Belarus and Ukraine are the logical extremity of the cultural-geographical Eurasian space ending at the border of the Carpathian mountains and the isotherm of January (according to Savitsky).It follows that Ukraine is an important link for the Eurasian Union and the bitter struggle of the US and West for this republic possesses geopolitical implications as the Eurasian Union would be incomplete without Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Eurasian Union is a bridge between West and East. Economically speaking, this is an important communication line between such political giants as the European Union and China. In connection with the expansion of the unified customs zone from the Masurian marshes in the North and the Caspian-Black Sea basin in the South on the one side to Dzungaria on the other, the possibility of creating a powerful transport corridor is already of great interest to Beijing. Thus, Petr Savitsky’s concept of the Eurasian land-sea finds its realization in the third millennium.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Ufa in 2015, the leaders of Russia and China discussed a possible synthesis of the EEU and Silk Road Economic Belt project which China began to implement in the 2013.

“The integration of these two large-scale continental, integration, transport, and logistical projects is capable of offering not only significant economic benefits, but also, without exaggerating, creating a new geopolitical reality in the space of Eurasia and generating new, maximally favorable conditions for the economic and socio-political lives and interests of the countries of the continent, thereby reducing any possible pressure on Russia and China.”[10]

Although China, as a self-sufficient civilizational actor, lies outside the classical scheme of Eurasianism (India and Pacific Asia are also “outsiders”), such cooperation is acceptable and in some cases even necessary from the perspective of neo-Eurasianism.

Beyond the framework of classical Eurasianism

The main theses for rethinking classical Eurasianism were laid after the collapse of the USSR by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, and the Russian scholar and geopolitician Alexander Dugin. They approached this issue from different sides, but their conceptions can be adequately combined and complement each other. N. Nazarbayev advocated Eurasianism from the perspective of a statist and for preserving the continuity of the Union. According to his plan, a new association was to overcome the discord inherent to the doctrines of Bolshevism, Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviet system, while simultaneously maintaining the economic ties between republics. His proposal remained unattended for many years due to a number of reasons ranging from conflicts in different republics to the erroneous orientation of the liberal-capitalist establishment imposed by the state and non-state actors such as the IMF and the World Bank. Alexander Dugin’s project of neo-Eurasianism appeared as a large-scale geopolitical doctrine reaching beyond the scope of conventional geographical borders. Carl Schmitt’s classic dichotomy of Land and Sea and division of enemies and friends automatically extended Eurasianism onto a planetary scale. [11]

Dugin noted that “Eurasianists are not only representatives of the peoples inhabiting the continent of Eurasia. Eurasianists are all those free and creative personalities who recognize the value of tradition, including the representatives of those regions which objectively remain bases of Atlanticism.”[12]

The Chinese researcher Tao Xu recently correctly noted that “the rapprochement between China and Russia is an inevitable result of the strategic pressure of the United States as well as the choice which the parties have made for the purpose of their own survival” [13]. In his publication, Xu noted that “the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are the most durable political entities on the Eurasian continent possessing a historically long-lasting civilization and sophisticated industrial and agricultural base. Interaction between China and Russia not only promotes the security and development of these two states, but also might attract the attention of other countries on the territory of Eurasia, including Iran and Pakistan, in order to disrupt the strategic plans of the USA in the region” [14]. Further continuing a regional analysis through the prism of geopolitical imperatives, Xu quite logically points out that Latin America represents an external force of the Eurasian community, while Africa represents a friendly force. He also points out that there are many supporters of Russia and China in Asia.

Thus, the formation of the Eurasian Union along with other integration processes in other parts of the world would represent a movement towards creating a multipolar (polycentric) world. The sooner that the Eurasian Union is created, the faster the states comprising it, as well as other countries contributing to shaping the new world order, will be able to get out from underneath the influence of the US by direct (hard power) or indirect (soft power) means.

It is particularly important that the creation of a synergy of Eurasian power would render it sufficiently difficult for foreign forces, and first and foremost the USA, to establish pockets of control in the form of military bases or satellite states. While the presence of Washington’s influence can still be observed in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, it is quite feasible in the near future that proper cooperation between the countries of the region will fully squeeze out the US.

It should be noted that there are two more projects associated with Russia and China: the Arctic sea route and the “Pearl necklaces” strategy. The first is a geo-economic project being realized by Russia, since a major part of the Arctic is located within its sovereign economic zone.

China successfully realized its project somewhat earlier. This “necklace” represents a kind of sequence (or chain) of codes where each “pearl” is a nexus of Chinese military presence or geopolitical influence through which Beijing is building strategic relationships and developing opportunities for establishing a presence along the lines of sea communication that connect China and the Middle East [15].

These two belts are by and large actually closing Eurasia from the North and South and, if necessary, could be integrated into a logistical naval ring.


Should we follow the German idea of autarchy (self-sufficiency) as described in the books of Johann Fichte (“closed trading space”) and Friedrich List (“national system of political economy”) in overcoming various nationalisms (Russian, Kazakh, etc.) and advancing to the level of collective economic sovereignty? Or should we stick to the concepts of Nikolai Trubetskoy and Petr Savitsky, who spoke not only of economic decisions favorable for Eurasia, but also of a universal human ideal which might be embodied in the special world of a Eurasian supranationalism? [16]

The Gesellian system of free money, or the ethical economy, which would be based on various functionals depending on regional specifics, in one way or another needs to overcome the logic of neoliberal capitalism. Recent discussion on the possibility of establishing a BRICS bank is a good start for emerging out of dependence on the speculative assets of the West.

Overall, as noted by Gregory Gleason, a doctor of political science from the US, “the creation of a single economic space throughout the territory of Eurasia is long overdue” [177].

But if this “official formula of the current integration project in the framework of the Eurasian Union means economic integration while maintaining political sovereignty and guaranteeing  collective security”[18], then in the future this should be extended to include political and social unification processes, including those on the level of public diplomacy. This would allow reaching the level of system integration and developing its own rules of the game.

As a response to the challenge of globalization, it is also necessary to: (1) stimulate production for domestic markets, (2) utilize the principle of subsidiarity, (3) defend local trade from the ravages of transnational corporations and low tariffs, (4) encourage the introduction of ecological technologies, and (5) form a type of mixed economy [19].

No matter what might be said about the smart economy and information technologies, the two pillars of production will always be food and energy. Without food, the proper functioning of any workforce is impossible, and without the energy components of a factory, plants and transport will stop. Russia and Kazakhstan are the world’s largest producers and exporters of wheat. In addition, Russia and Kazakhstan possess vast stocks of hydrocarbons and radioactive materials and have the appropriate infrastructure for processing them. The raw material component has an ambivalent character since Russia and Kazakhstan are regarded by the West as its own oil and gas appendages. But nuclear energy, despite the incident in Japan [20], will remain promising and relatively cheap for a long time to come and, in connection with this, the future creation of alternative grain (and, more broadly, agricultural) and energy exchanges will mean a new role and new status for the Eurasian Union. In this context, the accession of Russia to the WTO is assessed by many Russian politicians and experts as an error.

If we return to the post-Soviet space, we see that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are undergoing the transition from the framework of the Customs Union to the Eurasian Economic Union.

Although a decline in trade and economic relations can be seen between these countries due to the ongoing global financial crisis, alternative models are actively being developed which fit within the overall package of EEU documents and do not conflict with the norms of nation states and international law. Special attention is paid to services or, more precisely, the formation of a single market for services as a complex and multifaceted process [21]

Ethnic groups in the political processes of the Eurasian Union

What kind of approach will be developed in resolving ethnic and traditional cultural issues between the future union’s peoples will affect its success to a large extent. Based on the theory of Lev Gumilev, we will most likely be able to avoid conflicts of the Huntington type, although attempts at stirring ethnic conflicts and destabilization from without can never be excluded.

The following can be designating among non-violent methods for managing ethnic differences: (1) integration and/or assimilation, (2) hegemonic control, (3) arbitration (including a third party in the process), (4) Cantonization and/or federalization, (5) consociationalism or the separation of powers [22]. The first option was tested in Western Europe in a “humanized” version and is known under the name of multiculturalism. Its failure was recognized in 2010 by the president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Germany’s Angela Merkel. The second and third variants are absolutely unsuitable in our case. The fourth has been sufficiently studied in the example of the countries of Western Europe, and is not at all adequate for the realities of the Eurasian space. Consociationalism, which is often associated with corporatism, is more interesting since it is not based on economic principles that help to regulate class conflicts, but “on the basis of harmonizing social fragmentation along ethnic and religions lines” [23] which already exist, even in Russia. As some specialists on international law have noted, there exists a number of conditions which could render consociationalism effective. These are:

  • The segmental isolation of ethnic communities
  • A pluralistic balance of power
  • The presence of external threats common to all communities
  • Common loyalty to the state
  • The tradition of accommodating elites
  • Socio-economic equality
  • Small population size, the reduction of political pressures
  • A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties [24]

There is yet another important aspect: the crossing of boundaries which do not represent administrative lines, but rather social spaces with particular specificities. For example, if such a phenomenon is harmonized by common the Slavic ethnic particularities and Orthodox religious culture shared between Belarus and Russia, then between Russia and Kazakhstan there exist more differences not only along the line of Slavs vs. Turks or Orthodox vs. Muslims, but, for example, the presence of the Cossack element and the sharing of a common Turkic super-ethnos comprised of different parts. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of hybrid borders might turn out to have a positive effect. Historical experience shows that the intermixing of cultures contributes to the establishment of a polylogue of peoples despite their specific domestic, cultural, and ritual differences and different world views.

Critics and opponents

As regards current criticism of the idea of the Eurasian Union, there are a number of politicians and experts, mainly from the US and Western Europe, who have already called the initiative an attempt at reviving the Soviet Empire with a principal role for Moscow as the main decision-making center.

More astute analysts consider this initiative in the context of the international situation, the growing power of a number of states, and regional geopolitics. Lauren Goodrich of the Stratfor intelligence-analytical center called the plan for creating a Eurasian Union a restoration of the Russian Empire “as much as possible.” He believes that, due to unique geographical circumstances, Russia has unprotected borders and therefore has to maximize its territory and create strategic depth on its “outskirts.” Goodrich writes that “the final plan of Russia is regaining control over much of its former territories…Russia will begin this new integration of the Russian Empire by creating a union with former Soviet republics on the basis of Moscow’s current associations such as the Customs Union, the Union State, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This will allow the Eurasian Union to strategically encompass both the economic and security spheres” [26]. Nevertheless, the American expert recognized that the Eurasian Union will not be a new copy of the USSR as Moscow has taken all errors associated with control into account. Therefore. “Moscow will influence foreign policy and security, but will not be held responsible for a large proportion of the domestic affairs of each country.”

The coup in Ukraine must be assessed as an attempt not only at controlling the country, but also at weakening Eurasian integration, as the events in Ukraine provoked actions by Moscow which evoked mixed appraisals. For example, the president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has recognized the Kiev regime and even provided logistical support to Ukraine for conducting the military-punitive operation in Donbass. This caused a negative reaction on the part of Moscow.

The agenda of the day also includes the accession of Central Asian states, a prospect which has not escaped the attention of political scientists. Tajikistan is interested in joining the EEU and Uzbekistan is considered to be no less of an important figure on the Eurasian chessboard in geopolitical plans. But, there are tensions over water resources between these countries. The activity of militants in Afghanistan partially contributed to the strengthening of the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (there is a Russian military presence in Tajikistan which was recently strengthened by military transport and attack helicopters), but, nevertheless, an adequate integration of these two countries demands developing a detailed “road map.”

Be that as it may, any criticism should be thoroughly assessed. The picture is less clear when arguments “against” are sounded from US or Western European neoliberal think-tanks for whom, based on a neocolonial logic, the unifying process of Eurasia is not in their interests. If there is a rational kernel in the objections of opponents, then it is necessary to take into account these points and hold an extensive discussion. It is necessary to understand that the Eurasian Union is not a project of ruling elites, but the materialization of the aspirations of our continent’s peoples.

Strategy or strategies?

Each state has its own strategy of foreign political activity connected with national interests and values. In the example of the NATO bloc countries, we see that arguments arise often on issues of foreign policy which are connected with principles of strategic culture. The same could happen in the Eurasian Union if are attempts at synchronizing national strategies, including questions of security, are not made now.

The very project of the Eurasian Union will require a long-term strategy demanding ideological content as well as the institutionalization of a new strategic culture which should overcome ethnic, national, civill, and regional contradictions that, in previous historical stages, were causes for the escalation of conflict. Given the new international situation, they may take on new forms associated with the tactical priorities of ruling elites and external influence.

This strategy must necessarily be a Grand Strategy, since it implies not only a grand geographical scale and economic reforms in the states entering the future union, but also a strong reaction from rival countries or state blocs [27].

Although this term [Grand Strategy] originally applied to the art of war and pointed to the need for a state to make large-scale efforts in various spheres of activity during a war [28], it was reconsidered later by geopoliticians and began to be used in delineating the consolidating activities of a state and alliances with the aim of achieving certain strategic goals.

For this purpose it is necessary to tap into the syncretic potential of already existing doctrines and collective agreements. The academic pool, questions of natural determinism, the thinking of senior officials, tactical questions, and regional and intergovernmental spheres should culminate in a united, common Eurasian paradigm. It is necessary to study the general geopolitical context. As the prominent geopolitician Colin Gray said, context (from the Latin contextere) has two meanings. It can refer to that which “surrounds,” or that which now has daily relevance. At the same time, it can mean “that which weaves together” [29]. Unity is the context of the national security of the countries of the Eurasian Union and the foundations of future development. And if tactical errors in the realization of various programs can still be corrected, then a strategic error cannot be corrected. In our case, we have no right to make such a mistake as this means a loss of many future decades. So that this does not happen, the actors and founders of the Eurasian Union need to formulate the geopolitical context themselves, not under its influence.


[1] The very term “international relations” is not quite adequate as all existing schools – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – describe first and foremost relations between states, and not peoples who could be divided by state boundaries or, on the contrary, remain on the territory of one country.

[2] Trzubetzkoy, N.S. Об идее-правительнице идеократического государства.// Евразийская хроника. Выпуск XI. Paris, 1935. С. 29-37.

[3] Suess, Eduard. Hotel Das Antlitz der Erde. Vienna, 1885.

[4] Similar contractions can be observed in contemporary geopolitical debates taking place in Latin America, where representatives of the integration school of South and Central America criticize the contemporary political thought of North America on the level of terms, calling its region “Our America” (“Nuestra America”) and condemning the colonization processes of former European powers.

[5] Серио П. Структура и целостность. Об интеллектуальных истоках структурализма в Центральной и Восточной Европе. 1920-30 гг. – Мoscow: Языки славянской культуры, 2001. С. 89.

[6] However, a further and broader perspective of unification is fully possible. At the time, a number of European geopoliticians (Karl Haushofer, Jean Thiriart, Hordes von Lohausen) already proposed the project of a continental “Eurasian Empire from Dublin to Vladivostok,” and indicated the need for integrating the countries of Western Europe and the Soviet Union. More recently, the Chinese researcher Tao Zu proposed creating a Eurasian alliance of Russia and China for the joint defense of interests in opposition to the hegemonic ambitions of the US.

[7] The residents of  all countries of this continent, except Brazil, speak Spanish (in addition to native Indian Guarani, Aymara, etc.).

[8] Makkinder, H. “The Geographical Pivot of History”. Geographical Journal, 1904.

[9] Such a formulation was proposed by Z. Brzezinski in his book The Grand Chessboard.

[10] Grozin, А.V. Интеграционные проекты Пекина и Москвы для Евразии: перспективы взаимодействия // Постсоветский материк № 2 (6)/2015, С. 91.

[11] See Наш путь. Стратегические перспективы развития России в XXI веке. М.: Арктогея, 1999; Дугин А.Г. Проект «Евразия». – Moscow: Эксмо, Яуза, 2004; Дугин А.Г. Евразийский путь как национальная идея. – М.:Арктогея, 2002; Дугин А.Г. Основы геополитики. Геополитическое будущее России. – Мoscow: Арктогея, 1999.

[12] Dugin, A.G. Евразийский взгляд.// Геополитика № XIII, С. 5.

[13] Xu. Китаю и России следует создать Евразийский альянс.// Жэньминь жибао онлайн. 30/01/2012.

[14] ibid.

[15] Savin, L.V. Новая волна американской геополитики: взгляд на Китай // Институт высокого коммунитаризма,

[16] Trubetzkoy, N.S. Мысли об автаркии.//Новая эпоха. Narva, 1933. С.25-26.

[17] Paramanov, V.. Евразийская интеграция и Китай: виртуальный экспертный форум. Часть 5.// Информационно-аналитический центр. 04.12.2011.

[18] Solozobov, Y.M. Евразийский Союз: от идеи к практике.// Геополитика № XIII, С. 15-16.

[19] Savin, L.V. Глобализация во благо народов. Перспективы четвертой политической теории. Текст доклада на международной конференции «Земля, живи! От вражды к сотрудничеству цивилизаций». Moscow, 04.12.2009.

[20] It should be noted that Fukushima station is an American model. Modern Russian nuclear power stations have a high security level including in the case of natural disasters.

[21] Oshakbaev, R.S. Новые подходы к регулированию сферы торговли услугами в рамках Евразийского экономиеского союза // Союз Евразия, № 3, 2014. С. 64.

[22] John McGarry and Brendan O’leary. “The Marco-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflicts” from The Politics of Regulating Interethnic Conflicts: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts (London, Routledge: 1993) pp. 1- 40.

[23] A Hassel. Salaries, Social Pacts, and the Euro: A new role for the state (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press: 2006) pp. 281.

[24] Michael, K. Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon (Dublin, Irish Academic Press: 2006) pp 27-28.

[25] In contrast to dialogue (Greek: Διάλογος) in which the participants of an interaction are two subjects, th term “polylogue” (or “multilogue”) is used for multilateral relations.

[26] Goodrich, L. “Россия: восстановление империи по возможности”.// Геополитика № XIII, С. 35-40.

[27] Савин Л.В. Великая Стратегия для Евразийского Союза.// Геополитика № XIII, С. 26-30.

[28] See Гарт Б.Л. Стратегия непрямых действий. – Мoscow: Эксмо, 2008.

[29] Gray, Colin. Modern Strategies Chapter 5 “Strategic Culture as Context” (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1999).


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